

IAASTD GLOBAL REPORT CHAPTER 8

Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology: Investment and Economic Returns

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1 **Key Messages**

2 **1. On average investments in agricultural research and development (R&D) are still**
3 **growing but at a decreasing rate for the public sector during the 1990s. However, there**
4 **has been an increasing diversity in investment trends among countries.** Investment in
5 public agricultural R&D in many developed countries has stalled or declined and has become a
6 small proportion of total Science & Technology (S&T) spending. Many developing countries are
7 also stagnating or slipping in terms of public agricultural R&D investments, except for a selected
8 few (often the more industrialized countries). The slowing growth in agricultural R&D investment
9 in the public sector has implications for attaining the development goals. Investments by the
10 private sector in developed countries have been increasing, but have remained small in most
11 developing countries. There is a knowledge gap in other areas of AKST investments such as
12 extension, traditional knowledge, farming systems, social sciences, ecosystems services,
13 mitigation and adaptation of climate change, and health in agriculture.

14
15 **2. Funding for public agricultural R&D in developing countries is heavily reliant on**
16 **government and donor contributions, but these sources have declined.** Despite declining
17 government budgets for agriculture in general, and agricultural R&D specifically, government
18 remains the major source of funding for public agricultural R&D in most developing countries. The
19 trend indicates that donor support for agricultural R&D has substantially declined since the mid-
20 1980s with the majority of this smaller amount supporting global research rather than research at
21 the country level.

22
23 **3. The participation of nongovernmental agencies in agricultural R&D is increasing.** AKST
24 in the more developed world is increasingly undertaken by the private sector. Private sector
25 research is also growing in the developing world, but is concentrated in a few countries where the
26 private sector thinks it can make a profit. In addition, higher education agencies, NGOs,
27 foundations, and producer groups are also increasing their participation in agricultural R&D. Still,
28 publicly funded research in developing countries is mostly conducted by government-sponsored
29 agencies.

30
31 **4. There is evidence of under-investment in research in agriculture.** Rates of Return (ROR)
32 in AKST across commodities, countries and regions on average are high (40-50%) and have not
33 declined over time. They are higher than the rate at which most governments can borrow money,
34 which suggests under-investment in AKST. Although limited, evidence indicates that the
35 investments in agricultural R&D perform equally well or better than the other public sector
36 investments in the agricultural sector.

37

1 **5. Public investments in AKST have significantly contributed to overall economic growth,**
2 **but this not always has translated into poverty reduction.** Public investments in AKST have
3 in some countries significantly contributed to poverty reduction, but AKST's impact on poverty
4 varies greatly depending on the policies, institutions, and access to resources of the country.
5 Before AKST investments are made, distributional aspects should be explicitly taken into account.
6 Additional analysis is required to understand better who has benefited from this additional growth
7 and why it did not always translate into commensurate improvement of poverty and food security.
8 Likewise, agricultural price policies and trade policies influence the distributional impacts of
9 productivity-increasing technology, as do land and access patterns.

10
11 **6. Rates of return alone are not sufficient to guide AKST investment decisions.** AKST
12 investment generates economic, social, environmental, health and cultural costs and benefits to
13 society, some of which are considered as externalities (positive or negative) and spillovers. These
14 noneconomic impacts are also important to society, but often not included in conventional RoR
15 analysis due to quantification and valuation problems. The challenge is to factor these aspects
16 into the macro-level decision-making process. RoR analysis needs to be complemented by other
17 approaches to estimating impact of AKST investment on poverty reduction, ecosystem services
18 and well-being. More evidence is needed on the economic and social impact of AKST investment
19 in sectors such as forestry and fisheries, as well as in policy-oriented social science research.

20
21 **7. AKST investments could have been more effective and efficient in achieving sustainable**
22 **development goals had more attention been given to governance.** Governance is an
23 important determinant of mobilization of resources for AKST. It also plays a major role in
24 allocation of resources between different components of AKST. Increased demand for
25 effectiveness, efficiency, responsiveness to stakeholder needs, accountability and transparency
26 is a driving force leading to changes in AKST investment decisions. High transaction costs in
27 knowledge generation and transfer, inefficiency in resource allocation and utilization, lack of
28 transparency, exclusion of some stakeholders, unequal access, and fear of private monopoly
29 over technologies developed through public AKST institutions have prompted changes in AKST
30 systems. The ability to allocate resources more effectively will also depend on a significant
31 improvement in the capacity in public and private sectors to forecast and respond to
32 environmental, social, and economic changes, locally and globally. This will include the capacity
33 to make strategic technological choices, create effective public policy and regulatory frameworks,
34 and pursue educational and research initiatives.

35
36 **8. Increasing participation of nongovernmental stakeholders and more appropriate**
37 **incentive systems are required to improve the effectiveness of AKST investments.**

1 Institutional arrangements for AKST resource mobilization and allocation have, in the past, largely
2 excluded users of research information, resulting in inefficiency and ineffectiveness in AKST
3 investments. These arrangements have also resulted in unequal access to technologies. The
4 demands for enhanced stakeholder participation, improved accountability and transparency are
5 leading to institutional innovations around AKST investment governance issues. These are new
6 and unproven arrangements, so investments will be needed to carefully monitor, evaluate and
7 learn from the lessons in order to derive best practices. Investment is also required for
8 strengthening capacity in order to institutionalize such practices.

9
10 **9. More government funding and better targeted government investments in AKST in**
11 **developing countries can make major contributions to meeting development and**
12 **sustainability goals.** Developing countries need to increase the intensity of AKST investments.
13 This would involve a major increase in public sector investments, which is justified given the high
14 rates of return to research and the evidence that AKST investments can reduce poverty.
15 However, to do this, public investments must be targeted using evidence other than simply overall
16 RORs, as they usually do not include environmental and human health impacts, positive or
17 negative, or information on the distribution of costs and benefits among different groups.

18
19 **10. Major public and private research and development investments will be needed in plant**
20 **and animal pest and disease control.** Continued intensification of agricultural production,
21 changes in agriculture due to global warming, the development of pests and diseases that are
22 resistant to current methods of controlling them, and changes in demand for agricultural products,
23 will lead to new challenges for farmers and the research system. Investments in this area by the
24 public and private sector have provided high returns in the past and are likely to provide even
25 higher returns in the future. In addition, these investments could lead to less environmental
26 degradation by reducing the use of older pesticides and livestock production methods; increased
27 demand for labor, which could reduce poverty; and positively improve human health of farmers
28 and their families by reducing their exposure to pesticides. This is an area in which public and
29 private collaboration is essential.

30
31 **11. Increasing investments in agricultural research, innovation, and diffusion of**
32 **technology by for-profit firms can also make major contributions to meeting development**
33 **and sustainability goals.** Private firms (large and small) have been and will in the future
34 continue to be major suppliers of inputs and innovations to commercial and subsistence farmers.
35 They will not provide public goods or supply good and services for which there is no market, but
36 there could be spillovers from private suppliers of technology to farmers and consumers. To make
37 the best use of private investments in AKST, governments must provide regulations to guard

1 against negative externalities and monopolistic behavior, and support good environmental
2 practices, while at the same time providing firms with incentives to invest in AKST.

3

4 **12. AKST investment that increases agricultural productivity and improves existing**
5 **traditional agricultural and aquaculture systems in order to conserve scarce resources**
6 **such as land, water and biodiversity remains as a high priority; these investments can**
7 **improve livelihoods and reduce poverty and hunger.** The major resource constraint on
8 increasing agricultural production in the future will continue to be agricultural land. AKST must
9 focus on increasing output per unit of land through technology and management practices. Water
10 is the next most important resource constraint to agricultural production and is likely to become
11 more of a constraint in the future. AKST resources need to be reallocated into water-saving
12 techniques, improved policies and management techniques. Fossil fuels reserves are limited;
13 high fuel prices and environmental concerns have recently focused attention on the need for
14 agriculture to more efficiently use this resource. Government investment in AKST may be
15 necessary to reduce the dependence of the agricultural sector on petroleum.

16

17 **13. AKST investment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and provide other ecosystem**
18 **services is another priority investment area.** AKST investments are needed to develop
19 policies, technologies and management strategies that reduce agriculture's contribution to
20 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and consequent global warming. This requires the
21 development of new farming systems, which use better technologies, produce less GHG, and
22 build on local and traditional knowledge to improve current cropping systems in order to become
23 more sustainable. Investments are also needed to underpin policies such as payments for
24 environmental services to farmers, which could induce the development and adoption of practices
25 that provide stronger environmental services. Some of the agricultural technologies and policies
26 that provide these ecosystem services can be designed to use the assets of the poor, such as
27 labor in labor-abundant economies.

1 **8.1 Spending and funding trends in AKST**

2 **8.1.1. Trends in agricultural R&D spending**

3 8.1.1.1. Public sector spending

4 Worldwide, public investments in agricultural research and development (R&D) increased, in
5 inflation-adjusted terms, over the past two decades from an estimated \$15 billion in 1981 to \$23
6 billion in 2000 (in 2000 international dollars); an increase of about one-half (Table 8.1 and Figure
7 8.2).^{1 2} The share of the developing countries as a group have increased considerably over the
8 years; during the 1990s the group invested more on public agricultural R&D than the combined
9 total in the industrialized world. Investments by Asia and Pacific countries as a group grew
10 relatively resulting in an increasing share of the global total; the regional share was 33% in 2000
11 compared to only 20% in 1981. Most of this growth took place during the late-1990s. In contrast,
12 the corresponding share for sub-Saharan Africa continued to decline, falling from 8 to 6% of the
13 global total between 1981 and 2000.

14
15 Public agricultural R&D has become increasingly concentrated in just a handful of countries.
16 Among the rich countries, the United States (US) and Japan accounted for 54% of public
17 spending in 2000; about the same as two decades earlier. Three developing countries, China,
18 India, and Brazil, spent 47% of the developing world's public agricultural research total, an
19 increase from 33% in 1981. Meanwhile, only 6% of the agricultural R&D investments worldwide
20 were conducted in 80 countries that combined had a total to more than 600 million people in
21 2000.

22
23 **[Insert Table 8.1]**

24 **[Insert Figure 8.1]**

25
26 Growth in inflation-adjusted spending has slowed down since the 1970s when most regions
27 experienced high growth rates (Figure 8.2). Overall spending in the Asia and Pacific region
28 increased with an annual growth rate of 3.9% during the 1990s; lower than the regional growth in
29 the 1980s (Beintema and Stads, 2006). However the average growth rate in total spending in
30 China and India increased during the 1990s. This was in part due to an increase in total
31 agricultural R&D spending in both countries during the second half of the 1990s, which reflects

¹ Public includes government, higher education, and nonprofit.

² Unless otherwise stated, financial figures in this subchapter have been expressed in inflation adjusted 'international dollars' using the benchmark year 2000 and purchasing power parities (PPPs). PPPs are synthetic exchange rates used to reflect the purchasing power of currencies, typically comparing prices among a broader range of goods and services than conventional exchange rates. Using PPPs as conversion factors to denominate value aggregates in international dollars results in more realistic and directly comparable agricultural research spending amounts in countries than if market exchange rates are used. This is because the latter tends to underestimate the quantity of spending used in economies with relatively low prices while overestimating the quantity for those countries with high prices. This is particularly a problem when valuing something like expenditures on agricultural R&D, where normally about two-thirds of the resources are spent on local scientist and support staff salaries and not on capital or other goods and services that are normally traded internationally.

1 new government policies to revitalize public agricultural research and improve its
2 commercialization prospects. Two other regions, Latin America and the Caribbean, and West
3 Asia and North Africa, both experienced relative less growth in total spending during the 1990s
4 (2.0 and 3.3%, respectively). In contrast, the increase in total spending in sub-Saharan Africa
5 decreased in the 1990s from 1.3 to 0.8% compared to a decade earlier. An even more severe
6 drop in spending is found in many sub-Saharan African countries. In about half of the 24
7 countries for which time series data were available, the public sector spent less on agricultural
8 R&D in 2000 than 10 years earlier.

9
10 **[Insert Figure 8.2]**

11
12 Noteworthy is the decline in total agricultural R&D spending among the rich countries; during the
13 1990s total spending declined by an annual rate of 0.6%. Specifically Japan, and to a lesser
14 degree a few European countries, reduced their investments in agricultural research. Support for
15 publicly performed agricultural research among rich countries has declined over a long period in
16 time due to changes in government spending priorities and a shift toward privately performed
17 agricultural R&D. These slowdowns in agricultural R&D spending may curtail the future spillovers
18 of technologies from rich to poor countries (Pardey et al., 2006b) (8.2.7).

19
20 The allocation of resources among various lines of research is a significant policy decision and
21 takes place at different levels and, in theory (although not always in practice), follows the priorities
22 set across commodity and multidisciplinary research programs. More than one half of the full-time
23 equivalent (fte) researchers in a sample of 45 developing countries conducted crops research
24 while 15% focused on livestock and 8% on natural resources research (Table 8.2). Asia-Pacific
25 had relatively less livestock researchers (13%) than sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America (18%
26 each). Forestry, fisheries, and postharvest accounted for 4 to 6% each. The remaining 9% of the
27 research staff in the developing world conducted research in other agriculture related sciences.

28
29 For all three regions, fruits and vegetables are among the major crops being researched.
30 Unsurprisingly, rice is a relatively important crop in the Asia-Pacific region while maize has high
31 importance in Latin America.

32
33 **[Insert Table 8.2]**

34
35 The allocation of resources above does not cover the full scope of AKST, e.g., areas of
36 importance in the future may include bioenergy, climate change, transgenics, and biodiversity.
37 The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (Stern, 2007) concludes that an annual
38 investment of 1% of global GDP is required to mitigate the negative effects of climate change.

1 Although economists argue whether the figures in the Stern review are right, most agree that the
2 cost of failing to tackle climate change will so vastly outweigh the cost of succeeding that further
3 refinement of the calculations are largely irrelevant to the political and investment choices that
4 must be made now. Among these could be the creation of incentives for investment in low-carbon
5 technologies.

6
7 Some limited information on the budget levels in bioenergy R&D in OECD countries is available
8 through the International Energy Agency (IEA). Total R&D budgets for bioenergy are estimated to
9 have increased almost three-fold since 1992 to a total of \$271 million (in 2005 international
10 dollars) in 2005. Despite the increased interest in renewable energy and energy-saving
11 technological innovations to mitigate climate change, total budgets on energy R&D in OECD
12 countries, in adjusted terms, have remained flat since 1992. As a result, the share of bioenergy
13 R&D in total energy R&D investments also grew almost threefold during 1992-2005 (IEA, 2006).

14
15 In this chapter, public agricultural research includes research performed by government, higher
16 education, and nonprofit agencies. There are substantial differences among countries and
17 between regions in the structure of the public research sector (Figure 8.3). Public research in the
18 United States is done mainly in state agricultural experiment stations located primarily in colleges
19 of agriculture and in federally administered, but often regionally located, laboratories. A large
20 share of public agricultural R&D in Asia-Pacific and Latin America is conducted by government
21 agencies (about three-quarters of the total). This is similar to the government agency share in a
22 27-country sub-Saharan African total. A small, but growing proportion of public agricultural
23 research in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa is conducted by nonprofit institutions. Nonprofit
24 institutions are often managed by independent boards not directly under government control.
25 Many are closely linked to producer organizations from which they receive the large majority of
26 their funding, typically by way of taxes levied on production or exports (see 8.3.3).

27
28 **[Insert Figure 8.3]**

29 30 8.1.1.2. Private sector spending

31 Agricultural R&D investments by the private sector have grown in recent years and in the
32 industrialized world now account for more than half of the sum of the public and private research
33 investments. Although private sector performed agricultural R&D appears to have increased in
34 some developing countries, overall the role of the private sector is still small and will likely remain
35 so given weak funding incentives for private research. In addition, many of the private sector R&D
36 activities in developing countries focus solely on the provision of input technologies or

1 technological services for agricultural production with most of these technologies produced in the
2 industrialized world.

3

4 **[Insert Box 8.1]**

5

6 Private sector share of total agricultural research investments are estimated at 37% (Table 8.3).
7 Most of which was performed in the industrialized countries (94%) where they spent on average
8 more on agricultural research than the public sector. In contrast, only 8% of total spending in the
9 developing world was conducted by private firms with the remaining 92% by public agencies. In
10 the developing world, private sector involvement in agricultural research was relatively higher in
11 the Asia and Pacific region with an average of 11% in 2000 (Pardey et al., 2006a)

12

13 **[Insert Table 8.3]**

14

15 Private sector involvement in agricultural R&D in OECD countries differs from one country to
16 another. In 2000, more than 80% of total agricultural R&D spending in Belgium, Sweden, and
17 Switzerland was done by the private sector. In contrast, private sector shares were below 25% in
18 Australia, Austria, Iceland, and Portugal that same year. Private and public sectors are involved in
19 different types of research. In 1993 only 12% of the private research in five industrialized
20 countries (Australia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, UK, and the US) focused on farm-oriented
21 technologies compared to 80% in the public sector. Food and other postharvest accounted for 30
22 to 90% of agricultural R&D investments in Australia, Japan, the Netherlands, and New Zealand.
23 Chemical research accounted for 40 and 75% of private research in the UK and US, but was less
24 important in Australia, and almost negligent in New Zealand (Alston et al., 1999).

25

26 A survey of seven Asian countries during the mid-1990s showed that the share of private
27 investments had grown in three countries (China, India, and Indonesia) even more than the
28 increases in public sector investments (Pray and Fuglie, 2001). However, this growth was uneven
29 across subsectors. Total investments in the agricultural chemical industry in Asia, which includes
30 mostly pest control chemicals and, to a lesser extent, fertilizer and biotechnology, tripled during
31 mid-1980s and mid-1990s. Private spending on livestock research also grew considerably, but
32 growth was substantially slower in other subsectors such as plantation crops and machinery.
33 Both locally-owned and multinational firms played similar important roles in agricultural R&D.
34 Multinational firms accounted for an average of 45% of total private research spending in the
35 seven Asian countries, but with substantial differences among countries. Almost all research in
36 China by truly private firms (rather than government-owned, commercial firms) was by
37 multinational firms in the mid-1990s while in Malaysia only 10% of private sector investment from

1 multinationals. Foreign firms were concentrated in the agricultural chemical and livestock
2 subsectors; i.e., those with the highest growth rates (Pray and Fuglie, 2001).

3
4 In SSA, only 2% of total agricultural R&D is conducted by the private sector.³ Almost two-thirds of
5 the region's private research was done in South Africa. Most firms in SSA have few research staff
6 with low total spending and they focus on crop improvement research, often export crops
7 (Beintema and Stads, 2006).⁴ Similarly as in the Asian region, multinationals and locally owned
8 companies play a similarly important role. Given the tenuous market realities facing much of
9 African agriculture, it is unrealistic to expect marked and rapid development of locally conducted
10 private R&D. Yet there may be substantial potential for tapping into private agricultural R&D done
11 elsewhere through creative public-private joint venture arrangements (Osgood, 2006).

12
13 In 2000, total investments in all sciences conducted by the public and private sectors combined
14 were over \$700 billion (in 2000 international prices) (Table 8.4). The regional shares in the global
15 total differ substantially from the shares in agricultural R&D spending. Industrialized countries
16 combined accounted for about 80% of total science and technology (S&T) spending while SSA's
17 share was less than one percent. There are also considerable differences in the shares of public
18 and private agricultural R&D spending in total S&T spending. Agricultural R&D spending in SSA
19 accounted for more than one-third of the region's total science spending while in the other regions
20 in the developing world these shares were considerably lower (9 to 12%). In the industrialized
21 world spending in agricultural R&D was only 4% of the total S&T investments.

22
23 **[Insert Table 8.4]**

24 25 8.1.1.3. Intensity of research

26 In order to place a country's agricultural R&D efforts in an internationally comparable context,
27 measures other than absolute levels of expenditures and numbers of researchers are needed,
28 e.g., the intensity of investments in agricultural research. The most common research intensity
29 indicator is a measure of total public agricultural R&D spending as a percentage of agricultural
30 output (AgGDP).⁵ The industrialized countries as a group spent \$2.36 on public agricultural R&D
31 for every \$100 of agricultural output in 2000, a large increase over the \$1.41 they spent per \$100
32 of output two decades earlier, but slightly down from the 1991 estimate of \$2.38 (Figure 8.4). This

³ The private sector does, however, play a stronger role in funding agricultural research, as opposed to performing research itself. Many private companies contract government and higher-education agencies to perform research on their behalf.

⁴ Examples are cotton in Zambia and Madagascar and sugar cane in Sudan and Uganda.

⁵ Some exclude for-profit private agricultural research expenditures when forming this ratio, presuming that such spending is directed toward input and postharvest activities that are not reflected in AgGDP. For reasons of consistency with these other studies, we excluded national and multinational private companies (but not nonprofit institutions) from the calculated intensity ratios.

1 longer-run increase in research intensity is in stark contrast to the group of developing countries;
2 this group has seen no measurable growth in the intensity of agricultural research since 1981. In
3 2000, the developing world spent just 53 cents on agricultural R&D for every \$100 of agricultural
4 output. Agricultural output grew much faster in the developing countries as a group than in the
5 industrialized countries. As a result, intensity ratios remained fairly stable for the developing
6 regions as a group despite overall higher growth rates in agricultural R&D spending in the
7 developing countries, and the intensity gap between rich and poor countries has widened over
8 the years. More than half of the industrialized countries for which data exists have higher
9 research intensity ratios in 2000 than they did in 1981 (and the majority of them spent in excess
10 of \$2.50 on public agricultural R&D for every \$100 of AgGDP). Most countries in our Asian and
11 Latin American sample (9 out of 11 Asian countries and 8 out of 11 Latin American countries)
12 increased their intensity ratios over the 1981-2000. Only 6 of the 26 countries in SSA had higher
13 intensity in 2000 compared to two decades earlier.

14

15 **[Insert Figure 8.4]**

16

17 The large and growing gap between developing and industrialized countries as groups is even
18 larger in terms of total, i.e., public and private, agricultural research spending (Figure 8.5). In
19 2000, the intensity of total spending was nine times higher in rich countries than in poor ones; and
20 four times higher than when only public research spending is used as the basis of the intensity
21 calculation.

22

23 **[Insert Figure 8.5]**

24

25 Other research intensity ratios can be calculated as well. The industrialized countries as a group
26 spent \$692 on public agricultural research per agricultural worker in 2000, more than double the
27 corresponding 1981 ratio (Table 8.5). The developing countries as a group spent just \$10 per
28 agricultural worker in 2000, substantially less than double the 1981 figure. These differences are
29 not too surprising considering that a much smaller share of the workforce in industrialized
30 countries is employed in agriculture, and the absolute number of agricultural workers declined
31 more rapidly in these countries than it did in the developing countries.

32

33 Expressing agricultural R&D spending per capita gives a different trend than the other two
34 intensity calculations. Spending per capita for the industrialized countries as a group increased
35 substantially from 1981 to 1991, but has declined since then. About half of the rich countries
36 experienced declining levels of spending per capita; Japan most severely due to the sharp
37 decline in agricultural R&D spending in that country during the 1990s. Spending per capita levels
38 are much lower for the developing countries. Most countries, especially those in Africa, spent less

1 than \$3 per capita in 2000; while 59% of the industrialized countries invested more than \$10 per
2 capita in 2000. In contrast to the group of rich countries, agricultural R&D spending per capita for
3 the developing countries as a group continued to increase from \$2.12 per capita in 1981 to \$2.72
4 in 2000. The exception is SSA where spending per capita has declined during the 1981-2000
5 period.

6
7 **[Insert Table 8.5]**

8 9 8.1.1.4. International agricultural R&D

10 International agricultural research efforts began in the middle of the 20th century when the Ford
11 and Rockefeller Foundations placed agricultural staff in developing countries to collaborate with
12 national scientists. These efforts evolved into the establishment of four international organizations
13 during the 1960s. In 1971 these centers formed the basis for the Consultative Group on
14 International Agricultural Research (CGIAR or CG). Currently there exist 15 centers (see Chapter
15 2.2.4 for a detailed historical overview), with a total budget of US \$415 million in 2004—US \$384
16 million in 2000 prices. Although the CG system has played an important role in the Green
17 Revolution, it only spends a small part of total of the global agricultural R&D investment. In 2000,
18 the CG represented 1.6% of the US \$23 billion global public sector investment in agricultural R&D
19 (from 0.8% in 1981); 2.9% when spending by the rich countries is excluded (Pardey et al.,
20 2006b).

21
22 After an initial expenditure of US \$7 million in 1960, total spending rose to US \$13 million per year
23 in 1965, in inflation-adjusted terms. By 1970, the four founding centers (IRRI, CIMMYT, IITA, and
24 CIAT) were allocated a total of US \$15 million annually. During the next decade, the total number
25 of centers increased to twelve, and the funding per center increased. This led to a tenfold
26 increase in nominal spending to US \$141 million in 1980. During the 1980s, spending continued
27 to grow, more than doubling in nominal terms to reach US \$305 million in 1990. The rate of
28 growth had slowed but was still substantial. In the 1990s, however, although the number of
29 centers still grew, funding did not grow enough to maintain the level of spending per center and
30 growth rates declined. Since 2000, funding has grown in total but with a continuing trend toward
31 earmarked support for specific projects and programs of research involving multiple centers and
32 other research providers outside the CG. In 1980, the share of the four founding centers of total
33 CG spending was 54%, but by 2004 it had slipped to only 36% (Pardey et al., 2006b).

34 35 **8.1.2. Determinants of public and private R&D investments**

36 A conceptual model of the factors that influence these investments is needed to make a critical
37 assessment of research investments trends.

38

1 8.1.2.1. Determinants of public research

2 In the absence of public intervention, private firms will under-invest in research when the output of
3 that research has the characteristics of a public good—that is, the outputs of research are often
4 non-rival and non-excludable. Because of the public goods nature of research, the social benefits
5 are much higher than the private benefits, and hence the justification for public intervention. While
6 many public investments have high social benefits, public investment will only be justified if the
7 return is higher than other forms of public investment. A review of the RORs to research (see 8.2)
8 shows that public investments do have high payoffs, often 40 to 50% or more. Considering that
9 private companies and governments usually can obtain credit at interest rates below 10% and the
10 public RORs on other types of government investments are considerably lower than 40%, these
11 returns are very high.

12

13 Whereas studies that show high social RORs to research investments may convince economists
14 that agricultural research is a good investment, most policy makers who actually do not appear to
15 have been sufficiently convinced that these high social RORs warrant large investments. Rather,
16 public investments in agricultural research respond to many of the same forces that influence the
17 amount and direction of private research (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985).

18

19 Public agricultural R&D increases when there are advances in basic knowledge and technology in
20 fields such as biology, chemistry, engineering, and information technology that increase the
21 possibility of an innovation or reduce the cost of developing an innovation. This is referred to as
22 an increase in technological opportunity. The discovery of dwarfing genes in rice and wheat
23 created the opportunity for plant breeders around the world to produce many new types of
24 varieties that would respond to higher doses of nutrients and water. These opportunities
25 increased the potential return to research and led to major increases in public sector plant
26 breeding research around the world. Likewise, the tools of biotechnology have created a major
27 shift in the innovation possibility curve for plant and animal breeding, pest control, and abiotic
28 stress tolerance, and many governments have again responded by increasing their investments
29 in research (Box 8.1).

30

31 Changes in the demand for agricultural products by farmers and consumers induced public R&D
32 investments (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985). Historically in Asia, population and per capita income
33 increases increased the demand for basic food grains such as rice; farmers were unable to
34 increase production rapidly due to limited land and agricultural prices increased. Private firms did
35 not attempt research to fulfill this demand because profits were projected to be insufficient. When
36 farmers and consumers were sufficiently well organized and demanded a solution, Asian
37 governments invested in agricultural research. For example, following World War I Japan had

1 very high rice prices and consumers demanded cheaper food, but Japanese farmers had no land
2 for expansion. The government responded by investing in research that eventually led to nutrient-
3 responsive rice varieties; this resulted in biological technologies and inexpensive fertilizers
4 increased yields per unit of land. In the late 1950s, national governments, nonprofit foundations,
5 and aid donors responded in a similar manner to the food crisis and high food prices caused by
6 rapid population growth in other Asian countries and invested in the international agricultural
7 research centers and the national agricultural research systems.

8
9 Demand for solutions to specific problems, such as a new disease or pest or the shortage of a
10 key input (such as the aforementioned land shortages in Asia and resulting development of land-
11 saving technologies), also lead to public sector research investments and can direct the allocation
12 of investments. The worldwide public sector response to Avian Influenza is a current example. .
13 There are also demands that receive insufficient investments, for example, research on diseases
14 such as malaria or investment in appropriate agricultural technologies for poor people. Whether
15 these factors will actually lead to more or less R&D investments by governments depends on the
16 structure of the government, its ability to raise money, and the power of various interest groups to
17 influence government spending decisions.

18
19 Some governments are more committed to R&D as a major tool for economically sustainable
20 development. They will put a larger share of their budget into research of all types including
21 agriculture (Anderson, 1994). The structure of the research system will also influence the size
22 and direction of agricultural research (Morris and Ekasingh, 2002). Some governments have
23 structured their R&D system to be more responsive to the demands of the agricultural sector
24 while others are more responsive to demands of the food consumers, agricultural scientists, or
25 foreign aid donors. The size and power of different interest groups can also have a major impact
26 on the size and direction of agricultural R&D. Commercial farmers can push their governments for
27 large investments in research that is likely to concentrate on reducing costs crop production or
28 increasing demand. If the textile industry is strong, research will be focused on bringing down the
29 cost of cotton. Strong consumer lobbies are likely to lead to research that lower food prices. In
30 countries where private research on topics such as maize breeding or poultry breeding become
31 strong, the companies that are doing this research will lobby for government to stop competing
32 with them in the applied research of the development of new varieties and to move upstream to
33 work on things like germplasm enhancement (Pray and Dina Umali-Deiningner, 1998; Pray, 2002).

34 35 8.1.2.2. Determinants of private research

36 For private firms agricultural R&D is an investment that they hope will increase their profits. The
37 returns to private research improve in the presence of sizable expected demand for the research

1 products, the availability of exclusion mechanisms to appropriate part of the benefits from the new
2 product or process, favorable market structure, and a favorable business environment that
3 permits efficient operations (Pray and Echeverría, 1991). The profitability of private research also
4 depends on technological opportunities (Pray et al., 2007).

5
6 Potential demand for inputs and consumer products developed through research, and thus
7 market size, varies among regions depending on the size of the population, the purchasing power
8 of the prospective buyers, local agroclimatic conditions, and sectoral and macroeconomic policies
9 that influence input and output prices. In 2000, for example, the size of the global crop protection
10 market was estimated to be US \$28 billion (Syngenta, 2004), and consequently the first
11 generation of biotechnology traits were designed to capture a portion of this market by either
12 substituting for, or enhancing the productivity of, existing chemicals. Firms introduced these traits
13 into crops with large markets, thereby enhancing their ability to extract rents.

14
15 Changes in the incentive environment affect the demand for research services and the speed at
16 which countries can adopt new agricultural innovations. Macroeconomic and sectoral policies
17 alter the relative profitability of agricultural activities which in turn affect the expected profitability
18 of adopting different agricultural innovations, as well as the capacity of different segments of the
19 farm community to acquire the new technologies (Anderson 1993). The effectiveness of
20 agricultural support services delivery (public and private), in particular agricultural extension, and
21 rural infrastructure (roads, markets, irrigation) will also have a major influence on the types and
22 range of technologies introduced and the speed of adoption. Bilateral and multilateral trade
23 agreements and phytosanitary legislation reshape trading rules and influence market access and
24 thus potential market size (Spielman and von Grebmer, 2004).

25
26 Government policies that affect the local business environment directly influence the returns to
27 private research. Examples of such policies are government marketing of inputs that reduce the
28 market share of private firms and licensing and investment regulations that favor smaller firms
29 over larger firms (Pray and Ramaswami, 2001).

30
31 Appropriability is an important precondition for private for-profit firms to participate in agricultural
32 research. If firms can not capture (appropriate) some of the social benefits of their research, they
33 cannot make profits on their research investments and will stop investing (Byerlee and Fischer,
34 2002). To capture some of the benefits from the innovation, the innovating firm must be able to
35 prevent imitators from using the innovation. The ability to do this is a function of the
36 characteristics of the technology, the laws on intellectual property and their enforcement, the
37 structure of the industry that is producing the technology and the industry that is using it. The

1 legal means of protection against unauthorized use include patents, plant breeder's rights,
2 contracts, and trademarks. They also control their use by keeping inventions or key parts of their
3 inventions secret, which in some countries is protected by trade secrecy law. These legal means
4 tend to give limited protection in developing countries (Pray et al., 2007).

5
6 Inventors can also protect their inventions by biological means such as putting new
7 characteristics into hybrid cultivars or including other technical means to prevent copying. In the
8 case of hybrids the seeds will yield 15 to 20% less. This is usually sufficient incentive for farmers
9 to purchase new seeds each year. In the case of genetic use restriction techniques some of the
10 proposed techniques (none are in commercial use yet) would use genetically engineered crops,
11 which would produce sterile seed unless the seed had been treated with a specific chemical.
12 The degree of appropriability achieved is a function of the strength of intellectual property laws,
13 and other factors causing farmers to prefer to purchase a technology, the degree to which
14 government agencies can enforce the law which exist, the structure of industry that reduces the
15 cost of enforcing IPRs, and the technical capacity of firms to balance the value they can charge
16 farmers for their products, which ultimately depends on the farmers receiving more value than
17 they pay for, protect their varieties through the use of hybrids (Pray et al., 2007).

18
19 Private research investments are also determined by the potential costs of the agricultural
20 research program and the associated risks (Pray and Echeverria, 1991). The cost of research is
21 the combination of quantity and price of research inputs, the number of years needed to develop
22 a new technology, and available knowledge in the area of science. Such costs decrease with the
23 supply of research inputs, the presence of a favorable business environment, the stock of existing
24 knowledge and technology, and available human capital for conducting research activity.
25 Research costs increase in the presence of anti-competitive markets or when firms have to meet
26 certain regulatory requirements.

27
28 The supply of research inputs and thus their price depends on the availability and accessibility of
29 research tools and knowledge, many of which are produced by the public sector. For example,
30 private breeders, to add desirable traits to new private varieties, may use improved populations of
31 crop germplasm developed by public research programs as parent material. The advances in
32 biotechnology knowledge have led to a significant increase in private investment in agricultural
33 research in the United States and Europe over the past two decades. Greater private sector R&D
34 implies that the marginal cost of applied agricultural research will decline as firms take advantage
35 of economies of scale and scope. However, the concentration of key research inputs amongst a
36 few firms raises the possibility that the cost of conducting research for those who do not have
37 access to such technologies will increase (Pray et al., 2007).

1

2 The domestic supply and quality of human capital, a key input to the research activity, influences
3 the level of research investments. In the Philippines, the availability and low cost of hiring local
4 well-trained research personnel encouraged some multinational firms to transfer their research
5 programs to teams of Filipino scientists (Pray, 1987). The domestic supply of skilled personnel is
6 heavily dependent on the level and composition of public and private expenditures on education.
7 Several aspects of the business environment affect the level and productivity of research costs.
8 Industrial policy can influence the degree of market concentration, the intensity of competition,
9 and the prices of research inputs and outputs. Various government incentive programs, such as
10 government contracts for new products and processes, grants and concessional loans, technical
11 information services, and tax incentives, reduce research costs. Indirectly, the development of
12 capital markets makes it easier for firms to raise funds for research (for example, venture capital).
13 Bilateral and multilateral agreements also improve trade opportunities by facilitating access to
14 intermediate technologies.

15

16 Regulation such as product quality standards, quality testing regulations and seed certification
17 procedures can greatly increase the costs of commercializing research output and they can delay
18 the adoption to new technology which reduces the incentive to innovate and reduces the benefits
19 to farmers. Regulations that have been put in place in many countries to ensure that products
20 developed using biotechnology are environmentally benign and safe for human consumption are
21 necessary to gain consumer acceptance, but they have greatly increased the cost of developing
22 and releasing transgenic plant varieties. For example, one seed company spent US \$1.6 to 1.8
23 million to obtain regulatory approval for Bt cotton in India. This is more than the annual research
24 budgets of most Indian seed companies. As a result, only the largest companies can afford to
25 attempt to commercialize genetically modified crops (Pray et al., 2005). Bangladeshi regulations
26 that required irrigation pumps and diesel engine meet efficiency standards of wealthy countries
27 delayed the commercialization of inexpensive Chinese irrigation equipment and slowed the
28 spread of high yielding rice varieties by 5 to 10 years (Gisselquist et al., 2002)

29

30 **8.1.3. Investments in other AKST components**

31 Investment data for other AKTS components, such as education and mainstreaming traditional
32 knowledge, are difficult to obtain.

33

34 Due to the public good attributes of extension services, it not surprising that the great majority of
35 official extension workers worldwide are publicly-funded and most extension is delivered by civil
36 servants. Universities, autonomous public organizations, and NGOs deliver perhaps 10% of
37 extension services, and the private sector may deliver another 5% (Anderson and Feder, 2003).

1

2 The structure and function of national extension systems continue to change, particularly as the
3 level and source of funding,—especially public funding, changes across different countries. In
4 many countries, there is a continuing effort to shift the cost of extension to farmers, although
5 these different approaches to privatizing extension or to increase cost recovery by public
6 extension systems have met with different levels of success (Anderson, 2007), private sector
7 involvement remains small..

8

9 Given the numbers of extension personnel and the likely costs incurred in the different country
10 contexts, agricultural extension investment is of the same order of magnitude (although likely
11 lower) as the agricultural research world presented in expenditure terms (Table 8.1); so it is
12 surprising that it has been subject to relatively little critical data collection and analysis. In
13 contrasting differences between developing and more industrialized countries, one feature is the
14 even more extreme differentiation between public and private entities; however, the situation is
15 not fully clear (World Bank, 2006; Anderson, 2007).

16

17 **8.1.4. Funding agricultural R&D in developing countries**

18 Although various new funding sources and mechanisms for agricultural research have emerged
19 in recent decades (see 8.3), the government remains the principal source of funding for many
20 developing countries. For example, the principal agricultural research agencies in the largest
21 countries (in terms of agricultural R&D investments) such as Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Nigeria,
22 and South Africa are still mostly funded by the government. In contrast, the principal agencies in
23 a number of countries have been able to diversify their sources of support through contract
24 research (for example, Chile and Cote d'Ivoire) or a commodity tax on agricultural production or
25 export (for example, Uruguay, Malaysia, Colombia) (ASTI, 2007).

26

27 Bilateral and multilateral funding has been an important source for agricultural R&D for many
28 countries. Since 1970, both multilateral and bilateral assistance grew in real terms, but began to
29 decline after the early 1990s to only US \$51.2 billion by 2001. In recent years, ODA has
30 increased again (Table 8.7). After several decades of strong support, international funding for
31 agriculture and agricultural research began to decline around the mid-1980s. This decrease is
32 mostly related to the significant increase in the share of ODA spent on social infrastructure and
33 services (FAO, 2005a). Data on the sectoral orientation of aid are available for bilateral funds
34 only. The agricultural component of bilateral assistance grew steadily and accounted for 16% in
35 1985, declining thereafter to 4% in 2003. Regionally the largest proportional reductions in
36 assistance occurred in Asia. ODA to agriculture halved in SSA and decreased by 83% in South
37 and Central Asia during the period 1980-2002 (FAO, 2005a).

1

2 **[Insert Table 8.6]**

3

4 Data on aggregate trends of donor funding for agriculture and agricultural research are
5 unavailable, but information on agricultural R&D grants and loans from the World Bank and the
6 United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is accessible. The amount of
7 funding that USAID directed toward agricultural research conducted by national agencies in less-
8 industrialized countries declined by 75% in inflation-adjusted terms from the mid-1980s to 2004.
9 Again, Asian countries experienced the largest losses, but funding to Africa and LAC was also cut
10 severely (Pardey et al., 2006a). Over the past two decades, World Bank lending to the rural
11 sector has been erratic, but after adjusting for inflation, the general trend has been downward as
12 well. The exception is the large amount of lending in 1998, which resulted mostly from loans with
13 large research components approved for India, China, and Ethiopia (Pardey et al., 2006a).

14

15 There appears to be no single cause for the decline to the donor support for agriculture
16 between 1980-2003, although the following factors could have contributed (Morrison et al., 2004):

17

- 18 • Loss in donor confidence in agriculture;
- 19 • Perceived high transaction costs and complexities in agricultural investments;
- 20 • Changes in definitions in aid statistics;
- 21 • Weaker demand for assistance to agriculture from many developing country governments;
- 22 • Changes in development policy and approaches to more market led approaches;
- 23 • Shifting emphasis towards the education and health sectors;
- 24 • Changes in aid modalities, such as the movement away from the green revolution
25 technologies of the 1960s to 1980s and the integrated rural development projects of the
26 1980s and 1990s, to the current sector wide approaches and support to poverty reduction
strategies (Eicher, 2003).

27

28 However, science and the use of new ideas have been acknowledged by many as being
29 important in delivering the MDGs and there has been renewed interest by the donor community
30 on the role of agriculture in promoting economic growth and poverty reduction. In addition, a
31 number of new funding sources such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation have become
32 available.

33

34 A number of developing countries, especially in SSA, have become increasingly dependent on
35 donor funding. Although the share of donor contributions in total funding for SSA agricultural R&D
36 has declined slightly in the later half of the 1990s (Figure 8.6). These declines resulted in part
37 from the termination of a large number of World Bank projects in support of agricultural R&D or

1 the agricultural sector at large. Donor contributions (including World Bank loans) accounted for an
2 average of 35% of funding to principal agricultural research agencies in 2000. Five years earlier,
3 close to half the funding of the 20 countries for which time series data were available was derived
4 from donor contributions. These regional averages mask great variation among countries. In
5 2000, donor funding accounted for more than half of the agricultural R&D funding in 7 of the 23
6 sample countries. Eritrea, in particular, was highly dependent on donor contributions. In contrast,
7 donor funding was virtually insignificant in Botswana, Malawi, Mauritius, and Sudan (under 5%)
8 (Beintema and Stads, 2006).

9
10 **[Insert Figure 8.6]**

11
12 Since the International Conference on Financing for Development convened in Monterrey 2002,
13 the share of aid to least developed countries in donor gross national income (GNI) has increased
14 to 0.08%, and longer term commitments to reach 0.7% have been made by donors but it is still
15 short of the target, and the level of the external assistance to agriculture has remained
16 unchanged (FAO, 2005a). However the situation continues to change.

17
18 To improve upon past efforts to achieve food security, the New Partnership for Africa's
19 Development (NEPAD) has developed the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development
20 Programme (CAADP). In line with CAADP's goal of improving agricultural productivity with an
21 average of 6 percent per year, is the recommendation to double the region's intensity in
22 agricultural research by 2015 (IAC, 2005). Doubling Africa's agricultural research intensity ratio
23 from 0.7% in 2000 to about 1.5% by 2015 would require an average annual growth rate in
24 agricultural R&D spending of 10% (Beintema and Stads, 2006). This goal seems unlikely
25 considering that growth in Africa's R&D spending averaged 1% per year during the 1990s as
26 reported earlier. There is no evidence that governments and donor organizations have
27 substantially increased their funding to agricultural research since the late 1990s and it is unlikely
28 that the high level of donor support will continue indefinitely.

29
30 **8.2 Impacts of AKST Investments**

31 The purpose of undertaking and impact assessment of agricultural AKST depends on when the
32 assessment is done in relation to the project cycle. It can be undertaken before initiating the
33 research (ex-ante) or after completion of the research activity (ex-post). Ex-ante impact studies
34 (proactive) can indicate the potential benefits from research and, therefore, assist managers in
35 planning, priority setting and, consequently, in allocating scarce resources. They can also provide
36 a framework for gathering information to carry out an effective ex-post evaluation. Ex-post studies
37 (reactive) can demonstrate the impacts of past investments in achieving the broader social and
38 economic benefits. Most commonly, ex-post impact assessments are carried out because

1 decision makers and research managers usually require them as a pre-condition for support.
2 They are undertaken to (i) help managers by providing better and more convincing advice on
3 strategic decisions about future AKST investment; (ii) make scientists and researchers aware of
4 the broader implications, if any, of their research; (iii) Identify weak links in the research to affect
5 pathways; and (iv) better inform managers on the complementarities and tradeoffs between
6 different activities within a research program (Maredia et al., 2001).

7

8 **8.2.1. Conceptual framework**

9 AKST investments generate different outputs including technologies of various types,
10 management tools and practices, information, and improved human resources. In the literature
11 the term impact is used in many different ways (DANIDA, 1994; Cracknell, 1996; Pingali, 2001).
12 In this chapter we refer to impact of AKST investment as the broad long-term economic, social
13 and environmental effects (SPIA, 2001). Impact assessment is a process of measuring whether a
14 research program has produced its intended effects, such as increase in production and/or
15 income, improvement in the sustainability of production systems (Anderson and Herdt, 1990) or
16 improvements in livelihood strategies. In any comprehensive impact assessment, it is necessary
17 to differentiate between the research results (outputs) and the contribution of research to
18 development efforts (outcomes) and both aspects should be addressed simultaneously. A
19 conceptual framework for assessing impacts (Figure 8.7) incorporates the multifaceted
20 consequences of AKST investment in terms of both institutional and developmental impacts
21 including spillover effects. This framework recognizes the multiple impacts of AKST investments
22 and the need for multi-criteria analysis as well as RORs earned by such investments.

23

24 A comprehensive impact assessment requires multiple techniques using both qualitative and
25 quantitative assessment. This means that not all impacts associated with AKST investment can
26 be quantified and valued in monetary terms, although new techniques are emerging that could
27 complement ROR measures especially in valuing social and environmental consequences
28 (Anandajayasekeram et al., 2007). There are also concerns about exclusively reliance on ROR
29 for decision making. The portfolio approach considers the internal rates of return across projects
30 rather than considering them in isolation and aims to maximize the expected returns to the entire
31 AKST investment. Despite its shortcomings the ROR to investment is the most commonly used
32 measure to compare the relative performance of investments and a frequently used measure of
33 research efficiency. Most literature on impact assessment of AKST investment is largely based on
34 RORs and these studies are assessed in the following sections (Anandajayasekeram et al. 2007;
35 Alston et al., 2000a).

36

37 **[Figure 8.7]**

1

2 **8.2.2. Economic impact assessment**

3 Economic impact measures economic benefits produced by an AKST project or program and
4 relates these benefits with the economic costs associated with the same project or program. This
5 information is used to compute measures like benefit-cost ratio, internal rate of return (IRR) and
6 net present value of benefits (NPV). Economic impact evaluations are intended to measure
7 whether a project or program actually had (or expected to have) an economic impact and
8 compare this impact with project or program costs. They do not measure whether it was designed
9 or managed and executed optimally (Evenson, 2001). An AKST program may have other relevant
10 impacts, such as social (poverty reduction, enhanced nutrition, equity) and environmental effects;
11 and benefits of the research may be distributed in different ways. Some nonmarket impacts such
12 as environmental or health effects of AKST could potentially be given economic value and
13 incorporated into economic analysis. Measurement in these cases is, however, usually more
14 difficult than the measurement of economic impacts that are observable in product or input
15 markets. These attributes should be accounted for in some way, even if economic values cannot
16 be ascertained, when a more realistic evaluation of research impacts is required. In any
17 meaningful empirical analysis, a multi-criteria approach is recommended to assess the impact of
18 AKST assessment.

19

20 The literature on economic impact studies includes a wide range of levels of impact analysis. The
21 economic basis for government involvement in agricultural AKST is the perception of market
22 failure leading to private underinvestment (Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962; Alston and Pardey, 1998).
23 The appropriate criterion for the assessment of policy aiming to correct market failure is the effect
24 on net social benefits, and this can be expressed as a social rate of return (ROR) to public
25 investment in agricultural AKST (Alston et al., 2000a).⁶

26

27 **8.2.3. Methodological limitations of impact measurements**

28 Although there have been significant developments in impact assessment methodologies a
29 number of issues still need further attention. Key among these are the issues of attribution,
30 incrementality, causality, defining counterfactual situations, and estimating economic impacts for
31 organizational and institutional innovation and social science and policy research. The issue of
32 counterfactual situations refers to the significant problem of determining what the pattern of
33 productivity growth would have been in the absence of a particular research investment (Alston
34 and Pardey, 2001). This is associated with dynamics of productivity factors even in the absence
35 of AKST investment. AKST programs operate in environments in which ordinary or 'natural'

⁶ In the literature the terms financial, economic and social rates of returns mean different things, but in this chapter the term economic rate of return and social rates of return are used interchangeably. This is because the various meta-analyses do not explicitly make this distinction.

1 sequences of events influence outcomes. Impact assessment and ROR estimates must arrive at
2 estimates of net intervention effects, i.e. they should measure the changes attributable to the
3 intervention.

4
5 Causality is another issue that merits attention. In measuring the impacts of AKST investments, it
6 is important to ensure that the impacts measured are the results of the technologies and activities
7 undertaken within the program/project. However, as one moves from the direct product/output to
8 broader economic, social and environmental effects, the chain of causal events is too long and
9 complex, and the variables affecting ultimate outcomes are too numerous to permit the
10 identification and measurement of impacts of specific interventions (Biggs, 1990; Rossi and
11 Freeman, 1993). This is further complicated by the time lag between initial investment and
12 reaping its return.

13
14 Attribution problems arise when one believes or is trying to claim that a program has resulted in
15 certain outcomes, and there are alternative plausible explanations. Relating an impact indicator
16 with a specific research investment is only valid in the absence of other effects on indicators,
17 such as markets and policies (Ekboir, 2003). In addition, many ROR estimates often fail to
18 account for the effects of work done by others in the research development continuum. Temporal
19 aspects of the attribution problem would result when assuming a specific time lag between
20 research results and their implementation. At times, the period over which research affects
21 productivity may be overestimated. A number of strategies can be used to address attribution,
22 called contribution analysis (Mayne, 1999), which may enhance the validity of the estimates, but
23 do not eliminate the problem.

24
25 In many estimates the spill-over effects are not usually included as benefits (see 8.2.7). In others,
26 the effects resulting from changes in rural employment, health and education policies and
27 programs are excluded. Environmental impacts, both negative and positive, are often ignored
28 (see 8.2.5) as well as those costs arising from institutional marketing arrangements. This issue
29 can be addressed through estimations of the ROR for research and complementary services, as
30 well as research. Increasingly it is likely that valuation of nonmarket impacts of agricultural AKST
31 will be incorporated into economic analysis. Past studies did not address these issues because of
32 measurement difficulties and the fact that research impacts directly observable in commodity and
33 factor markets were abundantly available. Research systems are now increasingly called upon to
34 provide positive nonmarket environmental or health benefits as well as to mitigate past negative
35 impacts. A number of economic tools are now available to measure nonmarket environmental
36 benefits and costs such as environmental quality, longevity, and health effects (Freeman, 1985;
37 Feather et al., 1999; Dolan, 2000; Hurley, 2000).

1

2 There has been little empirical work in the area of assessing the ROR for social science research,
3 and organizational and institutional innovations including capacity strengthening. This lack is
4 associated with the difficulty of attributing any change in policy, institutions or process and the
5 linked economic growth or poverty reduction to research information generated by social science
6 or other factors (Alston and Pardey, 2001). Attempts to quantify the ROR to social science
7 research have used esoteric methods, utilizing ‘incredible identifying assumptions’ that cannot be
8 robustly defended (Gardner, 2003; Schimmelpfennig and Norton, 2003; Schimmelpfennig et al.,
9 2006). In addition, social and applied science research is often undertaken jointly and difficult to
10 isolate.

11

12 **8.2.4. Empirical evidence**

13 There are many studies on the ROR of investment in agricultural development. This critique
14 draws heavily upon a number of meta-analyses (Alston et al., 2000a; Evenson, 2001; Evenson
15 and Rosegrant, 2003; Thirtle et al., 2003), which cover 80% of published materials (more than
16 one thousand studies). Most of these studies are associated with production technologies, far
17 fewer address other research outputs e.g. post harvest processing, marketing, policy,
18 organizational or institutional innovations. We recognize the shortcomings in these data but these
19 reviews provide useful insights into impacts of AKST investments across continents, commodities
20 and components (research, extension, private sector research.

21

22 8.2.4.1. Rate of returns to national AKST investments

23 One meta-analysis estimated the economic impact of agricultural R&D investment at the national
24 level for 48 selected developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America (Thirtle et al., 2001)
25 The analysis revealed that R&D expenditures per unit of land have an elasticity of 0.44 in terms of
26 productivity. It was also noted that the elasticity of agricultural R&D is positive and highly
27 significant in all cases and is slightly larger for Africa than Asia and both are over 50% greater
28 than the Latin America’s elasticity. The elasticity of value added per unit of land with respect to
29 agricultural R&D was used to calculate ROR to agricultural R&D at the country and the
30 continental level (Table 8.7). The estimated ROR for the sample countries in Africa ranged
31 between -12 and 58%. In only three cases the gains were less than the expenditures. For the
32 Asian countries, the estimated ROR ranged between -1 and 50%; and appears to be less varied
33 and generally higher. The mean of the country RORs for Asia (26%) is better than for Africa
34 (18%) and the weighted mean (31%) is still higher. These means are dominated by the huge
35 agricultural sectors of China and India, both of which seem to have done well in economic terms.
36 In the case of Latin America, only five of the thirteen countries had positive RORs. The estimated

1 ROR ranged between -22 and 40%. The poor results for the Latin American countries are at least
2 partly due to the limitation of data availability (Thirtle et al., 2001).

3
4 **[Table 8.7]**

5
6 8.2.4.2. Rates of return to crop genetic improvement investments

7 Over the years, a significant amount of AKST resources have been devoted to genetic
8 improvement. A second assessment of economic consequences of crop genetic improvement
9 estimated the economic impact of 17 commodities and 35 country/regions using a “global market
10 equilibrium” model (Evenson and Rosegrant, 2003). Benefit/cost ratio (using 6% as the external
11 interest rate) and IRRs of crop genetic improvement programs by region have been computed for
12 both national agricultural research systems (NARS) and international agricultural research
13 centers (IARCs) (Table 8.8). The IRRs for the NARS ranged between 9 and 31%, which are
14 considerably lower than the ones reported in individual studies. This is primarily because most
15 individual studies tend to ignore the research costs to build the germplasm stock that is required
16 to reach the stage where benefits are produced. The lowest IRR was observed for SSA (9%). The
17 IRRs for the IARC programs are very high and ranged between 39 and 165%. The lowest IRR
18 was observed for Latin America. These high RORs reflect the leveraging associated with the high
19 production of IARC crosses and high volume of IARC germplasm (Evenson and Rosegrant,
20 2003).

21
22 **[Table 8.8]**

23 8.2.4.3. Economic impacts of research and extension investments

24 A number of economic impact studies were assessed to evaluate the contribution of agricultural
25 research and extension programs both public and private, using the estimated ROR on
26 investment to index economic impacts (Evenson, 2001) (Table 8.9). The benefit exceeded cost in
27 SSA almost 15 years later than was the case for Latin America and Asia, causing the low IRR.
28 The available evidence suggests that the economic RORs to agricultural R&D are high (Evenson,
29 2001). The broad scope of the evidence for high returns suggests considerable international
30 spillovers. Economic RORs to agricultural research are likely to be above most public and private
31 rates (Fuglie et al., 1996; Alston et al., 2000a; Evenson, 2001). Recently studies have been
32 carried out on the impact of natural resource management research. In most cases however
33 these were satisfactory but lower than in germplasm improvement research (Waibel and
34 Zilberman, 2007).

35
36 **[Table 8.9]**

37

1 Due to a variety of market failures, private returns to R&D are far smaller than economic returns
2 as private developers cannot appropriate many of the benefits associated with their research
3 (Evenson and Westphal, 1995; Scotchmer, 1999; Shavall and van Ypserle, 2001) (see 8.1.2). In
4 agriculture in particular, firms often have difficulty in capturing much of the economic benefits of
5 their investments (Huffman and Evenson, 1993); e.g., in the US seed companies retained 30 to
6 50% of the economic benefits from enhanced hybrid seed yields and 10% of benefits from non-
7 hybrid seed during 1975-1990 (Fuglie et al., 1996). A key market failure that inhibits developers
8 from recovering the cost of R&D in agriculture is the potential for resale of seeds (Kremer and
9 Zwane, 2005). The gap between social and private returns may be more acute in tropical
10 agriculture, where market failures are particularly severe and the intellectual property rights (IPR)
11 environment is weaker (Pray and Umali-Deininger 1998; Kremer and Zwane, 2005).

12
13 Very often the reported higher economic ROR is attributed to the selectivity bias. First, highly
14 successful programs are likely to be evaluated. Second, the unsuccessful evaluations are less
15 likely to be published than evaluations showing impact. However, one can compare the studies
16 covering aggregate programs, which includes both successful and unsuccessful) with studies of
17 specific commodity programs and the evidence is based on a substantial part the world's
18 agricultural research and extension programs (Evenson, 2001). A comparative analysis of returns
19 to AKST investments across continents, commodities, types of research, methods of estimation,
20 public versus private, and over time (Alston et al., 2000a) is presented in Table 8.10 - 8.12.

21
22 **[Table 8.10]**

23
24 The distribution of ROR for crops, livestock, and multiple commodities is similar to that for the
25 entire sample (Table 8.11). A substantial difference in the distribution of ROR is observed for
26 resources research; these estimates mostly include forestry research, for which the research lags
27 are relatively long, contributing to the relatively low average rates of return. The highest ROR
28 observed for all agriculture, field crops, livestock, tree crops, resources and forestry were 1,219;
29 1,720; 5,645; 1,736; 457; and 457, respectively. All studies related to livestock and trees had a
30 positive ROR. The mean ROR for livestock R&D was around 121. These data demonstrate that
31 the estimated RORs for livestock species are comparable to the rates estimated for the other
32 sectors. In addition, in this study the overall estimated ROR for animal research was 18% but
33 when this was decomposed, the ROR for animal health research and animal improvement
34 research were found to be 15 and 27%, respectively; indicating the underestimation of ROR for
35 the overall investment. Probably, the decomposition by species would also show different RORs
36 associated to each of them.

37

1 **[Table 8.11]**

2
3 Although the mean ROR estimates for industrialized countries is higher than that for developing
4 countries (98 and 60%, respectively), the median are virtually identical (46 versus 43%) (Table
5 8.12). While there are not many studies from Africa assessing the returns to R&D, the existing
6 analyses generally indicate high returns in the range of 4 to 100% for country level studies
7 (Anandajayasekaram and Rukuni, 1999).

8
9 **[Table 8.12]**

10
11 The key findings of the last meta-analysis were (Alston et al., 2000a):

- 12 • Research has much higher ROR than extension only or both research and extension
13 combined;
- 14 • There is no measurable difference in estimated ROR between privately and publicly
15 performed research;
- 16 • The RORs were 25% per year higher for research on field crops and 95% per year lower
17 for research on natural resources than for total agriculture;
- 18 • There is no significant difference in rates of return related to whether studies reported basic
19 or other categories of research;
- 20 • The estimate also indicates that if research took place in an industrialized country, the ROR
21 was higher by 13% per year, but this effect was not statistically significant at the 10% level.
22 The estimated rates of return tended to be lower in Africa and West Asia and North Africa
23 than in Latin America and the Caribbean or Asia;
- 24 • There is no evidence that the ROR to agricultural R&D has declined over time;
- 25 • Unable to detect any effect of accounting for spillovers or market distortions on measured
26 rates of return to research.

27
28 8.2.4.4. Agricultural research and education investments and agricultural growth

29 A summary of studies that have applied decomposition analysis to agricultural growth in
30 developing countries suggests that past investments in agricultural research may have
31 contributed anywhere from 5 to 65% of agricultural growth, depending on the country and time
32 period (Pingali and Heisey, 2001). Decomposition of recent measurements of African agricultural
33 growth suggests that up to one-third of the growth in aggregate agricultural productivity is
34 attributable to past investments in agricultural research (Oehmke et al., 1997). This roughly
35 corresponds to a contribution of agricultural research to economic growth of $\frac{1}{4}$ of a percentage
36 point.

1 A study on agriculture growth and productivity in the United States demonstrated similar results
2 (Shane et al., 1998). During 1974-1991 annual growth rate of agriculture productivity was
3 estimated to be 2.2% and entire economy productivity growth was 0.2% in the U.S. total factor
4 productivity (TFP) growth rate was 2.3% during 1959-91. During 1949-91, productivity growth in
5 agriculture can be attributed to four major factors: public investment in agricultural R&D (50%),
6 public expenditure on infrastructure (25%), private investment in R&D, and technological
7 advances embodied in material inputs such as fertilizers and chemicals (combined 25%).

8

9 Technological advancements depend on the quality and quantity of scientific capacity of the
10 national institutes (Mashelkar, 2005). There is a positive relationship between science enrolment
11 and technology achievement indices indicating that increased investment in human capacity can
12 result in better technological advancement. This relationship has not been fully understood or
13 analyzed in the development literature. In general, there is a lack of analysis or questioning of the
14 role of increased capacity in explaining growth performance in developing countries (UI Hague
15 and Khan, 1997).

16

17 Detailed evidence on the ROR of investments in agricultural education is very limited, but a
18 number of studies have showed that education has a positive impact on economic growth and
19 positive benefits to health and other noneconomic benefits (OECD 2003; Evenson, 2004;
20 Johanson and Saint, 2007). Economic growth increases 4% for every additional year of schooling
21 of the adult population; particularly high attainment levels in secondary and tertiary education are
22 relatively more important for economic growth (UNESCO/OECD 2003). The available evidence
23 on the impacts of tertiary education on economic growth and poverty reduction in the case of SSA
24 Africa show that an increase of one year of tertiary education will result in growth increase of 6%
25 in the first year, and about 3% after five years (Bloom et al., 2007). Another study found that an
26 increase in the number of degrees awarded in natural sciences and engineering in East Asia
27 have a strong positive relationship on GDP per capital levels (Yusuf and Nabeshima, 2007). The
28 expected rates of return to investments in education at primary, secondary and higher level for
29 selected countries in Africa range from 24% for primary education, 18.2% for secondary to 11.4%
30 for higher education (Psacharopoulos, 1994).

31

32 Per capita income levels are higher among countries that have invested in educating their
33 population (Babu and Sengupta, 2006) and increased capacity will result in better implementation
34 of programs and policies that reduce poverty and hunger (Kaufman et. al., 2003). Whereas there
35 is a positive relationship between increased capacity and better governance, there is a need for
36 better understanding of the nature and magnitude of the capacity needed to increase governance

1 of development programs and policies that translate the development goals into development
2 outcomes (Babu and Sengupta, 2006).

3
4 There is ample evidence available from the literature that AKST investments have contributed
5 significantly to organizational and institutional innovations in the form of methods, tools
6 development, capacity strengthening, and understanding how institutes interact with each other in
7 achieving developmental goals. However, not much work has been done on assessing the RORs
8 on investments in agricultural training and capacity strengthening. Assessing the economic
9 impacts of non-research products such as training, networking and advisory services policy and
10 institutional reforms need greater emphasis. Detailed analysis of causality of agricultural
11 education and capacity strengthening on development outcomes will require identifying indicators
12 that reflect institutional and human capacity to contribute better development processes.

13 14 8.2.4.5. Rates of return to CGIAR investments

15 The CGIAR Science Council's Standing Panel on Impact Assessment (SPIA) commissioned an
16 independent study to weigh the measurable benefits of CGIAR research against the total cost of
17 system operation to 2001 (Raitzer, 2003). The analysis found that the value of documented
18 benefits generated by the CGIAR surpasses total investment in the system. The analysts did not
19 calculate a single benefit-cost ratio for all potential audiences. Instead, they offered five different
20 versions of the benefit-cost ratio to allow for its sensitivity to different assumptions regarding the
21 credibility of the values derived for key measures of benefit. The most restrictive assessment
22 yields a benefit cost ratio of 1.9, i.e., returns of nearly 2 dollars for every dollar invested. The most
23 inclusive estimate puts the benefits–cost ratio nearly nine times higher.

24
25 The analysis excluded the benefits from the vast majority of CGIAR work, which has not been
26 subject to large-scale ex-post economic assessment. The analysis aggregated only published
27 large-scale economic assessments that met a strict set of criteria for plausibility and
28 demonstration of causality. As a result, only a few isolated examples of success are used to
29 produce these substantial benefit levels, and many probable impacts that lack reliable
30 quantification are omitted. To underscore this point, the economic value of benefits derived from
31 just three CGIAR innovations is estimated to be greater than the entire US \$7 billion (in 1990
32 prices) invested in the IARCs since the CGIAR was established. Under very conservative
33 assumptions, benefits generated (through 2001) from: (i) new, higher yielding rice varieties in
34 Latin America, Asia, and West Africa; (ii) higher-yielding wheat in West Asia, North Africa, South
35 Asia, and Latin America; and (iii) cassava mealybug biocontrol throughout the African continent
36 combined almost twice the aggregate cumulative CGIAR costs. If slightly more generous
37 assumptions were applied, the estimated benefits generated to date by these three technologies

1 rise to more than eight times the total funds invested in CGIAR research and capacity-building
2 programs. If impact assessment were applied to a larger proportion of the system's portfolio than
3 these three innovations will result in much higher aggregate benefit values. Furthermore, the
4 aggregated studies do not take into account multiplier effects that result from stimulated growth in
5 the nonfarm economy, or nonmarket benefits. As a result, even the most generous of the values
6 reported may be considered as conservative (Raitzer, 2003).

8 8.2.4.6. Rates of return to agricultural R&D investments in sub-Saharan Africa

9 A compilation of the available case studies on ROR for African agricultural R&D investment
10 support findings of four meta-analyses (Table 8.13). Of the 27 RORs to past investments in
11 agricultural technology development and dissemination (TDT), 21 show RORs in excess of 12%.
12 Detailed investigations into the lower RORs suggest that researchers had not yet found the right
13 mix of activities to produce cost-effective solutions in challenging agroecological environments.
14 Examining the future potential impact of innovations released or still in the development stage, 24
15 of 30 forward-looking RORs show expected returns in excess of 12%. The second study
16 reviewed the impact studies conducted in Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) during 1978-2005
17 (Anandajayasekeram et al., 2007). The RORs for those studies using the noneconometric
18 methods ranged from 0 to 109. For those studies using the econometric methods ranged
19 between 2 to 113%. Only 10 out of the 86 observations were below 12% under the worst case
20 scenario. These compilations confirm that returns to research in SSA are similar to those found
21 elsewhere, showing a high pay off for a wide range of programs.

23 [Table 8.13]

25 **8.2.5. Environmental impacts of AKST investments**

26 The success of modern agriculture in recent decades has often masked significant externalities
27 that have positively and negatively affected natural resources. Externalities of agriculture include
28 the depletion of resources such as fossil fuel, water, soil and biodiversity; pollution of the
29 environment by the products of fuel combustion, pesticides and fertilizers; and economic and
30 social costs to communities. In the past, the objectives of AKST investments have been largely to
31 increase quality, quantity and to improve food security. Thus, the environmental impacts of
32 agricultural technologies were not usually considered in ROR and other decision-making tools.
33 Their importance, however, is increasingly understood because of the positive link between
34 ecologically sustainable development and poverty reduction (UNEP, 2004a). A good example at
35 the national level is a study that estimates the total external environmental and health costs of
36 'modern agriculture' in the United Kingdom at a total cost of £2343 million in 1996 (Pretty et al.,
37 2000). This is equivalent to 89% of average net farm income and £208 per hectare of arable and

1 permanent pasture. These estimates only include those externalities that give rise to financial
2 costs, and so are likely to underestimate the total negative impacts to the environment.
3 The quality and size of environmental impacts depend on many external forces. Different
4 agroecological zones, market conditions, and financial and social incentives as well as specific
5 technologies play significant roles in determining impacts. In order to quantify and value the
6 environmental impact of an agricultural R&D investment, it is important to understand the source
7 of the impact, the nature, and the relationship between the impact and those variables that can
8 affect producers and consumers. Agriculture globally (including livestock and land use, but
9 excluding transport of agricultural products) has an estimated contribution to GHG emissions of
10 32% (Stern, 2006).

11
12 Although many economic valuation techniques have been developed and refined over the last
13 twenty years, obtaining monetary values of environmental impacts is difficult due to two basic
14 reasons. First, the issue of time and scale complicates the data collection and valuation. Many of
15 the environmental impacts are accumulative by nature, and thus time is a critical constraint in
16 estimating values. Geographic scale is also critical, for example, captive shrimp production leads
17 to a large-scale pollution of marine environments and destruction of mangroves (Clay, 2004). In
18 general, environmental and ecological economists consider the scale either through an
19 ecosystem-centric lens: the plot, the farm, the watershed, and region (Izac and Swift, 1994) or a
20 human-centric lens: the individual farmer, the local community, downstream communities,
21 national citizens and the global population. These issues of scale are seldom incorporated into
22 ROR calculations or other decision-making tools, and thus they exclude the critical elements of
23 'who pays, who benefits'. Second, reconciling different levels of aggregation to obtain reliable
24 estimates is complex. For example, movement of pesticides through soil is determined by several
25 factors such as specific soil characteristics (physical and chemical), properties of the soil, the
26 climate, crop management practices, and so on. The problem is how to generate information that
27 reflects the complex of physical, biological and technical factors. One of the more difficult areas to
28 estimate is the value of impacts on and by biodiversity, because the links between biodiversity
29 and ecosystem functions and services is less understood than many other environmental
30 interactions. Moreover, no monetary values can be given to it and the value is also context-
31 specific and relative to the livelihoods and uses given to biodiversity. The willingness is related to
32 the knowledge of the impacts of biodiversity loss, including the impact of climate change (Turpie,
33 2003).

34
35 New development in economic science, such as ecological economics, can bring promising tools
36 in the future to measure externalities and tackle the problems identified above (Proops, 1989;
37 Jacobs, 1996). One example is the evaluation of hundred years of agricultural production in the

1 Rolling Pampas of Argentina by analysing energy flows within systems (Ferreira, 2006). The
2 ecological footprint quantifies the amount of resources required by a production method or a
3 technology related to AKST, and thus, can give an idea of the environmental impact
4 (Wackernagel and Rees, 1997) and was used to assess the resource use and development
5 limitations in shrimp and tilapia aquaculture (Kautsky et al., 1997).

6
7 Due to the complexity of agriculture and the links with the food chain, most studies, particularly
8 ecological economic studies, examine the impacts of food systems and not the technologies in
9 isolation. There is a significant paucity of data and studies on environmental impacts (see below
10 as well as Table 8.14).

11
12 **[Table 8.14]**

13
14 8.2.5.1. Agriculture

15 *Biodiversity loss.* Reduction in the use of biodiversity in agriculture is driven by the increased
16 pressures and demands of urban and rural populations and by the global development paradigm,
17 which favors specialization and intensification (FAO, 2003). Most studies combine influences and
18 impacts from crop and livestock systems. The total economic benefits of biodiversity with special
19 attention to the services that soil biota activities provide worldwide is estimated to be US \$1,542
20 billion per year (FAO et al., 1997; Pimentel et al. 1997). The estimated total damage to UK's
21 wildlife, habitats, hedgerows and drystone walls was £125 million in 1996 (Pretty et al., 2000).

22
23 *Soil erosion.* Scientists estimate the global cost of soil erosion at more than US \$400 billion per
24 year. This includes the cost to farmers as well as indirect damage to waterways, infrastructure,
25 and health (Pimentel et al., 1995). In the UK, the combined cost of soil erosion with organic
26 carbon losses was £106 million in 1996 (Pretty et al., 2000).

27
28 *Pesticides and chemical fertilizers.* Agricultural runoff pollutes ground and surface waters with
29 large amounts of nitrogen and phosphorus from fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural waste.
30 Agriculture is the main cause of pollution in US rivers and contributes to 70% of all water quality
31 problems identified in rivers and streams (Walker et al., 2005). In the UK the cost of
32 contamination of drinking water with pesticides is £120 million per year (Pretty et al., 2000).

33
34 *Carbon sink.* Agricultural systems contribute to CO₂ emissions through several mechanisms: (i)
35 the direct use of fossil fuels in farm operations; (ii) indirect use of fossil fuels through inputs, such
36 as fertilizers; and (iii) the loss of soil organic matter. On the other hand, agricultural systems
37 accumulate carbon when organic matter is accumulated in the soil, or when above-ground woody

1 biomass acts either as a permanent sink or is used as an energy source that substitutes for fossil
2 fuels (Pretty and Ball, 2001). A 23-year ongoing research project by the Rodale Institute in the US
3 found that if 10,000 medium-sized farms in the US converted to organic production, the carbon
4 stored in the soil would equal taking 1.2 million cars off the road, or reducing car travel by 27
5 billion kilometers (The Rodale Institute, 2003). Forty sustainable agriculture and renewable-
6 resource-management projects in China and India (Pretty et al., 2002) increased carbon sinks in
7 soil organic matter and above-ground biomass; avoided carbon emissions from farms by reducing
8 direct and indirect energy use; and increased renewable energy production from biomass. The
9 potential income from carbon mitigation is \$324 million at \$5 tonne⁻¹ of carbon (Pretty et al.,
10 2002).

11
12 *Water use.* Agriculture consumes about 70% of fresh water worldwide. For example, the water
13 required for food and forage crops growing ranges from about 300 to 2,000 liter kg⁻¹ dry crop
14 yield, and for beef production 43,000 liter kg⁻¹ (Pimentel et al., 2004). Virtual water refers to the
15 water used in the production process of an agricultural product (Chapagain and Hoekstra, 2003).
16 Using a virtual water approach, some countries are net importers of water while others are
17 exporters. It is expected that in the future, approaches to quantify the amount of water used by
18 different countries or regions will be extremely important.

19 20 8.2.5.2. Livestock

21 The livestock sector has enormous impacts on the environment: it is responsible for 18% of GHG
22 emissions measured in CO₂ equivalents, and 9% of anthropogenic CO₂ emissions, including the
23 combustion of fossil fuels to make the additional inputs. Globally, it accounts for about 8% of
24 human water use, mostly for the irrigation of feed crops (Steinfeld et al., 2006). It is estimated that
25 1 kg of edible beef results in an overall requirement of 20 to 43 tonnes water per kg of meat (Smil
26 et al., 2002; Pimentel et al., 2004). The total area occupied by grazing is equivalent to 26% of the
27 world land; the total agricultural area dedicated to feedcrop production is 33%. In all, livestock
28 production accounts for 70% of agricultural land and 30% of land globally (Steinfeld et al., 2006).
29 It is probably the largest sectoral source of water pollution. In the US, livestock are responsible for
30 55% of soil erosion and sediment, 37% of pesticide use, 50% of antibiotic use and a third of the
31 loads of nitrogen and phosphorus into freshwater resources (Steinfeld et al., 2006). Data are not
32 available to estimate these impacts from an economic perspective. 'Emergy' evaluations have
33 recently been used to evaluate the costs of grazing cattle in Argentina's Pampas (Rótolo et al.,
34 2007); to compare soy production systems in Brazil (Ortega et al., 2003); and to compare organic
35 and conventional production systems (Castellini et al., 2006).

36

1 The rapid spread of large-scale industrial livestock production focused on a narrow range of
2 breeds is the biggest threat to the world's farm animal diversity (FAO, 2007). Traditional livestock
3 losses worldwide range from one breed per week (Thrupp, 1998) to one per month (FAO, 2007).
4 Many traditional breeds have disappeared as farmers focus on new breeds of cattle, pigs, sheep,
5 and chickens. In the year 2000, over 6,300 breeds of domesticated livestock were identified; of
6 these, over 1,300 are now extinct or considered to be in danger of extinction. Many others have
7 not been formally identified and may disappear before they are recorded or widely known. When
8 breeds without recorded population data are included, the number at risk may be as high as
9 2,255. Europe records the highest percentage of extinct breeds or breeds at risk (55% for
10 mammalian and 69% for avian breeds). Approximately 80% of the value of livestock in low-input
11 developing-country systems can be attributed to non-market roles, while only 20% is attributable
12 to direct production outputs (FAO, 2007). By contrast, over 90% of the value of livestock in high-
13 input industrialized-country production systems is attributable to the latter. How to measure or
14 evaluate the importance of considering nonmarket values of livestock when planning AKST
15 investment is lacking. Obtaining such data frequently requires the modification of economic
16 techniques for use in conjunction with participatory and rapid rural appraisal methods (FAO,
17 2007).

18

19 8.2.5.3. Forestry

20 There are different forestry systems ranging from systems of monoculture of trees (aiming to
21 obtain products such as cellulose, wood or other products) to systems that cultivate different tree
22 species with other agricultural products, including livestock. Agroforestry systems (AFS) provide a
23 mix of market and nonmarket goods and services with a high level of output per purchased
24 investments and minimal environmental impacts (Diemont et al., 2006). An agricultural system
25 that includes agroforestry is more profitable than a conventional system (Neupane and Thapa,
26 2004); agroforestry has great potential to minimize the rate of soil degradation, increase crop
27 yields and food production, and raise farm income in a sustainable manner.

28

29 8.2.5.4. Aquaculture

30 Intensification of aquaculture has resulted in higher impacts into the environment. A deeply
31 analyzed case is that of shrimp farming. In a simple cost-benefit analysis, industrial shrimp
32 farming is usually found to be profitable; however, cost-benefit analyses that include
33 environmental costs, can contradict these findings. For example, a study performed in India
34 concluded that shrimp culture caused more economic harm than good. The economic damage
35 (loss of mangroves, salinization and increasing unemployment) outweighed the benefits by 4 to 1
36 or 1.5 to 1, depending on the areas considered (Primavera, 1997). In Thailand, the total economic
37 value of an intact mangrove exceeds that of shrimp farming by 70% (Castellini et al., 2006). The

1 estimated internal benefits of developing shrimp farms are higher than the internal costs in the
2 ratio of 1.5 to 1 (Gunawardena and Rowan, 2005). When the wider environmental impacts are
3 more comprehensively evaluated, the external benefits are much lower than the external costs in
4 a ratio that ranges between 1 to 6 and 1 to 11.

5

6 In Malawi, the ecological footprint approach applied to integrated aquaculture showed that when
7 waste from each farming enterprise is recycled into other enterprises, the economic and
8 ecological efficiencies of all are increased (Brummet, 1999).

9

10 8.2.5.5. Traditional and local knowledge

11 Traditional knowledge and local farming systems associated are often either ignored or sidelined
12 by new technologies and profit-oriented interventions (Upreti and Upreti, 2002). Though there is
13 no economic valuation estimated in monetary terms, it is well recognized that there is tremendous
14 value in traditional knowledge for maintaining and improving farming systems, particularly with
15 regard to agrobiodiversity management and utilization.

16

17 In recent years researchers have started to address this significant gap. For example, a new
18 conceptual framework was developed to assess the value of pastoralism that goes beyond
19 conventional economic criteria (Hesse and McGregor, 2006). The objective is to provide fresh
20 insights to its contribution to poverty reduction, sustainable environmental management and the
21 economically sustainable development of dryland areas of East Africa in the context of increasing
22 climate uncertainty. One can associate environmental impacts of pastoralist traditional knowledge
23 in terms of sustainable land use and risk management in disequilibrium environments,
24 biodiversity conservation and improved agricultural returns, but these too are rarely captured in
25 national statistics or recognized by policy makers.

26

27 **8.2.6. Health impacts of agricultural R&D investments**

28 The interactions between agriculture and human health are well recognized. Agricultural
29 technologies through their effects on productivity, income, and food quality and security can
30 improve the health status of producers and consumers (Table 8.15); healthier people will
31 generally be more productive than people who suffer from sickness or who are undernourished.
32 On the other hand, agricultural technologies can have negative effects on the health status of
33 farmers, farm laborers, farm household members and consumers (Table 8.16).

34

35 Pesticides are an example of positive (increases in productivity), and negative (environment and
36 human health) effects (see also 8.2.5). There are at least 1 million cases of pesticide poisoning
37 annually, with women and children in developing countries disproportionately affected (WHO,

1 1990; UNEP, 2004b). The total number of unintentional fatal poisonings from all sources,
2 including agricultural chemicals, is 350,000 per year (WHO, 2006). These global figures are not
3 collected systematically or on a regular basis; estimation of the incidence of pesticide poisoning is
4 difficult as surveillance systems may be inadequate and tend to underreport (PAHO, 2002;
5 London and Bailie, 2001). Hence, official reports represent lower bound estimates. Farmers in the
6 developing world experience high rates of exposure to human health risks when using pesticides
7 (Jeyaratnam et al., 1982 and 1987; Kishi et al., 1995; Ajayi, 2000; Rola and Pingali, 1993; Antle
8 et al., 1998; Crissman et al., 1994 and 1998). Some authors (Cuyno et al., 2001; Garming and
9 Waibel, 2006) established that farmers reveal a willingness to pay for reducing the negative
10 health effects from chemical pesticides.

11

12 Economic studies carried out in industrialized countries found that health costs make up about
13 10% of the total externality costs of pesticides (Pimentel et al., 1993ab; Waibel et al., 1999).
14 Pesticide use globally continues to rise and hence the concerns about the implications for human
15 health remain (Ecobichon, 2001).

16

17 Considerable AKST investments were made by the public and the private sector to minimize the
18 negative health effects of pesticides. These investments included two major products, safe use
19 technology packages and IPM. Chemical companies have developed modules on safe use
20 training, which is an example of a private sector AKST. Pilot projects were carried out in Mexico,
21 India and Zimbabwe (Atkin and Leisinger, 2000), Guatemala, Kenya and Thailand (Hurst, 1999).
22 Successes were very limited; Farmers often went back to their old practices shortly after the
23 training (Atkin and Leisinger, 2000). In addition, some safe use technologies (e.g., protective
24 equipment) and management practices, (e.g., hygienic measures after spraying, compliance with
25 re-entry intervals, safe storage of equipment and pesticides) were often found unfeasible in
26 tropical climates and under the conditions of poor countries (Cole et al., 2000).

27

28 A good of example of public sector AKST investment to mitigate the negative impact of pesticide
29 use is IPM; IPM technologies are site-specific in that they need to be developed for specific
30 agroecological, socioeconomic and policy conditions. As a result a wide range of examples exist
31 in both developing and industrialized countries. Despite the large amount of investment in IPM,
32 global impact studies are rare. A meta-analysis for the CGIAR in 1999 showed that, although no
33 aggregate ROR could be established, the ROR for IPM was above 30%, and this does not
34 include the significant environmental and health benefits. In the industrialized countries several
35 successful IPM programs have been implemented in selected crops (e.g. Norton, 2005), but
36 successes on the aggregate level remain questionable due to a lack of enabling policy conditions
37 (Waibel et al., 1999).

1

2 Iron, zinc and iodine deficiencies are widespread nutritional imbalances (WHO, 2002; FAO, 2004;
3 Hotz and Brown, 2004; UN-SCN, 2004). The adverse health outcomes of micronutrient
4 deficiencies include child and maternal mortality, impaired physical and mental activity, diarrhea,
5 pneumonia, stunting or blindness, among others (Stein et al., 2005). Biofortification research aims
6 to reduce malnutrition by breeding essential micronutrients into staple crops. The CGIAR
7 HarvestPlus Challenge Program concentrates on increasing iron, zinc and beta-carotene
8 (provitamin A) content in six staple crops species (rice, wheat, maize, cassava, sweet potatoes
9 and beans). In addition, the program supports exploratory research in ten additional crops (Qaim
10 et al., 2006). Most biofortified crops are in R&D phase, except for beta-carotene rich orange
11 fleshed sweet potatoes and Golden Rice (Low et al., 1997; Goto et al., 1999; Ye et al., 2000;
12 Lucca et al., 2001; Murray-Kolb et al., 2002; Asconcelos et al., 2003; Drakakai et al., 2005,
13 Ducreux et al., 2005).

14

15 Thus far, only ex-ante economic analyses exist for biofortified crops. An evaluation of the
16 potential health benefits of Golden Rice in the Philippines showed that micronutrient deficiencies
17 can lead to significant health costs, which could be reduced through biofortification (Zimmermann
18 and Qaim, 2004). In an ex-ante impact assessment using disability adjusted life years (DALYS)
19 approach (Qaim et al., 2006) the estimated Internal Rate of Return (IRR) was very high, ranging
20 31 to 66% (pessimistic scenario) and 70 to 168% (optimistic scenario). Ex-ante studies on the
21 expected impact of biofortification research under HarvestPlus have been conducted for rice in
22 the Philippines, beans in Brazil and Honduras, sweet potato in Uganda, maize in Kenya and
23 cassava in Nigeria and Brazil; health-cost reductions range from 3 to 38% in the pessimistic
24 scenario and from 11 to 64% in the optimistic scenario depending on crop and location
25 (Meenakshi et al., 2006).

26

27 To find out if biofortified crops will be adopted by growers on a large scale requires research
28 including ex-post studies building on observable data to verify the preliminary results. Further
29 research is also needed on the bioavailability and micronutrient interactions in the human body.
30 The key conclusion emerging from the available ex- ante studies is that biofortification could play
31 an important role in achieving nutrient security in particular situations. However, its benefits will
32 depend on the necessary institutional framework that can facilitate the effective introduction of
33 these technologies as well as an enabling policy framework.

34

35 Other impacts of AKST on health, both positive and negative, can be shown with the
36 development of industrial livestock. Livestock products contribute to improved nutrition globally

1 and are linked to disease, such as cardio-vascular disease, diabetes and certain types of cancer
2 (Walter et al., 2005).

4 **8.2.7. Spillover effects**

5 The wide applicability of research results over a range of agricultural production conditions or
6 environments often cutting across geographical and national boundaries are generally referred to
7 as spillover effects. Spillover effects are a combination of four effects: price effects from the
8 increased production caused by reduced costs which are captured in the supply and demand
9 framework (Hesse and McGregor, 2006). Spill-over technology from country “Y” which can be
10 adopted without any research in country “X”; spillover of technology from country “Y” which
11 requires adaptive research before it is applicable in country “X”; and spillover of scientific
12 knowledge which ultimately enhances future research in many areas.

14 Technological spillovers increase the returns to research and can be spill-ins or spill-outs. Spill-
15 ins take place when a country is adapting a technology developed elsewhere. This reduces the
16 national research costs and shortens the time required for developing and disseminating the
17 finished product. The gains from spill-ins are important to all research organizations, but are
18 higher in smaller systems. Spill-outs take place when research findings are used by other
19 countries. Spill-outs are important when one is interested in the total benefits occurring to the
20 country where the technology was developed as well as the country where it was adopted. This
21 aspect is critical when performing impact assessment of a regional network (Anandajayasekeram
22 et al., 2007).

24 It has been long recognized that AKST spillovers are both prevalent and important (Evenson,
25 1989; Griliches, 1992). A study that fails to account appropriately for spill-ins will overestimates
26 the benefits from its own research investment.⁷ Similarly if state to state or nation to nation
27 spillovers are important—as in the case of regional research networks- and the study measures
28 its own benefit at the national level and ignores the “spill-outs”, this will underestimate the ROR.
29 Only 12% of the 292 studies in the sample of one of the aforementioned meta analysis made any
30 allowance for technology spillovers; even fewer allowed for international spillovers (Alston et al.,
31 2000a). They also noted that by far the majority of research impact studies that have allowed for
32 international agricultural technology spillovers were commodity specific studies, rather than
33 national aggregate studies, and mostly they were studies of crop varietal improvements.

35 A study covering twelve different commodities and using a multi-country trade model, found that
36 spillover effects from regions where research is conducted to over regions with similar

⁷ Farmer to farmer spill in / outs are also important, not just locally but where they happen through travel, guest worker return etc, but not easy to capture.

1 agroecologies and rural infrastructures ranged from 64 to 82% of total international benefits
2 (Davis et al., 1987). An analysis of 69 national and international wheat improvement research
3 programs found that 'given the magnitude of potential spill-ins from the international research
4 system, many wheat programs could significantly increase the efficiency of resource use by
5 reducing the size of their wheat research programs and focusing on the screening of varieties
6 developed elsewhere (Davis et al., 1987). The impact of research conducted within individual
7 Latin American and Caribbean countries covering edible beans, cassava, maize, potatoes, rice,
8 sorghum, soybeans and wheat showed that when allowance was made for spillovers to other
9 regions of the world, the resulting price impacts had important consequences for the distribution
10 of benefits between producer and consumers and thus among countries within Latin America and
11 the Caribbean (Alston et al., 2000b). At least for the United States, the locational range of spill-in
12 effects for crop production is lower than for livestock production (Evenson, 1989). Crop genetic
13 improvements in the United States had spillover effects into the rest of the world, with consumers
14 in the rest of the world gaining but producers outside the United States losing (Frisvold et al.,
15 2003). Overall increases in net global welfare from United States crop improvements were
16 distributed 60% to the US, 25% to other industrialized countries, and the remainder to developing
17 and transitional economies.

18
19 Growth in public funding for international research has slowed over the last twenty years (see
20 9.1). Thus, understanding the ROR of the CGIAR is very important, including the spill in and spill
21 out impacts. Over the years, a number of studies have attempted to value the benefits to
22 particular countries from research conducted at CG centers, in some cases comparing them
23 against donor support provided by the countries in question (Brennan, 1986, 1989; Burnett et al.,
24 1990; Byerlee and Moya, 1993; Bofu et al., 1996; Fonseca et al., 1996; Pardey et al., 1996;
25 Brennan and Bantilan, 1999; Johnson and Pachico, 2000; Brennan et al., 2002; Heisey et al.,
26 2002). For the period 1973-1984, Australia gained US \$747 million in terms of cost savings to
27 wheat producers as a United States benefit from its adoption of wheat varieties from CIMMYT
28 and rice varieties from IRRI (Brennan, 1986, 1989). Depending on the attribution rule used, the
29 United States' economy gained at least US \$3.4 billion and up to US \$14.6 billion from 1970 to
30 1993 from the use of improved wheat varieties developed by CIMMYT and US \$30 million and up
31 to US \$1 billion through the use of rice varieties developed by IRRI.⁸ These estimates did not
32 account for the world price impact as a result of the rest of the world having adopted CIMMYT
33 wheat varieties and thereby driving down the price of wheat.

34
35 Assessments were made of Australia's benefits from research conducted by ICRISAT and
36 ICARDA taking explicit account of the world price impacts (Brennan and Bantilan, 1999; Brennan

⁸ For a discussion of the issues related to these estimate see Alston (2002) and Pardey et al. (2002).

1 et al., 2002). Research on sorghum (ICRISAT) resulted in a national benefit of US \$3.6 million
2 (producer loss of US \$1.7 million and consumer gain of US \$5.3 million) for Australia. Similarly,
3 ICRISAT's research on chickpeas would have given a national benefit of US \$1.2 million
4 (producer loss of US \$2.6 million and a consumer gain of US \$3.8 million). The average
5 estimated net gain to Australia as a result of the overall research effort at ICARDA in five crops
6 (durum wheat, barley, chick pea, lentils and faba bean) is US \$7.4 million per year (in 2001
7 dollars and exchange rates) over the period to 2002 (Brennan et al., 2002). This represents 1% of
8 the gross value of Australia's production of the five crops. Most of those gains are achieved in the
9 faba bean and lentil industries. Producers receive most of the welfare gains in Australia,
10 amounting to US \$6.5 million of the total.

11 The main findings of the various studies are (Alston, 2002):

- 12 • Intra national and international spillovers of public agricultural AKST results are very
13 important.
- 14 • Spillovers can have profound implications for the distribution of benefits from research
15 between consumers and producers and thus among countries, depending on their trade
16 status and capacity to adopt the technology.
- 17 • It is not easy to measure these impacts, and the results can be sensitive to the specifics of
18 the approach taken, but studies that ignore spillovers are likely to obtain seriously distorted
19 estimates of ROR.
- 20 • Because spillovers are so important, research resources have been misallocated both
21 within and among nations.

22
23 The estimation of these state, national or multinational impacts is data intensive, difficult, and
24 adds to the measurement problems (Alston, 2002). However, there can be little doubt that
25 agricultural AKST generates very large benefits and that a very large share of those benefits
26 comes through spillovers. The omission or mis-measurement of spillover effects may have
27 contributed to a tendency to overestimate ROR to agricultural AKST in some instances. Clearly,
28 the issue of international research spillovers is an important one for the allocation of resources for
29 research both nationally and internationally. The spillover benefits to industrialized countries from
30 international agricultural research have positive funding implications. More work is needed in this
31 area to develop better methods to measure spillovers and also to develop the necessary policy
32 institutional arrangements to harness the full potential of spillover effects of AKST technologies
33 (Alston, 2002; Anandajayasekeram et al., 2007).

34
35 Agricultural machinery and agricultural chemicals are obvious cases where industrial AKST is
36 directed towards the improvement of agricultural inputs. Recent studies conclude that when new
37 industrial products first come on the market, they are priced to only partially capture the real value

1 of the improvement (most new models of equipment are better buys than the equipment that they
2 replace) (Evenson, 2001). This produces a spill-in impact. Another type of spill-in that is
3 recognized in few studies is the “recharge” spill-in from pre-invention science. Many of the studies
4 summarized in the meta-analysis actually covered a wide range of research program activities
5 including many pre-invention science activities. Some studies specifically identified pre-invention
6 expenditures and activities as well as industrial spill-ins (Table 8.17). These studies report
7 relatively high rates of return and are roughly equal to the social RORs to public agricultural
8 research.

9
10 **[Table 8.17]**

11
12 ***8.2.8 Impacts of public sector agricultural R&D investments on poverty***

13 Several recent studies (Fan et al., 2000; 2004ab, 2005; Fan and Zhang, 2004) clearly indicate
14 that public investment in agricultural R&D is the most efficient public sector investment (with the
15 exception of Ethiopia). In terms of number of poor people moving out of poverty, agricultural R&D
16 investments ranked among the top three. Although limited, this evidence indicates that the
17 investment in agricultural R&D performs equally as well or better than the other public sector
18 investments and contributes significantly to poverty reduction. These studies measured the
19 effects of public spending on growth and poverty reduction in selected Asian and African
20 countries using pooled time-series and cross-region data (Table 8.19). To assess the impact of
21 public investment on poverty, the number of poor people who would come out of poverty for a
22 fixed investment across different sectors was estimated. Similar to estimate the economic benefit
23 of the investment the benefit/cost ratios were estimated at the national level based on the
24 increase in household income and/or productivity per unit of investment. In Asian countries, the
25 growth effects of investments in agricultural research, roads and education are found to be large.
26 Regional differences were observed within the countries. This demonstrates that there is an
27 opportunity to improve the growth and poverty impacts of total public investments through better
28 regional targeting of specific types of investment (Fan et al., 2005).

29
30 Effects of improved technology on income distribution across farms with different resource
31 endowments have been ambiguous. Poverty reduction is largely about distribution. The benefits
32 of agricultural research investments are large and undisputed, but their actual levels and
33 distributional effects remain under discussion (Alston and Pardey, 2001). Measurement of
34 distributional effects can, in principle, be made using economic surplus methods (Alston et al.,
35 1995), although such measurement is not common. One reason why the debates continue may
36 be that discussions of research impacts on poverty implicitly refer to only one of two separate
37 concepts, absolute and relative poverty. Absolute poverty is a measure of how many people lie
38 below a certain income threshold; relative poverty measures the degree of income inequality.

1 Studies that show positive effects of agricultural R&D on poverty alleviation may implicitly be
2 considering absolute poverty; studies that indicate negative effects may be more likely to refer to
3 relative poverty (Foster, 1998).

4

5 **[Table 8.18]**

6

7 There are three sets of factors which further conflate attempts to analyze the impact of AKST on
8 poverty reduction. First, what is the role of underlying socioeconomic conditions in determining
9 the benefits/costs of AKST? It is easy to find cases in which poor farmers with small land holdings
10 have benefited as much as large-scale farmers, and those in which the benefits of new
11 technology were confined to wealthy, more commercialized farms only. Which outcome
12 predominates depends primarily on the underlying socioeconomic conditions of a particular case
13 rather than the characteristics of the technology per se (Kerr and Kolavalli, 1999). Second, what
14 is the role of the underlying social and political institutions? A review of the impacts of agricultural
15 research on the poor (Kerr and Kolavalli, 1999) shows that it is difficult to make generalizations
16 about the impacts of agricultural research on the poor and the distribution of benefits depends on
17 the underlying social and political institutions rather than technology per se. Effects of improved
18 technology on income distribution across farms with different resource endowments have been
19 ambiguous. About 80% of a review of 324 papers on the distributional impacts of the green
20 revolution argued that inequity worsened, but there were significant variations within the data set
21 (Freebairn, 1995). Innovations in agricultural research will not reduce poverty in the absence of
22 poverty-focused policy and action (Gunaseena, 2003). Third, in the absence of specific data on the
23 impacts of AKST on poverty alleviation, one can not simply use economic growth nor yield
24 increases as a proxy for poverty reduction. The effect of agricultural research on poverty is
25 usually linked in the literature through its effects on agricultural productivity (Kerr and Kolavalli,
26 1999). However, increasing productivity is not enough to decrease poverty (Palmer-Jones and
27 Sen, 2006). There are other factors that can affect poverty which are not affected by the increase
28 in productivity, such as the distribution of the income, the adoption of the technology or the
29 suitability of the technology for the rural community. In addition, increased food supply does not
30 automatically mean increased food security for all. What is important is who produces the food,
31 who has access to the technology and knowledge to produce it, and who has the purchasing
32 power to acquire it (Pretty and Hine, 2001). Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced growth in the
33 agricultural sector (FAO, 2005b); additional analysis is needed to understand who has benefited
34 from this growth, and why this growth did not translate into increased food security.

35

36 There is no agreement in the literature as to what kind of technologies would have the biggest
37 impact on the reduction of hunger and poverty. While some authors agree that the main problem

1 is not the technology itself, but the access of the poor to new technologies, others would argue
2 that the problem is that the technologies developed are not pro-poor, and benefit only the
3 wealthier farmers. Often, poor farmers do not have access to the technologies and do not
4 participate in the decision process on technologies. Thus, the research process ignores farmers'
5 knowledge and experience even though they may offer insights that could help identify and/or
6 develop effective technologies for unfavorable areas. For that reason the technologies developed
7 may increase productivity but this may not be their main objective. Such systems may perpetuate
8 a sense of helplessness among resource-poor farmers as they wait for effective technological
9 solutions. Recently, some explicit efforts are being made to include farmers' needs in the R&D
10 agenda. All actors seem to agree that participatory approaches are needed; participatory plant
11 breeding seems to be promising (Almekinders and Eling, 2001). What remains unclear is what
12 role the industry would play in this democratization process.

13

14 The poverty reduction effect can be substantial and it is free, in the sense that R&D has already
15 paid for itself, whereas redistribution can be counterproductive due to its negative effects on
16 growth (Thirtle et al., 2003). A long-run view of technological change must take into account the
17 distributional effects of agricultural research investments. These research investments go beyond
18 technology and include institutional innovations and the structure of the innovation system
19 catering to agriculture. The distributional impact of technological change ultimately depends on
20 the particular context of policies, markets, and institutions and on interregional connectedness
21 through infrastructure (von Braun, 2003) (Figure 9.8). Adoption of technologies and success
22 depends on many factors, e.g., land ownership, access to water, and availability and efficient use
23 of diverse plant genetic resources (von Braun, 2003). This is in line with the argument that at the
24 farm level, prices, access to inputs and resources, credit and markets, education levels and the
25 distribution of land, affect both the rate of uptake of improved technologies and the extent to
26 which they benefit the poor (Hazell, 1999). Improved technologies may fail to benefit poor farmers
27 not because they are inherently biased against the poor, but because the distribution of land, or
28 access to resources and markets is inequitable. When these are taken into account it becomes
29 possible to explain why similar technologies can have very different impacts on the poor in
30 different regions, or at different times.

31

32 **[Insert Figure 8.8]**

33

34 Research needs to focus on commodities used by poor people, and on areas where the poor are
35 concentrated (rain fed highlands, semiarid tropics and marginal lands) (Gunasena, 2003). Without
36 adequate investment in infrastructure, technology and human development in these areas
37 conditions are likely to deteriorate further. Technologies likely to succeed in these areas include

1 mixed farming systems; livestock and agroforestry, improved fallows, and cover crops
2 (Gunasena, 2003). In all cases marketing institutions need to be developed to support the small-
3 scale farmers.

4
5 Although less controversial than biotechnology, low-external-input agriculture (LEIA) is also the
6 subject of considerable disagreement (DIFD, 2004). Debate on the relevance of these
7 technologies is unfortunately often clouded by ideology. A dataset containing information on 208
8 cases from 52 developing countries show that in these projects and initiatives, about 9 million
9 farmers have adopted sustainable agriculture practices and technologies on 29 million hectares
10 (Pretty and Hine, 2001). This demonstrates that sustainable agriculture can reduce food poverty
11 through (i) appropriate technology adapted by farmers' experimentation; (ii) a social learning and
12 participatory approach between projects and farmers; (iii) good linkages between
13 projects/initiatives and external agencies, together with the existence of working partnerships
14 between agencies; (iv) presence of social capital at local level. A variety of options are available
15 to increase the returns to families from their production, either by reducing losses to pests (better
16 storage and treatment) and inefficient processes (e.g., fuel-saving stoves); or by adding value
17 before sale or use (conversion of primary products through processing). Adding value through
18 direct or organized marketing may involve improvements to physical infrastructure (e.g., roads,
19 transport); or through direct marketing and sales to consumers (thus cutting out wholesalers and
20 "middlemen").

21
22 Other aspects that need attention are the effects of the crop technology adoption on gender, for
23 example, in the distribution of work roles in the cropping (Von Braun and Webb, 1989) and the
24 significant spatial dependence on growth rates of agricultural output (Palmer-Jones and Sen,
25 2006).

26
27 Additional important issues to be considered in terms of effects of AKST on poverty reduction
28 include (i) how researchers are evaluated (Gunasena, 2003); (ii) poverty alleviation as specific
29 target in agricultural policy (Gunasena, 2003); (iii) relationship of increased productivity to
30 reduced food prices, and evidence that rural poverty is linked to international world prices (Minota
31 and Daniels, 2005; Yavapolku et al., 2006). In addition, indebted countries may have economic
32 growth but not poverty reduction as they must pay a substantial part of GDP to external debt.
33 The future is not just about the need for more scientific effort and technical breakthroughs
34 generated by both more public funding and private sector interventions, but about the political
35 economy of agriculture and food in the developing world (Scoones, 2003). Two basic components
36 of well-being are having a secure livelihood to meet one's basic needs, and realizing and
37 expanding one's capabilities in order to achieve fulfillment. For that reason measuring the link

1 between poverty and agricultural growth by using the human development index or developing
2 new indexes may be necessary.

3

4 **8.3 Governance of AKST investments: towards a conceptual framework**

5 **8.3.1. Demand for improved governance**

6 Particularly since the mid-1980s, there has been increasing demand for AKST systems to be
7 accountable to various stakeholders. These demands have been prompted by the high
8 transaction costs of conventional agricultural research systems in knowledge generation and
9 transfer as well as inefficiency in resource allocation and utilization (Von Oppen et al., 2000).

10 Other reasons for recent demands include lack of transparency, exclusion of other stakeholders
11 from the process of setting research agendas, unequal access to technologies emanating from
12 research and fear of private sector monopoly over technologies, particularly in biotechnology
13 (McMahon, 1992; Reischneider et al., 1997; Echeverria, 1998; Von Oppen et al., 2000).

14

15 The pressure for accountability is varied across countries and regions. For example, in
16 industrialized countries issues of efficiency and pluralism in the research process are becoming
17 more important (Heemskerk and Wennink, 2005). In most Asian and Latin American countries,
18 the pressure for more accountability seems to be driven by local stakeholders (Byerlee and Alex,
19 1998; Von Oppen et al., 2000; Hartwich and Von Oppen, 2000). In the case of sub-Saharan
20 Africa, it is the donors, who provide more than one-half of the funding for agricultural research in
21 some countries (see 8.1), who pressure for accountability (Herz, 1996). These demands for
22 accountability have resulted in changes in both the sources and the mechanisms for funding
23 AKST (8.1.4) and hence the rules and modalities which govern the mobilization and utilization of
24 AKST investments.

25

26 **8.3.2 Defining and judging governance in relation to AKST investments**

27 The changes in governance of AKST can be viewed as part of an 'induced institutional
28 innovation' (Ruttan, 2003), which sees changes in institutions or governance driven by factors of
29 demand and supply. On the demand side, the contemporary economic and social realities
30 (including developments of new technologies) are pushing for changes in governance and
31 institutions mediating AKST investments globally, nationally and at lower levels within nations. On
32 the supply side, advances in social science knowledge are increasingly an important source of
33 shifts in the supply of institutional solutions (Ruttan, 2003). Thus the accumulated knowledge
34 (both theoretical and empirical) on the functioning of institutions can be viewed as facilitating the
35 supply of new institutional solutions.

36

1 The discussion of governance and the criteria to judge good governance can be approached in
2 several ways. These criteria can be based on certain outcomes such as how efficient or effective
3 is the governance in meeting pre-determined objectives (Box 8.2).

4
5 **[Insert Box 8.2]**

6
7 Governance has three core functions:(i) To identify what is the `optimal' institutional structure; (ii)
8 To manage institutions, which implies monitoring, sustaining, fine-tuning, and facilitating of all
9 these activities (iii) to change the existing institutions or bring about newer ones to close the gap
10 between the existing and the `optimal' structures. Institutions are the formal and informal rules,
11 including norms and practices. Organizations are not institutions but actors within institutions.
12 Institutions often include markets too. However non-market or meta-market institutions are also
13 required for AKST investments because of multiple forms of market failures. Some of these
14 market failures are observable in any R&D investment requiring institutional interventions such as
15 patent rules. In general, market failure arise from the public good nature of some forms of AKST,
16 implying that it is very difficult or costly to exclude people who are not willing to pay for the
17 technology from using it (Norton, 1991; Stiglitz, 2000).

18
19 The framework for assessing governance of AKST systems comprises of a set of characteristics
20 that the outcomes of institutional interventions mediated through good governance is expected to
21 have. These are briefly discussed below to provide clarity of the analytical framework:

- 22 • Good governance should address identifiable market failure problems, in order to allocate
23 public resources in areas where uncoordinated action of private individuals would be
24 inadequate or inappropriate. Nonetheless, correcting market failure is only justified where
25 the losses from the failure are higher than the cost of correcting it, including both direct
26 and indirect costs of institutional intervention. Where there are multiple forms of market
27 failure occurring at different points of the technology development process, each failure
28 must be addressed accordingly.
- 29 • Where agricultural growth is not the constraining factor to poverty reduction or to attaining
30 economic growth, prioritization of appropriate intervention among sectors or between
31 agricultural research and other interventions within agriculture is another important
32 outcome. There may be cases where factors other than R&D become binding constraints
33 to agricultural competitiveness (Garelli, 1996). The appropriate level of resource
34 allocation for agricultural R&D is also related to sectoral prioritization (Tabor et al., 1998).
35 AKST decisions are made by many actors; each of them takes into account the expected
36 action of others. For example, poor and small developing countries may want to depend
37 on international technology transfer and this may be the best option for certain

1 technologies in order to avoid unnecessary and costly duplication of efforts (Tabor et al.,
2 1996). However, such dependence may not always be possible for tropical countries,
3 whose commodities (crops, livestock, fisheries, and forests) are unlikely to be cultivated
4 or raised in the industrialized world.

- 5 • Good governance should ensure that institutions and organizations (as well as individuals
6 who work within these organizations) serve the intended purpose effectively and
7 efficiently under all conditions. The achievement of efficiency in research investments is
8 complex due to problems of economies (some times diseconomies) of scale and scope,
9 which determines the required degree of specialization or diversification of specific
10 research organizations. These considerations may also lead to contracting out or
11 contracting in of specific activities, and also the extent of decentralization in decision-
12 making. The role of governance is to enable the internalization of such efficiency
13 concerns in decision-making. This requires design of institutions with: (i) The ability to
14 shape specific objectives to suit socioeconomic realities. This implies that there should be
15 mechanisms to discontinue research programs that are no longer acceptable to
16 stakeholders. (Sometimes inefficient institutions may continue to persist due to path
17 dependence and lock-ins. Meanwhile, efficient institutions have a built-in ability to adapt
18 to changing realities through feedback.) (ii) The ability to meet the objectives with
19 reasonable assessment of risk and uncertainty. (iii) The ability to assess current and
20 potential future demands of AKST investments. (iv) The ability to carry out assignments
21 and tasks in the most efficient manner, which entails producing given output at the
22 cheapest possible cost or achieving maximum output for a given cost. Higher institutional
23 efficiency can be achieved by aligning the incentives of actors to be in tune with
24 institutional objectives, which in turn should change with evolving economic environment.
- 25 • Good governance should aim at following procedures that ensure transparency and
26 accountability for minimizing mistakes and errors of judgment to ensure that broader
27 societal priorities are reflected in decision making without being captured by distributional
28 struggles of narrow interest groups. For example, although local scientists may be better
29 informed about national agricultural priorities, their decisions on funding priority may be
30 biased towards maximizing the flow of funds to their own area of work (Tabor, et al.,
31 1998).

32

33 There can also be process-based criteria for good governance, where the concern is not only on
34 outcomes but also on how these outcomes are produced. For example, participation of specific
35 stakeholders can be viewed as important for efficiency or effectiveness of outcomes but also as
36 an important element on its own, with the assumption that pursuing participation is good

1 irrespective of its impact on efficiency or effectiveness. Thus there have also been arguments that
2 good governance should follow certain procedural correctness which should permit

- 3 • Negotiation of diverse interests and the identification of common interests;
- 4 • Negotiation of clear rules and norms among multiple stakeholders, their effective
5 implementation and the setting-up of control mechanisms for compliance to these rules and
6 norms;
- 7 • Equitable access to resources (economic/financial, human, natural, social, physical) and
8 AKST;
- 9 • Participation in strategic decision-making of all relevant stakeholders;
- 10 • Adequate equilibrium among power forces in decision-making and implementation of
11 strategic decisions, and
- 12 • Capacity to influence policy making.

13
14 Governance can also be viewed at multiple levels; at the level of a research station, a national
15 research system, a regional research network as well as at the global level. When we analyze the
16 issues of governance of a research station, we take the external environment including the
17 objectives given to the station as exogenous, and try to see how the governance of the station
18 can be improved to meet these given objectives within the resource constraints. One can also
19 analyze the larger question of governance at which one critically looks at whether the objectives
20 defined by, or resources given to the station are appropriate and meet the criteria of good
21 governance. Based on the conceptual framework as given here, one can develop a set of
22 questions that are relevant for analyzing the governance of, and institutions involved in AKST
23 investments (Table 8.19).

24
25 **[Insert Table 8.19]**

26 27 **8.3.3 Analyzing the experience of governing AKST investments**

28 8.3.3.1. Public funding /public sector research

29 The model of public sector research organization came to exist in many parts of the world during
30 the second half of the nineteenth century. The founding of the public research organization was
31 based on an assumption that nongovernmental agencies (including private firms and farmers
32 themselves) are unable to mobilize adequate resources and skills required to generate
33 agricultural research (see also 2.2.2). It was then assumed that farmers generally needed to be
34 educated on the benefits of new technologies and did not have any major role in the generation of
35 technology directly. Thus government, either national or regional, provided the resources for the
36 establishment of these research establishments from the taxes, international aid or other assets
37 such as state-owned land. This perception of the farmer, however, has changed in recent years.

38

1 Investment for AKST by governments has been successful on certain counts. It enhanced the
2 capacity of a number of countries to carry out good quality research. In many poor countries,
3 there would not have been any significant level of agricultural R&D without these institutions due
4 to the limited capacity as well as inadequate interest of the private or not-for-profit sectors to
5 provide agricultural R&D, which mostly falls in the public good domain. Government-funding for
6 AKST has also played an important role in enhancing the awareness of farmers, in creating a
7 wide pool of trained personnel and informing policy making at the national level in a number of
8 countries.

9

10 Despite such achievements, this model has had several problems. For example, it did not
11 perform well in assessing the needs of farmers in many parts of the world and it has been fairly
12 slow in responding to social and economic changes. There have been innumerable cases where
13 research investments were directed in a way that they failed to meet set objectives, even if the
14 uncertainty inherent in R&D activities is accounted for. Public organizations were not very
15 successful in taking into account local agroclimatic and socioeconomic features in their research
16 programs (Santhakumar and Rajagopalan, 1995). Efficiency of public R&D organizations is also
17 open to question, and one feature noted in many developing countries is the spending of a
18 greater amount of financial resources to provide the salary of permanently employed staff, with
19 little left for actual research activities, which in turn affect the research output and hence the
20 research efficiency (Eicher, 2001). This may not be directly evident in ROR calculations of
21 agricultural research. It is possible to have high ROR even with these levels of inefficiency. There
22 have been inappropriate resource allocations between capital and operating expenditures in the
23 public sector, resulting in a pool of inadequately trained and equipped personnel, research
24 laboratories without sufficient operational and maintenance funds, or other inefficiencies.

25

26 The fiscal problems of the governments of many developing countries have led to a reduction of
27 resources made available to public research systems, which often reduced the funds available for
28 recurring and operating costs (Premchand, 1993; Eicher, 2001). The rewards of the agricultural
29 staff tend to be misaligned leading to difficulties in keeping the best talent on the one hand, while
30 the indexed salaries of employees without much concern for market wages tend to balloon the
31 overall budget for this purpose. There is also the widely discussed problem of wage erosion,
32 meaning the loss of salary purchasing power, which impacts negatively on commitment and
33 morale of research staff.

34

35 Sometimes allocations of public resources can lead to spending being spread too thinly across
36 commodities, regions and research themes. There can also be other inefficiencies within public
37 organizations leading to wastage of resources, corruption and poor planning in public funded

1 research. Public sector scientists can continue with research on commodities (crops, livestock,
2 and natural resources) and technologies even when farmers move out of these areas due to
3 economic reasons. Some studies show that returns to public sector agricultural extension
4 became low due to the multitude of “non-extension” duties, and that extension agents were not
5 the main sources of technical information to farmers (Isinika and Mdoe, 2001).

6
7 During the 1980s, public research models were reformed to become more participatory. This was
8 to make public research organizations more responsive to the requirements of farmers, especially
9 those that are poor and live in resource-deprived areas (Kaimowitz, 1993). Only limited
10 successes were achieved through such participatory research models. This could be due to the
11 fact that the structure of public research organizations was not reformed. The channels of priority
12 setting do not correspond to the funding channels, in other words, funding is provided from other
13 sources than those setting research priorities (Hartwich and von Oppen, 2000). Another reason
14 could be that the incentives for individual researchers were not always adequately oriented to
15 participatory research. These incentives include not merely additional money but also additional
16 facilities to carry out participatory research, but also intangible ones.

17
18 Public research organizations have also responded to the criticisms on their inefficiency by
19 adopting impact assessment of their efforts, priority setting exercises, and also the introduction of
20 operation and management reforms through measures such as decentralization, accountability,
21 transparency and cost recovery among others (Hall et al., 2000). Moreover there have been
22 efforts to give more autonomy to research organizations, remove them from civil service
23 regulations and to provide greater flexibility to manage their physical, financial and human
24 resources (World Bank, 2000). One can see such examples from the industrialized world. There
25 has also been decentralization of research and extension systems in developing countries
26 including Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, Zambia and Ethiopia (Anandajayasekaram and Rukuni,
27 1999). Similar examples of more pluralism in AKST systems were documented for various other
28 African and Latin American countries (Shao, 1996; Byerlee, 1998; Echeverria, 1998; Heemskerck
29 and Wennink, 2005). But the experiences in different countries are mixed. Research practices
30 and administrative and financial procedures of national research systems have not witnessed any
31 major changes in a number of countries. On the other hand, reforming compensation in the
32 national agricultural system of Chile has made the public research sector more attractive to
33 talented agricultural researchers (Venezian and Muchnik, 1994).

34
35 The resource allocation for public sector research, though ideally driven by considerations of
36 social welfare, is determined in reality by the political economy⁹, i.e. the struggle between the

⁹ The term political economy is used within the framework of 'new political economy' (e.g., Bardhan, 1997) .

1 interests of different societal sections (social groups, regions, growers of specific crops, gender),
2 and also those who dominate decision-making. Evidence from different parts of the world
3 indicates the influence of such political-economy factors in resource allocation for agricultural
4 research. Research and extension spending is linked to the political effectiveness of farm
5 interests (Rose-Ackerman and Evenson, 1985). A study of 37 countries show that structural
6 changes in the economy have important effects on the political incentives to invest in public
7 agricultural research (Swinnen et al., 2000).

8
9 Thus even when agricultural research provides higher returns or has the potential to reduce
10 poverty; it does not get enough investments in the public allocation of resources. Sometimes
11 ideological considerations lead to high priority being placed on certain crops, thus making
12 investments economically inappropriate. For example, perceived notions of food security in
13 certain states of India have led to excessive research investments on food crops even when the
14 region is inappropriate for those particular crops, and hence farmers adopt, diversified
15 commercial crops (Santhakumar and Rajagopalan, 1995; Santhakumar et al., 1995). Gender is
16 an area where political economy influences research investments and outcomes. This manifests
17 itself in certain situations through inadequate investment in research on crops cultivated by
18 women or technologies which would reduce the drudgery of female agricultural workers. In
19 certain other situations, new technologies produced through research lead to the displacement of
20 women workers. An example is access women to ICT, which may be limited because of their
21 reduced physical access to resources and infrastructure, social and cultural norms, education and
22 skills, and poverty and financial constraints (Hambly Odame et al., 2002).

23
24 Does democracy help in achieving the socially desirable objectives through AKST investments?
25 There is no straightforward answer evident from the literature (for example, Diamon and Plattner,
26 1995) on whether democracy vs the responsiveness of governments has a higher degree of such
27 achievement. Even in democratic countries the political process can be captured by narrow
28 interest groups, whose goals do not necessarily aim at overall social welfare. Even if the role of
29 such groups are controlled, democracy is likely to be driven by the preference of the median
30 voter, and there are situations in which the interest of such a voter need not be in tune with the
31 maximization of the overall welfare of the society. Thus, though democracy is valuable by itself,
32 and provides greater opportunity for wider participation in political decision-making, there is no
33 assurance that it will lead to decisions that enhance the welfare of the society as a whole. The
34 lesson for AKST is that democratic governance is not sufficient to ensure effective and efficient
35 investments aimed at achieving larger development goals.

36
37 8.3.3.2. International donors

1 Broadly, international donors are motivated by three objectives in extending funding for ASKT to
2 developing countries. These are:

- 3 • International charity or resource transfer based on altruistic considerations;
- 4 • Correction of international market failure or the provision of international public goods;
5 and/or
- 6 • Expansion of the markets of the donor countries.

7

8 These objectives have motivated international donors to support agricultural research and
9 extension capacity to enhance food production in many developing countries during the last 50 or
10 more years.

11

12 Although international funding for AKST is a major source of support in the developing or poorer
13 countries and domestic research would not have developed without this crucial support,
14 international funding can also create distortions. The availability of international funding at times
15 may encourage domestic players not to mobilize internal resources, which is needed if and when
16 international sources withdraw their support. This is most visible in Africa where donor support to
17 agricultural research has increased in relation to domestic support so that nearly half of the
18 agricultural investment in Africa is from donors including development banks (see 8.1.4). This has
19 perpetuated donor dependence and undermined efforts to develop domestic political support for
20 sustainable funding, especially for the smallholder sector (Rukuni et al., 1998; Eicher, 2001). The
21 allocations of international funds between different types of expenditures, such as between
22 capital and recurring costs do not need to adequately reflect the domestic opportunity cost of the
23 resources. There have been instances where external aid has compounded the inefficiencies in
24 AKST investment decisions in developing countries. The risk of bad investment goes up when
25 grants are easily available (Tollini, 1998).

26

27 Correcting market failures at the international level could be another force driving international
28 donors to fund AKST systems or generation. There are at least two major forms of market
29 failures. There can be international negative externalities, which need action at the international
30 level, but there may also be instances where it is efficient for the international community to take
31 action to address certain problems within the developing countries that have the potential for
32 global impact. The recent incidence of avian flu is a good example. Even if the interest in the
33 industrialized world is to protect itself, financing some activities in developing world on
34 preventative measures at the source of the problem would be a more effective and efficient
35 strategy rather than spending money only on protective activities within the industrialized world.
36 Similar arguments apply for international public goods. Certain technologies or technology
37 generation systems themselves can be seen as international public goods. The ideal strategy

1 would be for the industrialized and developing world to pool their resources together, but there
2 are problems of coordinating such efforts. The severity of lacking such public goods perceived in
3 the industrialized world would encourage them to take proactive steps, whereas developing
4 countries who face other more pressing problems would give low priority. How far AKST
5 investments driven by the requirements of correcting international market failure reflect the
6 economic variables of the world as a whole, would determine their effectiveness, efficiency and
7 outcomes. Moreover, it is important to see that such investments made in the developing world
8 do not create distortions in their economies.

9

10 The expansion of markets or cost-reduction of global production has also driven industrialized
11 countries, multinational firms and multilateral agencies to make AKST investments in developing
12 countries. These, however, raise a number of issues: (i) Trade and nontrade barriers (and
13 associated transaction costs) might influence where such investments take place and at what
14 cost; (ii) Since the domestic institutions in many developing countries are weak, this may lead to
15 an intensification of `market failure' problems in such countries. For example, there are
16 apprehensions on increasing field research of new (genetically modified) seed varieties in
17 developing countries as part of international contract research, without taking adequate
18 safeguards against the unknown long-term impacts of such seed varieties and also for the
19 preservation of local genetic materials.

20

21 The urge to expand the lending of multilateral funding agencies has also received criticism during
22 the last decade. The incentives of the personnel in these agencies could be directed towards
23 excessive lending, and this, combined with the incentive' of political and administrative decision
24 makers of developing countries to borrow excessively (more than what is warranted by the
25 domestic economy considerations), can lead to excessive loans. Whether this incentive problem
26 has affected the efficiency of multilateral funding for AKST in developing countries is an issue that
27 needs to be analyzed.

28

29 8.3.3.3. Competitive funding

30 Block grants have been used for allocating research resources for many years. Now block grants
31 have become less attractive as concerns have been raised about inefficiency in resource
32 allocation, effectiveness and relevance of research as well as exclusion of other stakeholders in
33 the research process, from priority setting to execution of research projects/ programs (McMahon,
34 1992; Echeverria, 1998; Reischneider et al., 1998; Von Oppen et al., 2000). This has led to the
35 gradual evolution of competitive funding mechanisms at the international and national levels.

36 Competitive grants;

- 1 • Allow for a wider network of actors to participate in the research process broadening the
- 2 scientific talent available (Von Oppen et al., 2000);
- 3 • Allow for a possibility to seek a diversity of funding sources (Byerlee, 1998);
- 4 • Improve research quality (Byerlee and Alex, 1998);
- 5 • Improve allocation of research resources (Alston et al., 1995).

6

7 However, competitive funds have the disadvantage of having high transaction costs (Echeverría,
8 1998). Competitive grants take scientists' time (funded through core funding) for preparation of
9 research proposals, and evaluation (Huffman and Johnson, 2001). There is also significant
10 increase in administrative costs for managing research competition. Another disadvantage of
11 competitive grants is that they do not contribute to capacity development in terms of infrastructure
12 and human capital development. They also tend to be of short term in nature, which may divert
13 attention from more crucial research topics and national priorities (Echeverría, 1998). It has been
14 noted in Africa that competitive grants (i) fail to include beneficiaries in the research process (ii)
15 fail to prioritize and hence tend to spread resources too thinly (iii) create uncertainty as to whether
16 the funds are truly competitive and are able to link to performance, given the limited number of
17 researchers in the region (iv) are expensive to operate; and (v) are not sustainable without
18 external donor support. The inherent ex-ante uncertainty in research, asymmetric information that
19 makes monitoring of scientists by administration difficult, and the sharing of risk between funding
20 agencies, administrators and scientists are issues that may make contract-oriented reforms in
21 R&D complex even in industrialized countries.

22

23 8.3.3.4. Commodity boards and growers' associations

24 The growing role of commodity boards, producer-funded or growers' associations, in research is
25 also a related development. Nonprofit organizations constitute a comparatively large share of
26 agricultural research in Colombia and some Central American countries (Beintema and Pardey
27 2001). Colombia has twelve nonprofit institutions, which accounted for about one-quarter of the
28 country's agricultural research investments during the mid-1990s. Many of these agencies began
29 conducting research several decades ago and are funded largely through export or production
30 taxes or voluntary contributions (Beintema et al., 2006). In Africa examples include agencies
31 conducting research on tea (Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, Zimbabwe), coffee (Uganda, Kenya,
32 Tanzania), cotton (Zambia), and sugar (Mauritius, South Africa). There are, however, other forms
33 of nonprofit institutions in a number of countries, including Madagascar and Togo, although these
34 play a limited role in agricultural research (Beintema and Stads, 2006). There is no evidence that
35 the involvement of growers' associations or private sector has added more investment for AKST
36 or have been replacing government funding.

37

1 How far research driven by these agencies is different in terms of efficiency and effectiveness
2 from that in state-funded organizations, especially in the developing world, is a question requiring
3 further investigation. In tea research in India the R&D carried out under planters' association
4 leads to the development of appropriate technology due to the greater awareness of clients'
5 requirements, and faster or timely communication of these technologies to the users (Muliyar,
6 1983). If commodity boards have also a mandate for marketing and/or the provision of other
7 support services (including subsidies), they may have a greater incentive for being effective in
8 terms of technology generation and extension, even if these boards function under the
9 government (Narayana, 1992). In Kenya, acceptable ratios of personnel/operations cost prevail in
10 coffee and tea research, which is financed by a cess. But there are also cases in Kenya where
11 growers associations became politicized and hence being less accountable to the growers
12 (Kangasniem, 2002).

13

14 One concern is that the producers' associations or commodity boards focus on the sole benefit to
15 producers and thereby mostly neglecting the welfare of the consumers and the economy as a
16 whole. It is not uncommon to see the growers associations and commodity boards lobbying for
17 enhanced protection of their products in domestic markets or support for exports, both of which
18 may have a negative impact on domestic consumers. Moreover, the provision of subsidies
19 associated with the propagation of specific technologies, as well as the bureaucratic compulsions
20 of commodity boards may also lead to excessive inducement of farmers to adopt specific
21 production systems, which may not be sustainable in a more market-determined situation. Finally,
22 it is possible that producer organizations may not be the best suppliers of research services
23 except for adaptive on-farm research (Echeverria et al., 1996). These shortcomings provide a
24 justification for continuation of government funding for basic and strategic research even in
25 industrialized countries. Moreover, for crops that have a large number of cultivators such as rice
26 or wheat, the concept of growers' association becomes unmanageable and would have problems
27 similar to those of government-owned research. Additionally, to what extent the small farmers are
28 represented by these associations remains unclear and depends on the commodity and the
29 countries.

30

31 8.3.3.5. Private research

32 In the industrialized countries and the more advanced developing countries, the inadequacies of
33 the public research model led to the gradual emergence of private sector (or broadly market-
34 oriented) reforms in agricultural R&D investments in the late seventies and eighties. This was
35 facilitated by the interests and the capability that the private sector has developed in AKST

1 investments. The structural adjustment policies implemented in many developing countries,¹⁰ the
2 global changes in trade regime and developments in biotechnologies, have also facilitated this
3 transition.¹¹ This transition is manifested in the increase in private sector funding in public sector
4 organizations and universities, and the increase of the research directly carried out by private
5 sector organizations. The commercial or application-orientation of the private sector to some
6 extent fills the gap between technology generation and extension that existed in the public
7 research model. There has been an increasing involvement of the private sector in agricultural
8 extension as well (Umali and Schwartz, 1994).

9
10 There are variations between countries and regions in terms of the contribution of private sector
11 in agriculture research (see 8.1.1). Though private sector investments play an important role in
12 OECD countries, their share in many developing countries continues to remain insignificant. Not
13 surprisingly, there may be a linkage between national income of the countries and the role of the
14 private sector in agricultural research (McIntire, 1998). But the lack of significant private research
15 is also often the result of the legal and administrative environment in many countries (Ahmed and
16 Nagy, 2001).¹² There are indications that mutually negative perceptions of public and private
17 players, unresolved issues of risk and liability, high transaction and opportunity costs act as
18 barriers against the development of public private partnerships (Spielman, 2004; Spielman and
19 Grebmer, 2004).

20
21 Each of these funding mechanisms has advantages and disadvantages. In developing countries
22 where governance structures are still weak, the advantages may not be apparent during initial
23 stages of the funding options (Box 8.3).

24
25 **[Insert Box 8.3]**

26 27 **8.3.4 AKST governance and changes in the larger institutional environment**

28 So far we have considered only the institutions directly governing AKST investments. However
29 the broader institutional environment encompassing the ownership of rights over land, water, and
30 other common property resources would also influence indirectly the governance of AKST
31 investments. The institutions under this category can include land reform, water management,
32 forest protection, international standards related to food products and agricultural imports,
33 international law of the seas, global agreements on climate change and so on. These institutions

¹⁰ See Tabor (1995) for a number of articles dealing with the impact of structural adjustment policies on agricultural research system.

¹¹ Private sector involvement in agricultural biotechnology research started much before, and by the 1990s, private sector investment in this regard has exceeded that of the universities and government owned laboratories (Lewis, 2000).

¹² On the other hand some countries (for example, Thailand) seem to have government policies favorable to private sector research.

1 that set the rules for managing natural resources locally, nationally and internationally would have
2 a direct bearing on the effectiveness, nature and content of AKST investments. Similar is the
3 impact of emerging organizational forms in the trade of agricultural and related commodities. For
4 example, contract farming for export-oriented horticultural crops is expanding in many developing
5 countries, and this will have a bearing on how AKST is generated and used, and consequently
6 how investments are made for this purpose (Porter and Phillips-Howard, 1997; Haque, 1999). It is
7 not only that the effectiveness of AKST investments is influenced by institutions governing natural
8 resource management and use, but, increasingly AKST investments are also seen as solutions
9 albeit partially for sustaining the natural resource base. This is especially important in a context
10 where urban and environmental interests in resources such as land and water compete with
11 farming interests (Farrell, 2004). AKST investments and the institutions of natural resource
12 management are in turn influenced by the wider political and economic institutions of countries
13 and the world. The market expansion in developing countries,¹³ changes in world trade regime,¹⁴
14 structural adjustment policies in many countries, and others are going to influence not only
15 natural resource management but also investments in AKST.

16
17 In addition to these institutions, the way human consumption especially that of food and
18 agricultural commodities changes in the future would have a strong influence on the nature of
19 AKST investments. Though economic variables such as income play an important role, social,
20 cultural and ideological factors do have significant influence on the evolution of human food and
21 consumption systems. There need not be a linear evolution from traditional and home-based
22 subsistence consumption to a full reliance on globally integrated markets for commodities
23 produced with factory-based inputs and modern technology. There are indications from India and
24 China that economic growth and development do not lead to a decline in (if not an increase of)
25 the demand for the so-called traditional systems of food-making or nature-dependent health care
26 systems. This underscores the importance of visualizing different scenarios of future and their
27 likely influence on the investments of AKST. However one probable scenario on the governance
28 of AKST in the near future is outlined below.

29 30 **8.3.5 The future roles of governance and institutional structure**

31 In many developing countries the domestic private sector may continue to play only a small role
32 in the near future. Even in industrialized countries, the new set of research instruments is not
33 going to replace the conventional public research model. It is envisaged that there will be a

¹³ Poorly developed market infrastructure can influence the distribution of gains from agricultural research (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980).

¹⁴ The opening up of an economy may make farmers' price takers, and hence they may become less capable of being the major beneficiaries of agricultural innovations. Changes in trade regime may have a greater potential in changing the distribution of direct benefits of agricultural research in a country than other routes such as better targeting of agricultural research expenditure (Voon, 1994; Sexton and Sexton, 1996).

1 combination of public and private investments with the latter increasing over time. The additional
2 costs associated with competitive funding would encourage the persistence of a combination of
3 conventional forms of funding (such as formula funding) and competitive grants in the near future.
4 However competitive funding as a mechanism complementary to the regular budgetary support
5 seems to be inevitable (Gage et al., 2001), or project funding and institutional grants may have to
6 coexist (Becker, 1982).

7
8 Similarly one should not expect that the private sector is going to replace the public sector even in
9 areas such as agricultural biotechnology in which private organizations have an upper hand.
10 Private sector research will concentrate on areas where (a greater part of the) benefits can be
11 privately appropriated as in export or plantation crops, hybrid seed development or in off-farm
12 processing of agricultural products, and in the diffusion of capital goods such as agrochemicals.
13 For example, USAID recognizes that the private sector will not deliver biotechnology applications
14 for many crops (such as minor or food security crops), will not address all biotic and abiotic
15 production constraints, which are important in developing countries nor will it realize the
16 development of commercial markets in all developing countries (Lewis, 2000). Public sector
17 research will have to fill these gaps. Moreover, some of the conventional market failures
18 associated with agricultural R&D are still important and hence some form of societal or state
19 intervention may continue to be necessary. Some of these market failures, which make private
20 investments alone inadequate, are the following.

- 21 • Given the scale economies in specific research initiatives, competition and existence of
22 multiple firms may not be economical. This would lead to monopoly powers of the existing
23 firms, which would warrant certain regulations to remove entry barriers in order to avoid
24 social losses;
- 25 • Given the features of positive externality or public good associated with the development of
26 agricultural innovations and knowledge, it is very likely that there can be under-investment
27 (less than the socially optimal levels) by private firms in such cases. This may be
28 particularly so in the creation of what can be called basic or pure knowledge where the
29 appropriation or excludability problem is acute;
- 30 • Certain innovations or technologies may have negative externalities especially with regard
31 to environmental pollution or long-term health hazard. This is an area where institutional
32 intervention by the state or society is required to make the private firms internalize these
33 externalities;
- 34 • There can also be a distributional issue which would prompt governments to intervene (that
35 need not necessarily be through state-owned research organizations) to see that
36 technologies that help poorer farmers living in less resource-endowed areas (for example
37 drought prone) are also generated. It is argued that the disbursement of funds in public

1 sector research through competitive grants is likely to generate regional disparities as well
2 as less money for activities such as managing natural resources and the environment,
3 which need not be profitable in market value terms. This too can encourage public support
4 for research, which are not solely based on commercial considerations;

- 5 • Agricultural research has to stand on the firm foundation of higher education. In many
6 countries, including those in the industrialized world, higher education in AKST is closely
7 linked to research laboratories. Higher education is unlikely to thrive solely on profit-
8 oriented investments. This would necessitate the functioning of public/private organizations
9 involved in agricultural research based albeit partially on public funds and endowments or
10 other nonprofit oriented investments.

11

12 However it is very likely that there is more and more rethinking on the specific roles governments
13 (both national and local), funding organizations and public sector research organizations in AKST
14 investments. It is quite possible that state-owned institutions devote more resources on
15 technologies to be used by the poor, and also on environmental conservation and other related
16 areas where due to the externalities, private firms are less likely to invest adequately. (This is
17 based on the assumption that the distributional struggles, political economy and the overall
18 governance, including the role of democracy, are such that poverty reduction and mitigation of
19 externalities become priorities of the governments.) In future there will be more and more public
20 private partnerships in agricultural research and here the experience from OECD countries seem
21 to be successful in making research systems more responsive to the rapid transformation of
22 economy and their innovation requirements (Guinet, 2004). There are multiple ways of enlisting
23 private partnership in public research and here the choice of mechanisms is very important to
24 enhance the overall benefits. Governments and public sector organizations may be more involved
25 in regulation and quality control of products and technologies developed by the scientists from
26 both public organizations and private firms. Scientists may have to encounter more competition in
27 getting research funds not only from international organizations but also from their national
28 governments. The labor market for scientists may also become more flexible with shorter-period
29 incentive-based contracts rather than permanent jobs. Though there is evidence that participation
30 by private partners enables publicly funded research to concentrate on areas where private
31 incentives are weaker (Day-Rubenstein and Fuglie, 1999), care is needed to ensure that
32 institutional changes in public sector and changing sources of funding do not undermine the
33 research agenda of public institutions, especially the generation of knowledge, which may not
34 seem to be profitable and viable by the private firms.

35

36

37

1 **8.4 Investment options**

2 The goal of this international assessment of AKST is to provide policy makers with investment
3 options for meeting the development and sustainability goals. Since no single investment can
4 meet all goals at once, a portfolio of AKST investments are needed. Countries are likely to have
5 different weights on the importance of the different objectives and so alternative combinations of
6 AKST investments will be presented based on whether countries place more weight on
7 environmental goals, improving health and nutrition, reducing poverty and hunger, or maximizing
8 economic growth.

9

10 This subchapter focuses on the research investment options of governments, international
11 organizations, and foundations that support AKST in order to achieve development and
12 sustainability goals. The questions that these organizations would like to be answered include:

- 13 • How much should governments invest in AKST versus other public goods?
- 14 • How should AKST resources be allocated? Which commodities? Where—for example,
15 less favored land, small poor countries? What type of technology—for example, labor
16 using, land saving, or water saving technologies? Which disciplines? Which components
17 of AKST? Which institutions?
- 18 • What methods should be used to decide how much money to invest and how to set
19 AKST priorities?

20

21 The answers to the first two questions need to incorporate multiple criteria, which should include
22 at least public RORs to research as well as the impacts on poverty, human health, and
23 environment (see 8.2). Societies and policy makers who place more emphasis on poverty
24 reduction rather than economically sustainable development or environmental sustainability could
25 place more weight on the AKST investments that reduce poverty than societies that favor
26 improving the environment. Societies with more poor people may place more weight on research
27 to improve the livelihood of the poor than on research to reduce greenhouse gases Countries in
28 which agribusiness plays a big role in the economy and a large role in governance of the public
29 research institutes, may invest more in developing productivity-increasing change

30

31 Formal priority-setting methods, including those based on ROR studies, are in practice only
32 occasionally used to set research priorities, and formal multi-criteria techniques for research
33 resource allocation are used even less (Alston et al., 1995). This is because they are expensive,
34 time consuming, and some factors are difficult, if not impossible, to quantify. The impacts of
35 agricultural research on environment, health and poverty have been particularly difficult to
36 measure (see 8.2.5, 8.2.6, 8.2.8). As a result, most of the studies that we were able to assess
37 and base our policy options on are those of the ROR type. However, making mistakes when

1 investing in AKST can also be a problem - investing money in an AKST project that has little
2 social or economic importance, large negative consequences, or very little chance of succeeding
3 can be even more expensive than formal priority setting. Thus, investing in formal priority setting
4 can save money and have high payoffs. Changes in governance that incorporate users of this
5 technology into the priority setting and evaluation processes can also be productive.

6
7 When looking forward – particularly 50 years forward – people who decide on AKST investments
8 often simply have to look for major problems that appear to be coming and invest to fill gaps in
9 knowledge.

10 11 **8.4.1. Criteria and methods for guiding AKST investments**

12 “Any research resource allocation system, regardless of how intuitive or how formal in its
13 methodology, cannot avoid making judgments on two major questions. What are the possibilities
14 of advancing knowledge or technology if resources are allocated to a particular commodity,
15 problem or discipline? What will be the value to society of the new knowledge or the new
16 technology if the research effort is successful?” (Ruttan, 1982).

17
18 ROR studies and broader comprehensive impact assessments can be undertaken before
19 initiating any AKST investment (ex-ante) or after completion of the R&D activities (ex-post)
20 depending on the purpose. The purpose of undertaking ex-ante assessments is to study the likely
21 economic impact of the proposed investment, to formulate research priorities by examining the
22 relative benefits of the different AKST investments, to identify the optimal portfolio of investments
23 and to provide a framework for gathering information to carry out an effective and efficient ex-post
24 assessment. Thus the greatest benefit of ex-ante assessment is derived from its power to assist
25 decision makers to make informed decisions on investments i.e., in setting priorities to allocate
26 the scarce resources.

27
28 AKST investment priorities are set at both micro and macro levels. More formal quantitative
29 methods are used at the macro level and participatory methods are increasingly being used at the
30 micro level. Priority setting is carried out explicitly or implicitly in all AKST investments through
31 allocation of research resources to different commodities, regions, disciplines problems and type
32 of technology. Since priority setting occurs at various levels of decision making, the resource
33 allocation questions and methods employed vary depending on the level at which priorities are
34 set. Priority setting also requires intensive consultation among and between politicians,
35 administrators, planners, researchers as well as the beneficiaries. Formal procedures facilitate
36 this process as they systematize the consideration of key variables and multiple objectives in the
37 analysis and allow an interactive process to develop.

38

1 Priority setting based on ex-ante assessment employs a range of methods that can be broadly
2 classified into supply-and demand-oriented approaches; although some combination of these
3 approaches is often used in empirical studies. Supply-oriented approaches to priority setting and
4 resource allocation often are conducted at the more aggregative regional and national level and
5 use a variety of methods from informal methods based on previous allocations; discussions and
6 consensus among research managers taking into account national agricultural goals and
7 strategies; to formal quantitative methods such as scoring models, congruency analysis, domestic
8 resource cost ratio, mathematical programming, and simulation techniques. The more
9 sophisticated approaches such as programming and simulation rely on mathematical optimization
10 of a multiple goal objective function to select the optimum portfolio of AKST investment. These
11 are data and skill intensive and thus often quite costly to undertake. Many attempts have been
12 made in the past to use a formal priority setting exercise to ensure that research resources are
13 allocated in ways that are consistent with national and regional objectives and needs. Studies
14 which have been undertaken to assess ex-ante AKST investment priorities have included those
15 employing criteria which include equity and distributive concerns (Fishel, 1971; Pinstrup-
16 Andersen et al., 1976; Binswanger and Ryan, 1977; Oram and Bindlish, 1983; Pinero, 1984; Von
17 Oppen and Ryan, 1985; ASARECA, 2005) those focusing more on efficiency criteria such as
18 congruency (Scobie, 1984); those employing the notion of comparative advantage using domestic
19 resource cost analysis (Longmire and Winkelmann, 1985): those using economic surplus to
20 examine research priorities (Schuh and Tollini, 1979; Norton and Davis, 1981; Ruttan, 1982;
21 Davis et al., 1987, Omamo et al., 2006), and those using an optimization routine (Pinstrup-
22 Andersen and Franklin, 1977; Mutangadura, 1997). One of the most comprehensive studies of
23 research resource allocation lists methods for allocating research resources (Alston et al., 1995).
24 These combine information from scientists, technicians and other experts on the expected output
25 of science, their probability of success and possible timelines with information from economists
26 and other social scientists on what the potential economic and social payoff would be if the
27 research investment is successful. The formal methods have been extended to include
28 environmental consequences of AKST investments (Crosson and Anderson, 1993). The overall
29 aim is to foster consistency of research priorities with goals and objectives and to improve the
30 efficiency of the AKST investments in meeting the needs of the producers, consumers and
31 society at large.

32

33 In demand-oriented approaches, priorities are set based on the perspective of major
34 stakeholders from outside the research system – especially the users. These might employ
35 consultative and participatory methods using various forms of ranking techniques or users
36 themselves might be empowered to make decisions on research priorities. However, it is worth
37 keeping in mind that demand-led and supply-led approaches are not mutually exclusive. Better

1 results can be obtained by combining formal supply-led priority setting with participatory
2 approaches leading to better ownership of resulting priorities and greater chances that the
3 priorities will be translated into actual resource allocation. Even the imperfect participation and
4 empowerment of beneficiaries is likely to produce better results than conventional supply-led
5 approaches on both efficiency and equity grounds, as they can improve the probability of broad-
6 based adoption of technologies and knowledge generated, thereby enhancing innovation
7 capacity. The challenge is to develop a judicious blend of bottom-up (demand-led) and top-down
8 (supply-led) approaches to priority setting incorporating the multiple goals of AKST investments.

9
10 Formal models exist for the ex-ante evaluation of research projects, which are being used
11 increasingly in more industrialized countries to allocate research funds but this is less common in
12 developing countries (Pardey et al., 2006b). Few formal ex-ante models incorporate the goals of
13 reducing poverty and hunger and the environmental consequences as explicit criteria for
14 allocating research resources. Some progress has been made recently to incorporate these
15 aspects in the analytical process. The two ex-ante studies reported in Eastern and Southern
16 Africa (ASARECA, 2005; Omamo et al., 2006) consider the ex-ante benefits of all major
17 commodities and the economic and poverty reduction potential of research investments. In
18 addition, there are specific studies on site-specific maize research in Kenya (Mills et al., 1996)
19 and the research priority setting under multiple objectives for Zimbabwe (Mutungadura, 1997;
20 Mutungadura and Norton, 1999). The extent to which such results are actually used for setting
21 the R&D agenda remains unclear. These approaches (based on expected costs and benefits) are
22 very useful in allocating resources among applied and adaptive research programs and projects.
23 However, they are of very little use to allocate resources between basic, strategic, applied and
24 disciplinary research.

25
26 It is not just methods per se that are problematic; it is also the ability of would-be analysts gaining
27 the requisite skills to use what methods are available. In the context of NARS, the task of
28 developing the needed capacity to address aspects such as environmental and economic
29 assessment of agricultural technology consequences on NRM (Crosson and Anderson, 1993) is
30 still not yet adequately developed, especially in an era of profound under-funding of research, at
31 local, national and regional levels. An important issue in developing and implementing AKST
32 investment priorities is to explicitly incorporate the requirements of those who are expected to
33 benefit from such investments.

34
35 Our approach in this study, which presents the empirical evidence available on the economic,
36 health and environmental impacts of research but does not try to use a formal priority setting
37 process to weight the importance of different criteria, reflects the discussion of well-intentioned,

1 but often misguided attempts to deal with such multi-criteria formulations of research priorities
2 (Alston et al., 1995). The review of methods based on scoring models suggests that there are
3 definitely methodological challenges in such work yet to be satisfactorily dealt with. This fact
4 shows the need of more resources to develop easier and more effective evaluation methods that
5 can include environmental and societal (poverty, nutrition and health) impacts, both positive and
6 negative.

7

8 **8.4.2 Investment options**

9 The ideal social planner would be able to rank research investments by their expected
10 contribution to economically sustainable development, decreased hunger and poverty, improved
11 nutrition and health, and environmental sustainability; and then would solicit weights from society
12 based on the relative value society places on these expected contributions. Each country will
13 have different weights based on the governance of the system and the countries' available
14 resources, their culture, their institutions and their technology. More investment in AKST can
15 make important contributions to the goals of economically sustainable development, hunger and
16 poverty reduction, environmental sustainability, and improvement of nutrition and health.

17

18 The private sector will not make major investments in the provision of public goods, poverty
19 reduction, and the provision of environmental services and health services for which there is no
20 market (see 8.3.5). Therefore most governments, especially in developing countries, need more
21 public sector investments into AKST that will produce public goods and services necessary to
22 reach development and sustainability goals. Few countries are likely to reach the 2% research
23 intensity level of OECD countries, but they will need a major increase in investment in agricultural
24 research intensity from the current level of 0.5% (see 8.1).

25

26 As reported in 8.2.8, studies of seven countries in Asia and Africa showed the returns to
27 agricultural research were high relative to other investments that countries could make such as
28 irrigation, roads, electricity, and other government programs (Fan et al., 2000, 2004ab, 2005; Fan
29 and Zhang, 2004). Agricultural research was one of the leading investments that governments
30 could make to reduce poverty. Research by itself will not lead to poverty reduction, but it can be
31 an important component of a poverty reduction strategy. The other component of AKST in these
32 studies was primary education which also made a major contribution to poverty reduction. The
33 evidence shows that research alone cannot reduce poverty and thus, funding for AKST must be
34 accompanied by other pro-poor policies, such as access to natural resources, equity of
35 distribution, good governance practices, and local market development.

36

1 Projections in chapter 5 of this report show that the baseline scenario will have a limited impact
2 on reducing child malnutrition – it would decline 15% in the reference world (see 5.3.3). However,
3 with increased levels of AKST investments accompanied by other complementary investments,
4 the share of malnourished children is expected to decline. In addition, projections suggest that
5 returns to research will stay high. Under the business-as-usual scenario, the demand for
6 agricultural products will continue to grow rapidly in the next 50 years; resources that are now
7 used to produce agricultural products will be increasingly in short supply - water, land, and clean
8 air; and basic science will move rapidly ahead creating new opportunities for applied science and
9 technology, which will also increase returns to research.

10
11 An additional factor that will be required to keep returns high is good governance (see 8.3).
12 Specifically, the farmers, who will be the primary users of the research, must be included in
13 determining how public money is invested in AKST and how that funding is allocated. In addition,
14 consumers of food and other ecosystem services from agriculture must be represented. Finally,
15 the private sector, which provides inputs to the agricultural sector and purchases, markets and
16 processes agricultural products, must also be represented.

17
18 Private sector investments in agricultural research, innovation, and diffusion of technology and
19 management systems in developing countries are also essential to meeting development and
20 sustainability goals (Pray et al., 2007). While the private sector will not make major investment in
21 the provision of public goods and poverty reduction for which there is no market, private
22 agricultural input companies can be an efficient way to provide poor farmers with inputs such as
23 improved seeds and livestock, which can help improve the incomes of the poor and other private
24 companies can develop and supply farmers with inputs needed to increase their supply of
25 ecosystem services (see 8.1.2 and 8.3.5). By encouraging companies to develop and supply
26 technology and management systems to the commercial sector, the public sector can
27 concentrate its limited resources on research to produce public goods, the development and
28 supply of technology to the poor and the development and diffusion of environmental and health
29 services.

30
31 It appears that the underinvestment in private research in developing countries is even greater
32 than in public sector research. Because of the spillovers of the benefits of technology from private
33 suppliers of technology to farmers and consumers, substantial benefits have accrued to farmers
34 and consumers from private sector research (see 8.2.4 and 8.2.7). The median rate of return to
35 society from research by private firms is 50% (Evenson, 2001). Aggregate studies in India
36 (Evenson et al., 2001) and the US (Huffman and Evenson, 1993) have shown that private
37 research and private imported technology have made major contributions to agricultural

1 productivity growth. Case studies of specific private research programs have shown that the
2 benefits of private research can reach farmers growing poor peoples' crops such as pearl millet
3 and sorghum in rainfed environments such as the semi-arid tropics of India (Pray et al., 1991).
4 Despite these benefits, research investments by the private sector in developing countries lags
5 even farther behind OECD countries than by the public sector investments, both in absolute
6 amounts and in research intensity. Private research investment as a share of Agricultural GDP is
7 0.03% in developing countries and almost 3% in industrialized countries (see 8.1). To induce
8 more private research, governments can invest in educating scientists and technicians and
9 developing research infrastructure such as ex situ and in situ germplasm collections and basic
10 research programs such as enhancing the diversity of plant and animal germplasm, which will
11 generate ideas for new technology in the private sector. It also requires an enabling business
12 environment for private investment (see 8.1). The components of an enabling business
13 environment include a system for protecting intellectual property rights, the ability to enforce
14 contracts, a stable regulatory environment, functioning markets for agricultural inputs and outputs,
15 and so on. To make sure that private investments in AKST meet societies' goals, governments
16 need to put in place incentives that will induce private firms to meet social goals. These incentives
17 can be positive such as payments for environmental services that could induce firms to develop
18 technology to more effectively provide those services. These incentives can also be negative, for
19 example environmental and food safety regulations and liability laws that penalize negative
20 externalities from introduced technologies. In addition, industrial policies that limit monopoly
21 power will also be needed. Government alone cannot enforce regulations and industrial policies.
22 The active involvement of NGOs and other parts of civil society is essential.

23
24 Tradeoffs occur between different development goals when different choices of AKST
25 investments on specific commodities or types of institutions are made (Table 8.20). For example,
26 RORs to wheat research have been high (see 8.2.4), but the research that produced high-yielding
27 wheat varieties may also have induced more irrigation of wheat in poorly drained regions, which
28 has led to increased salinity, destroyed land, and displaced farmers. Pesticide use on wheat is
29 limited so there has been little negative impact of pesticides. Green revolution wheat varieties
30 reduced prices of wheat, which increased consumption of wheat by the poor improving their
31 health. The high yielding wheat varieties during the green revolution period in South Asia
32 increased demand for labor and thus the incomes of the poor (Lipton, 2001). An example of
33 research that has positive effects on economically sustainable development, but a negative
34 impact on other development goals is research to increase the productivity of intensive livestock
35 production. It has high RORs but major negative environmental effects through water and air
36 pollution, and negative health impacts through *E. coli* and other public health crises (see 8.2.5
37 and 8.2.6). At the same time it can have positive health impacts through dramatic declines in the

1 price of meat and poultry, which in turn facilitates access for more people to animal protein and
2 other essential nutrients.

3

4 **[Insert Table 8.20]**

5

6 8.4.2.1. Options for societies aiming to give major support to environmental sustainability
7 For these societies investment in AKST can have three different, but complementary,
8 alternatives: reducing the negative environmental impacts of farming systems, enhancing existing
9 agricultural systems that have been shown to be environmentally sustainable, and developing
10 new agricultural systems. They will have to focus on providing ecosystem services such as
11 reduced greenhouse gas emissions, absorption of the carbon dioxide, reduced water pollution
12 and slowing the loss of biodiversity.

13

14 We have made judgments about the most important negative impacts of agricultural technologies
15 on the environment (see 8.2.5); unfortunately, data is not available to know which of the impacts
16 are most important or which negative impacts could be mitigated most effectively through
17 investments in AKST. This gap suggests that the first important need for AKST investment is for
18 social and ecological scientists working with other scientists to develop methodologies and to
19 quantify the externalities of high and low external input farming systems from a monetary
20 perspective as well as from other perspectives such as the concept of energy flows used in
21 'emergy' evaluations. Evidence on these externalities' potential implications on food security also
22 needs to be analysed.

23

24 There are three other types of AKST investments in which countries can invest. First is research
25 to develop management practices, technologies, and policies that reduce the ecological footprint
26 of agriculture, such as reducing agriculture's use of fossil fuels, pesticides and fertilizers. This
27 would include AKST investments to develop management practices such as: no-tillage systems
28 to reduce use of fossil fuels for tillage, integrated pest management strategies to avoid overuse of
29 inorganic pesticides, integrated soil management technologies to reduce the need for inorganic
30 fertilizer, rotational grazing and support of mixed farming systems to improve the nutrient cycling
31 within agriculture and livestock production. In this area, investments on sustainable and low-input
32 farming practices would also be recommended. AKST investments can also increase agriculture's
33 role as a carbon sink. The greatest dividends would come from conversion from grain crops to
34 agroforestry as there is a benefit from both increased soil organic matter and the accumulation of
35 above-ground woody biomass. Thus, agroforestry can play a major role in the two key
36 dimensions of climate change: mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and adaptation to
37 changing environmental conditions (Garrity, 2004). Other management strategies such as

1 including grasslands within rotations, zero-tillage (or no-till) farming, green manures, and high
2 amendments of straw and manures, would also lead to substantial carbon sequestration (Pretty
3 and Ball, 2001).

4
5 A second type of AKST activity would be the development of biological substitutes for industrial
6 chemicals or fossil fuels. These would include new biopesticides, improvements in biological
7 nitrogen fixation, and search for alternative sources of energy that do not compete with food
8 production and do not induce deforestation. There is some evidence that research in this area
9 can provide a good economic ROR, and the RORs are likely to rise as more governments put
10 policies in place that reward farmers for the provision of these services.

11
12 Third, research to support traditional knowledge on effective ways of using and conserving
13 available resources such as soils, water, and biodiversity to improve rural livelihoods will be
14 required. This knowledge has been neglected but research and management systems based on
15 this knowledge have been shown to have positive ecological and economical impacts in all areas
16 of agriculture (crops, livestock, aquaculture and agroforestry). New nonconventional crops and
17 breeds may play a vital role in the future for conserving local and indigenous knowledge systems
18 and culture, as they have a high local knowledge base which is being promoted through
19 participatory domestication processes (Leakey et al., 2003; World Agroforestry Centre, 2005;
20 Garrity, 2006; Tchoundjeu et al., 2006).

21
22 This may be an area of AKST that had lower returns to public investments research than some
23 other types of research historically. This is due in part to the difficulty of measuring the impact of
24 research in this area and the lack of studies of the impact of these types of research. It is also
25 partly due to the fact that the complementary policies and institutions needed to implement
26 solutions developed by AKST are often not in place. Considering that agriculture and land use
27 contribute to 32% of global emissions, more research is needed to analyse the potential
28 contribution of new and existing but ignored agricultural technologies and practices that could
29 contribute to decreasing global warming and climate change. Another important type of research
30 investment needed is social science research which develops recommendations for policy and
31 institutional changes that reward farmers for reducing the negative externalities, enhancing the
32 multiple functions of agriculture, and for the provision of ecosystem services. Investments in
33 incentives for private sector to develop technologies that assist farmers to provide ecosystems
34 services are also needed.

35

1 For AKST for environmental services to have adequate levels of funding and for the funding to be
2 sustainable, consumers and environmental groups must have a role in the governance of the
3 research system.

4

5 8.4.2.2. Options for societies aiming to give major support to improving nutrition and human
6 health

7 As in the case of the environmental sustainability, this area of AKST investment can adopt
8 several different but complementary goals: to reduce the negative documented impact of
9 agriculture on health and to develop policies and technologies aiming to improve the nutritional
10 and health status of population. The key areas of AKST investment could be in improved quantity
11 and nutritional quality of culturally appropriate food to the poor, safer management or reduction in
12 use of pesticides and research to improve food safety. This is another area for which evidence is
13 lacking and where investments are needed to obtain data on the size of the problem and the
14 potential of AKST to solve it.

15

16 AKST has positive and negative effects on human health (see 8.2.6). Increased plant and animal
17 productivity have reduced prices of these food products and often reduced under-nutrition of the
18 poor and led to more balanced diets. At the same time, increased productivity has led to
19 environmental pollution (of water and air) and overuse of antibiotics and pesticides (including
20 toxic residues in plants and animals and resistance to antibiotics) have lead to serious health
21 impacts. Additionally, problems of growing obesity in industrialized and developing countries are
22 also indirectly linked to AKST.

23

24 The evidence on negative impacts suggests that one area of major AKST investment needs to be
25 on improved pesticide management and the reduction in use of dangerous pesticides and
26 antibiotics (see 8.2.6). In particular investments in IPM and substituting less dangerous chemicals
27 or biopesticides for dangerous pesticides appear to be important investments. Farming systems
28 which improve productivity while using little or no pesticide, chemical fertilizer and antibiotics
29 need to be studied and developed in order to improve their management and increase their
30 potential to feed the local population. Organic agriculture is one type of farming system that
31 reduces pesticide use and has a growing demand, so investments in research to increase the
32 productivity and resilience of organic agriculture would be appropriate.

33

34 AKST investment to develop and implement schemes for food safety and quality standards to
35 improve public health and consumer confidence is a major area in the health portfolio. In addition,
36 investments to increase the nutritional values of crops and livestock products with the objective of
37 improving the nutritional status of global population, such as biofortification, need more emphasis

1 in plant breeding research. Biofortification is one of the few areas where there have been careful
2 studies both of the size of the health problem and that AKST investments can reduce these
3 problems (see 8.2.6).

4

5 Farming system diversification can also improve nutrition. The expansion of vegetable and fruit
6 tree cultivation on farms can have a significant effect on the quality of child nutrition. Many
7 indigenous fruits, nuts and vegetables are highly nutritious (Leakey, 1999b). The consumption of
8 some traditional foods can also help to boost immune systems, making these foods beneficial
9 against diseases, including HIV-AIDS (Barany et al., 2003; Villarreal et al., 2006). If countries
10 neglect investments to improve the farming systems of both subsistence and commercial farmers,
11 major health problems would increase.

12

13 Reduction of nutritional imbalances would require research on educational programs and policy
14 mechanisms to provide appropriate incentives for facilitating the access to healthier products and
15 healthier consumption patterns while penalizing in the market those products leading to nutritional
16 problems, for example, through the internalization in the final price of the products the health
17 costs calculated by means of AKST. Still, more AKST from social sciences is needed in order to
18 find and develop the best policy strategies to avoid malnutrition. The AKST investments to
19 continue the reduction in the numbers of the undernourished through productivity increasing
20 research or better distributional or commercialization strategies of food are described in more
21 detail below in the section on poverty.

22

23 8.4.2.3. Options for societies aiming to give major support to hunger and poverty reduction

24 These societies will need to target investments in research, policy and institutional change in
25 organizations that provide research to produce public goods. These include public research,
26 extension and education programs as well as the international research centers of the CGIAR.

27

28 AKST investments can increase the productivity of major subsistence crops such as rice, wheat,
29 and other basic staples that are grown and/or consumed by the poor (see 8.4.3.1) while
30 respecting the culture and livelihoods of those who produce the food. Investment can also be
31 allocated to the productivity-increasing research in regions where the poor are located, such as
32 rain-fed and marginal areas, even if these are not the areas which would increase total
33 Agricultural GDP the most. Also, investments to preserve biodiversity and traditional systems that
34 maintain the livelihoods of millions of people are required in order to increase the wealth of poor
35 populations in many countries. For example, research on animal genetic resources conservation
36 programs could be directed to increase drought resistance or disease resistance of local
37 domestic breeds. This implies appropriate technologies that do not destroy the environment while

1 at the same time aims to improve the existing local knowledge of traditional farming systems
2 towards the needs of the farmers.

3

4 Research for the poor should aim to develop and maintain crop and animal production techniques
5 that allow extending the assets controlled by the poor such as labor, management skills, or
6 biodiversity with assets owned by the wealthy, such as land.

7

8 Investments in institutional change and policies which improve the access of the poor to food,
9 education, land, water, seeds, markets and improved technology for producing food, better
10 access to jobs, and more influence on the governance of research systems are a major need for
11 reducing poverty (see 8.3.4). The investments in improved institutions might include AKST
12 programs that support small scale agricultural and food industry innovators and public private
13 partnership with the aim to (i) encourage adaptation and adoption of pro-poor technologies from
14 the public research agencies, (ii) adapt scientific discoveries from industrialized countries and, if
15 needed, import technology from them that increases the productivity of poor farmers; and (iii)
16 transfer technology from neighboring countries, which may have developed technology that is
17 more appropriate for poor farmers in developing countries than those of industrialized countries.
18 These technologies can flow through multinational corporations, local private firms, public sector
19 research systems and their regional networks, and farmer-to-farmer communication.

20

21 8.4.2.4. Options for societies aiming to give major support to economically sustainable
22 development

23 These societies should consider investing in AKST which provides evidence of high future (ex
24 ante) RORs. These investments will include some areas that had high ROR in the past such as
25 yield increasing technologies and promise high returns in the future since there will be continued
26 demand for these technologies and science. AKST investments in water management and pest
27 and disease management, which have less history of high returns but are likely to have high
28 returns in the future because of high demand or recent advances in science, would also be
29 included. In addition, some AKST investments that did not have high returns in the past, such as
30 NRM, are likely to have high ROR in the future if policies, such as carbon trading under the Kyoto
31 protocol or subsidies for good environmental practices in agricultural policies, provide incentives
32 to adopt these technologies. It is clear that economically sustainable development can only be
33 achieved if the environment is at the same time preserved

34

35 Governments must continue to invest in AKST to develop productivity-increasing technology and
36 management systems that save on the use or reduce the misuse of scarce resources such as
37 land, water, and in fossil fuels. The major resource constraint to increasing agricultural production

1 in the future will continue to be agricultural land. In the future AKST must focus on increasing
2 output per unit of land through technology and management practices. RORs to land saving
3 research are high. There are a limited number of studies which show substantial returns to land
4 management research. However, future AKST must avoid the negative externalities of past
5 investments in this area.

6

7 Water is the next most important resource constraint to agricultural production and is likely to be
8 even more of a constraint in the next 50 years. AKST resources are being reallocated into water-
9 saving techniques, improved policies and management techniques. The expected ROR to
10 investments in water productivity research may be lower than for germplasm research.

11 Nevertheless, comparing the cost of science-based studies with the costs of inaction (growing
12 poverty, malnutrition and disaster relief) indicates that the benefits of science-based actions
13 vastly exceed the costs (Kijne and Bennet, 2004). Still, a few examples of water-saving research,
14 which were evaluated by SPIA had high returns (Zilberman and Waibel, 2006), and some of the
15 research on drought tolerant crops (both breeding new varieties and recovering existing ones)
16 looks very promising. However, the development of these technologies will take time, and major
17 changes in water pricing policies are likely to be needed to give farmers in irrigated areas
18 incentives to adopt such technologies.

19

20 Fossil fuels in the long run may run out. Concerns about their impact on global warming, and the
21 high price of fossil fuel has once again focused attention on the need for agriculture to save on
22 the use of this scarce resource and support agricultural systems that have higher outputs per unit
23 of sustainable energy. In this context, low-external-input agriculture could bring promising
24 opportunities. There is little evidence yet from the ROR literature of high returns, but the demand
25 is there and agricultural research has the capacity to produce appropriate technologies (see also
26 chapter 6). Since prices are likely to continue to fluctuate due to politics as much as to scarcity,
27 AKST investments by governments will be necessary to develop these technologies and to inform
28 farmers how they may best reduce agricultural use of fossil fuels.

29

30 Major public and private R&D investments will be needed in emerging issues such as plant and
31 animal pest and disease control. Continued intensification of agricultural production, changes in
32 agriculture due to global warming, the development of pests and diseases that are resistant to
33 current methods of controlling them, or changes in demand for agricultural products such as the
34 increasing demand for organic products, will lead to new challenges for farmers and the research
35 system. Investments in this area by the public and private sector have provided high returns in
36 the past and are likely to provide even higher returns in the future. In addition, these investments
37 could lead to less environmental degradation by reducing the use of older pesticides and

1 improving livestock production methods. These technologies could also use more labor, which in
2 labor abundant countries, could reduce poverty. They would also positively impact human health.
3 Pest and disease control is an area in which public and private collaboration is essential.

4
5 Pre-invention, strategic, and basic research can be justified in many countries and in international
6 research centers. The studies that try to estimate the separate impacts of different components of
7 AKST find that both applied and more basic research investments have high returns (see 8.2.4).
8 Advances in basic biological knowledge such as genomics and proteomics, nanotechnology, ICT,
9 and other new advances in AKST will create major new opportunities for meeting development
10 and sustainability goals (see chapter 6). Emerging knowledge of agroecological processes and
11 synergies, and the application of resultant technologies, will play a crucial role in future AKST
12 investments. Both new and existing but neglected knowledge can pay off by increasing public and
13 private development of technologies and management practices that improve agricultural
14 production, mitigate climate change, improve health or reduce poverty. Thus, it is not inherently
15 productivity increasing or polluting but is needed to achieve economically sustainable
16 development. A major increase in private sector research will be needed to increase agricultural
17 productivity growth for developing countries.

18 19 8.4.2.5 A portfolio of AKST investments to meet multiple goals

20 If, as has been argued earlier in this sub-chapter, a large infusion of public funding in AKST is
21 needed, a coalition of interest groups will have to lobby for this increased funding. This suggests
22 that policy makers and advocates for AKST activities that increase environmental sustainability,
23 achieve economically sustainable development, improve nutrition and health, and reduce poverty,
24 should attempt to put together an AKST investment portfolio that attracts groups beyond the
25 traditional agricultural community. The investment areas listed above which can meet multiple
26 criteria could be attractive to these different groups. As indicated above, many AKST investments
27 can meet multiple goals. Other investments primarily meet one goal but still play a valuable role
28 and should not be eliminated because they do not make major contributions to all of the goals.
29 For example, private research to increase poultry productivity may create increased pollution, but
30 this does not mean that governments should try to prevent private poultry research. A more
31 appropriate approach may be to encourage the private sector to do productivity-enhancing
32 research but at the same time prevent the potential pollution through more effective enforcement
33 of laws against pollution, by mandating waste management plans or by public sector research to
34 development management systems which reduce pollution and improved public health.

35
36 One strategy is to make small public investments in an enabling policy environmental that would
37 encourage private research and shift public research into the production of public goods and

1 meeting other social goals such as improving the environment or developing technology for
2 resource poor farmers or into basic research. For example, many countries could reduce their
3 public research investments on improving the productivity hybrid maize, which will be done by the
4 private sector, and shift those resources into productivity-enhancing research on cassava or open
5 pollinated varieties of maize grown by poor people. Or the resources could be shifted into fertilizer
6 and pest management to reduce overuse of chemicals that create pollution and can harm human
7 health. Shifting more public AKST investments to increase the productivity and adoption of
8 organic agriculture for which markets are available can also reduce the use of nonorganic
9 pesticides and chemical fertilizers.

10

11 **8.4.3 Future AKST investment levels and priorities**

12 8.4.3.1. Levels of AKST investments

13 More government funding and better targeted government investments in AKST in developing
14 countries can make major contributions to meeting development goals. The evidence of returns to
15 AKST investments shows that public investments have high payoffs, in the order of 40-50% and
16 can reduce poverty (see 8.2.4 and 8.2.8). These returns are high compared to other public sector
17 investments and evidence shows that AKST investments are one of the most effective ways to
18 reduce poverty. In addition public investments in AKST can be used to reduce agriculture's
19 contribution to global warming and to improve public health. However, to do this public
20 investments must be targeted using evidence other than the ROR, which usually do not include
21 environmental and human health impacts, positive or negative, or the distribution of costs and
22 benefits among different groups.

23

24 Increasing investments in agricultural research, innovation, and diffusion of technology by for-
25 profit firms can also make major contributions to meeting development and sustainability goals.
26 Private firms both large and small have been and in the future will continue to be major suppliers
27 of inputs and innovations to both commercial and subsistence farmers. They will not provide
28 public goods or supply good and services for which there is no market, but evidence shows that
29 there are spillovers from private suppliers of technology to farmers and consumers.. However,
30 private research intensity in developing countries is only one hundredth of the corresponding ratio
31 in industrialized countries. To make the best use of private investments in AKST, governments
32 must provide both government regulations to guard against negative externalities and
33 monopolistic behavior and support good environmental practices providing firms with incentives
34 to invest in AKST.

35

36 8.4.3.2 Allocation of AKST resources

1 Social science research to assist priority-setting, to measure the impact of past AKST
2 investments in health and the environment, to improve AKST and complementary institutions and
3 policies, and to link with indigenous knowledge is a high priority investment. One of the major
4 constraints of this assessment is the lack of evidence on both the positive and negative impact of
5 AKST on the environment, human health, and, to a lesser extent, on poverty reduction (see 8.2.5,
6 8.2.6, 8.2.8). Investments are needed to develop better methodologies and indicators to measure
7 these impacts, both with monetary and nonmonetary values. In addition, investments are needed
8 to develop better methods for measuring the contributions of indigenous knowledge, social
9 science research on institutions and policies, the value of improving governance systems, and
10 better priority-setting tools and methods. Finally more investments are needed in research priority
11 setting processes in developing countries which include both social and natural scientists and
12 input from stakeholders (see 8.4.1).

13

14 AKST investments that can increase the productivity of agriculture and improve the existing
15 traditional systems of agriculture and aquaculture in order to conserve scarce resources such as
16 land, water and biodiversity remains a high priority. The major resource constraint on increasing
17 agricultural production in the future will continue to be agricultural land. AKST must focus on
18 increasing output per unit of land through technology and management practices. Water is the
19 next most important resource constraint to agricultural production and is likely to be even more of
20 a constraint in the next 50 years. AKST resources need to be reallocated into water-saving
21 techniques, improved policies and management techniques. Fossil fuels in the long run will run
22 out and recently high prices due to political conflicts have once again focused attention on the
23 need for agriculture to save on the use of this scarce resource. Since prices are likely to continue
24 to fluctuate with politics as much as on scarcity or their negative externalities, government
25 investments in AKST will be necessary to reduce agricultural use of this resource.

26

27 AKST investment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and provide other ecosystem services is
28 another priority investment area. Agriculture and land use contribute 32% of total GHG emissions
29 (Stern, 2007). Thus, AKST investments to develop policies, technologies and management
30 strategies that reduce agriculture's contribution could facilitate to decreasing global warming. This
31 requires the development of new farming systems, which use fewer technologies, produces less
32 GHG, and builds on indigenous knowledge to improve current cropping systems to be more
33 sustainable. These systems could include practices such as no-tillage systems, integrated pest
34 management strategies, integrated soil management technologies, rotational grazing and support
35 of mixed farming systems to improve the nutrient cycling. A second, complementary type of AKST
36 activity is the development of policies such as payments for environmental services from farmers,
37 which could induce the development and adoption of practices that provide environmental

1 services. In addition, some of the agricultural technologies and policies for provide these
2 ecosystem services can be designed to use the assets of the poor, such as labor in labor-
3 abundant economies which would reduce poverty.

4
5 Major public and private research and development investments will be needed in plant and
6 animal pest and disease control. Continued intensification of agricultural production, changes in
7 agriculture due to global warming, the development of pests and diseases that are resistant to
8 current methods of controlling them, and changes in demand for agricultural products, will lead to
9 new challenges for farmers and the research system. Investments in this area by the public and
10 private sector have provided high returns in the past and are likely to provide even higher returns
11 in the future. In addition, these investments could lead to: less environmental degradation by
12 reducing the use of older pesticides and livestock production methods; more labor use, which
13 could reduce poverty; and positively improve human health of farmers and their families by
14 reducing their exposure to pesticides. This is an area in which public and private collaboration is
15 essential.