

GLOBAL IAASTD REPORT CHAPTER 7

Options for Enabling Policies and Regulatory Environments

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1 **Key Messages**

2 **1. Policy approaches to improve natural resource management and the provision of**
3 **environmental services benefit from security of access to and tenure to resources and**
4 **land and the explicit recognition of the multiple functions of agriculture.** Options include
5 increased investment in sustainable surface water delivery to stop aquifer water-mining;
6 establishment and strengthening of agencies administrating large water systems that cross
7 traditional administrative boundaries; systems for monitoring forest conditions and forest dwellers'
8 welfare; more resource efficient use, more transparent allocations of use and better enforcement
9 of regulations over forests and lands; and recognition of communal rights of local and indigenous
10 communities.

11
12 **2. Mechanisms to better inform and democratize AKST policy making are**
13 **fundamental to achieving development and sustainability goals.** The complexities of the
14 globalizing world require vast amounts of knowledge for informed policy development on
15 emerging technologies, trade, environmental and other issues to support the objectives of the
16 IAASTD. Options include increased comparative technology assessment, strategic impact
17 assessment, and increased trade capacity development for developing countries. Strongly
18 improved governance is needed to respond to discontinuities arising from global environmental
19 change and conflict. Options include adoption of enhanced governance mechanisms at all levels
20 (i.e., to institutionalize transparency, access to information, participation, representation and
21 accountability) will help assure that social and environmental concerns, including those of the
22 small farm sector, are better represented in local, national and international policy making.

23
24 **3. Market mechanisms to internalize environmental externalities of agricultural**
25 **production and reward the provision of agroenvironmental services are effective to**
26 **stimulate the adoption of sustainable agricultural practices and improve natural resources**
27 **management.** Market mechanisms include payment/reward for environmental services (PES) is
28 one approach that recognizes the multifunctionality of agriculture, and creates mechanisms to
29 value and pay for the benefits of ecosystem services provided by sustainable agricultural
30 practices such as low-input/low-emission production, conservation tillage, watershed
31 management, agroforestry practices and carbon sequestration. Other approaches include, taxes
32 on carbon and pesticide use to provide incentives to reach internationally or nationally agreed
33 use-reduction targets, support for low-input/low-emission, incentives for multiple function use of
34 agricultural land to broaden revenue options for land managers, and carbon-footprint labeling of
35 food. Incentive and regulatory systems structured to generate stable revenue flows that contribute
36 to long-term sustainability of service-providing landscapes will benefit small-scale farmers and
37 local communities.

1

2 **4. Decisions around small-scale farm sustainability pose difficult policy choices.**

3 Special and differential treatment is an acknowledged principle in Doha agricultural negotiations
4 and may be warranted for small farm sectors without a history of government support. New
5 payment mechanisms for environmental services by public and private utilities such as catchment
6 protection and mitigation of climate change effects are of increasing importance and open new
7 opportunities for the small-scale farm sector.

8

9 **5. Opening national agricultural markets to international competition before basic
10 national institutions and infrastructure are in place can undermine the agricultural sector,
11 with potential long-term negative effects for poverty alleviation, food security and the**

12 **environment.** Some developing countries with large export sectors have achieved aggregate
13 gains in GDP, although their small-scale farm sectors have not necessarily benefited and in many
14 cases have lost out. The poorest developing countries are net losers under most trade
15 liberalization scenarios. These distributional impacts call for differentiation in policy frameworks
16 as embraced by the Doha work plan (special and differential treatment and non-reciprocal
17 access). Trade policy reform aimed at providing a fairer global trading platform can make a
18 positive contribution to the alleviation of poverty and hunger. Developing countries could benefit
19 from reduced barriers and elimination of escalating tariffs for processed commodities in
20 developed countries; deeper preferential access to developed country markets for commodities
21 important for rural livelihoods; increased public investment in local value addition; improved
22 access for small-scale farmers to credit; and strengthened regional markets.

23

24 **6. Intensive export oriented agriculture has increased under open markets, but has
25 been accompanied in many cases by adverse consequences such as exportation of soil
26 nutrients, unsustainable soil or water management, or exploitative labor conditions. AKST**

27 innovations that address sustainability and development goals would be more effective with
28 fundamental changes in price signals, for example, internalization of environmental externalities
29 and payment/reward for environmental services.

30

31 **7. Better integration of sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS) and policy and
32 regulation related to food safety, plant and animal health needs to be better integrated
33 internationally to more effectively utilize the limited national resources that are available
34 for issues.**

35 Strong international food safety standards are important but present major regulatory
36 costs for developing countries; lack of resources means that these countries are often only able
37 to implement SPS standards for the purpose of trade facilitation with little benefit to domestic
consumers who are affected by a wide array of food-borne illnesses. Confining Codex, OIE and

1 IPPC to work within their constitutional mandates may be of less relevance today given the
2 globalization of agriculture and trade. The efficacy of working within the traditional international
3 mandates is challenged by the emergence of alternative regulatory mechanisms that integrate
4 food safety, animal and plant health related standards and production practices in on-farm
5 HACCP plans. Revising SPS-related policy and regulatory measures within a biosecurity
6 framework may be one option for promoting cross-sectoral interventions, as is increased
7 international support for domestic application of food safety measures in developing countries.

8
9 **8. IPRs may undermine research and use of ASKT to meet development and**
10 **sustainability goals.** Even though license agreements may promote technology transfer by
11 clarifying roles and responsibilities in some cases, policy mechanisms are needed to protect and
12 remunerate traditional knowledge and genetic resources used to develop industrialized products.
13 Even though IPRs have a role in a commercial approach to innovation, in many countries it is the
14 public sector research institutions that promote the introduction of IPRs in agriculture. This
15 promotion may be at odds with the public tasks of contributing to poverty alleviation and
16 household nutrition security. Reliance on IPR based revenues is likely to lead to a change in
17 public research priorities from development to business opportunities, e.g., commercial crops like
18 maize and oil crops at the cost of research on small grains and pulses.

19
20 **9. Climate mitigation options employing the agricultural sectors are not well covered**
21 **under current national and international policy instruments. A much more comprehensive**
22 **agreement is needed that looks forward into the future if we want to take full advantage of**
23 **the opportunities offered by agriculture and forestry sectors.** Achieving this could be
24 accomplished through, among other measures, a negotiated global long-term (30-50 years),
25 comprehensive and equitable regulatory framework with differentiated responsibilities and
26 intermediate targets. Within such a framework there could be a modified Clean Development
27 Mechanism, with a comprehensive set of eligible agricultural mitigation activities, including:
28 afforestation and reforestation; avoided deforestation, using a national sectoral approach rather
29 than a project approach to minimize issues of leakage, thus allowing for policy interventions; and
30 a wide range of agricultural practices including zero/reduced-till, livestock and rice paddy
31 management. Other approaches include reducing agricultural subsidies that promote GHG
32 emissions and mechanisms that encourage and support adaptation, particularly in vulnerable
33 regions such as in the tropics and sub-tropics.

34

1 **7.1 Natural Resources and Global Environmental Change**

2 “We are moving now into new, post-industrial, third-generation agriculture (TGA). The challenge
3 for TGA is to combine the technological efficiency of second-generation agriculture with the lower
4 environmental impacts of first-generation agriculture. Policy tools, many of which are now
5 available, must be further developed and integrated. Through a combination of regulation against
6 pollution and degradation, the creation of markets for public goods through the rural development
7 regulation, and enabling and educating consumers to opt for goods produced to high
8 environmental standards, the environmental benefits of agriculture could be delivered to a high
9 level alongside outputs of food and fibre.” (Buckwell and Armstrong-Brown, 2004)

10

11 **7.1.1. Resources, processes of change and international, national and local policies**

12 The broad history of the relation between natural resources, i.e. the natural world, and agriculture
13 has been one of a slow transition from small patches of agriculture in a surrounding matrix of
14 natural habitat, to one of small patches of natural habitat embedded in a matrix of agricultural or
15 otherwise human influenced land. This trend is likely to continue at the global level over the next
16 50 years.

17

18 There is an obvious, but in fact poorly quantified, two-way interaction between agricultural land
19 and natural systems. This interaction has changed significantly as the global “footprint” of
20 agriculture has expanded. Natural systems provide “services” to agriculture both as sources of
21 environmental goods (provisioning services) and also as sinks (regulating services), whilst
22 agriculture often acts as a driver in natural resource degradation. Natural systems provide not
23 only environmental goods and provisioning and regulating services. In Millennium Ecosystem
24 Assessment (MA) terms, the most critical services natural systems provide to agriculture are
25 “supporting services,” such as nutrient cycling, pollination. Over the past 50 years, agriculture has
26 gone from being a relatively minor source of off-site environmental degradation to becoming a
27 major contributor to natural resource depletion and degradation, acting through habitat loss and
28 fragmentation, invasive alien species, unsustainable use (over harvesting), pollution (especially of
29 aquatic systems) and, increasingly, climate change.

30

31 Policy responses to this trend toward natural resource degradation have occurred at international,
32 regional and local levels. An essential component of all necessary policy reforms for mitigating
33 agricultural impacts is to integrate environmental, natural resource, and biodiversity concerns into
34 policy making at the highest possible level in order to achieve the necessary facilitation and
35 leverage on lower-level policies. For example, in the European Union the revised EU Sustainable
36 Development Strategy (EUSDS II) includes biodiversity conservation, but still lacks an
37 overarching commitment to reduction in drivers that other sectoral policies could then address in

1 more detail within the stronger mandate provided by EUSDS II. Further revision of the EU-SDS
2 could provide better integration of the EU's internal and global commitments (WSSD, Doha and
3 Monterrey) and provide better harmonization between different European sustainable
4 development processes (Cardiff, Lisbon, Gothenburg and Johannesburg) and instruments
5 (Extended Impact Assessment and Indicators for Sustainable Development). High level
6 integration can also be achieved, to some extent, via Multilateral Environmental Agreements
7 (MEAs), for example through the agreed Programme of Work for Agricultural Biodiversity of the
8 UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).

9
10 The CBD Agricultural Biodiversity work program focuses on (i) assessing the status and trends of
11 the world's agricultural biodiversity and of their underlying causes, as well as of local knowledge
12 of its management, (ii) identifying and promoting adaptive-management practices, technologies,
13 policies and incentives, (iii) promoting the conservation and sustainable use of genetic resources
14 of actual/potential value for food and agriculture, (iv) assessing the impact of new technologies,
15 such as modern biotechnology in general and Genetic Use of Restriction Technologies (GURTs)
16 in particular. The work program also has cross-cutting initiatives for conservation and sustainable
17 use of pollinators and soil biodiversity, studies the impacts of trade liberalization on agricultural
18 biodiversity, identifies policy to promote mainstreaming and integration of biodiversity into sectoral
19 and cross-sectoral plans and programs. But the CBD is a framework, or umbrella agreement that
20 requires its constituent Parties to adopt policies and enact legislation for effective implementation
21 of its Decisions.

22
23 Even if its Decisions are adopted and implemented fully at the national level, there is a danger
24 that the CBD, like many other policy instruments, will be continually "running behind the future,"
25 (e.g., the CBD 2010 Target) to significantly reduce the rate of biodiversity loss. Historically, the
26 principal policy instrument has been the establishment of protected areas, although this has been
27 ineffective where prime agricultural land and high biodiversity compete, as can be seen by the
28 under-representation of lowland, fertile land in the majority of current national protected area
29 systems (WCMC, 2006).

30
31 Broadly, natural habitats around the world can be divided into three categories, each requiring
32 different, but overlapping or integrated sets of policies to ensure their survival in the long-term
33 (Chomitz, 2007). The first category can be defined as wilderness: the majority of the land (or
34 aquatic) area is natural, and anthropogenic land use has had a minor impact. With the exception
35 of the major tropical rainforest regions of Amazonia, the Congo, Indonesia and Papua New
36 Guinea, the majority of these areas are in temperate regions and do not harbor high levels of
37 biodiversity, although they may provide valuable ecosystem services, especially in terms of water

1 supply and carbon sequestration. Policies that promote establishment of protected areas in these
2 regions are still feasible due to lack of pressure from alternative land use, but even in these
3 areas, protected area design must consider the external threats arising from climate change (e.g.,
4 increased wild fires, and global transport of pollutants).

5
6 The second major category of land could be termed frontier: land potentially suitable for
7 agriculture that is close to an expanding agricultural system. Effective policies for the sustainable
8 management of natural resources in these areas are difficult to design and implement. In most
9 countries, traditional concepts of agriculture are used to develop protection policies based on the
10 ecosystem representation and species richness as sole criteria. However, (*sensu* Peres and
11 Terborgh, 1995) the development of sustainable natural resource management policies in terms
12 of local community support and resilience in the face of climate change will be critical in coming
13 years. Also critical will be the acknowledgement that appropriate policies and institutional
14 arrangements (e.g., providing positive incentives to farmers to adopt sustainable soil
15 management practices in areas where soils are depleted) can ultimately result in improved
16 natural resources quality through agricultural use (Izac, 1997).

17
18 Increasingly, improved methods of measuring and mapping total ecosystem value of natural land
19 are allowing land-use planners and land-holders to make informed economic decisions based on
20 a broader range of criteria than agricultural production alone (Troy and Wilson, 2006). This is
21 allowing policy makers to introduce land-use planning “rules” (zoning) and economic incentives to
22 better conserve natural environments in complex agricultural land-use mosaics.

23
24 At a relatively large scale, this kind of planning is increasingly emerging in the Brazilian Amazon
25 and Atlantic rainforests, (Campos and Nepstad, 2006; Wuethrich, 2007, respectively), where
26 government and land-holders are slowly forging agreements on establishment of a complex
27 mosaic of protected areas, sustainable use forests and agricultural land. This represents a shift in
28 policy away from prescriptive land use decisions made by the imposition of protected area on
29 unwilling land-users towards the use of incentives, including payments for conservation. Auction
30 bids for direct payments for conservation services such as native forest protection, reforestation,
31 and restoration of riparian vegetation can further improve efficiency (Chomitz et al., 2006). Under
32 this type of policy, eligible landowners voluntarily decide whether to apply for participation, and
33 the resultant conservation network emerges as a consequence of many independent choices
34 about participation. Similar incentive-based schemes may be found in the US Conservation
35 Reserve Program (CRP), the Bush Tender program in Australia and the Costa Rica
36 Environmental Services Payment program (see references in Chomitz et al., 2006).

37

1 In the more “crowded” landscapes of Europe and the west coast of the USA, where remaining
2 natural land exists in an agricultural and urban matrix rather than the converse, similar trends
3 towards land use planning based on ecosystem service valuation and “multifunctionality” are
4 being explored (Zander et al., 2007). In California, a spatially explicit conservation planning
5 framework to explore trade-offs and opportunities for aligning conservation goals for biodiversity
6 with six ecosystem services (carbon storage, flood control, forage production, outdoor recreation,
7 crop pollination, and water provision) has been used. Although there are important potential
8 trade-offs between conservation for biodiversity and for ecosystem services, a systematic
9 planning framework offers scope for identifying valuable synergies (Chan et al., 2006).

10
11 In Europe, agroenvironmental subsidies have been used as incentives to maintain and promote
12 biodiversity-friendly land use on agricultural land. There has been some criticism that the
13 schemes do not deliver all of the environmental and biodiversity benefits for which they were
14 designed, especially as the scale of implementation becomes too small and fragmented
15 (Whittingham, 2007). One option that avoids this situation is the adoption of regional planning
16 approaches (e.g., the OECD environmental farm plan programs) to generate more coordinated
17 land use patterns across larger landscapes (Manderson et al., 2007).

18
19 A recent summary (Chan et al., 2006) of the policies for sustainable development at the interface
20 between tropical forest and agriculture shows how these can be used to promote the trends
21 described above:

22 *At the international level:*

- 23 • Mobilize carbon finance to reduce deforestation and promote sustainable agriculture.
24 • Mobilize finance for conservation of globally significant biodiversity.
25 • Finance national and global efforts to monitor forests and evaluate the impacts of forest
26 projects and policies – including devolution of forest control.
27 • Foster the development of national-level research and evaluation organizations through
28 twinning with established foreign partners.

29
30 *At the national level:*

- 31 • Create systems for monitoring forest conditions and forest dwellers’ welfare, make land
32 and forest allocations and regulations more transparent, and support civil society organizations
33 that monitor regulatory compliance by government, landholders, and forest concessionaires. The
34 prospect of carbon finance can help motivate these efforts.
35 • Make forest and land use regulations more efficient, reformulating them to minimize
36 monitoring, enforcement, and compliance costs. Economic instruments can help.

37 In wilderness areas:

- 1 • Avert disruptive races for property rights by equitably assigning ownership, use rights,
2 and stewardship of these lands.
- 3 • Options for forest conservation include combinations of indigenous and community rights,
4 protected areas, and forest concessions. Some forests may be converted to agriculture where
5 doing so offers high, sustainable returns and does not threaten irreplaceable environmental
6 assets.
- 7 • Plan for rational, regulated expansion of road networks—including designation of
8 roadless areas.
- 9 • Experiment with new ways of providing services and infrastructure to low-density
10 populations.

11
12 *In frontier areas:*

- 13 • Equitably assign and enforce property rights.
- 14 • Plan and control road network expansion.
- 15 • Discourage conversion in areas with hydrological hazards, or encourage community
16 management of these watersheds.
- 17 • Use remote sensing, enhanced communication networks, and independent observers to
18 monitor logging concessionaires and protect forest-holders against encroachers.
- 19 • Consider using carbon finance to support government and community efforts to assign
20 and enforce property rights.
- 21 • Encourage markets for environmental services in community-owned forests.

22
23 *In disputed areas:*

- 24 • Where forest control is transferred to local by communities, build local institutions with
25 upward and downward accountability.
- 26 • Where community rights are secure and markets are feasible, provide technical
27 assistance for community forestry.
- 28 • Make landholder rights more secure in “forests without trees.”
- 29 • When forest tenure is secure, use carbon markets to promote forest regeneration and
30 maintenance.

31
32 *Mosaic lands:*

- 33 • Reform regulations to reward growing trees. Promote greener agriculture—such as
34 integrated pest management and silvo-pastoral systems—through research and development,
35 extension efforts, community organization, and reform of agriculture and forest regulations.
- 36 • Develop a wide range of markets for environmental services—carbon, biodiversity, water
37 regulation, recreation, pest control— to support more productive, sustainable land management.

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7.1.2 Reducing the impacts of climate change and the contribution of agriculture to climate change

Agriculture can contribute to climate change in four major ways:

- Land conversion and plowing releases large amounts of stored carbon as CO₂ from original vegetation and soils,
- Carbon dioxide (CO₂) and particulate matter is emitted from fossil fuels used to power farm machinery, irrigation pumps, and from drying grain, etc., as well as fertilizer and pesticide production;
- Nitrogen fertilizer applications and related cropping practices such as manure applications and decomposition of agricultural wastes result in emissions of nitrous oxide (N₂O); and
- Methane (CH₄) is released mostly through livestock digestive processes and rice production.

The share of the agricultural sector to total global GHG emissions is approximately 58% of CH₄ and 47% of N₂O making it a significant contributor with a good deal of potential for reduction in emissions in mitigation strategies (Smith et al., 2007). With appropriate policies, each of these well-known sources of GHG can be mitigated to some extent.

Many of these mitigation options are “win-win” as long as they are supported by policy interventions that remove entry barriers and reduce transaction costs. For example, lower rates of agricultural extensification into natural habitats and the re-use/restoration of degraded land, could be encouraged through the participation of farmers in emissions trading, or biofuel production. Farmers can benefit financially depending on the amount of credits generated through carbon storage projects under the Kyoto Protocol, as is already occurring in a number of countries. Despite some transaction costs associated with quantifying and maintaining stored carbon, farmers who implement conservation agriculture; use cover crops to reduce erosion; or reforest degraded lands with tree species that have commercial value could profit financially by selling their credits in an emissions trading market. Agricultural N₂O and CH₄ mitigation opportunities include proper application of nitrogen fertilizer, effective manure management, and use of feed that increases livestock digestive efficiency. To date, there is little policy or legislation that recognizes the ability of the agricultural sector to provide GHG reductions through mitigation of N₂O and CH₄ and that provides positive incentives for farmers to adopt more sustainable practices.

Under the Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), deliberate land management

1 actions that enhance the uptake of carbon dioxide (CO₂) or reduce its emissions have the
2 potential to remove a significant amount of CO₂ from the atmosphere in the short and medium
3 term. The quantities involved may be large enough to satisfy a portion of the Kyoto Protocol
4 commitments for some countries (but are not large enough to stabilize atmospheric
5 concentrations without additional major reductions in fossil fuel consumption). Carbon
6 sequestration options or sinks that include land-use changes (LUCs) can be deployed relatively
7 rapidly at moderate cost and could play a useful bridging role while new energy technologies are
8 being developed. A challenge remains to find a commonly agreed and scientifically sound
9 methodological framework and equitable ways of accounting for carbon sinks. These should
10 encourage and reward activities that increase the amount of C stored in terrestrial ecosystems
11 but at the same time avoid rewarding inappropriate activities or inaction. Collateral issues, such
12 as the effects of LUC on biodiversity and on the status of land degradation, should be addressed
13 simultaneously with the issue of carbon sequestration in order to exploit potential synergies
14 between the goals of UN CBD, CCD, and CCC conventions and the Kyoto Protocol. Such
15 measures would also improve local food security and alleviate rural poverty (FAO, 2004b).

17 **7.1.3. Managing the natural resource base of agriculture**

18 7.1.3.1 Soils, nutrients and pests

19 **Soils:** Multifunctional agriculture recognizes the many ecosystem services of soil, including: (a)
20 services that support the growth of plants, including nutrient regulation, water supply and water
21 cycle; (b) storage of carbon in soil organic matter and hence regulation of GHGs; (c) regulation of
22 the impact of pollutants through biological activities and absorption on soil particles; (d) habitat for
23 a very large component of biodiversity (e.g., soil microorganisms and invertebrates); (e)
24 biodiversity pool, such as habitats, species and genes; (e) physical and cultural environment for
25 humans and human activities; (f) source of raw materials; (g) archive of geological and
26 archeological heritage (Kibblewhite et al., 2007). The framework European Commission strategy
27 for soil protection (CEC, 2006) is based on identification of risk of loss of function, and the putting
28 place of remediation measures to mitigate threat. Many of these remediation measures could be
29 applied to agricultural lands, but will need to be driven by a different mix of command and control,
30 incentive based, or market-based trading policy measures appropriate to different situations.
31 Policies based on payments per tonne C or market sales of C are likely to be more efficient than
32 those based on a per hectare basis, but will require new methods and techniques to provide cost
33 effective information about the relationship between carbon sequestration and land quality, use
34 and management in addition to estimates of base line for effective enforcement and verification
35 (Antle and Mooney, 2002). Policy measures that promote carbon sequestration in soils would
36 most likely generate positive results for the other functions listed above (Swift et al., 2004).

37

1 Projected increases in certified organic agriculture raise additional sets of opportunities for AKST
2 to contribute to maintaining productivity and soil nutrient levels while controlling costs and
3 improving labor efficiencies (Ch 5). Policy options for reforming institutional environments,
4 policies and programs to be more conducive to sustainable agricultural methods (Egelyng and
5 Høgh-Jensen, 2006) include:

- 6 ➤ Investing in the development of organic certification (and small-scale) compliant pest-,
7 weed- and soil nutrient management-, particularly non-proprietary, methods, such as biocontrol
8 using natural enemies, and non-chemical, cultural methods of pest management and similar
9 public good types of AKST.
- 10 ➤ Reforming tax systems to shift the conditions under which certified organic farming
11 compete with energy intensive agricultural systems, involving a shift from taxing wages towards
12 taxing pollution and consumption of resources. (Ch 2)
- 13 ➤ Increasing awareness of organic certification to domestic consumers in developing
14 countries;
- 15 ➤ Supporting development of methods for organic certification compliant pest (and weed)
16 and soil nutrient management, particularly non-proprietary, methods for the public good, such as
17 biocontrol using natural enemies, non-chemical, and cultural methods of pest management.
- 18 ➤ Supporting AKST to further energy efficiency in organic agriculture;
- 19 ➤ Developing certified organic seeds that are better adapted to low-input farming
20 landscapes (Ch 2).
- 21 ➤ Investing in low external input technologies aimed at soil fertility improvement. [Ch 6]

22

23 *Nutrients:* Although in many countries policies for reductions of point source pollution have been
24 successfully introduced, controlling non-point source pollution remains a more difficult challenge.
25 Agriculture's contribution to non-point source pollution varies widely as a complex function of land
26 use, cropping system, soil type, climate, topography, hydrology, animal density, and nutrient
27 management techniques. Despite this complexity, research based nutrient management practices
28 that are effective at reducing non-point source pollution are available. Wider implementation of
29 currently recommended nutrient management plans is important for further gains in
30 environmental quality.

31

32 Site-specific, nutrient management planning should guide the implementation of agricultural
33 nutrient management practices that will be profitable and protective of the environment. Modern
34 agricultural science innovations can increase not only efficiency of production, but also efficiency
35 of nutrient use. Examples include (i) increased plant nutrient recovery and nutrient retention by
36 animals; (ii) improved understanding and modeling of the fate and transport of nutrients in soils;

1 and (iii) development of mitigation and bioremediation strategies such as wetlands, riparian
2 buffers, and filter strips to limit total nutrient exports from agricultural systems.

3
4 Adoption of efficient agricultural nutrient management practices may be limited by current market
5 processes that do not provide for positive or negative externalities and the politics of crop and
6 animal production. Social and political pressures to prevent nutrient overloads from agriculture
7 are increasing, but many in the sector cannot afford the high transaction costs to introduce
8 mitigation measures and maintain profits under current agricultural business models without
9 subsidies. In countries where these subsidies have been introduced the key policy challenge is to
10 improve cost effectiveness through competitive bidding; environmental cost-benefit analysis; and
11 performance-based payments for farmers to remove environmentally sensitive land from crop
12 production.

13
14 **Pests:** Invasive alien species (IAS) are a threat to global biodiversity and can have devastating
15 effects on both agricultural and natural systems at large scales after small isolated introductions.
16 A major policy challenge from IAS is the fact that the vast majority of current and future IAS were
17 either poorly known species, or were unknown as pests, before their introduction to a new
18 location. This is the main reason for the failure of past policies to deal with IAS, even those using
19 the best available risk assessment methodologies (Keller et al., 2007).

20
21 Future IAS policies should be based on the following principles in order to mitigate this weakness.

- 22 • National IAS systems should be linked to regional and global databases of known IAS
23 and their treatment;
- 24 • IAS control systems should be based on a “pathways of entry” approach where detection
25 and control effort is focused on the most likely points of entry into a country (or region).
26 Introductions of IAS occur through various channels or pathways, both intentionally and
27 unintentionally. Primary pathways of intentional introduction of potential IAS include horticultural
28 products, food products, and exotic pets, the use of non-native organisms in aquaculture and for
29 restocking of marine and inland water systems for commercial and recreational fisheries;
30 scientific research; horticulture; trade in pets and aquarium species; biocontrol agents; and ex situ
31 breeding projects. Pathways of unintentional introductions include ballast water and ballast
32 sediments, ship hulls, packaging materials and cargo containers, garbage and waste,
33 international assistance programs; tourism; military activities, and unprocessed materials, such as
34 timber.
- 35 • Risks posed by pathways of IAS prior to introduction and establishment should be
36 addressed and mitigated both before the IAS reach the border and at the border. Preventing
37 introductions before they occur is the most effective and cost-efficient approach to addressing

1 IAS issues. Removing IAS once they have become established requires significantly more
2 financial, technical, and personnel resources than preventing their introduction; and, often,
3 complete removal is not even possible.

- 4 • An operating principle of the system should be that it is based on a list of approved
5 species for deliberate introduction, and that any species not on the list must pass through a risk
6 assessment process before being approved for entry.

7

8 A number of policy initiatives have been undertaken for specific major pathways of introduction
9 including:

10 ➤ *Importation of living plants and plant material.* Many attempts are being made to address
11 plant-related pathways of invasive species. One voluntary initiative, based on the Missouri
12 Botanic Garden St. Louis Declaration, is developing and implementing self-governed and self-
13 regulated codes of conduct for nursery professionals, government agencies, the gardening public
14 (specifically Garden Clubs), landscape architects, and botanic gardens/arboreta, designed to stop
15 use and distribution of invasive plant species. Working with these respective industries, the
16 process has generally appealed to the responsible use and import of horticultural products by the
17 private sector to minimize the introduction of IAS. There is an urgent need for the IPPC to more
18 effectively address, perhaps through a quarantine/sterilization-based ISPM, based the problem of
19 “hitchhikers” on horticultural products, which are potential IAS, but may not be considered plant
20 pests per se (e.g., spiders, ants).

21 ➤ *FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries.* This code includes a section
22 encouraging the use of legal and administrative frameworks to promote responsible aquaculture,
23 including discussions with neighboring states prior to the introduction of non-indigenous species,
24 minimizing the impacts of nonindigenous or genetically altered fish stocks, as well as minimizing
25 any adverse genetic or disease impacts. While the Code serves as a useful guide, it is not
26 focused on specific prevention, management and control measures related to IAS within the field
27 of aquaculture and fisheries.

28

29 Given the role of trade in the production and transport of goods, approaches to regulating
30 pathways of IAS should consider relevant trade rules and agreements. The World
31 Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS
32 Agreement) defines the basic rights and obligations of WTO members regarding use of
33 sanitary and phytosanitary measures to protect human, animal or plant life or health from the
34 entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease carrying organisms; and prevent or
35 limit other damage from the entry, establishment or spread of pests (see 7.3.3 for details).

36

37 7.1.3.2 Genetic resources and agrobiodiversity

1 Three major types of policy tools are available to support conservation of genetic resources (1)
2 public investment in *in situ* and *ex situ* conservation; (2) stronger intellectual property rights over
3 genetic inventions, particularly in developing countries; and (3) material transfer agreements
4 (Rubenstein et al., 2005). Apart from ecological approaches to agriculture, connected to nature
5 management, strategies for conservation and sustainable use of agricultural genetic resources
6 also include “*ex situ*” and “*in situ*, on farm” approaches. *Ex situ* conservation in gene banks is well
7 established for major crops under the auspices of the FAO by the centers of the CGIAR, and at
8 national plant and farm animal gene banks. A Global Crop Diversity Trust has recently been
9 initiated to generate funds for the sustainable conservation of the most important collections
10 worldwide, on behalf of all future generations, and Norway is hosting a long-term conservation
11 facility in the Arctic at Svalbard. Public policies converged progressively through the International
12 Undertaking (1985) to the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
13 Agriculture (IT PGRFA - 2005) providing special rules for the conservation of PGRFA, their
14 sustainable use and the sharing of benefits arising from their use. It also contains mechanisms for
15 facilitated access and benefit sharing through its Multilateral System. Many signatory countries
16 (116 in June 2007) are yet to implement the Treaty. Policy options range from contributing to the
17 Global Crop Diversity Trust (currently mainly OECD countries, but also countries like Colombia
18 and Brazil), to establishing or expanding national *ex situ* collections (e.g. India), and for liberal or
19 restrictive regimes for access to these collections, including the sharing of information on these
20 resources. The agricultural sector generally supports liberal access regimes in order to promote
21 availability of genetic resources for plant breeding in support of food security and rural
22 development.

23

24 On-farm policy approaches to management of genetic resources include various types of support
25 to farmers who maintain and further develop genetic resources, such as payments based on
26 cultural heritage (e.g. historic cattle breeds), technical support to foundations for crop-hobbyists
27 (e.g. old apple variety clubs in Europe) to participatory plant breeding strategies in many
28 developing countries (Almekinders and Hardon, 2006). Such mechanisms may conflict with
29 existing policies and laws that focus on seed system development, including seed laws, plant
30 breeder’s rights, etc. The EU recently developed the concept of “conservation varieties” for this
31 reason. National policies to bring these objectives in harmony with each other are supported by
32 the concept of Farmers’ Rights of the IT PGRFA. However, countries may make these rights
33 ‘subject to national law and as appropriate’ (Art. 9 – ITPGRFA) which provides broad options for
34 national priorities and implementation strategies. The use of a range of standard economic tools
35 (taxes, subsidies, “cap and trade” with permits) can help maintain higher level of plant genetic
36 diversity in seed markets recognizing that information barriers limit market efficiency (Heal et al.,
37 2004).

1

2 Recent advances in molecular biology have provided a whole new set of tools for investigating
3 biodiversity, including the diversity of agricultural plants and animals. While there has
4 undoubtedly been significant loss of diversity over time of plant and animal genetic resources for
5 agriculture at the varietal level, there is some evidence that overall losses of genetic diversity
6 when measured at the genetic level have not been so great and that modern biotechnological
7 breeding tools can regenerate some of this diversity, especially if the tools can be transferred to
8 developing country agricultural research levels through support for initiatives such as African
9 Agricultural Technology Foundation and Public Sector Intellectual Property Resource for
10 Agriculture (PSAPRA) (USDA, 2003).

11

12 **Livestock:** The livestock sector is an important source of greenhouse gases and factor in the
13 loss of biodiversity, while in developed and emerging countries it is a significant source of water
14 pollution.¹ Current decision-making on the livestock–environment–people nexus is characterized
15 by severe under-pricing of virtually all natural processes that go into livestock production process.
16 This includes neglect of major down-stream externalities. Limiting livestock’s impact on the
17 environment to more socially optimal levels requires measures to reduce land and other natural
18 resources requirements for livestock production. This could be achieved by intensification of the
19 most productive arable and grassland used to produce feed or pasture; and retirement of
20 marginally used land, where this is socially acceptable and where other uses of such land, such
21 as for environmental purposes, are in demand, and have higher value. Intensification can lead to
22 gradual reductions of resource use and waste emissions across the sector. For example,
23 precision feeding and use of improved genetics can greatly reduce emissions of gases (carbon
24 dioxide, methane, etc.) and of nutrients per unit of output.

25

26 The major policy goals for addressing environmental pressure points arising from current policy
27 and market processes in the livestock sector are:

- 28 • controlling expansion into natural ecosystems;
- 29 • managing rangeland in a sustainable way;
- 30 • reducing nutrient loading in livestock concentration areas; and
- 31 • reducing the environmental impact of intensive feed production.

32 Because the major stressors arising from the livestock sector differ in different parts of the world –
33 ranging from overgrazing in Australia and sub-Saharan Africa, biodiversity loss from pasture
34 expansion in Latin America, to pollution arising from intensive pig production in Europe and SE

¹ (The following text draws heavily on a major review of the negative impact of livestock production on the environment by Steinfeld et al., 2006.)

1 Asia – the mix and emphasis of the policy instruments will need to be different in different parts of
2 the world, but could include measures to:

- 3 • Limit livestock’s land requirements,
- 4 • Correct distorted prices,
- 5 • Strengthen land titles,
- 6 • Price water and water quality internalizing all externalities,
- 7 • Remove subsidies,
- 8 • Liberalize trade, and
- 9 • Support intensification and promoting research and extension of cutting edge technology.

10 The choice of policy instruments should take into consideration the broader goals of efficiency;
11 effectiveness and equity (Hahn et al., 2003), given the major economic contribution and social
12 role played by the livestock sector globally.

13

14 **Aquaculture:** “Traditional” aquaculture has been an integral part of one of the world’s most
15 sustainable agricultural systems – the polyculture Chinese fish-farm (FAO/IPT, 1991) for around
16 3000 years, but recent rapid expansion of commercial aquaculture, in the absence of appropriate
17 policies, is generating negative environmental and social impacts that threaten to undermine the
18 long-term sustainability of the industry. In recognition of these growing negative impacts, broad
19 environmental management principles have been agreed for the sector (e.g. FAO Code of
20 Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, Article 9; FAO Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries
21 No. 5. Development of Aquaculture). However, these have often not been well integrated into
22 national policy and legislative frameworks.

23

24 A number of policy tools have been used to regulate unsustainable aquaculture expansion (e.g.,
25 banning of mangrove utilization for aquaculture practices, determining maximum production per
26 area, standards for feed, rules for disease control, and use of drugs, to harmonize the
27 expectations of aquaculture entrepreneurs with the exigencies of the ecosystem often have
28 recourse to control and command strategies (e.g., licenses, use of pharmaceuticals).

29

30 Regulations focused on individual production units alone cannot guarantee sustainability at the
31 landscape level because they do not consider the cumulative impacts of multiple farms on a
32 particular area. In addition, existing regulatory structures for aquaculture mostly do not allow, or
33 facilitate, a production mode or approach that is conducive to long-term sustainability. Nutrient
34 cycling and reutilization of wastes by other forms of aquaculture (polyculture) or local fisheries are
35 frequently prohibited or discouraged.

36

1 FAO and progressive industries are now increasingly promoting an ecosystem approach to
2 aquaculture which will “balance diverse societal objectives, taking into account knowledge and
3 uncertainties of biotic, abiotic and human components of ecosystems including their interactions,
4 flows and processes and applying an integrated approach to aquaculture within ecologically and
5 operationally meaningful boundaries” (FAO, 2006a). The purpose of an ecosystem approach
6 should be to plan, develop and manage the sector in a manner that addresses the multiple needs
7 and desires of societies, without jeopardizing the options for future generations to benefit from the
8 full range of goods and services provided by aquatic ecosystems.

9
10 Policy options for improved environmental performance of the aquaculture sector could include:

- 11 • further development of guidelines for environmentally sound and sustainable aquaculture
12 industry and promotion of compliance with the guidelines;
- 13 • promotion of the adoption of exclusion zones that protect wild stocks in areas considered
14 to be essential to their continued survival in the wild and/ to maintain commercial wild fisheries;
- 15 • improved integration of aquaculture development with wild fish stock management,
16 including, where appropriate, enhancement strategies for aquatic species to help wild stock
17 fisheries recover and to provide additional recreational opportunities;
- 18 • promotion and enforcement of regulations that require Strategic Environmental Impact
19 Assessment of potential aquaculture developments at the landscape level and develop land use
20 plans that maintain total production within environmentally sustainable limits;
- 21 • adoption of production unit design and management practices that encourage integration,
22 recycling and reuse of effluents, provide for disposal and/or processing of wastes;
- 23 • adoption of production unit design and management practices that minimize and, where
24 practicable, eliminate the use of agriculture and veterinary chemicals and ensure the correct use
25 and disposal of registered chemicals;
- 26 • support for the development and use of diets and feeding strategies which minimize
27 adverse environmental impacts;
- 28 • promotion of improved monitoring and enforcement of management systems to reduce
29 the risk deliberate and unintentional releases.
- 30 • development of appropriate protocols regarding the safe transfer and culture of exotic
31 species and the translocation of live product within and between states, including living modified
32 organisms (see Myhr and Dalmo, 2005)
- 33 • promotion of industry training and education opportunities in environmental awareness,
34 clean production methods and best practice; and
- 35 • promotion of an information clearinghouse and information dissemination system for
36 environmentally sound aquaculture.

37

1 7.1.3.3 Water scarcity, water quality and the distribution of water

2 The broad policy recommendations which can be made for improved water management in the
3 agricultural sector have their roots in the same fundamental paradigm shift that is required for all
4 aspects of sustainable development – full cost accounting and recognition of the multi-
5 functionality and interdependence of landscapes. There is a need for overall reform in the water
6 sector which must address the following: getting technical water bureaucracies to see water
7 management as a social and political as well as a technical issue; supporting more integrated
8 approaches to agricultural water management; creating incentives to improve equity, efficiency,
9 and sustainability of water use; improving the effectiveness of the state itself, particularly its
10 regulatory role; developing effective coordination and negotiation mechanisms among various
11 water development and management sectors; and empowering marginalized groups, including
12 women to have a voice in water management (Merrey et al., 2007).

13

14 *Improve investment in sustainable irrigation.* There are four principal reasons to invest in irrigation
15 over the next three to five decades:

16 (1) to reduce rural poverty -- in countries and regions that rely on agriculture for a large portion of
17 their GDP (much of SSA), increased agricultural productivity is the most viable option for poverty
18 reduction;

19 (2) to keep up with food demand and changing food preferences;

20 (3) to adapt to changing condition -- increasing competition for water will require investments that
21 enable farmers to grow more food with less water; increasing climate variability and extremes,
22 due to climate change, may require further irrigation development and changes in the operation of
23 existing schemes; and

24 (4) to increase multiple benefits and ecosystem services from existing systems, while reducing
25 negative impacts (Faurès et al., 2007).

26

27 Investment has traditionally meant public expenditure on new irrigation systems (capital
28 investment). A broader definition is needed that includes public investment in irrigation and
29 drainage development, institutional reform, improved governance, capacity building, management
30 improvement, creation of farmer organizations, and regulatory oversight, as well as farmers'
31 investment in joint facilities, wells, and on-farm water storage and irrigation equipment. The
32 appropriate focus for both policy and investment will depend on both the scale and type of
33 irrigation, and the structure of national economies (Faurès et al., 2007)

34

35 *Develop locally relevant groundwater management strategies that support aquifer recharge and*
36 *manage demand.* A large body of evidence from Asia suggests that groundwater irrigation
37 promotes greater interpersonal, inter-gender, interclass, and spatial equity than do large irrigation

1 projects. Evidence from Africa, Asia, and Latin America also suggests that groundwater is
2 important in settings where poor farmers find opportunities to improve their livelihoods through
3 small-scale farming based on shallow groundwater circulation. However, pumping costs are
4 rising, and irrigation–supporting subsidies are compromising the viability of rural energy
5 providers. India is a prime example. Moreover, the impacts of groundwater depletion on water
6 quality, stream flows, wetlands, and down-gradient users in certain pockets are rapidly
7 threatening to undermine the benefits. In arid regions, where fossil groundwater is a primary
8 source of water for all uses, intensive groundwater irrigation may threaten future water security. In
9 addition, with anticipated shifts in precipitation patterns induced by climate change, groundwater’s
10 value as strategic reserve is set to increase world wide (Shah et al., 2007). Because groundwater
11 use and dependency will continue to grow in many parts of the developing world, participatory
12 approaches to sustainable groundwater management will need to combine supply-side
13 measures, such as artificial recharge, aquifer recovery, inter-basin transfer of water and the like,
14 with demand-side measures, such as groundwater pricing, legal and regulatory control, water
15 rights and withdrawal permits and promotion of water-saving crops and technologies (Shah et al.,
16 2007).

17

18 *Establish and strengthen the authority of agencies administering large water systems that cross*
19 *traditional administrative boundaries.* The state has historically played a leading role in water
20 development, both in supporting large-scale irrigation, hydropower, and flood control as well as
21 facilitating private and small-scale farmer managed irrigation (Merrey et al., 2007). There are
22 good reasons for the state’s central role in regulating and managing this vital public good
23 resource. While the state remains the main actor to initiate reforms, these reforms are needed at
24 all jurisdictional levels, from local to national level, and even at regional level. A recent trend has
25 been to promote river basin organizations to manage competition for water at the basin level.
26 There is general agreement on the long-term benefits of effective integrated management of river
27 basins, especially with increasing competition and environmental degradation. But attempts to
28 impose particular models of river basin organizations in developing countries, especially models
29 derived from the experiences of rich countries, are not likely to succeed because the objectives
30 and institutional contexts differ so greatly (Shah et al., 2005). An externally imposed one-size-fits-
31 all strategy for managing such complexity is unlikely to be effective. Numerous models for
32 institutional arrangement for basin water governance exist, and their effectiveness will depend on
33 local basin and national conditions (Molle et al., 2007).

34

35 *Better integration of water use between agricultural and industrial users.* Water use by agriculture
36 could limit the amount available for other uses when water becomes scarce, however usually the
37 opposite is true. Higher value uses (e.g., domestic purposes and industries in urban areas) have

1 precedence; hence agriculture must adapt to reduced allocations. Uses with lower priority than
2 agriculture are aquatic ecosystems and the environment (CA, 2007). Industrial and domestic use
3 can also affect agriculture through the discharge of untreated wastewater from urban areas into
4 surface-water systems can decrease the quality of water used in irrigation. Intersectoral water
5 allocation is to a large extent a product of broader political and economic considerations, such as
6 the political clout of urban areas and industrial interests (see Molle and Berkoff, 2005).

7 Negotiating and crafting new types of organizational arrangements for managing irrigation,
8 therefore, are not possible without considering broader institutional arrangements and policies in
9 the water, agricultural, and rural sectors as well as currency, trade, and overall macroeconomic
10 policies (Merrey et al., 2007).

11
12 *Water markets to better allocate water amongst uses and users.* Water markets are playing an
13 increasingly important role in the developed world in allocating water on a regional basis. There
14 are examples in which government has used markets or market-like arrangements to resolve
15 vexing problems of allocation. Water pricing is one market vehicle that has received considerable
16 attention. The difficulties of implementing water pricing in developing countries, however, are
17 substantial. Pricing policies for full cost recovery of infrastructure development and operation and
18 maintenance, for example, risk seriously aggravating water deprivation and poverty (Dinar, 2000;
19 Molle and Berkoff, 2007). A sliding-scale pricing strategy is one possible solution (Schreiner and
20 van Koppen, 2001). Another water market reform mechanism is tradable water rights, which
21 represents the greatest degree of privatization in water management. In addition to clearly
22 defined water rights (including transfer rights), water markets require physical infrastructure that
23 allows water to be transferred, and institutional arrangements to protect against negative impact
24 on third parties (Easter et al., 1998). Earlier enthusiasm for market- based water reforms was at
25 best premature (Merrey et al., 2007). The conditions necessary for market based reforms to
26 contribute to sustainable water management in agriculture are extremely rare in developing
27 countries and uncommon even in rich countries. The Chile and Valencia (Spain) water market
28 reforms have been held up as examples, but closer inspection raises many questions (Bauer,
29 1997, 2005; Ingo, 2004; Trawick, 2005). As in all market and private property rights situations,
30 questions of regulation (who sets the rules and what are the rules?) and capture of benefits (who
31 wins and who loses in imperfect markets?) are central for assessing market-inspired reforms. A
32 phased approach of vesting rights in existing users and currently excluded users and of clarifying
33 regulatory mechanisms before developing detailed water market mechanisms may be more
34 appropriate and politically more feasible than a rush to markets (see Bruns et al., 2005).

35
36 *Encourage water-saving irrigation practices and technology.* Farmers in most industrialized
37 countries have only recently begun to adopt water saving practices, whereas in developing

1 countries they have been relying on traditional water saving practices for a long time. Low levels
2 of adoption of water-saving may be because the knowledge and incentives are not in place for
3 farmers to benefit directly by saving water. There is an important role for the private sector in
4 making low-cost agricultural water management technologies such as treadle pumps, small
5 power pumps, and bucket and drip kits more widely available. Such technologies can be readily
6 acquired and used by individual small-scale farmers, both men and women, and in many
7 situations can substantially improve nutrition and incomes (Shah et al., 2000; Namara et al.,
8 2005; Mangisoni, 2006; Merrey et al., 2006). Restrictive policies in some sub-Saharan African
9 countries are retarding the wider use of these technologies, in marked contrast to South Asian
10 countries.

11
12 *Reform of irrigation management to involve local stakeholders.* The establishment of Water User
13 Associations and contracting the management of lateral canals to individuals can improve water
14 management by providing incentives for users and managers to conserve water and improve fee
15 collection to increase irrigation revenues. However, pilot projects to transfer management from
16 the state to user groups on government built schemes have rarely been scaled up effectively to
17 cover larger areas. Many governments were reluctant, even when project documents promised to
18 do so. Another reason was the failure to recognize the critical differences between government-
19 and farmer- managed irrigation systems. Management transfer programs in countries as diverse
20 as Australia, Colombia, Indonesia Mali, Mexico, New Zealand, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and
21 the United States have demonstrated some positive results from involving farmers and reducing
22 government expenditures, but they have rarely shown improvements in output performance or
23 quality of maintenance (Vermillion, 1997; Vermillion and Garcés-Restrepo, 1998; Samad and
24 Vermillion, 1999; Vermillion et al., 2000). The few notable exceptions are middle-income
25 developing countries such as Mexico and Turkey and high income countries such as New
26 Zealand and the United States. Research in the 1990s on irrigation management transfer
27 processes and outcomes produced many case studies and some useful guidelines for
28 implementation (e.g., Vermillion and Sagardoy, 1999). There is broad agreement on the
29 necessary conditions, but very few cases where they have been met on a large scale (Merrey et
30 al., 2007).

31
32 Further “coping” strategies proposed for addressing water scarcity (see also Ch 6 for more details
33 on the options), need attention at policy levels to incorporate their potential into water
34 management agendas to optimize the use of limited water resources:

35
36 a) *Desalinization:* Currently, the costs of desalinated water remain too high for use in irrigated
37 agriculture, with the exception of intensive horticulture for high-value cash crops, such as

1 vegetables and flowers (mainly in greenhouses), grown in coastal areas (where safe waste
2 disposal is easier than in inland areas), but recent advances in membrane technology are
3 reducing costs. At the global level the volume of desalinated water produced annually (estimated
4 at 7.5 km³) is currently quite low, representing about 0.2% of the water withdrawn for human use
5 (FAO, 2006b).

6
7 b) *Urban wastewater*. Two features complicate policies pertaining to wastewater use in
8 agriculture: most wastewater is generated outside the agricultural sector, and many individuals
9 and organizations have policy interests pertaining to wastewater use (Qadir et al., 2007). Millions
10 of small-scale farmers in urban and peri-urban areas of developing countries use wastewater for
11 irrigating crops or forest trees or for aquaculture, reducing pressure on other freshwater
12 resources. Surveys across 50 cities in Asia, Africa and Latin America have shown that
13 wastewater irrigation is currently a common reality in three-quarters of cities (IWMI, 2006). Most
14 domestic wastewater generated in developing countries is discharged into the environment
15 without treatment but the dominant trend is for more wastewater treatment as countries develop
16 national integrated water resources management plans or improved environmental policies, for
17 example in Mexico, Brazil, Chile and Costa Rica (UNCSD, 2005). Israel currently uses 84% of its
18 treated sewage effluent in agricultural irrigation and in a few cities, such as Windhoek in Namibia,
19 the water is treated to a very high standard so that it can even be used as drinking water (UNIDO,
20 2006).

21
22 c) *Virtual water and food trade*: The import of food from water-rich countries allows water-poor
23 countries to save water they would have used to grow food (equivalent to the import of 'virtual
24 water'), and scarce water reserves can be used for more valuable domestic, environmental and
25 industrial purposes. Countries with limited water resources might also change their production
26 patterns to prioritize production of agricultural commodities requiring less water and to import
27 those requiring more water (FAO/IFAD, 2006). Whereas the strategy of importing virtual water is
28 appealing from a water perspective, political, social and economic issues, rather than water
29 abundance or scarcity, drive much of the current world food trade.

30
31 d) *Improving the productivity of water use in agriculture* (see Chapter 6 for detailed options).
32 Productivity gains could improve overall water use efficiency in irrigated and rainfed agriculture.
33 Agronomic improvements to improve overall productivity will also reduce the global "water
34 footprint" of agriculture. This could be achieved by, for example, improving the efficiency of
35 fertilizer use; improving soil moisture retention capacity through build up of organic matter;
36 preventing crop productivity losses due to insects, diseases and weeds; or reducing post-harvest
37 losses due to insects, fungi and bacteria. Each of these is an area for research and technology

1 development, or even for the reintroduction of older management systems, to promote water use
2 efficiency gains which places a high demand on AKST (CA, 2007; Hsiao et al., 2007).

4 **7.2 Trade and Markets**

5 **7.2.1 Trade and markets: the enabling policy context for AKST contributions to** 6 **sustainability and development goals**

7 Market and trade policies can limit or enhance the ability of agricultural and AKST systems to
8 drive development, strengthen food security, maximize environmental sustainability, and help
9 make the small-scale farm sector profitable to spearhead poverty reduction is an immediate
10 challenge around the world. Over seventy percent of the world's poor are rural and most are
11 involved in farming; about 2.5 billion people, or 40% of the world population, depend on
12 agricultural activities for their livelihoods, an increase of a billion over the past half century
13 (FAOSTAT, 2005). In the poorest countries agriculture is the engine of the rural economy (Diouf,
14 2007). The steep decline in commodity prices and terms of trade for agriculture-based economies
15 has had significant negative effects on the millions of small-scale producers. Although there has
16 been a recent upturn in commodity prices, in part due to an increase in demand compounded by
17 a weak US dollar, market analysts do not anticipate that will continue (FAO, 2006c). Continuing
18 overproduction in NAE countries contributes to these depressed world commodity prices.

19
20 Supporting the rural farm sector has been and continues to be a preferred option in NAE and
21 other countries; it offers a compelling option for reducing poverty in developing countries (Lappe
22 et al., 1998; CA, 2007; Diouf, 2007). Agriculture provides multiple public goods, such as the
23 conservation of ecosystem goods and services (e.g., biodiversity and watersheds), poverty
24 reduction and food security (Inco and Nash, 2004; McCalla and Nash, 2007). How to structure
25 trade and market policy platforms to drive development and support the multiple functions of
26 agriculture is a highly debated issue, discussed in a large body of literature. It is generally
27 acknowledged that analyses, projections and related policy options derived from research on
28 trade and market policy are controversial and susceptible to different interpretations. Some
29 studies suggest that liberalization has been associated with reduced poverty and enhanced food
30 security, whereas others indicate the opposite (FAO, 2006c).

31
32 The uptake of AKST by farmers does not occur in an economic vacuum. It takes place in a
33 national market environment that is, in turn, partly determined and shaped by international trade
34 (and its effects on national and market processes).

35
36 Policy options are determined by distinct national circumstances and different states of
37 development (Dorward et al., 2004; FAO, 2006c; Morrissey, 2007; Morrison and Sarris, 2007).

1 Policy options will differ as a function of a country's stage of economic development and
2 governance overall; the stage of development, composition and competitiveness of its agricultural
3 sector; and its initial factor conditions and endowments.

4

5 The IAASTD mission statement leads to an assessment of policies that pay particular attention to
6 poorer rural sectors and poorer countries. A "business as usual" policy will not enable these
7 countries to address development and sustainability goals. Agricultural export trade can offer
8 opportunities for the poor, but there are major distributional impacts among countries and within
9 countries that in many cases have not been favorable for the small-scale farm sector and rural
10 livelihoods. There is growing concern that developing countries have opened their agricultural
11 sectors to international competition too extensively and too quickly, before basic institutions and
12 infrastructure are in place, thus weakening their agricultural sectors with long-term negative
13 effects for poverty, food security and the environment (Diouf, 2007; Morrison and Sarris, 2007).
14 The poorest developing countries are net losers under most trade liberalization scenarios (FAO,
15 2006c).

16

17 The assertion that greater openness will benefit poor developing countries irrespective of their
18 stage of agricultural development (and the trade policies and implementation practices of their
19 trading partners) is increasingly questioned in the literature, and by developing countries and
20 other relevant stakeholders (African Group, 2006). This literature indicates that the investments
21 required to allow shifts of resources out of traditional agricultural activities into higher value
22 alternative activities (either agricultural or non-agricultural) are not likely to occur where market
23 failures are pervasive without some form of state intervention (Morrison and Sarris, 2007). For
24 countries at earlier stages of development, trade reform can be damaging to food security in the
25 short to medium term if introduced before a package of policy measures to raise productivity and
26 maintain employment has been implemented (FAO, 2006c).

27

28 There is broad agreement across the IAASTD sub-Global reports and in the literature on the need
29 to increase investment in human capital, land tenure (titling and expansion of land ownership by
30 small producers and landless workers), water access, technology, infrastructure, nonagricultural
31 rural enterprises, organizations of small scale farmers, and other forms of expansion of social
32 capital and political participation for the poor and vulnerable (Díaz-Bonilla et al., 2002). A
33 reinvigorated look at how these policy packages can be funded, given that developing country
34 general revenues are often reduced when tariffs are reduced, and overseas development
35 assistance (ODA) to the agricultural sector has been flagging. Developing countries must address
36 significant local production, marketing and institutional constraints. There is wide agreement in
37 the literature that a renewed donor effort is urgently needed if development and sustainability

1 goals are to be advanced, and specifically to enable a supply response to any opportunities for
2 the small-scale farm sector that may arise from future trade negotiations (Diaz-Bonilla et al.,
3 2003; FAO, 2006c; Diouf, 2007).

4
5 Trade policy reform aimed at providing a fairer global trading platform can make a positive
6 contribution to the alleviation of poverty and hunger (FAO, 2006c; Diouf, 2007; Morrison and
7 Sarris, 2007). Approaches that are tailored to distinct national circumstances and different stages
8 of development, and that target increasing the profitability of the small-scale farm sector, are
9 effective options to reduce poverty in developing countries. Flexibility and differentiation in trade
10 policy frameworks will enhance the ability of developing countries to benefit from agricultural
11 trade; pursue food security, poverty reduction and development goals; and minimize potential
12 dislocations associated with trade liberalization.

14 **7.2.2 Policy challenges and tradeoffs**

15 Whether and how ASKT systems are generated, delivered and used in ways that promote
16 poverty reduction and environmental sustainability can be enhanced or limited by trade and
17 market policies. The sub-Global IAASTD reports identify many policy challenges:

- 18 (i) crafting trade rules that allow developing countries needed flexibility to pursue development,
19 poverty reduction and food security agendas, and that address the distributional impacts of
20 welfare benefits and losses from trade liberalization;
21 (ii) achieving remunerative prices for small-scale farmers;
22 (iii) increasing the value captured by small-scale producers in vertically integrated agrifood
23 chains;
24 (iv) addressing the increased regulatory responsibilities required by trade agreements with limited
25 tax revenues, which can be diminished by tariff reductions;
26 (v) addressing the environmental externalities of agriculture; and
27 (vi) improving governance of agriculture sector policy making, including decisions about AKST
28 research, development and delivery, and trade policy decision-making.

29
30 There are also important synergies and tradeoffs between policy options that merit special
31 consideration. Potential liberalization of biofuels trade is a clear example, presenting tradeoffs
32 between food security, greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions, and rural livelihoods which
33 need to be carefully assessed for different technologies and regions. There are likely to be
34 significant tradeoffs between for example policies to promote agricultural development, such as
35 the reduction of agricultural subsidies and increased investment in roads to help rural farmers,
36 and environmental and social impacts such as increased tropical deforestation and increased
37 agricultural land concentration in some parts of the developing South. Forest protection policies in

1 many of these countries may not be sufficiently strong to resist the increased economic pressure
2 to expand the agricultural land and increase tropical deforestation. Note that these concerns also
3 apply to other policy interventions that may work to increase agricultural rents including increased
4 road building and other market access measures that tend to increase the pressure on forests
5 (Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 1999).

6

7 **7.2.3 Policy flexibility to pursue development, poverty reduction and food security**
8 **agendas**

9 There is broad acknowledgement that agricultural trade can offer opportunities for the poor under
10 the right circumstances. Numerous studies show that the impact of the economic growth spurred
11 by trade on poverty, hunger and the environment depends as much on the nature of the growth
12 as on its scale. National agricultural trade policy to advance sustainability and development goals
13 will depend upon the competitiveness and composition of the sector. Appropriate trade policy for
14 the agriculture sector in developing countries will depend upon the extent to which the sector
15 produces exportable products, import substituting basic foods, and non-tradable products
16 (Morrison and Sarris, 2007). Advice to developing countries has tended to focus on promoting
17 opportunities for increased exports to international markets (traditional and non-traditional crops)
18 rather than enhancing competitiveness or market opportunities in domestic and regional markets;
19 greater balance among these policy approaches may be indicated.

20

21 Market conditions and opportunities for domestically or regionally produced staples are potentially
22 more favorable to poorer developing countries than are the opportunities for expanding exports to
23 the global market (Diao and Hazell, 2004; Morrison and Sarris, 2007). For example, Africa
24 imports 25% of basic grains such as maize, rice, and wheat. Domestic production could
25 potentially replace some of these imports.

26

27 Appropriate agricultural trade policy at early stages of development, for countries with an
28 important agricultural sector, may include moderate levels of import protection, and in countries
29 where applied tariffs are already low, further liberalization may not be appropriate (Morrison and
30 Sarris, 2007). A recent FAO study concluded that, for countries at earlier stages of development,
31 trade liberalization can be damaging to food security in the short to medium term if introduced
32 before a package of policy measures to raise productivity and maintain employment has been put
33 in place (FAO, 2006c). Lower tariffs will imply intensified competition from imported foods for the
34 domestic agricultural sector. Reduced tariffs also increase vulnerability of domestic production to
35 competition arising from import surges. A number of instances have been reported in which a
36 developing country's agricultural production has been negatively affected by such sudden, short-
37 run increases in food imports (FAO, 2006c).

1

2 For many developing countries sustainable food security depends on local food production;
3 ensuring policy space for these countries to maintain prices for crops that are important to food
4 security and rural livelihoods is essential (FAO, 2006c). Trade policies designed to ensure
5 sufficient levels of domestic production of food, not just sufficient currency reserves to import
6 food, and to balance domestic production with food stocks and foreign exchange reserves, are
7 reported as important components of food security and sovereignty in the ESAP, LAC and SSA
8 IAASTD sub-Global reports. Agricultural policies in industrialized countries, including export
9 subsidies, have reduced commodity prices and thus food import costs; however this has
10 undermined the development of the agricultural sector in developing countries, and thus
11 agriculture's significant potential growth multiplier for the whole economy (Diaz-Bonilla et al.,
12 2003). Reducing industrialized countries' trade distorting policies including subsidies is a priority,
13 particularly for commodities such as sugar, groundnuts and cotton where developing countries
14 compete. Some observers point out that net agricultural importing countries (particularly net food
15 importers in Africa) will suffer a balance of payments loss from the negative terms of trade effect
16 as world commodity prices rise, but at the same time stress the importance of lifting subsidies to
17 benefit the rural sectors of these countries, where poverty is concentrated, because of higher
18 world agricultural prices (Panagariya, 2004).

19

20 The steep secular decline in commodity prices (Fig. 7.1) and terms of trade for agriculture-based
21 economies has had significant negative effects on the millions of small-scale producers. For
22 example, from 1980 to 2001, the price of robusta coffee fell from 411.7 to 63.3 cents kg⁻¹; cotton
23 fell from 261.7 to 110.3 cents kg⁻¹ and rice (Thai) dropped from \$521.40 to 180.20 per tonne.
24 (Ong'wen and Wright, 2007). Even the best performing agricultural subsector (horticultural
25 products) saw an annual 1.35% price decline over 1961-2001 (FAO, 2005a). Although the
26 increase in the volume of exports over the past two decades has resulted in a 30% aggregate
27 trade revenue increase for developing countries as a whole, this volume-driven increase accrued
28 to a small number of net exporting developing countries. Export earnings of the least developed
29 countries (LDCs) fell by 30% during that time, with countries in SSA suffering most from the fall in
30 prices and incomes (FAO, 2005a).

31

32 **[Insert Figure 7.1]**

33

34 Although most aggregate agricultural production is not traded internationally, and most primary
35 producers do not supply global commodity chains, national agricultural planning is increasingly
36 oriented towards exports. Intergovernmental institutions are advising governments how to
37 integrate small scale producers into these supply chains, with the goal of reducing poverty,

1 particularly in developing countries dependent on commodity exports for the majority of their hard
2 currency revenues (UNCTAD, 2005). This export focus has left small scale producers, the
3 majority of the rural poor, ever more vulnerable to international market factors. For example, as a
4 result of a supermarket price war in the United Kingdom, Costa Rican banana plantation workers
5 wages fell from US \$12-15 a day in 2000 to \$7-8 in 2003 (Vorley and Fox, 2004).

6
7 The increase in absolute numbers of agriculturally dependent populations during the past two
8 decades, together with the inability of primary producers to capture more than a small fraction of
9 those increased trade incomes, has meant that growth in agricultural trade flows have had on
10 aggregate a very modest effect on poverty reduction. This implies that policy options are needed
11 to provide greater opportunities for small-scale producers to increase their profitability in such an
12 international context. Failure to do so will result in missed opportunities to promote sustainable
13 development.

14 7.2.3.1 Special products, special safeguard mechanisms and deeper preferences

15 There is broad agreement that the rules of the international trading system should recognize the
16 food security and development needs and priorities of developing countries (FAO, 2006c).

17 Flexibility and differentiation in trade policy frameworks (i.e., “special and differential treatment”)
18 can enhance developing countries’ ability to benefit from agricultural trade; pursue food security,
19 poverty reduction and development goals; and minimize negative impacts of trade liberalization.

20 This includes the principle of non-reciprocal access, i.e., that the developed countries and
21 wealthier developing countries should grant non-reciprocal access to less developed countries
22 has a significant history and role to play in trade relations to foster development. Preferential
23 market access for poorer developing countries, least developed countries and small island
24 economies will be important.

25
26
27 At the household level depressed prices can mean inability to purchase AKST, the need to sell
28 productive assets, or missed school fees. World Trade Organization country categories that
29 better reflect the heterogeneity of food security conditions in developing countries’ food security
30 could help ensure that no food insecure country is denied use of these mechanisms. These
31 measures aim to provide tariff options to developing countries so that they may support rural
32 livelihoods. The formula for applying safeguards under some regional and bilateral trade
33 agreements can limit their effectiveness (see e.g., CAFTA) and may need to be revisited if
34 safeguards are to effectively address rural livelihood issues (Priyadarshi, 2002; Stiglitz, 2006).

35
36 Flexibility and differentiation in trade policy will thus enhance developing countries’ ability to
37 benefit from agricultural trade, and pursue food security, poverty reduction and development

1 goals. Multilateral trade regime is currently based on the principle of “reciprocity for and among all
2 countries” with the principle of reciprocity among equals, but differentiation between those
3 countries in markedly different circumstances. The principle of non-reciprocal access, i.e. that the
4 developed countries and wealthier developing countries should grant non-reciprocal access to
5 countries less developed than themselves, has a significant history and role to play in trade
6 relations to foster development. The European Union for example followed this approach by
7 unilaterally opening its markets to the poorest countries of the world, and eliminating most tariffs
8 and trade restrictions without demanding any reciprocal concessions (Stiglitz, 2006; Stiglitz and
9 Charlton, 2007).

10
11 The WTO July Framework Agreement of 2004 acknowledges that developing countries will need
12 to designate some products as special products based on livelihood security, food security and
13 rural development concerns. Developing countries may require significant time periods for
14 investments in their agriculture sectors, including targeted ASKT research, development and
15 delivery to the small scale sector, enhanced institutional and organization capacity and
16 governance, to make the sector competitive on the international market (Polaski, 2006).

17
18 When they signed the Agreement on Agriculture, some developing countries bound tariffs on
19 important food security and other sensitive crops at very low levels, increasing the vulnerability of
20 their farmers to the drop in global commodity prices. At the same time many DCs did not reserve
21 the right to use emergency safeguard measures. The experience of the GATT round shows that
22 following trade liberalization agricultural imports in developing countries have risen more rapidly
23 than have exports, leading to import surges and a deterioration of net agricultural trade.

24 25 7.2.3.2 Distributional impacts of welfare benefits and losses from trade liberalization

26 Most of the gains from any further liberalization are likely to accrue to developed countries and
27 the larger, wealthier developing countries (FAO, 2006c). For developing countries, the projected,
28 or potential, welfare benefits resulting from the most likely Doha Round scenarios for the
29 Agreement on Agriculture and non-agricultural market access outcomes are just US \$6.7 billion
30 and concentrated in just a few developing country WTO members (Anderson and Martin, 2005)
31 (Fig. 7.2). The poorest countries including those of SSA, except South Africa, are net losers
32 according to these estimates (Anderson et al., 2005; Jaramillo and Lederman, 2005).

33
34 **[Insert Figure 7.2]**

35
36 There are major differences and distinct distributional impacts between regions, among countries
37 within a region, and between different farm sectors within any particular country (Fig. 7.3). One

1 analysis of World Bank CGE projections (Anderson and Martin, 2005) for likely Doha outcomes
2 calculated that the “benefit to the developing countries is more than \$17 per person per year, or
3 almost \$.05 per person per day” whereas high income countries would realize more than ten
4 times the per capita welfare benefits of developing countries (Ackerman, 2005).

5
6 **[Insert Figure 7.3]**

7
8 Model-based analyses that have been used to bolster the case for further trade liberalization are
9 often overoptimistic in their assumptions as to the ability for resources to be invested in “higher
10 return” activities (and the assumption of full employment in developing countries); the use of their
11 results in arguing for further trade liberalization in poorer economies could be misleading
12 (Morrison and Sarris, 2007). The models assume that markets function competitively (ignoring
13 vertical integration within value chains that can limit competition); assume that within highly
14 aggregated regions producers have access to similar technologies; and assume faithful
15 implementation of commitments by all parties (Morrison and Sarris, 2007). Additionally, many
16 CGE models are based on assumptions, such as a net zero tax revenue impact from tariff
17 reductions, and full employment, that be difficult or impossible to realize in the real world.

18
19 “[T]here is a general consensus that the trade agreements, reforms and policies adopted
20 throughout Latin America and the Caribbean within the last ten to fifteen years have had uneven
21 impacts, with many of the benefits concentrated in the hands of the elite few, while the poorest
22 often bear the brunt of the ills wrought by greater exposure to the world market. The fact is that
23 trade liberalization has not reduced poverty nor inequity. And clearly there are winners and
24 losers” (IADB, 2006).

25
26 **7.2.3.3 Meeting new regulatory costs associated with international trade**

27 Developing countries are facing significant new regulatory costs related to international trade,
28 e.g., meeting international SPS standards, with fewer resources due to tariff revenues losses
29 (which represent a significant percentage of collected tax revenues in many countries). For many
30 countries, decreased tariff revenues means decreased funds available for social and
31 environmental programs and agriculture sector development, as other taxes (such as
32 consumption taxes) can be politically and administratively difficult to collect. Concern that the high
33 costs of regulatory measures to comply with sanitary and phytosanitary standards will divert
34 resources from national food and animal safety priorities, is an example. The fundamental
35 practical question of how developing countries can advance sustainability and development
36 objectives without significant increases in donor driven efforts is noted across the developing
37 South.

1

2 Tariffs represent about a quarter of tax revenue in developing countries; other taxes are hard to
3 collect in poor countries, particularly with large informal sectors (Panayatou, 2000; Bhagwhati,
4 2005). Tariff revenue reduction as a result of liberalization can represent a significant proportion
5 of government revenues (Díaz-Bonilla et al., 2002; FAO, 2006c). This compounds the effects of
6 structural adjustment programs, which weakened the institutional capacity of developing
7 governments to carry out basic functions such as tax collection, enforcement of laws, and
8 provision of basic health, sanitation and education services (Jaramillo and Lederman, 2005).

9

10 **7.2.4 Policy options to address the downward pressure on prices for the small-scale**
11 **sector**

12

13 **[Insert Figure 7.4]**

14

15 **7.2.4.1 Subsidies**

16 Price stability at remunerative prices is an important factor in determining farmer's capacity to
17 invest and innovate rather than pursue low-return, risk-averse behavior (African Group, 2006;
18 Murphy, 2006). Reducing or eliminating agricultural subsidies and protectionism in industrialized
19 countries, especially for those commodities in which developing countries compete (e.g. cotton,
20 sugar and groundnuts) is an important objective of trade reform to reduce the distortionary impact
21 in those markets (Fig. 7.4) (Díaz-Bonilla et al., 2002; Dicaprio and Gallagher, 2006; Nash and
22 McCalla, 2007).

23

24 **[Insert Figure 7.5]**

25

26 For developed countries agriculture is a very small share of the economy and employment, yet
27 subsidies and other supports are highest, unfairly tilting the benefits of agricultural trade in their
28 favor (Watkins and Von Braun, 2002). Agricultural research, farmers' support, and investment in
29 infrastructure have also been greatest in these countries (Pardey, 2001). The result is increased
30 concentration of agricultural production capacity in the very few countries. This leads to a relevant
31 question is: where subsidies are used, what would be the impact of their elimination on the
32 redistribution of production capacity? Developing country income would be some 0.8% higher by
33 2015 if all merchandise trade barriers and agricultural subsidies were removed between 2005 and
34 2010, with about two-thirds of the total gain coming from agricultural trade and subsidy reform
35 (Anderson et al., 2005).

36

1 In globally integrated markets, international prices affect domestic prices across the globe, even
2 for small farmers who grow only for the domestic market (Stiglitz, 2006). Nevertheless reducing
3 trade distorting export subsidies in industrialized countries, although widely agreed to be
4 necessary, is also acknowledged as insufficient by itself to establish higher world prices for many
5 commodities. For example, the reduction or lifting of export subsidies by the US and EU is
6 critically important for some commodities such as cotton, but is unlikely to have a large positive
7 effect on developing countries as a whole, e.g. there will be a number of countries that gain but
8 also a number of countries that lose (Ng et al., 2007). The short-run impact of global subsidy
9 reform will largely depend on whether a country is a net importer or exporter of the products
10 concerned. Countries such as Argentina, for which products subject to export subsidies for some
11 WTO members constitute a large share of exports, are likely to benefit greatly from elimination of
12 export subsidies. Conversely, countries such as Bangladesh that export virtually no products that
13 are subsidized in industrial countries but import a substantial share of such products (13% of
14 imports) are unlikely to benefit in the short run from removal of export subsidies (Ng, Hoekman,
15 and Olarreaga, 2007).

16
17 Econometric simulations suggest that removal of trade distorting subsidies would increase
18 agricultural commodity prices only modestly; for example, even cotton, which is heavily
19 subsidized, would increase an average of merely 4 to 13.7%, depending on policy scenario
20 assumptions, defined baseline and other factors (Baffes, 2006). It is questionable however if such
21 a price increase from depressed agricultural commodity prices reported by FAO (2005b) would
22 suffice to reach the “normal” price, which, according to the WTO, is the zero degree of trade
23 distortion.

24
25 Policy tools in addition to subsidy cuts may be needed to raise agricultural prices to remunerative
26 levels (African Group, 2006). Proposals for a plurilateral commitment from major exporting
27 countries not to allow trade at prices below cost of production (CoP) – dumping – and for OECD
28 member countries to publish full CoP figures annually are options that merit further study. (Full
29 CoP would include the primary producer’s production costs + government support costs
30 [Producer Subsidy Estimates] + transportation and handling on a per unit basis.) Publication of
31 full CoP figures, when compared to freight on board (FoB) export prices would enable calculation
32 of the percentage of the price that is dumped on world markets (IATP, 2005). Further refinements
33 of the dumping calculation methodology have been made in the context of determining the extent
34 to which industrialized animal production receive input subsidies from below CoP feed grains
35 (Starmer et al., 2006).

36
37 7.2.4.2 Supply management for tropical commodities

1 On average, prices of tropical products (taking dollar inflation into account) are only about one
2 seventh of what they were in 1980 (UN General Assembly). Essentially, less income is earned as
3 more commodities are produced. At the same time, retail prices of products made from coffee
4 (roasted and instant coffee) have increased substantially over the same period. This
5 phenomenon also applies to many other primary commodities produced by developing countries,
6 e.g., cocoa, sugar, cotton, maize, spices. An OECD report acknowledges that “there is concern
7 not only that oligopolistic retailing and processing structure will lead to abuse of market power,
8 but that the lion’s share of the benefits of any future reforms in the farming sector may be
9 captured by the processors and retailers...” (Lahidji et al., 1996) (Fig. 7.6).

10
11 **[Insert Figure 7.6]**

12
13 The view on supply management held by most institutions and conventional economic
14 perspective is that supply management has been tested and is too costly and prone to problems
15 of free-riding and quota abuse. However, it is also the case that supply management is being
16 used in many commercial markets, given this success a new approach to supply management,
17 that is regulated through the private sector rather than government, may be an effective and
18 fundamental solution to a growing world problem. A variant on this policy approach is to refocus
19 global commodity supply management on the concept of sustainable development. The option
20 suggests that the International Commodity Agreements (ICAs) could be reformed to reduce price
21 volatility, building on the coffee, cocoa and sugar lessons of the 1980s.

22
23 The African proposal to explore supply management mechanisms is an option to achieve the
24 production control mechanisms common to other economic sectors (African Group, 2006).
25 Policy options to help meet the sustainability and development objectives include a bundle of
26 mechanisms to stabilize and increase prices. Supply management mechanisms should be
27 investigated, market by market, to determine their potential to do this. One critical policy issues is
28 whether the objective should be price stabilization or price increases (Lines, 2006). To address
29 the continued slide in global commodity prices an increasing number of development groups and
30 policy analysts are suggesting that supply management can provide a viable means of dealing
31 with this chronic problem. In the OECD supply management is used to regulate the supply and
32 demand of more than 50 goods on the world market.

33
34 **7.2.4.3 Escalating tariffs**

35 Current tariff structure is a disincentive for investment in the creation of value-added
36 agroprocessing in the developing south, because developed countries use escalating tariffs.
37 Escalating tariffs discourage development by placing higher tariffs on manufactured goods than

1 on raw commodities and materials. Levying much higher tariffs on processed agricultural
2 products than raw commodities makes it more difficult for developing countries to promote and
3 gain from value-added local agroprocessing industries, which could provide much needed off-
4 farm rural employment (Wise, 2004). Reducing or eliminating tariff escalation would greatly
5 facilitate off-farm diversification in developing countries (Koning et al., 2004) and encourage
6 value-added agroprocessing (Stiglitz, 2006).

7
8 The fisheries sector in many of the poorest countries face trade barriers to diversifying production
9 and exports towards value-added processing products. These barriers include tariff escalation,
10 stringent standards, and rules of origin requirements, among others (ITCSD, 2006). Negotiations
11 on regulating fisheries subsidies have attracted considerable attention at the WTO, but other
12 areas that are critical to the fisheries sector, including market access, non-tariff barriers, and
13 measures taken under multilateral environmental agreements, have not been addressed. Many
14 stakeholders in the debate, foremost among them the fishing communities whose livelihoods are
15 at stake, have been marginalized in these discussions (ITCSD, 2006).

16 17 **7.2.5 Options to increase market size, competition, and value capture in commodity** 18 **chains to increase incomes for small-scale farm sector**

19 7.2.5.1 Regional integration

20 Regional integration to create larger, regional markets with common external tariffs but no
21 restrictions to internal trade, as a substitute for lack of a large domestic market, can help maintain
22 more consistent demand and stable, higher prices, for locally produced commodities. Large
23 domestic internal markets have often been found to be a pre-requisite to agriculture based growth
24 in Asian economies, since they facilitated the shifting of the commodity from surplus to deficit
25 areas, helping to ensure effective demand was maintained even in times of surplus and therefore
26 assisting in stabilizing prices (Morris and Sarris, 2007).

27
28 Supporting food production encourages local and regional market integration. In many low
29 income countries especially in Africa, emphasis on cash crop production for export has
30 encouraged transportation networks linking rural areas direct to ports but neglecting internal
31 connections such as local market feeder roads that would benefit small scale farmers producing
32 for local and regional markets. Greater emphasis on food production for local markets reduces
33 the need for domestic farmers to contract as suppliers to multinationals and encourages greater
34 independence. While some producers will continue to find it profitable to link into global
35 commodity chains, regional integration can create the opportunity for small scale producers to
36 diversity their markets with potentially significant benefits for rural livelihoods (Morrissey, 2007).

37

1 7.2.5.2 State trading enterprises for developing country export commodities

2 Many observers note that that in many marginalized markets the private sector has not filled the
3 gap left by withdrawal of the state from its significant role in providing secure outlets for small-
4 scale producers including more remote producers or producers in higher risk environments
5 (Morrison and Sarris, 2007). The reestablishment of state trading enterprises (STEs) for
6 developing country commodities, if designed with improved governance mechanisms to reduce
7 rent-seeking, may provide enhanced market access for small-scale farmers in developing
8 countries and create competition in concentrated export markets. Export state-trading enterprises
9 can thus offer a competitive counterweight to concentrated export markets.

10

11 STEs have real costs and it is widely acknowledged that they have been marred by corruption
12 and cronyism in some countries. Nonetheless, properly overseen and controlled by farmers'
13 organizations, they offer important benefits, especially in developing countries where the private
14 sector is under-capitalized (Stiglitz, 2006). Nonetheless, STEs can potentially provide a useful
15 counterbalance to the market power of global agribusiness thereby increasing competition. STEs
16 may be only market for producers in remote areas of developing countries, and governments can
17 insist that STEs provide this service, whereas they cannot demand it of private corporations
18 (Murphy, 2006).

19

20 Current WTO rules require that governments complete questionnaires about any STEs operating
21 in their country, but no similar requirement applies to transnational agribusiness, although they
22 may control a significant share of global trade in a particular commodity. This information
23 generation requirement could be expanded to include any company – private or public – with, for
24 example, more than a given percentage of the import or export market. This information could be
25 gathered by the WTO or under the auspices of the UN Conference on Trade and Development
26 which has a long-standing mandate to monitor restrictive business practices (Murphy, 2006).

27

28 7.2.5.3 Microfinance

29 Almost all small-scale agricultural systems benefit significantly from rural credit; this credit will not
30 flow from commercial sources, so policy action is needed (Najim et al., 2007). Microfinance
31 programs and banks present a key alternative strategy for many developing countries' agricultural
32 market infrastructure.

33

34 Because so much of the developing South's agricultural output is generated by small-scale
35 farmers and other microentrepreneurs, microfinance (as the set of financial services whose scale
36 matches the needs of micro and small producers) is the mechanism by which agricultural
37 producers are able to expand their production, buy fertilizer and other inputs and technologies,

1 smooth seasonal fluctuations in household and enterprise income, and introduce flexibility into
2 small-farm/microproducer investment and asset building.

3

4 Newer financial services and products, such as crop or rain insurance, are critical to reducing the
5 risk associated with adopting new technology, transitioning to sustainable agricultural practices,
6 and innovating production and marketing methods. Credit terms tailored to agricultural production
7 and marketing, such as loan repayment terms that track with seasonal crop production, are vitally
8 important to enabling agricultural producers to take advantage of economic opportunities.

9

10 7.2.5.4 Alternative trade channels: Fair Trade, certified organics, and mark of origin

11 As a means of developing pro-poor procurement, initiatives such as Fair Trade and
12 environmentally linked production systems, such as organic and eco-friendly production, were
13 introduced as alternatives to the mainstream commodity markets. While these models offer small-
14 scale producers better terms of trade, the market share for these trading systems has been slow
15 to grow and still only occupies a small percentage of global trade. Nevertheless, the principles
16 were proven and a new generation of business models needs to be designed that can provide
17 windows for the less endowed producers to enter mainstream markets through trading platforms
18 that promote greater stability of demand (Berdegue et al., 2005).

19

20 There are now almost 600 Fair Trade producer groups across 54 Latin American,
21 African and Asian countries selling 18 certified products (FLO, 2008). Over five million farmers,
22 farm workers and their families currently benefit from Fair Trade with many more seeking to enter
23 these markets (FLO, 2008). Sales of Fair Trade certified products increased 42% between 2005
24 and 2006 with a value of over US \$2 billion in 2006 (FLO, 2007).

25

26 Fair Trade is no longer a niche market with certified products now sold by large mainstream food
27 processing corporations (such as Proctor and Gamble and Nestle), giant retailers (such as
28 Carrefour, Costco, and Sam's Club), and fast food chains (such as McDonald's and Dunkin'
29 Donuts) (Krier, 2005; Reynolds et al., 2007). (For a business perspective on this growth see
30 Kroger, 2004; Roosevelt, 2004). Market research suggests that there is a very large pool of
31 potential Fair Trade consumers. In the UK, the ethical food market is currently valued at US \$3.2
32 billion per year (Co-operative Bank, 2003). In the US, 68 million consumers with purchases of US
33 \$230 billion per year are identified as "Lohas" (lifestyles of health and sustainability) shoppers
34 (Cortese, 2003).

35

36 Fair Trade is increasingly envisioned in Latin America as an avenue for bolstering small-scale
37 production in domestic markets and for South-South trade, in addition to northern markets

1 (Bisaillon et al., 2005). Mexico has already developed its own Fair Trade labeling organization
2 (Comercio Justo Mexico) and certification agency (Certimex). This expanded vision of Fair
3 Trade's future is encouraging efforts to expand Fair Trade to include basic food products, such as
4 corn and beans.

5
6 There are a number of policy options for promoting Fair Trade as a concrete vehicle for
7 ameliorating poverty and hunger and bolstering environmental sustainability and rural livelihoods.
8 These policies can foster Fair Trade by strengthening the involvement of Fair Trade
9 organizations, producers, traders, and consumers. Governments and multilateral organizations
10 could complement existing ethical business and civil society initiatives, and thus broaden Fair
11 Trade's benefit streams, via a suite of policy options. These include: educating consumers,
12 producers, and businesses about Fair Trade; supporting producer cooperatives and worker
13 organizations to ensure that they have the capacity, information, contacts, and product quality to
14 enter Fair Trade networks; committing to source Fair Trade items; and encouraging the creation
15 of new Fair Trade networks, for example, for basic food stuffs to promote South-South trade.

16
17 Similarly, certified organics can work as an effective policy instrument to promote broader rural
18 development and environmental protection goals. Policy options exist to make institutional and
19 policy environments more conducive to certified organic agriculture and less conducive to energy
20 intense (net energy consuming) agriculture. A number of recent case studies confirm the benefits
21 for small-scale farmers of participating in certified organic farming schemes (Eyhorn, 2007; FAO,
22 2007).

23
24 With organic global sales now approaching USD \$40 billion, certified organic agriculture (COA)
25 offers a challenging, but attractive rural development pathway for small-scale producers and for
26 policy makers wishing to support the production of global public goods. Organic agriculture can
27 help develop an alternative global market that improves agricultural performance through better
28 access to food, relevant technologies, and environmental quality and social equity (FAO, 2007).

29
30 COA is value-added agriculture, which is accessible to small farmers who can not purchase off-
31 farm synthetic inputs such as fertilizers and pesticides (Egelyng and Høgh-Jensen, 2006) and the
32 knowledge intensive methods practiced in COA are particularly compatible with traditional and
33 local knowledge capacity for innovation. COA may provide a way out of poverty for developing
34 country farmers. Widening adoption is therefore a clear policy option; several governments now
35 have targets for the expansion of certified or compliance assessed organic production. To this
36 end, the FAO/IFOAM/UNCTAD International Task Force on Harmonization and Equivalence in

1 Organic Agriculture has generated international organic guarantee tools, adoption of which would
2 help support further development of organic market.

3

4 Policy options generated by the FAO International Conference on Organic Agriculture and Food
5 Security (Rome, 3-5 May 2007) include increased advocacy and training on organics, investing in
6 organic awareness in agricultural and environmental education, building organic knowledge in
7 university and research institutions, transitional crop insurance, providing organic training to
8 extension officers, and supporting investments that facilitate the transition of small-scale
9 producers to organic agriculture have been incorporated into developing countries national
10 policies and legal frameworks (FAO, 2007).

11

12 A number of Latin American countries have also adopted policies and legal frameworks to
13 promote organic agriculture. For example, Costa Rica adopted a national law to develop organic
14 agriculture which sets out a series of mechanisms and incentives to support the organic sector
15 (Asamblea Legislativa de Costa Rica, 2006). These policy tools include incentives to promote
16 increased professional education on organic production, organic certification options for the
17 national and international market, crop insurance for farmers transitioning to organic production,
18 special credit lines for small and medium scale organic producers, and tax exemptions on inputs
19 for organic production as well as on profits from the sale of organic products.

20

21 *Mark of Origin or Appellation:* An approach that has been widely used in France as a means of
22 locking in added value is via protection of specific spatial areas, such as a defined geographic
23 area know to produce a high quality brand, or an area that has traditionally developed a specific
24 type of food processing. The classic examples of this are the wine denominations that allow
25 buyers to purchase products based on geographic location, grape variety and year. Whereas this
26 has proven to be very effective in areas that respect such legal definitions, the products are
27 generally based on long-term consumer loyalty and cultural standards. As such this system is
28 unlikely to be applied to mainstream products unless this strategy is used in combination with
29 other standards such as air-miles and or carbon footprints.

30

31 *Certification:* Another approach to locking in access to higher value markets is to join a
32 certification scheme such as those offered for organic production and rainforest production. All of
33 these movements aim to capture a premium price for producers who can provide evidence that
34 they are meeting and have been monitored to prove their compliance with specific ethical
35 standards. While the area of certification is gaining appeal, the system is extremely expensive
36 and unless charges can be passed onto consumers the ability of poor producers to comply with
37 such regulations will be doubtful.

1

2 An Agricultural Market Analysis Unit could be established and supported in developing countries.

3 This unit would be concerned with coordinating and developing policy on the development of

4 market-orientated strategy in agriculture and setting policy guidelines for agricultural research.

5 The Unit would also coordinate its activities with relevant regional bodies and work closely with

6 the private sector and, especially, with those private-sector support groups working to stimulate

7 production for growth markets.

8

9 Many actors in the agricultural sectors in poor developing countries are still not familiar with the

10 idea of competitive markets. A National Market Education Programme could be established

11 targeted, primarily at farmers, traders and agricultural product processors. Such a programme

12 needs to be linked to the Agricultural Market Analysis Unit (see above). Market Information

13 Services (see below) and run in conjunction with other stakeholders including Ministries of

14 Agriculture, Education and Trade, farmers' and traders' associations and other private sector

15 actors and with extension services.

16

17 The program needs to set targets for training farmers to understand how competitive markets

18 work, to take advantage of market information and to inform them of the difficulties and

19 opportunities associated with market conditions. Issues addressed need to include the stimulation

20 of collective activity to improve economies of scale, linking supply variety and quality to market

21 needs, negotiation of sales and inputs and the use of credit and business management. The

22 program should have a limited duration and should be administered efficiently as a separate unit

23 within a national agricultural development reform program.

24

25 Many small- and medium-scale farmers, traders and processors in poor developing countries

26 have limited access to information about prices and market conditions of the commodities they

27 produce. Farmers find themselves in a weak bargaining position with traders which results in

28 lower-than-market farm-gate prices, high transaction costs and wastage. Market Information

29 Services need to be established at local, national, and regional levels to collect, process, and

30 disseminate market information in the appropriate language of intended recipients. Such services

31 need to be fully coordinated with each other and involve full participation of stakeholders.

32

33 To assist developing countries to compete successfully in the world economy research and

34 extension institutions need to develop or acquire new skills and expertise in market analysis and

35 market linkage. Producers need to ensure that there are viable markets for any existing or new

36 products. They need to ensure that the quality and packaging of those products meet the

37 requirements of customers both on the domestic and export market. Research and extension

1 services have a vital role to play in this effort and must be prepared to reform quickly to meet the
2 challenges of globalization.

3

4 In many respects national research programs have succeeded in their goal to achieve food
5 security, the current emphasis should now be to develop dynamic and commercially orientated
6 research that supports improved market analysis, market access and added value processing.

7 Extension services should now focus on assisting producers to trade more effectively within a
8 liberalised market. Special attention should be given to aspects such as linkage of production to
9 markets, access to credit and collective marketing which will enable the millions of atomised,
10 small-scale farmers to gain from economies of scale in their input and output markets.

11

12 Government research services need to work closely with the private sector which is increasingly
13 developing its' own research capacity, particularly in regard to higher value commodities and
14 research related to issues and problems further up the value chain.

15

16 **7.2.6 Market mechanisms to optimize environmental externalities**

17 Agriculture generates environmental externalities (see 7.1). There are currently few market
18 mechanisms that internalize these externalities.

19

20 The environmental impacts of agricultural trade stem at least in part from the globalization of
21 market failures, as well as the lack of market mechanisms to internalizing the environmental
22 externalities of production and account for the positive externalities (Boyce, 1999). Trade
23 liberalization leading to the displacement of traditional jute production in Bangladesh by imported
24 synthetic fibers is an example. Nearly the entire price advantage enjoyed by synthetics over jute
25 would be eliminated if environmental externalities were factored into the price (Boyce, 1999). At
26 the same time, traditional producers receive no compensation for the positive environmental
27 externalities, e.g., biodiversity conservation, associated with many forms of traditional production.
28 Similarly, U.S. corn production which requires significant energy and agrochemical inputs which
29 cause significant environmental externalities is sold at below the cost of production in Mexico,
30 displacing traditional corn production in the small and medium farmers who plant diverse
31 traditional varieties (Nadal and Wise, 2004).

32

33 Trade agreements bring two distinct kinds of production into direct competition, with vastly
34 different environmental impacts and with significant ramifications. In both cases the market price
35 for the modern product fails to internalize or account for significant environmental externalities. At
36 the same time, the positive environmental externalities that are present in many forms of
37 traditional agriculture are not assessed.

1

2 7.2.6.1 Policy options for internalizing environmental externalities

3 Some OECD countries adopted economic measures, including environmental taxes on
4 agricultural inputs as a part of a policy package to reduce the environmental impacts of
5 pesticides, fertilizer and manure waste. Denmark, Norway and Sweden, for example, have
6 introduced taxes on pesticide use, as incentives to reach pesticide use reduction targets.
7 Similarly, the Netherlands imposed an excise manure tax. The recent reforms of the European
8 CAP may be interpreted as a move towards rewarding farmers, not only as producers of food, but
9 as caretakers of natural resources and environmental services. European support for organic
10 agriculture is another important aspect of this recognition (Halberg et al., 2006).

11

12 Many critical ecosystem services are under-valued or un-valued; there are no market signals that
13 would spur technological development of alternative supplies (Najim et al., 2007). Charges to
14 internalize cost of transportation energy expenditure in globalized agriculture, such as “food mile”
15 taxes are one policy approach. Food mile taxes could help internalize the social and
16 environmental externalities of transport, including the climate impacts, pollution, and the cross-
17 border movement of pests and livestock pathogens, among others (Jones, 2001).

18

19 Policy approaches to assist small-scale producers to articulate their carbon rating will be key,
20 especially as an over-simplified response may be to simply ban long haul agricultural goods, and
21 provide greater support to local food systems and season procurement policies that could end
22 year round supply of off-season goods. In some cases though, an integrated analysis of energy
23 costs and GHG emission from distant developing country production as compared to local
24 northern country production will be favorable for developing country production. For example a
25 recent analysis showed that Kenyan flower production exported long distances to the European
26 market nonetheless generated fewer GHG emissions than hot-house flower production in the
27 Netherlands (DFID, 2007).

28

29 7.2.6.2 Payments for agroenvironmental services

30 Ecosystem services remain largely un-priced by the market. These services include climate
31 regulation, water provision, waste treatment capacity, nutrient management, watershed functions
32 and others. Payments for environmental services (PES) reward the ecosystem services provided
33 by sustainable agriculture practices. PES is a policy approach that recognizes the
34 multifunctionality of agriculture and creates mechanisms to value and pay for these benefits. In
35 principle, payments for environmental services (PES) such as watershed management,
36 biodiversity conservation and carbon sequestration, can advance the goals of both environmental
37 protection and poverty reduction (Alix-Garcia et al., 2005).

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PES is an approach that, like economic instruments used for pollution prevention, seeks to support positive environmental externalities through the transfer of financial resources from beneficiaries of the services to those who protect or steward the environmental resources that provide the service. PES schemes often focus on environmental services provided by forest conservation, reforestation, sustainable forest extraction, and certain agroforestry and silvo-pastoral practices. Carbon sequestration services are also involved in several PES schemes, both to increase active absorption through reforestation or to avoid carbon emissions through forest conservation.

A key objective of PES schemes is to generate stable revenue flows that can help ensure long-term sustainability of the ecosystem that provides the service; and to structure the arrangement so that small farmers and communities, not just large landowners, may participate and benefit (this may involve increased transaction costs, and tends to be more effective where farmers are well organized). Examples in Latin America show that community participation and equitable rules are key; promoting rural livelihoods must be a stated objective of the PES program otherwise the lion's share of benefits will go to wealthy landowners. In one example in Costa Rica 70% of PES for carbon sequestration in one year went to a single wealthy landowner (Rosa et al., 2004).

PES revenues can be generated by user fees, taxes, subsidies, and grants by IFIs and donor organizations and NGOs. Long standing programs, including those established by New York City and Quito, Ecuador, which levy increased fees on water users to fund watershed conservation are well known. A similar, smaller programs in the Cauca Valley of Colombia works on a similar principle; farmer associations organized a PES program which levies additional water use fees to promote the adoption of conservation measures on over one million hectares and maintain dry-season water flows (Mayrand and Paquin, 2004).

PES schemes may also include measures to assist local communities with market development and revenue diversification as part of the compensation, or payment, package for the environmental service protected and provided. For example, in Brazil, rubber tappers receive payments for forest conservation services they provide through their management of forest resources. In the US, the Conservation Reserves Program provides funding to farmers to remove sensitive lands from production, prevent land degradation and preserve biodiversity.

Other projects promote the adoption of improved silvo-pastoral practices in degraded pasture areas that may provide valuable local and global environmental benefits, including biodiversity conservation; payment-for-service mechanism are being employed to encourage the adoption of

1 silvo-pastoral practices in three countries of Central and South America: Colombia, Costa Rica,
2 and Nicaragua. The project has created a mechanism that pays land users for the global
3 environmental services they are generating. Another example is the Coffee and Biodiversity
4 project supported by the GEF and the World Bank in El Salvador, which provides marketing and
5 technical support as a proxy for direct payments, to promote biodiversity protection and habitat
6 creation on shade-grown coffee plantations via niche marketing of “shade-grown,” song-bird
7 friendly coffee (Pagiola and Agostini, 2002).

8
9 Supportive national policy environments are important. In 1997 Costa Rica reformed its forest law
10 to allow land users to receive payments for specified land uses, including new plantations,
11 sustainable logging, and forest conservation. The amended law recognizes four types of
12 environmental services: carbon sequestration, biodiversity conservation services, hydrological
13 services, and scenic beauty and ecotourism. The law also introduced a fuel tax to finance forest
14 conservation and established an agency (Fonafifo) to raise funds and manage the PES scheme.
15 Similarly, the Ecuadorian National Biodiversity Policy recommends the establishment of markets
16 for environmental services, and the establishment of the mechanisms for water and watershed
17 conservation, coastal protection, global climate changes services, and compensation to
18 landowners – importantly, to both individuals and communities (Mayrand and Paquin, 2004).

19
20 Another variant of a PES scheme is the BioCarbon Fund established by the World Bank to buy
21 certified emission reductions from land-use, land-use change, and forestry projects admissible
22 under the Kyoto Protocol. The Fund is designed to target agricultural and forestry projects that
23 enhance other ecosystem services, such as biodiversity and watershed protection, while
24 improving the livelihoods of local people. Projects include conservation agriculture, such as
25 shade-grown coffee, agroforestry to restore degraded areas, improved agricultural practices,
26 such as shifting from subsistence farming to organic agriculture, and reforestation (Kumar, 2005).

27 28 7.2.6.2.1 Bioenergy and biofuels: subsidies and standards

29 Large direct and indirect subsidies, including tax credits for biofuels, have been used to build
30 bioenergy production and markets. Fuel blending mandates and import restrictions, particularly
31 tariffs on ethanol likewise have helped to build domestic markets (UN Energy, 2007). How the
32 bioenergy value chain is structured is crucial for determining the development benefits of this
33 sector. Policy options to support small and medium size enterprises in bioenergy should be
34 considered because of studies showing the multiplier economic and development effects of local
35 ownership in local economies (Morris, 2007; UN Energy, 2007).

36 37 7.2.6.2.2 First generation liquid biofuels: trade, subsidy and sustainability issues

1 When subsidies are granted to biofuels, they should be tied to objectively observable positive
2 externalities. Biofuels policies set incentives for producers that directly affect the extent of
3 externalities, the primary justification for granting the subsidies in the first place. In the case of
4 current policies in most countries it is apparent that these incentives are rarely closely linked to
5 the externalities they are allegedly supposed to provide. In fact, the majority of policies in OECD
6 countries create incentives to maximize production of 1st generation biofuels, irrespective of
7 quality and quantity of externalities. Consequently, many biofuels are produced with intensive use
8 of energy inputs, leading to low energy balances and GHG emission reductions while contributing
9 to environmental problems.

10
11 Biofuels produced from agricultural feedstocks (first generation) are rarely competitive with other
12 forms of energy and practically all producing countries support their biofuels industries through a
13 complex set of federal and state-level policies. The most common forms of support are reductions
14 on excise taxes that are designed to foster consumption by reducing the cost of biofuels relative
15 to conventional fuels. On the supply side, these policies are often complemented with direct
16 production support, e.g. payments of Euro 45 ha⁻¹ for energy crops grown on non-set-aside land
17 in the EU and subsidized credit for producers in Brazil and the U.S. In addition, biofuels also
18 benefit indirectly from highly distorted agricultural markets in OECD countries, e.g. the U.S. maize
19 sector, the primary ethanol feedstock in the country, received US\$ 37.4 billion in subsidies
20 between 1995-2003 (UNCTAD, 2006). In many countries, subsidies are accompanied by
21 blending mandates, e.g. the E.U. set a voluntary 5.75% biofuels target for 2007, supported by
22 several mandatory targets at the country level. The differential treatment of ethanol and biodiesel
23 under international trade rules (ethanol is classified as an agricultural product, biodiesel is
24 classified as a chemical/industrial product) has important implications on international market
25 access and also affects how the fuels would be treated under a proposed WTO category of
26 “environmental goods and services” (IEA, 2004; IEA, 2006; Kopolow, 2006; UNCTAD, 2006;
27 USDA, 2006; Kojima et al., 2007).

28
29 Together, these forms of policy support generate substantial economic costs – reducing funds
30 available for other policy goals, including energy conservation and support for other alternative
31 energy generation technologies. Current levels of subsidies are considerable. For example, total
32 annual subsidies to liquid biofuels in the US are estimated at US\$5.1-6.8 billion, corresponding to
33 US\$0.38-0.49 and US\$0.45-0.57 per liter of petroleum equivalent ethanol and biodiesel,
34 respectively (Kopolow, 2006). Moreover, taxes on fuels represent a significant source of
35 government income in many countries and reductions are often difficult to compensate. While
36 blending mandates are attractive to policy makers because they do not directly affect government
37 budgets, they too create considerable economic costs. In addition, blending mandates create

1 inefficiencies by guaranteeing a market for biofuels producers irrespective of costs and limiting
2 competition. This reduces incentives to develop more efficient and cheaper production – an effect
3 that is reinforced by trade barriers.

4
5 Against these costs stand potential benefits in terms of rural development, climate change
6 mitigation and energy security as well as possible negative effects on the environment and food
7 prices. Consequently, decision makers need to carefully assess whether the full social costs of
8 bioenergy and associated promotion policies are worth achievable benefits.

9
10 Policy options to reduce the social and environmental externalities of 1st generation biofuels
11 production such as sustainability standards are widely noted in the literature, but developing
12 effective standards that balance environmental and social interests with access to export markets
13 for developing countries is a significant challenge. Given the potentially adverse social and
14 environmental effects of large-scale increases in biofuels production (see Ch 4.3 and 6.2.5), the
15 development of sustainability standards is being discussed in different private and government
16 supported forums.

17
18 In the absence of universal regulations and enforcement, standards are viewed as key to limiting
19 negative effects and improving benefits for small-scale farmers (O'Connell et al., 2005; Reijnders,
20 2006; WWF, 2006). In addition to disagreements on the definition of these standards, with large
21 differences of opinion between industrialized and developing countries, uncertainty persists on
22 how effective such standards can actually be. Given that biofuels are fungible export
23 commodities, their effectiveness would depend on the participation of all major consumers and
24 producers. Moreover, qualifying for standards and obtaining certification can be a considerable
25 financial and institutional burden for poor producing countries. It is therefore essential that
26 developing countries are included and supported in the process of the development of
27 sustainability standards to ensure that environmental and social considerations are balanced with
28 the broader needs of developing countries, including considerations about the needs of small-
29 scale farmers, farmer cooperatives and access to the markets of industrialized countries.

30
31 Liberalization of biofuels trade would shift production to developing countries. There is significant
32 question as to whether this would benefit small-scale farmers and in the absence of effective
33 safeguards the resulting expansion of production in these countries could magnify social and
34 environmental costs. Growing crops for biofuels could worsen water shortages; biofuel crop
35 production in addition to food crops will add another new stress on water use and availability (de
36 Fraiture et al., 2007b).

37

1 7.2.6.2.3 Second generation biofuels

2 The U.S. Department of Energy calculates that if all corn now grown in the US were converted to
3 ethanol, it would satisfy only about 15% of the country's current transportation needs (DOE,
4 2006); others put that figure as low as 6% (ETC, 2007). A second approach is to produce ethanol
5 from cellulose, which has the potential to obtain at least twice as much fuel from the same area of
6 land as corn ethanol, because much more biomass is available per unit of land. Thus promoting
7 research and development for second generation biofuels is an often noted policy option.

8 Synthetic biology approaches to break down cellulose and lignin, crucial for second generation
9 "cellulosic" biofuels production, are still years off but may be promising. Importantly, efforts are
10 also needed to allow developing countries and small-scale farmers to profit from the resulting
11 technologies (Diouf, 2007). While some countries have recently increased their support for
12 research and development on 2nd generation biofuels, more public efforts international efforts are
13 needed to focus on developing means by which 2nd generation biofuels may benefit small-scale
14 farmers and developing countries. This includes tackling the high capital intensity of technologies,
15 facilitating farmer cooperatives and dealing with intellectual property rights issues.

16
17 If any of the synthetic biology approaches are successful, the agricultural landscape could quickly
18 be transformed as farmers plant more switchgrass or miscanthus as feedstock crops– not only in
19 North America, but also across the global South. By removing biomass that might previously have
20 been returned to the soil, fertility and soil structure would also be compromised. As presently
21 envisioned, large-scale, export-oriented biofuel production in the global South could have
22 significant negative impacts on soil, water, biodiversity, land tenure and the livelihoods of farmers
23 and indigenous peoples (de Fraiture et al., 2007a).

24
25 7.2.6.2.4 Bioelectricity and bioheat

26 There is considerable potential for bioelectricity and bioheat to contribute to economic and social
27 development (see Chapters 3 and 6) and a number of clear policy options to promote a better
28 exploitation of this potential (Stassen, 1995; Bhattacharya, 2002; Kishore et al., 2004; Kartha et
29 al., 2005; Ghosh et al., 2006). Promotion of R&D, development of technical standards as well as
30 better access to information and finance are needed to better exploit the potential of bioelectricity
31 and bioheat in developing countries.

32
33 Promoting research and development to improve the operational stability and reducing capital
34 costs promises to improve the attractiveness of bioenergy, especially of small and medium-scale
35 biogas digesters and thermo-chemical gasifiers, is important for the developing South. The
36 development of product standards and dissemination of knowledge is also key. A long history of
37 policy failures and a wide variety of locally produced generators with large differences in

1 performance have led to considerable skepticism about bioenergy in many countries. The
2 development of product standards as well as better knowledge dissemination can contribute to
3 increase market transparency and improve consumer confidence.

4
5 Experience of various bioenergy promotion programs has shown that proper operation and
6 maintenance are key to success and sustainability of low-cost and small-scale applications.
7 Therefore, building local capacity, ensuring that local consumers are closely engaged in the
8 development as well as the monitoring and maintenance of facilities, and increased access to
9 finance for bioenergy are necessary. Compared to other off-grid energy solutions, bioenergy often
10 exhibits higher initial capital costs but lower long-term feedstock costs. This cost structure often
11 forces poor households and communities to forego investments in modern bioenergy, even when
12 payback periods are very short. Improved access to finance can help to reduce these problems.

13 14 **7.2.7 Enhancing governance of trade and technologies**

15 Agricultural policymaking and AKST investment are affected by global governance issues that
16 may apply in a number of economic sectors, including agriculture. This section addresses a suite
17 of governance issues in trade and environmental decision-making, including the democratization
18 of global trade regimes, as well as international competition policy to govern corporate power
19 over commodity markets and promote more equitable distribution of agricultural rents that could
20 help drive development and improve rural livelihoods. The section also reviews policy options for
21 international instruments (agreements and intuitions) to assess the impact of proposed trade
22 agreements and emerging technologies against the development and sustainability goals; these
23 processes, including strategic impact assessments of proposed trade agreements and
24 comparative technology assessments, could help educate policy makers and stakeholders,
25 increase transparency, and assist in making decisions that would support development goals.

26 27 7.2.7.1 Governance of trade and environmental decision-making

28 If trade negotiation processes were made more transparent, social and environmental concerns
29 would likely be better represented in the resulting agreements. The principles of good
30 governance, such as representation, transparency, accountability, access to information and
31 systematic conflict resolution should be fully internalized and implemented by international trade
32 and environmental institutions (Stiglitz, 2006). Developing countries, which often lack personnel
33 and institutional capacity to deal with the complexity of trade negotiations are at a distinct
34 disadvantage negotiating for the interests of their rural sectors in these fora, and often lack
35 resources to analyze important and highly complex issues, to develop negotiating positions and
36 to respond quickly and effectively to their various negotiating teams. Civil society participation is

1 limited from negotiations through dispute resolution process, much of which takes place behind
2 closed doors.

3

4 Policies to strengthen developing country negotiating capacity in trade talks are important. Trade
5 capacity development, as a part of “aid for trade” packages, are one option. Consideration may
6 also be given to establishing national and regional teams of experts with the necessary authority
7 to analyze the interests of their stakeholder groups and to establish appropriate negotiating
8 positions.

9

10 Another option is to develop CSO consultative committees to support negotiators, giving farmer
11 organizations, business and NGOs the opportunity to provide valuable input and support
12 negotiators. A number of countries, for example Kenya, the Philippines and India, have created
13 national consultative committees to the WTO (Murphy, 2006).

14

15 Without effective global environmental governance, nation-states, subject to the pressures of
16 globalization, may drift towards a low-level environmental policy convergence that is insensitive to
17 local ecological conditions and does not respect the diversity of preferences and priorities across
18 and within nations (Zarsky, 1999). The creation of a United Nations Environmental Organization,
19 perhaps modeled on the World Health Organization, has been proposed as one policy approach
20 to address this significant global governance deficit and promote technologies and behaviors that
21 respect ecosystems more effectively (Esty, 1994; Friends of the UNEO, 2007).

22

23 7.2.7.2 International competition policy and anti-trust: governing commodity markets to promote
24 development goals

25 Vertical and horizontal concentration in global commodity markets is a primary cause of market
26 distortion. Possible policy responses include an international review mechanism for proposed
27 mergers and acquisitions among agribusiness companies that operate in a number of countries
28 simultaneously (Stiglitz, 2006), the establishment of international competition policy, and the re-
29 establishment of state trading enterprises.

30

31 One of the major anti-competitive effects of globalization has been a rapid concentration of
32 market power away from producers into the hands of a limited number of trade and retail
33 companies (Vorley et al., 2007). What looks like buying and trading between countries is often the
34 redistribution of capital among subsidiaries of the same parent multinational corporation (Shand,
35 2005). As a result, the negotiating power within agricultural chains, over the past 20 years has
36 moved rapidly away from the producer end of the market chain. The first level of consolidation
37 was made at the wholesale level through a series of mergers, acquisitions and take-overs that

1 reduced the number of international traders from hundreds of family based enterprises to a
2 handful of international trade houses that dominate particular commodities, such as Archer Daniel
3 Midland, Unilever and Cargill.

4
5 This situation means that even when farmers organize and aggregate, produce quality goods,
6 and sell collectively, they have insufficient volumes of sale to negotiate effectively with four to five
7 giant corporations. There is increasing concern that lack of competition in the marketplace is
8 having seriously negative social effects on agricultural producers; the most vulnerable are the
9 poorly organized, resource poor farmers in developing nations (Fig. 7.7).

10
11 **[Insert Figure 7.7]**

12
13 One approach to address this imbalance in trade relationships is the establishment of
14 international competition policy in the form of multilateral rules on restrictive business practices. A
15 potential model for this approach is the French law (*Loi Galland*) that prohibits selling at a loss
16 and “excessively low prices.”

17
18 Another policy option that is widely noted is the reintroduction of price bands as a means of
19 cushioning the impact of world price instability. For example Chile’s Free Trade Agreements with
20 EU and Canada allowed it to keep its agricultural price band which was designed to stabilize
21 import costs of agricultural staples (including wheat, sugar, oil) through adjustment to tariffs on
22 such with the objective of allowing a fair rate of return to Chilean farmers even if they were
23 competing with heavily subsidized US farmers. In contrast the US-Chile Free Trade Agreement
24 committed Chile to phase out its agricultural price band system. An international competition
25 policy framework might also include creation of an independent UN agency to address some of
26 the issues that UN Center for Transnational Corporations used to address.

27
28 **7.2.7.3 Strategic impact assessment and comparative technology assessment**

29 There is often a dearth of information on the potential social and economic benefits and risks of
30 proposed trade agreements and emerging technologies alike. Policy tools to allow developing
31 countries to better analyze benefits, risks and tradeoffs of proposed trade agreements and the
32 introduction of new technologies are needed. Policy approaches to redress this issue include
33 Strategic Impact Assessment (SIA) of trade agreements and Comparative Technology
34 Assessment for emerging technologies. Additionally, increased research and more sensitive trade
35 policy stimulations tailored to countries at different stages of development with different
36 characteristics to their agricultural sectors may be helpful to inform policy choices to address
37 development and sustainability goals (Morrison and Sarris, 2007).

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SIA's have provided early warnings as well as research evidence that failing to mitigate negative environmental effects can substantially reduce net economic and welfare gains from trade. In this way, these assessments can provide critical information to governments and stakeholders allowing them to consider whether or not to reject or mitigate a trade policy proposal that is likely to worsen poverty, inequity or environmental degradation in certain sectors.

Strategic impact assessment of trade agreements that have been undertaken for regional agreements, such as NAFTA and multiple EU trade agreements, aim to give negotiators a fuller understanding of potential environmental impacts in their own countries, such that they may be taken into account alongside the economic and social considerations on which trade negotiations have traditionally been based. The fuller information on environmental issues enables negotiators to make more reliable tradeoffs, in those cases where the effects do not provide win-win outcomes for national and international economic, social and environmental concerns.

The European Commission for example has defined the goal of SIA as generating information to integrate sustainability into European trade policy by assessing a proposed trade agreement's potential impacts on sustainable development. SIA's, which are public documents, inform negotiators and interested stakeholders of the possible social, environmental, and economic consequences of a trade agreement; provide analysis that will help maximize benefits of the agreement through better management of environmental, social and economic resources; and inform the design of policy options, including capacity building and international regulation, that may maximize the benefits and reduce the negative impacts of the proposed trade agreement (George and Kirkpatrick, 2003).

Another noted policy option to increase information and transparency is the establishment of an intergovernmental framework for the comparative assessment of new technologies as they evolve from initial scientific discovery through to possible commercialization. For example, observers have noted that rapid developments in nanotechnologies and nano-material production may out-compete developing countries' primary commodities in international markets in the near and mid-term (ETC Group, 2005). All stakeholders, perhaps especially including developing country governments that are negotiating market access for their agricultural commodities and raw materials in various multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements, could be provided with information on how future technology development may affect them and the markets that are essential for their economies.

1 The potential benefits and risks of nanotechnologies present an example of the benefits for the
2 realization of development and sustainability goals that a technology assessment agreement or
3 agency might afford. There has been considerable reporting and analysis of the potential benefits
4 of nano-scale technologies for developing countries, particularly with regard to water and energy.
5 The potential health and environmental risks of this new technology platform, as well as
6 nanotechnology's potential impacts on commodity markets and the social and economic
7 disruption that may cause, are less well studied. Nanotechnologies are still very new; nonetheless
8 if a new engineered nano-material outperforms a conventional material, including for example
9 cotton textiles, copper or rubber, that are key commodities for developing country economies,
10 significant economic dislocation may result (ETC Group, 2005).

11

12 Emerging technologies, including nano-scale technologies, require scientific, socioeconomic and
13 societal evaluation in order for governments to make informed decisions about their risks and
14 benefits. Rather than approaching technology assessment in a piecemeal, technology-by-
15 technology fashion, governments and the international community could consider longer term
16 strategies to address technology introduction on an ongoing basis. One option for the
17 international community is to consider an independent body that is dedicated to assessing major
18 new technologies and providing an early warning and early listening system. Comparative
19 technology assessment could help policy makers and stakeholders monitor and assess the
20 introduction of new technologies and their potential socioeconomic, health and environmental
21 impacts.

22

23 One policy approach might be to reinvigorate the capacity of the UN System to Conduct
24 Technology Assessment for Development. The UN Commission on Science and Technology for
25 Development has become a subsidiary body of the Economic and Social Council, where it
26 operates with greatly reduced staff and funding. This commission could be strengthened, or
27 another specialized UN agency could be given the mandate to both conduct technology
28 assessments and build capacity in developing countries to assess technologies, with the goals of
29 promoting poverty reduction, health and environmental protection, and sustainable development
30 (ETC Group, 2005).

31

32 Another policy option could be the establishment of a legally-binding multilateral agreement on
33 comparative technology assessment, potentially negotiated through a specialized agency such as
34 UNCTAD, the ILO, or ECOSOC's Commission on Sustainable Development. The objective of
35 such a convention would be to provide an early warning and assessment framework capable of
36 monitoring and assessing emerging technologies in transparent processes and their potential
37 benefits as well as costs and risks for human health, the environment, and poverty reduction and

1 development. At the same time, such an agreement might help to generate information that would
2 help educate citizens and stakeholder groups, via participatory and transparent processes,
3 support broader societal understanding of emerging technologies, encourage scientific
4 innovation, and facilitate equitable benefit and risk-sharing. Alternatively, a specialized
5 Technology Assessment Agency could be created, within the UN system to conduct comparative
6 technology assessments of new and emerging technologies.

7 8 **7.3 Food Safety, Animal and Plant Health**

9 The management of food safety, animal and plant health issues along the farm to fork continuum
10 requires a level of coordination and integration that often is not provided by the current
11 international policy and regulatory framework for agriculture. Instead, these three issues are
12 largely addressed in terms of international standards elaboration through parallel programs
13 developed by the Codex Alimentarius Commission, World Animal Health Organization (OIE) and
14 the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) for food safety, animal health and plant
15 health respectively. These standards and related sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures are
16 implemented and enforced to a greater or lesser degree through an array of often uncoordinated
17 national initiatives variously managed by ministries such as agriculture, health, environment,
18 forestry, fisheries, trade, commerce and international affairs. Related to this lack of coordination,
19 or perhaps because of it, alternative regulatory mechanisms such as third party standard and
20 certification systems mandated by private sector retailers, in response to increased consumer
21 demand for improved food safety and food quality, have been implemented. Much of the cost
22 burden for meeting these private regulatory requirements is borne by primary producers.

23
24 The increasing internationally traded volume and variety of food, food ingredients, feed, animals
25 and plants poses many challenges for private quality assurance programs and government SPS
26 programs. SPS system failures affect both exporting and importing countries. For example, recent
27 U.S. imports of contaminated pet food from China resulted not only in the deaths and illnesses of
28 an unknown number of pets and the closing of 180 processing plants in China, but a U.S.
29 Congressional proposal for reorganization of US food import inspection. Yet proposals to equip
30 SPS authorities and private establishments with adequate personnel and technology to enforce
31 standards sometimes encounter not only bureaucratic resistance and/or opposition from industry
32 segments of the supply chain, but broader resistance based on credible threats of trade
33 retaliation in non-food and agriculture sectors (Barboza, 2007; Clayton, 2007; Weiss 2007).
34 Whether or not food and agriculture trade expands to the extent projected by FAO for 2030 (FAO,
35 2006c), the cost-benefit framed tension between measures to protect human, animal and plant
36 health and broader trade pressures is likely to remain.

37

1 **7.3.1. Food safety**

2 7.3.1.1 Surveillance challenges

3 The lack of reliable data or data that are comparable between countries on the prevalence and
4 severity of foodborne disease, despite several WHO initiatives to develop global and regional
5 surveillance and outbreak reporting systems, continues to impede the development of evidence-
6 based food safety interventions in many WHO member countries (WHO, 2002a, 2004). For
7 example, the EU has undertaken a fully harmonized baseline surveillance study for *Salmonella* in
8 poultry production which is the basis of targeted interventions to manage the prevalence of this
9 foodborne pathogen (EFSA, 2006a).

10

11 Epidemiological uncertainty about the origin, prevalence and severity of much foodborne illness
12 makes it difficult to target resources and do comprehensive and pro-active food safety control
13 planning. More than 200 known diseases are transmitted by food, however under-reporting,
14 illnesses caused by unknown pathogens and other factors, such as water sanitation, obscure the
15 origin of foodborne illness. The confluence of these factors impedes estimates to characterize the
16 burden of existing foodborne illness, much less the evolution of future pathogens.

17

18 Pathogens featured in today's headlines, such as *Listeria monocytogenes* or *E. coli* O157:H7,
19 were not identified as major causes of foodborne illness 20 years ago (Mead et al., 1999).
20 However, for most foodborne infections effective preventive interventions can be taken despite a
21 lack of exact epidemiological knowledge. Furthermore, the majority of foodborne infections in
22 most countries are caused by a few pathogens e.g., in the EU, *Salmonella* and *Campylobacter*
23 accounted for about 96% of reported zoonoses cases in 2005 (EFSA, 2006a). In developing
24 countries, actions such as water sanitation and heat treatment of food in combination with
25 measures for basic sanitary and hygienic routines would have significant health benefits, even
26 without immediate support of detailed surveillance data. Diarrhea is the leading causes of illness
27 and death in less developed countries, killing an estimated 1.9 million people annually worldwide
28 and almost all deaths are caused by food or waterborne microbial pathogens (Schlundt et al.,
29 2004). This incidence of morbidity and mortality is consequent to the fact that globally > 1 billion
30 people, and in sub-Saharan Africa > 40%, lack access to clean drinkable water and 2.4 billion do
31 not have basic sanitation (CA, 2007). In practice, this means that these people have to drink
32 water with fecal contamination from humans and animals and their intestinally excreted
33 pathogens.

34

35 For countries with weak surveillance and outbreak detection systems, estimating the burden of
36 foodborne illness is even a more daunting challenge, despite the assistance provided by WHO's
37 Global Salm-Serv, Global Outbreak and Response Network (GOARN), International Food Safety

1 Authorities Network (INFOSAN) and the FAO/OIE/WHO Global Early Warning System and
2 Response for zoonotic disease surveillance (Flint et al., 2005). Further complicating the future of
3 foodborne disease surveillance is the likelihood that as a result of climate change, new pathogens
4 will emerge, particularly in fish and shellfish raised in water whose quality is degraded or
5 contaminated (Rose et al., 2001).

6
7 The timeliness and efficacy of preventative or prophylactic food safety interventions depend on
8 accurate, comprehensive and timely surveillance information. The factors of uncertainty in
9 calculating the burden of foodborne illness are compounded by weak national surveillance
10 systems upon which the international systems depend. Many governments, particularly in least
11 developed countries, are unable to finance the development of such surveillance systems as part
12 of national health system planning.

13
14 Since welfare benefits from agricultural trade are expected to increase for only a few developing
15 countries as a result of the WTO Doha Round of negotiations (Bouet et al., 2004; Anderson and
16 Martin, 2005; Polaski, 2006), it is unlikely that non-benefiting countries will be able to pay the
17 costs of foodborne disease surveillance systems and SPS interventions from trade revenues.
18 Therefore, in what follows we assume that some form of public finance and donor assistance will
19 be required for capacity building in surveillance and other food safety activities. Furthermore,
20 public finance may be involved in helping to insure against global foodborne illnesses risks that
21 are not and perhaps cannot be insured by private firms.

22 23 7.3.1.2 Financing a public good

24 The globalization of the food and feed trade enables a broader and more rapid transmission of
25 foodborne illness, particularly from high-risk microbial pathogens of animal origin (OIE, 2006).
26 Development of surveillance data often becomes a priority only if a food contamination incident or
27 zoonosis threatens trade, e.g., BSE and avian influenza. Such threats to trade usually focus only
28 on emerging diseases and less on those that are prevalent and perennially cause major
29 problems. Yet the costs of foodborne illness far exceed those that can be recovered from
30 inspection fees or other forms of trade related SPS financing, even when the origin of an illness
31 can be traced back to a specific source. Whereas the costs of food safety measures can be
32 internalized to some extent in the cost of a product, there is no adequate mechanism for financing
33 the public health costs resulting from transborder foodborne illness. FAO and WHO recognize
34 that “[f]ood safety is an essential public health issue for all countries,” but the normative
35 framework and technical assistance planning for food safety in developing countries is largely a
36 function of trade policy, or more broadly of the economics of private markets. Donor interest in

1 and exporting country demand for SPS related assistance tends to be triggered by the threat of
2 trade disruption or to ensure that food imports are safe (World Bank, 2005).

3
4 Although food safety is characterized as a global public good, economic analysis of food safety
5 interventions often is framed largely in cost/benefit terms of market failures, in this case, the
6 failure to internalize such negative cross border externalities as foodborne illness. Attempts to
7 mitigate these externalities on an *ad hoc* emergency basis “is a costly and unsustainable form of
8 assistance” (World Bank, 2005). The role of public food safety management is defined in terms of
9 serving the market, without, however, an adequate financing mechanism designed to enable the
10 development of food safety as a public good and taking into consideration the full and
11 considerable cost for foodborne infection e.g. loss of labor time and cost for medical care. New
12 proposed public finance mechanism (e.g. Kaul and Conceição, 2006) could be adapted to the
13 provision of food safety, both on a global and regional basis, as a global public good. A World
14 Bank study has argued cogently for a more proactive and preventative supply and demand
15 approach to providing capacity building for food safety to facilitate trade (World Bank, 2005) but
16 such capacity building need not be limited to trade facilitation.

17 18 7.3.1.3 Implementing food safety standards for domestic public health benefits

19 In theory, trade related food safety standards and control measures may also be applied readily
20 to domestic food safety programs. In practice, according to developing country official
21 respondents to survey input into the FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme Evaluation,
22 developing countries adopt few international food standards into domestic legislation because
23 they lack the resources and technical capacity to implement and enforce the standards (CAC,
24 2002).

25
26 The unmet challenge remains, how to apply food safety measures not only for internationally
27 traded products but for the great share of global food production that is not traded internationally.
28 Of particular concern is the implementation of standards and other guidance to prevent foodborne
29 illness resulting from new foodborne pathogens in domestically produced and consumed foods or
30 from existing pathogens whose prevalence or severity has increased. The challenge of applying
31 standards domestically for public health benefits is even greater in countries where food safety
32 control systems are not integrated into the public health system but are instead largely confined
33 to export establishments and import inspection. Policy options, outlined below, to meet this
34 challenge should take into account capacity building challenges.

35
36 Despite the proliferation of international public and private standards, compliance with which is
37 required for market entry, there are relatively few public studies of sanitary/phytosanitary (SPS)

1 compliance costs for developing country agricultural exports (Pay, 2005). These few quantified
2 studies indicate that existing levels and kinds of trade related technical assistance are far from
3 providing the necessary facilities, such as accredited laboratories for measuring pesticide residue
4 levels, to enable SPS standards implementation and enforcement (e.g., Larcher Carvalho, 2005).
5 However, in some developing countries, qualitative needs assessments should suffice to
6 demonstrate the desirability of donor financing of basic SPS infrastructure and training.
7 Notwithstanding the technical capacity shortfall to implement the SPS requirements of trade
8 agreements, the view that “aid for trade” should be a binding, scheduled and enforceable part of
9 trade negotiations for least developed countries (WTO, 2004; Stiglitz and Charlton, 2006) has not
10 received support from developed country WTO members. While “best endeavor” capacity building
11 can be helpful, the trade-off in depending largely on private sector SPS infrastructure investment
12 is that WTO members not integrated into transnational corporate food supply chains likely will be
13 unable to ensure that their agricultural exports meet SPS requirements.

14
15 In the absence of adequate funding, proliferation of unfunded negotiating mandates may result in
16 attempts to avoid SPS rule compliance. Furthermore, domestic adoption of international
17 standards will not be enhanced by a simple increase in current capacity building initiatives, since
18 there is a considerable disjuncture between the sanitary-phytosanitary technical assistance
19 requested by developing countries, particularly for SPS infrastructure, the assistance provided by
20 donors that is often limited to training to understand SPS rules (CAC, 2002).

21 22 **7.3.2 Animal health**

23 Internationally, policies aimed at managing infectious animal diseases, including emerging or re-
24 emerging human diseases caused by animal-borne pathogens (Taylor et al., 2001), have been
25 directed to improving preparedness. Methods of controlling and responding to zoonoses have
26 been proposed, through developing and strengthening surveillance systems and identifying risks,
27 including the economic, sociological and political implications and the need for intersectoral
28 collaboration (e.g., WHO, 2004). It is particularly challenging for developing countries to try to
29 meet internationally defined or driven regulations and policies for the animal health sector as
30 these are continuously shifting in response to the increasing needs and ambitions of developed
31 countries. This is assessed below in relation to the major groups of infectious animal diseases
32 and the current principles for their control and regulatory support (Fig. 7.8).

33
34 **[Insert Figure 7.8]**

35
36 7.3.2.1 Major epizootic diseases and impact on trade and developing countries

1 The effectiveness of current policies (eradication and SPS standards for maintaining disease free
2 status) successfully applied in developed countries to prevent outbreaks of the major epizootic
3 diseases (Leforban and Gerbier, 2002; DG SANCO, 2007) means that many developing
4 countries will continue to be excluded from accessing the high-value international markets. This is
5 generally because the conflict between free trade and the protection of health status and, more
6 specifically, because eradication of important epizootic diseases, a core principle of the OIE who
7 determine the animal health standards within the SPS Agreement, is not considered achievable in
8 developing countries in the next decades because it requires significant efforts and investments
9 in surveillance and veterinary service to meet eradication and control policies (Scoones and
10 Wolmer, 2006). The magnitude of the challenges involved is demonstrated by the fact that an
11 estimated 200 million poultry producers in Asia are on small holdings (e.g. 97% in Thailand and
12 75% in Cambodia (FAO, 2004a; Gilbert et al., 2006).

13
14 International debate on this dilemma has focused on an increased implementation in developing
15 countries of other policies such as using a risk- and commodity-based approach that allows an
16 alternative to the total restriction in trade of animals and animal products (Brückner, 2004;
17 Thomson et al., 2004; Perry et al., 2005; Thomson et al., 2006). The concept is that different
18 commodities pose very different risks for the spread of pathogens. For example, deboned meat
19 has a reduced risk in relation to whole carcasses and is applied by certain countries to facilitate
20 import from certain foot and mouth disease infected countries (Sabirovic et al., 2005). Similarly,
21 policies that limit import restrictions to certain export producing areas (regions) instead of
22 restrictions on whole countries or continents are also recommended. Such regionalization is
23 considered as a useful additional tool in maintaining trade flow by limiting import restrictions in the
24 case of new outbreaks of animal diseases, and also allowing import from individual countries or
25 regions based on their improvement of the animal health status food products (DG SANCO,
26 2006). However, these policies require a reliable and independent system of certification based
27 on international standards (Thomson et al., 2006).

28
29 Instead of focusing on achieving high value exports from African countries to Europe and the U.S,
30 bilateral agreements between developing countries that protect exporting countries and
31 producers could be promoted (Scoones and Wolmer, 2006). A third alternative e.g. for African
32 countries, is to initially focus on local trade and markets to supply the growing local and regional
33 demand for meat (Kulibaba, 1997; Diao et al., 2005; Scoones and Wolmer, 2006). These
34 alternative policies for developing countries emphasize benefits to their producers by using food
35 safety and animal health standards needed for the local and regional market.

36

1 In addition to the introduction of advanced and new methods for improved and more cost effective
2 disease and outbreak control (e.g., DIVA vaccines), the recent pandemic of highly pathogenic
3 avian influenza virus demonstrated the importance of providing international support to
4 developing countries when coordinated interventions are required to manage international
5 emergencies, and also that sustained improvements in national disease control systems are
6 required so that countries view such activities as investments rather than internationally imposed
7 costs (Lokuge and Lokuge, 2005).

9 7.3.2.2 Zoonoses as foodborne infections - policies for integrated approach

10 The BSE crisis, the avian influenza pandemic and the threat of global warming with vectors and
11 diseases moving into new areas has highlighted the importance of the animal- human link via the
12 food chain and the need for capacity building for surveillance and control of zoonotic diseases
13 (FAO, 2006d). In addition to these and other emerging zoonotic diseases, as highlighted above,
14 there is also a basic need for effective policies for the prevention of the majority of the foodborne
15 outbreaks that in most part of the world are caused by agents like *Salmonella* and
16 *Campylobacter*.

17
18 In the US it is estimated that *Campylobacter* causes 2 million cases of foodborne infections
19 annually and *Salmonella* is estimated to cause another 1.4 million infections, the latter at a total
20 estimated annual cost of US\$ 3 billion annually (Mead et al., 1999; USDA, 2007). In developing
21 countries the situation is likely to be at least of the same magnitude. The vast majority of these
22 infections primarily originate from animal production so the overriding aim for the animal health
23 sector is safe food and consumer protection (Schlundt et al., 2004). A problem is that these
24 infections usually cause no or very limited economic losses to animal production. Thus, efforts
25 are needed to implement policies with economic incentives for producers to improve hygiene in
26 their animal production in order to decrease the input of potential pathogens to the food chain.
27 The need for integrated approaches is emphasized when interventions are needed along the
28 whole food chain. Of particular interest are challenges posed by the increasing global demand for
29 protein as animal feed, in response to the increasing global demand for meat (Morgan and
30 Prakash, 2006). To meet that demand soybean production has increased e.g., in Brazil, which
31 has resulted in deforestation and monoculture followed by environmental degradation from high
32 pesticide use and significant problems with pesticide residues in the soy products produced (Klink
33 and Machado, 2005). In addition, many countries have experienced an increased risk of
34 *Salmonella* contamination in soy meal, which constitutes an important route for introducing
35 *Salmonella* into animal production when used as animal feed (Hald et al., 2006; EFSA, 2006b). A
36 pandemic spread of *Salmonella* occurred when contaminated fishmeal from South America was
37 exported to the U.S. and Europe, causing more than one million human cases in the U.S. alone

1 (Clark et al., 1973; Crump, Griffin and Angulo, 2002). *Salmonella* contamination has become a
2 significant challenge to the global marketing of animal feed and food products (Plym-Forshell and
3 Wierup, 2006).

4

5 7.3.2.3 Endemic diseases – the major challenge and potential

6 Categorization of livestock diseases is critical for the determination of public intervention, as
7 highlighted in the recent assessment of the EU animal health policy (DG SANCO, 2006).

8 International and national policy and legislation focuses on the control of the major epizootic
9 diseases and, increasingly, on the foodborne zoonotic diseases. Economic compensation in case
10 of outbreaks, surveillance and other measures are generally limited to these, so-called, listed
11 diseases (Table 7.1) (WHO, 2006).

12

13 **[Insert Table 7.1]**

14

15 Endemic diseases comprise the majority of animal diseases and, in developed countries,
16 continuous implementation of disease prevention measures directed against these endemic
17 diseases is necessary for efficient production. The economic importance of endemic diseases is
18 recognized and in many developed countries a number of the endemic diseases have been
19 successfully eradicated or controlled (e.g. Aujeszky's disease in pigs, infectious bovine
20 respiratory disease and bovine virus diarrhea in cattle). Such programs have been found to be
21 very cost effective (e.g. Valle et al., 2005). The increasing focus on reducing antibiotic use to
22 prevent resistance and on animal welfare further emphasizes the importance of control and/or
23 eradication of animal diseases (Wierup, 2000; Angulo et al., 2004).

24

25 Control of animal diseases and the promotion and protection of animal health are essential
26 components of any effective animal breeding and production program (FAO, 1991). However,
27 despite remarkable technical advances in the diagnosis, prevention and control of animal
28 diseases, the condition of animal health through the developing world remains generally poor,
29 causing substantial economic losses and hindering any improvement in livestock productivity
30 (FAO, 1991; FAO, 2002). Consequently, in addition to efforts to minimize the negative effects of
31 the major epizootic and foodborne diseases, policy could also focus on the prevention and control
32 of endemic diseases, even though the producer is generally considered to bear the responsibility
33 for production losses caused by this group of diseases. However, such actions could also have a
34 direct strengthening effect on food safety and food security and, in this respect it has been
35 emphasized that a focus on safe food in the context of strengthening export capacities of
36 developing countries should come second to the primary objective of improving food safety for
37 local consumption (Byrne, 2004).

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The global burden of animal diseases when including also the cost for public health and loss of labor is also estimated to be dominated by the endemic diseases, in contrast to the public focus on the control of the epizootic diseases.

7.3.2.4 Animal welfare

The protection of animal welfare and the demand for a sustainable animal production system, which is increasingly being considered in animal health policies and in SPS- associated regulations, can be an additional constraint for developing countries trying to access international markets. However, sustainable extensive livestock production practices in developing countries that promote animal welfare could open niche market opportunities in developed countries. This is in contrast to intensive livestock production in many sectors of the industrialized world where in the short term the implementation of systems for improved animal welfare often are associated with increased cost of production (OIE, 2005a; Kyprianou, 2006).

The veterinary services of developing and transition countries are in urgent need of the necessary resources and capacities that will enable their countries to benefit more fully from market access opportunities in trade agreements, while at the same time providing greater protection for human and animal health, animal welfare and reducing the risks linked to zoonoses (OIE, 2004; Thomson et al., 2006). It is of utmost importance that the ongoing initiatives from OIE and others to support veterinary services, in particular in developing countries, continue. OIE emphasizes the need for veterinary services to support access of animals and their products into national markets, indicating the importance of animal health control in a safe and secure food supply. A challenging factor is the limited availability of veterinarians trained in veterinary public health (WHO, 2002b), which in developing countries has opened discussions on the need of para-professionals such as community animal health workers (Scoones and Wolmer, 2006).

7.3.2.5 Priority setting for disease control technologies

Historically significant resources have been directed towards tools to implement eradication policies and research often focuses on the production of a vaccine that simply should be the key to success. These resources are also often directed to diseases that gain special attention in relation to international trade but that might be of less economic importance in an endemic situation in a developing country (Scoones and Wolmer 2006). However, effective vaccines are available only for a limited number of infections and therefore preventive actions need to come into focus. Many important diseases have been successfully controlled through the application of simple, preventive hygienic methods; a “bottom-up” approach to priority setting can therefore be recommended (Scoones and Wolmer, 2006). Recommending that milk be boiled prior to

1 consumption in South Africa could more simply and cheaply limit human health risks due to
2 *Brucellosis* than a comprehensive vaccination control program in a cattle population where the
3 disease caused relatively limited production losses (Mokaila, 2005).

4 5 **7.3.3 Plant health**

6 Food availability depends in the first instance on the actual production of food, which is influenced
7 by agroecological production potential as well as by available production technologies and input
8 and output markets (FAO, 2005b). Plant pests are key constraints to achieving the true yield
9 potential of food and fiber crops, particularly in tropical and subtropical regions where conditions
10 necessary for the reproduction of pests may be present year-round (FAO, 2005c). In addition to
11 their direct and deleterious effect on the yield and quality of plant products, plant pests can also
12 pose an absolute barrier to imports when countries apply phytosanitary measures to regulate the
13 entry or plants, plant products or others materials capable of harboring plant pests.

14 15 7.3.3.1. The challenge of international phytosanitary standards

16 International phytosanitary standards recognized as authoritative by the SPS Agreement can be a
17 positive driver in developing countries. When applied to high value food products, these have
18 played a beneficial role in stimulating improvements to existing regulatory systems and the
19 adoption of safer and more sustainable production practices (World Bank, 2005). More
20 commonly, however, international phytosanitary standards are considered as barriers to trade
21 that particularly discriminate against developing country stakeholders who can neither afford to
22 meet the high costs of compliance associated with these nor participate effectively in their
23 development by international standard setting bodies like the International Plant Protection
24 Convention (IPPC) (e.g., Simeon, 2006). Governments, institutions and farmers may respond to
25 such standards in a number of ways: support or participate in programs that will address the
26 management of the pest problem; find alternative foreign markets for nationally produced goods;
27 focus on increasing domestic demand for trade-prohibited plants and products; or exit production,
28 with or without compensation and/or incentives to promote diversification into other crops.

29
30 Governments generally divide resources applied to address phytosanitary considerations in two
31 ways: (1) to meet the phytosanitary requirements of importing countries (export certification); and
32 (2) to meet domestic phytosanitary requirements, including those applied to imported agricultural
33 products. In both developed and developing countries these regulatory tasks are typically
34 addressed through an array of plant protection and quarantine (PPQ) programs. Core services of
35 traditional PPQ programs include activities such as: detection and control or management of plant
36 pests of quarantine or economic significance; undertaking pest risk analyses; and managing
37 import, export and/or domestic certification programs. These programs are being challenged by

1 increases in the volume and kinds of agricultural products being traded internationally, the
2 number of countries exporting such products, and international travel which creates more
3 opportunities for the rapid introduction and spread of new pest species (FAO, 2003).

4 5 7.3.3.2. Opportunities through regionalism

6 For some countries, particularly those with limited resources applied to national PPQ programs,
7 regional or sub-regional programs may be a workable alternative. Regional initiatives to
8 harmonize standards where trade between the participating member countries for specific plant
9 products is significant and where an international standard is not needed (i.e., a different, less
10 restrictive or less economically punitive standard will suffice). Regional pooling of scientific
11 resources (human and institutional) to collectively manage plant pests and implement
12 surveillance programs can enable developing countries to meet the surveillance and pest risk
13 assessments required for compliance with import requirements. Surveillance data is important to
14 ensure that domestic phytosanitary measures are equivalent to those applied to imported
15 commodities so that discrimination against imports based on pest exclusion is not supported.
16 Efforts to collect these data for key pests that affect movement of plant material from or within a
17 specific region may be best addressed by establishing harmonized protocols for data collection
18 and then pooling resources to acquire the necessary information to demonstrate pest-free status.
19 Initiatives to promote meaningful, results-based regional cooperation to address plant health
20 issues will require incentives to promote cooperation both within and between national agricultural
21 systems. Where regional regulatory programs may be government to government, these should
22 also actively encourage the inclusion of other stakeholders, especially the private sector and
23 producer groups.

24 25 7.3.3.3 Biosafety and plant protection

26 With the ratification of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, many governments are in the
27 process of developing or implementing national biosafety regulatory programs (GEF, 2006). With
28 the rapid adoption and global trade of transgenic maize, soybean, cotton and canola the primary
29 focus of these new programs is typically the regulation of transgenic crops. National, bilateral and
30 international support for the establishment of biosafety regulatory programs has favored the
31 creation of new regulatory entities under ministries other than agriculture. Given the shared
32 nature of many of the regulatory functions of PPQ and biosafety programs (e.g., risk assessment,
33 monitoring and inspection activities) and the inclusion of Living Modified Organisms in ISPM No.
34 11 (Pest Risk Analysis for Quarantine Pests, Including Analysis of Environmental Risks and
35 Living Modified Organisms), there exists an opportunity to apply new resources available for
36 biosafety regulatory capacity building to strengthen existing PPQ programs so that the objectives
37 of both can be achieved without building redundant administrative services. This could be

1 achieved under the umbrella of “plant biosecurity” to include plant health, plant biosafety and also
2 invasive alien plant species. Inputs for programs related to plant biosafety or, more broadly, plant
3 biosecurity should be actively sought from, if not led by, ministries of agriculture.

4 5 7.3.3.4 Meeting the plant health needs of small-scale farmers

6 Control of plant pests that are important from a trade perspective may be of little or no
7 significance to small-scale farmers who are not exporting their plant products. Instead, their
8 priorities are likely to be management of local pests that will have a direct impact on their
9 harvested or post-harvest yield. Policy makers could ensure that the small-scale farmer, whose
10 fields may be an inoculum source of a trade-prohibited pest, is provided with incentives to assist
11 in the management of such pests so that export certification of the commodity in question can still
12 be achieved. This could come in the form of support that links breeding or pest management
13 programs designed to address the priorities of the small farmer with activities that will also assist
14 in the management of the prohibited plant pest. Similarly, a government could strengthen the
15 capacity of regulators to enforce compliance with internationally relevant phytosanitary standards
16 but couple this with direct support for the primary producer where production practices may have
17 to be modified so that pest exclusion goals can be attained.

18
19 An alternative policy option is to realign public sector AKST funding to support research explicitly
20 directed to improving small-scale, diversified farming practices that promote improved yields and
21 enhanced food quality through sustainable pest management practices. These could variously
22 include IPM, organic farming, and improved plant breeding programs, including the development
23 of pest resistant varieties through marker assisted selection or recombinant DNA techniques.
24 National prioritization of the needs of resource-poor farmers may be more important in the future
25 as scientific and agricultural technology spillovers from developed countries that are adapted by
26 developing countries may be less available (Alston et al., 2006).

27 28 7.3.3.5 The private sector and third party certification

29 The private sector has responded to enhanced consumer awareness and concern about food
30 safety by developing their own phytosanitary (and sanitary) standards, enforced through third
31 party certification (Hatanaka et al., 2005). This means that participating primary producers have
32 to meet an array of requirements that go beyond those mandated in government regulations,
33 such as implementing traceability programs or participating in accreditation programs that add
34 expense and complexity to more traditional production systems. While there are examples of
35 developing country farmers who have benefited from third party certification (Hatanaka et al.,
36 2005), arguably these private sector standards discriminate against resource poor farmers who
37 cannot afford the high costs of participation. In response, governments may decide to align their

1 public sector investment to ensure that AKST is applied to assisting producers to meet only
2 statutory phytosanitary standards, through agricultural research, extension and/or education
3 systems. Individual farmers or commodity-specific producer associations would have to use their
4 own resources to meet additional private-sector requirements. Alternatively, governments could
5 strategically invest in AKST that will promote the participation of small-scale farmers in third party
6 certification, through the provision of education programs and technical assistance. This may also
7 provide a stimulus for the development of off-farm employment opportunities through the
8 provision of services such as third-party accreditation of farms or production systems.

9 Internationally, the private sector in developed countries, which is driving third party certification,
10 should promote the harmonization of private sector standards and streamline accreditation,
11 especially where these apply to plant products produced in developing countries (Jaffee, 2005).

12 13 7.3.3.6 Climate change and plant health

14 A significant consideration for policy makers tasked with addressing plant health issues is the
15 impact that climate change will have on plant production. Climate change can affect plant health
16 by: modifying the encounter rate between host and pest by changing the ranges of the two
17 species; introducing new hosts, vectors and/or pests; causing social changes such as shifts in
18 agricultural labor; and shifting land use patterns that will alter the potential for populations of
19 plants and pests to migrate to fragmented landscapes (Garrett et al., 2006). In response to this,
20 policy makers will be challenged to decide if investments in development and deployment of
21 AKST will be proactive (e.g., inclusion of climate prediction in forecasting models of plant
22 disease) or reactive (e.g., deployment of resistant varieties after the emergence of a new plant
23 disease). Action to mitigate the impacts of climate change on crop production will require
24 integrated strategies developed and implemented in a participatory fashion that emphasizes the
25 need to include non-traditional players in agricultural research. Coherent policies could be
26 developed cooperatively through multi-disciplinary partnerships within government (e.g.,
27 Ministries of Agriculture, Energy, Trade, Health and Commerce) and with significant guidance
28 from academic, agricultural, nongovernmental and private sector players.

29 30 **7.3.4 Ways forward**

31 Recognizing that food safety, animal health and plant health are global public goods, new
32 mechanisms to support the development and, most importantly, implementation of proactive and
33 preventative policies and programs to facilitate compliance with SPS standards could be
34 explored. Internationally, donor support could be targeted to specifically assist those countries
35 that cannot adequately finance SPS standard implementation nationally but attention could also
36 be paid to ensuring that trade facilitation is not the only driver of SPS program delivery. The
37 application of AKST to address yield and quality losses associated with pests or pathogens that

1 are of domestic, but not international, importance may have more impact on reducing hunger and
2 poverty, and improving nutrition and health, particularly in the least developed countries, than
3 applying these resources exclusively to accessing international markets. For small developing
4 countries, the possibility of regional food safety "trusts" to provide a continuous funding source for
5 shared SPS related surveillance programs, infrastructure and personnel should be considered.
6 An international SPS insurance mechanism that would supplement or replace current *ad hoc*
7 funding to detect and mitigate transborder food contamination incidents, zoonoses and plant
8 health contagion should also be considered.

9
10 Given the globalization of agriculture and trade, the institutional separation of Codex, OIE and
11 IPPC may be of limited relevance in the future. The traditional mandates of these international
12 organizations are already challenged by the emergence of alternative regulatory mechanisms that
13 integrate food safety, animal and plant health related standards and production practices e.g.,
14 Good Agricultural Practices, Good Manufacturing Practices, on-farm HACCP plans and other
15 retailer-driven certification programs. Revising SPS-related policy and regulatory measures within
16 an explicitly coordinated biosecurity framework may be one option for promoting cross-sectoral
17 interventions. Internationally, policy and regulation related to food safety, plant and animal health
18 could be better integrated if the mandates of Codex, OIE and IPPC were recast to remove areas
19 of duplication, identify sources of conflict and promote opportunities for policy and program
20 coordination to more effectively utilize the limited resources that are applied to SPS issues.

21 22 **Policy options**

- 23 ➤ For smaller and contiguous developing countries, strengthening or starting regional
24 foodborne, animal and plant health surveillance systems may be a viable option,
25 particularly where dietary patterns, agricultural practices, and natural resources for
26 agriculture are similar.
- 27 ➤ Consideration should be given to establishment of national or regional food safety trust
28 funds invested to ensure a continuous funding mechanism to gradually build the national
29 or regional surveillance systems upon which effective food safety interventions depend.
30 The trusts could be financed from an increase in ODA and from an increase in agrifood
31 corporate taxes. Alternatively, governments can continue to respond *ad hoc* to food
32 safety emergencies or SPS related threats to trade, financed by voluntary funds for each
33 purpose.
- 34 ➤ Governments should consider expanding current "aid for trade" commitments to include
35 the financing of specific SPS infrastructure requested by WTO members with
36 documented incapacity to finance that infrastructure from domestic sources. Since it is
37 unlikely that governments will support binding and enforceable "aid for trade"

- 1 commitments, governments should consider developing a model contract for expedited
2 needs assessment that is not tied to import of SPS technology or training from any one
3 donor.
- 4 ➤ Considering that SPS standards are largely implemented in developing countries for the
5 purpose of trade facilitation, often with little benefit to local consumers of domestically
6 produced food, policies that focus on domestic food production and domestic priorities for
7 animal and plant health, food safety and public health could receive greater attention.
 - 8 ➤ Weak national SPS surveillance systems could be strengthened to improve the
9 timeliness and efficacy of preventative or prophylactic food safety, animal and plant
10 health interventions. Even where there is an absence of detailed epidemiological or
11 surveillance data, foodborne infections and animal and plant diseases could be better
12 managed through policies that promote simple, workable SPS programs implemented at
13 the farm or community level. Capacity building could be re-directed from training to
14 understand SPS rules to technical support needed to operationalize such programs.
 - 15 ➤ Eradication of the major epizootic animal diseases is unlikely to be achieved in the
16 foreseeable future in many developing countries in spite of significant investment and
17 effort to do so. An alternative, commodity based approach could instead be used as a
18 tool to promote access to international markets which would also allow resources to be
19 allocated for the prevention of losses caused by other animal and zoonotic diseases.
 - 20 ➤ Governments could align their public sector investment to ensure that AKST is applied to
21 assisting producers to meet only statutory SPS standards, through agricultural research,
22 extension and/or education systems.
 - 23 ➤ Governments could strategically invest in AKST to promote the participation of small-
24 scale farmers in third party certification, through the provision of education programs and
25 technical assistance.
 - 26 ➤ The ongoing initiatives from OIE and others to support veterinary services in developing
27 countries could continue as a means to support access of animals and their products into
28 national and international markets and to improve food safety and secure food supply.
29 Policies that recognize and support the training of para-professionals such as community
30 animal health workers could be promoted to compensate for the limited availability of
31 veterinarians trained in veterinary public.
 - 32 ➤ Policies could support the provision of international support to developing countries when
33 coordinated interventions are required to manage international emergencies (*e.g* highly
34 pathogenic avian influenza virus) and sustained improvements in national disease control
35 systems could be viewed as investments rather than internationally imposed costs.
 - 36 ➤ FAO, WHO and OIE could consider establishing a joint task force to examine what those
37 agencies and their member governments might do to prepare their SPS surveillance and

1 intervention systems to identify SPS risks and hazards that may result from anticipated
2 effects of climate change on food and agriculture production and distribution.

3

4 **7.4 Knowledge and Knowledge Management - Property Rights**

5 The generation, dissemination and maintenance of AKST increasingly depend on property rights,
6 placing AKST in private, community, and public domains. As opportunities to protect AKST
7 increase and access to innovations, local knowledge and genetic resources become restricted
8 through different regulatory systems. Public research may result in privately controlled
9 knowledge, either as a result of institutional policies or of public-private partnerships. IPRs have
10 multiple objectives, ranging from stimulating investments in R&D, facilitating technology transfer
11 and bringing knowledge to the public domain through publication and setting time limits to any
12 exclusive rights. However, the validity of these in a LIC and development context of low technical
13 capacity is contested. Nevertheless, public research institutions have to decide how to deal with
14 these developments and how far to go in developing capacities to manage proprietary knowledge
15 and materials (Egelyng, 2005).

16

17 Opportunities to legally protect knowledge can be analyzed in terms of the likely impact on the
18 generation of and access to such knowledge for development purposes. This analysis refers to
19 both the strength of intellectual property rights in general and to the policies towards the use of
20 the protection systems by public (research) organizations. IPRs fit in a paradigm of market-led
21 development which is essentially different from both the concept of sharing ideas that
22 characterize most farming communities (and which is essentially different from medicinal
23 knowledge in many communities) and from the public goods paradigm which dominated the
24 agricultural research for development policies for over 50 years. Strong intellectual property rights
25 may support commercial investments in research, but may not be effective in stimulating research
26 for non-market uses to serve the need of the poor.

27

28 Changes in property rights systems impact the roles of the stakeholders in AKST. National
29 policies, such as the Bayh-Dole Act in the USA, promoting “protection” of IP by public universities,
30 led to new commercialization strategies for publicly developed AKST, including exclusive
31 licensing of IP to companies in exchange for follow-up university research contracts and product
32 commercialization. Reduced public expenditure on agricultural research in a number of countries,
33 and the expansion of public-private partnerships in agricultural research also tend to stimulate the
34 protection of knowledge by public research institutions in order to generate income (Louwaars et
35 al., 2006). An analysis of the impact of the Bayh-Dole Act in the USA (Rosenberg and Nelson,
36 1994) indicates that as a result of the high costs of managing IP, very few schools make a net
37 profit on their R&D investment.

1

2 The design of systems of rights and the forms in which these are implemented are examples of
3 interactions between various levels of organization ranging from international conventions and
4 commitments to local forms of interpretation with or without the filter of national policy and legal
5 systems. If different rights systems do not specify how results produced by AKST system are
6 used, exploited and disseminated those knowledge products and technologies may be unused by
7 the intended AKST beneficiary. If the public sector is stimulated to use the rights to create a flow
8 of revenue, public sector researchers are likely to change their programming away from the
9 needs of the poor (World Bank, 2006).

10

11 **7.4.1 Public research and the generation of public goods**

12 The status and nature of AKST as “public/private good” is critical for its value in development.
13 Anthropologists and sociologists (Fuller, 1993; Callon, 1994) hold that science is a public good.
14 Innovation, a change in order to solve a constraining situation, is both a key for human
15 development and a tool for competitiveness. The report of a Commission initiated by the British
16 government to look at how IPR might work better for poor people and developing countries
17 remains a most important analysis of this challenge (Commission on Intellectual Property Rights,
18 2002).

19

20 Both the international priorities for the production of global public goods in global schemes (e.g. in
21 the CGIAR), and national innovation programs can to be viewed in this changing perspective
22 when they are to deal with multiple development objectives. The introduction of private,
23 community and national rights creates a wide range of challenges for public research.

24

25 Realization of environmental objectives are very appropriate areas of inquiry for publicly funded
26 AKST: research towards fulfilling these objectives can frame natural resources as public goods
27 requiring collective management, such as climate, air quality, water, landscapes. Knowledge can
28 help private stakeholders, like farmers, forest owners, rural factories, to develop environmentally
29 friendly practices even in those areas that are privately owned.

30

31 **7.4.2 Multilateral negotiations on rights systems**

32 Attempts to import concepts from one multilateral agreement to another to enhance their mutual
33 compatibility have met with strong opposition.² For example, the proposal to make the CBD's

² How to protect and license the use of intellectual property (IP) and traditional knowledge (TK) continues to be fiercely debated in World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the WTO negotiations to amend the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs) and in various civil society forums. The implementation of national sovereignty over genetic resources (GR) and arrangements for Access and Benefit Sharing (ABS) as debated within the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the International

1 Prior Informed Consent in the use of traditional knowledge and genetic resources a substantive
2 requirement of patentability in TRIPS has not prospered (Visser, 2004).

3

4 *WIPO and WTO*. Proposed binding WIPO norms to protect traditional knowledge and genetic
5 resources from unauthorized and unremunerated misappropriation (i.e. “biopiracy”) have been
6 rejected as a threat to WTO IP rules (e.g. paragraph 211 - WIPO, 2006a). The nature of the
7 threat is, however, not specified, but likely relate to the collective stewardship of traditional
8 knowledge, which from a classical IP viewpoint would represent an undermining of the individual
9 status of patent ownership (Finger, 2004). It remains an option to further explore a developing
10 country proposal to amend TRIPs Article 29 to require disclosure in patent applications of
11 traditional knowledge and genetic resources used in the development of patented products
12 (WTO, 2006a).³ Proponents of disclosure argue that disclosure would improve patent quality
13 (Article 27.1), prevent abuse of the patent system and promote the public interest (Article 8),
14 provide social and economic benefits to WTO members (Article 7) and make TRIPs supportive of
15 the CBD, particularly its ABS provisions (Articles 1 and 15). Opponents of disclosure opponents
16 contend that ABS is best implemented through contracts that offer a cash payment or other
17 benefits in exchange for the rights to patent products developed from an agreed number of
18 genetic resource samples (WTO, 2006b).

19

20 Intellectual property regimes alone, no matter how comprehensive, fully implemented, and
21 mutually supportive of other multilateral treaties, are insufficient to enable development of the
22 seed systems needed to fulfill goals, and poorly designed and implemented regimes can be
23 detrimental to achieving these objectives (World Bank, 2006).

24

25 *Genetic resources in agriculture*. Challenges to bringing the private rights of IPRs in harmony with
26 the collective rights over traditional knowledge and local genetic resources are further
27 complicated by the rights based on national sovereignty over the physical genetic resources, as
28 established in the CBD. Apart from conceptual and legal challenges, this complication has led in
29 the past years to practical problems in the exchange of genetic resources, which affects the
30 agricultural use of genetic resources in plant and animal breeding more than any other type of
31 use. Important steps have been taken in the sharing of benefits derived from the use of these
32 resources in a multilateral way through the IT PGRFA ‘s conclusion of the Standard Material

Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA) also link with the protection of IP and TK.

³ The information embedded in the genetics of the seed and the associated farmers’ and scientific knowledge comprise a significant part of AKST. The value of TK appropriated for use in patented agricultural and medical products would represent at least \$5 billion annually in royalties to developing countries, if TK were protected and licensed as patents are (McLeod, 2001). Just half of such a sum, if invested for the *in situ* conservation of agrobiodiversity and if distributed effectively to the often collective and indigenous stewards of that biodiversity, could help realize development and sustainability goals.

1 Transfer Agreement The IT PGRFA confirms the Farmers' Right of protection of TK, which
2 established a link with the debate in WIPO, the right of benefit sharing linking it further to the
3 CBD, and the right to participate in decision making at the national level on matters related to the
4 conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture. The IT
5 PGRFA refers the implementation of these rights to the national level (Article 9.2C)). However, it
6 may prove difficult for national policy makers to implement these Farmers' Rights while avoiding
7 conflicts among IPR, biodiversity and seed regulations with the right of farmers to save, use,
8 exchange and see farm-saved seed.

9

10 *Traditional knowledge (TK) and genetic resources.* A review of technical papers in support of the
11 WIPO negotiations has proposed that an "international enforcement pyramid" be constructed from
12 existing practices to enable developing countries to control and sustainable use traditional
13 knowledge and genetic resources (Drahos, 2006). The "enforcement pyramid" would integrate
14 indigenous and national government practices and would be coordinated by a Global
15 BioCollecting Society under the aegis of WIPO, FAO and the CBD. Complicating the construction
16 of an effective enforcement mechanism for traditional knowledge and genetic resources are
17 differences between indigenous customary law and governance, and national government
18 jurisdiction, particularly where indigenous territories cross national boundaries (IIED, 2006).

19

20 WIPO negotiations for a Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT) present a framework for IP
21 protection and enforcement very different from an enforcement pyramid based on national and
22 indigenous group enforcement practices for traditional knowledge and genetic resources
23 protection. The SPLT is part of a Patent Agenda to create and enforce a "global patent" with
24 mechanisms far more specific and powerful than the TRIPs enforcement provisions (Article 41),
25 and reduced transaction costs (WIPO, 2001). The U.S., EU and Japan are the main SPLT
26 advocates and cooperate in patent matters. Some IP scholars are concerned that the SPLT could
27 negatively affect public AKST and access to publicly held genetic resources, particularly in
28 countries where rules on plant variety protection do not yet limit farmers' rights to save or
29 exchange seed (e.g. Tvedt, 2005). The SPLT may also limit developing countries ability to shape
30 their patent laws to their own specific needs, taking into account the development stage that they
31 are in. SPLT is thus seen as supporting only a trade agenda rather than supporting a
32 Development Agenda (WIPO, 2004). The debate is ongoing.

33

34 Nevertheless, elements of the draft SPLT are being carried forward in Bilateral Investment
35 Treaties (BITs) and so-called "TRIPs plus" provisions in bilateral Free Trade Agreements

1 (FTAs)⁴. BITs with many of these parties define IP and genetic resources in ABS agreements as
2 “investments” and allow a very broadly defined “investor” to sue states for non-enforcement or
3 inadequate enforcement of investor rights, no matter how resource constrained the developing
4 countries parties may be (Correa, 2004).

5
6 *IP and TK economics*. Desegregated data on agricultural IP costs⁵ could help policy makers
7 make more informed decisions about whether to assume the costs and legal obligations of
8 specific patented agricultural products. The cost is difficult to justify in light of the aggregate 53%
9 price drop in agricultural export commodities from 1997 to 2001 (FAO, 2005a), nor from the
10 expected 2.8% price increase resulting from WTO Doha Round (Bouët et al., 2004). In our
11 assessment, the terms of trade rationale for investment in patented AKST becomes weaker still
12 when taking into account the costs of state liability for non-enforcement of IP as “investment” in
13 BITs and individual producer liability for violating patent holder rights, e.g. of agricultural
14 biotechnology firms.

15
16 There is no agreed methodology for estimating the economic value of traditional and local
17 knowledge and genetic resources, for the purpose of licensing its use in specific patented
18 products (Drahos, 2006). Agreement on such a methodology might be derived on the basis of
19 experience with studies estimating the value of traditional knowledge and genetic resources used
20 in specific patent products. A royalty or licensing fee system based on the value in the seed
21 market is incorporated in national laws in some countries (e.g. the gene fund in India) and in the
22 IT PGRFA that will be used to fund genetic resource conservation. Seed sales royalty funding
23 therefore remains a policy option.⁶

24
25 The global costs of withholding access to genetic resources due to national access regimes are
26 insufficiently researched. Given the interdependence of countries on genetic resources (Flores-

⁴ “TRIPS plus” agreements assert TRIPS as a foundation but add some provisions that arguably conflict with TRIPS provisions. Recent FTAs require the patenting of biological resources, thus overriding the patenting exemption in TRIPs Article 27.3, and require countries to become member of the Union for the Protection of new Varieties of Plants (UPOV), thus closing the door for alternative breeder’s rights protection systems, including earlier versions of the UPOV Act that are more compatible with farmers’ seed systems (World Bank, 2006). These FTAs also prohibit parties from citing resource constraints as a legal defense for non-enforcement of IP obligations (Fink and Reichenmiller, 2005).

⁵ One estimate suggests that developing country TRIPs commitments in the Uruguay Round amounted to \$60 billion annually in implementation costs, licensing fees and royalties (Finger, 2004).

⁶ As part of a project to measure genetic resource erosion and to suggest how royalties be paid to source countries of genetic resources might provide incentives for conservation, it was estimated that a 1% royalty on sales of patented seeds incorporating traditional knowledge and genetic resources would return about \$150 million per annum to the source countries, most of them developing countries (FAO, 1998). However, with the creation of the Global Crop Diversity Trust in 2004, FAO’s erstwhile interest in using royalties to pay for protection and enhancement of crop diversity has diminished. The Trust Fund has shifted away from FAO’s prior dependence on annual donor government contributions towards funding Trust activities from an endowment supplemented by foundation grants. Nevertheless, the Trust states that there are many crop diversity conservation activities that it cannot and will not finance.

1 Palacios, 1997) and the fact that exchange of agricultural genetic resources among developing
2 countries is much more frequent than transfer from South to North (Fowler et al., 2001), such
3 costs are likely to be borne to a large extent by developing countries. Providing financing
4 mechanisms to facilitate genetic resource access and transfer from agrobiodiverse rich
5 developing countries to agrobiodiverse poor developing countries is one option for remedying this
6 situation.

7
8 Other policy options regarding intellectual property and traditional knowledge include:

9 1) Insofar as traditional knowledge and genetic resources may form part of the prior art of a
10 patented AKST product, adoption of a disclosure amendment in TRIPS could serve to enhance
11 patent quality and might be a disincentive of misappropriation. Information so disclosed could be
12 part of the legal basis for any licensing agreement on traditional knowledge and genetic
13 resources used in a patented product. WTO members might also wish to consider adopting a
14 weaker interim standard of TK protection, such as a Declaration on Trade and Traditional
15 Knowledge (Gervais, 2005).

16
17 2) Given the impasse at the WTO over disclosure, developing country members are seeking to
18 protect traditional knowledge and genetic resources with strong norms in WIPO negotiations.
19 However, in the absence of the capacity to enforce such norms, members could agree on the
20 design of mechanisms for and the financing of an "enforcement pyramid" (Drahos, 2006) for any
21 norms that are agreed, preferably under the coordination of a joint agency under CBD, FAO and
22 WIPO. This could ensure that local and indigenous stewards of agrobiodiversity would participate
23 in member government decisions on the licensing of traditional knowledge and genetic resources,
24 as called for in Article 9 of the ITPGRFA.

25
26 3) Both multilateral IP negotiations and implementation discussion lack ex ante and ex post
27 economic analysis of the cost and benefits of adopting IP commitments and patented AKST.
28 Analysis of, not rhetorical claims about, IP benefits for developing countries, could inform bilateral
29 agreements and national government IP policy and legislation (Park and Lippoldt, 2004).
30 Multilateral and technical assistance could include financing for IP economic analysis.

31
32 4) A methodology for valuing the ex-post contribution of traditional knowledge and genetic
33 resources in patented AKST option to agree, as a pre-requisite for any agreement on how to
34 license traditional knowledge and genetic resources in patented products. Decision makers may
35 consider ex-post studies of traditional knowledge and genetic resources valuation in existing
36 patented products to better delineate the elements for an agreed methodology.

37

1 5) Facilitating access to and sustainable use of traditional knowledge and genetic resources
2 among developing countries, particularly for the benefit of agrobiodiverse poor developing
3 countries may be a an issue that policy makers may wish to move higher in the priorities of the
4 multilateral AKST agenda, Both for food security and agroenvironmental sustainability reasons, it
5 remains an option for policy makers to consider developing guidelines for a specific facility for the
6 benefit of agrobiodiverse poor developing countries.

7

8 **7.4.3 Effects of rights on AKST at the national and institutional levels**

9 IPRs on products and processes that are relevant to agricultural development in the widest sense
10 create novel conditions for the use of AKST at different levels. The trend towards privatization of
11 AKST is particularly felt in the sphere of plant breeding and biotechnology.

12

13 *Stimulating private investments in research.* IPRs are meant to stimulate private investment in
14 research, but even though evidence of such effects in various industries may be available, it is
15 very weak in the agricultural sector, notably plant breeding (Pray, 1991; Alston and Venner,
16 2000). IPRs protected in LDCs with a limited research capacity are more likely to improve access
17 to proprietary technologies from abroad (e.g. Bt cotton). There are claims of positive effects of
18 protection of breeder's rights for a selective number of cases; however, without taking into
19 account alternative explanations for the observed effects and without providing data for other
20 crops in the same case study countries (UPOV, 2005). Other studies show inconclusive results of
21 the value of IP protection for the plant breeding sector in LDCs. Based on evidence in five
22 developing countries, IPRs may support the development of a private seed industry, but only
23 when this sector has reached a certain level of maturity; IP protection is not a major stimulus for
24 initial investments in the sector (World Bank, 2006).

25

26 *Public-private partnerships in research.* In a market system, IPRs provide a way to share benefits
27 among the different chain partners through the transfer of technology fees (royalties). They are
28 the basis for negotiating partnerships in research between private and public partners, notably
29 private IPR-holders and public research institutions in accessing technologies in a certain
30 country. However, the reliance on negotiated license agreements also introduces prospects for
31 unequal sharing of benefits based on differences in negotiating capabilities and power of the
32 partners.

33

34 *Financial support to the public research systems through IPRs.* Even though IPRs fit in a
35 commercial approach to innovation, it is in many countries the public sector research institutions
36 that promote the introduction of IPRs in agriculture. This promotion is based primarily on a
37 perception that these institutes may obtain significant revenue when their inventions (e.g. plant

1 varieties) may be protected. This revenue is welcomed when there is under-investment in public
2 research (common in many countries since the 1990s), but may be viewed differently if such
3 benefits can only be obtained in commercial markets (e.g. seed markets). Reliance on IPR based
4 revenues is likely to lead to a change in public research priorities, in some cases to commercial
5 crops like maize and oil crops to the detriment of research on small grains and pulses, and to
6 benign ecologies and market oriented farmers, to the detriment of a small-scale farmer focus
7 (Fischer and Byerlee, 2002). Such research shifts may fit in market orientation priorities of
8 national development strategies, but may at the same time challenge to some extent the public
9 tasks of contributing to poverty alleviation and household nutrition security (Louwaars et al.,
10 2006).

11
12 The most common alternative strategy for a public research institute may be to publish its
13 innovations, i.e. place in the public domain. This strategy reduces opportunities to obtain financial
14 revenue and may limit public-private partnerships.

15
16 *Challenges to technology transfer – thickets of rights.* Even though license agreements may
17 promote technology transfer by clarifying roles and responsibilities, IPRs may also pose serious
18 limitations to research and the use of technologies in development. Particularly in advanced
19 research, so called thickets of rights lead to the tragedy of the anti-commons leading to
20 underinvestment and under-utilization of technologies (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). Property
21 rights on research tools, processes and products create very complex situations for researchers
22 and their institutions, potentially leading to under-utilization of technologies. Research institutes
23 have to learn how to establish and negotiate their freedom to operate on these technologies. The
24 quality and enforceability of the claims of a patent may significantly differ between jurisdictions;
25 negotiating access to a technology can be very difficult when unequal partners are involved; so-
26 called humanitarian use licenses (license on a technology for R&D for development with 'soft'
27 conditions) may be granted when the use of a technology is unlikely to challenge the commercial
28 interests of the rights holder, but the 'small print' license details can create significant obligations
29 for the recipient.

30
31 These are new policy challenges for most developing countries, the actual impact of which cannot
32 be readily assessed yet (World Bank, 2006). The rights on enabling technologies create
33 challenges for producing public goods, which has been the main focus of public research, and
34 more specifically for the centers of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research.
35 When more and more technologies are protected by IPRs in their target countries, producing
36 international public goods may become more and more difficult (Fischer and Byerlee, 2002).
37 Currently, these centers are venturing in license strategies on their protected technologies that

1 provide a public good status for the purpose of poverty alleviation and food security in developing
2 countries, while maintaining ownership in commercial markets both in developing and
3 industrialized countries.

4

5 *Costs of compliance.* Compliance with the rights of IPR-holders requires public and private
6 research institutions alike to invest in capacities that they had not required in the past, notably
7 legal and commercial specialists. There are already commercial seed companies that spend far
8 more on legal services than on research. This preponderance of legal over research expense in
9 fighting through the patent thicket may be a ‘warning’ to public research institutions that emulating
10 commercial plant breeding practices to produce public goods may be a less an optimal production
11 pathway. Legal advice is not only needed to channel the use of research results in development
12 oriented and commercial markets through contracts that need to be negotiated and concluded
13 and court and settling disputes. Legal considerations are also more and more influencing the
14 research itself. Scientists may be required to use old (free or cheap) technologies instead of
15 effective ones which may be costly or not available.

16

17 Scientists frequently feel stifled by the legal advisors who have to make sure that third party IP
18 rights of contributive technologies are respected and that the IP produced by the scientists can be
19 protected, by putting restrictions on scientific communication before a patent application is filed.
20 Another compliance cost is the need to transfer obligations derived from contracts downstream,
21 i.e. a research institute working in plant breeding with genetic materials that have been obtained
22 through contracts may have to require farmers involved in local testing of potential new varieties
23 to sign contracts restricting their use of the varieties that they obtained (e.g., farmers participating
24 in rice research in the Philippines).

25

26 Humanitarian use licenses on individual parts of AKST can reduce these transaction costs to a
27 limited extent since the negotiations that lead to such licenses may be lengthy. One policy option
28 is more generic approaches that limit such costs have been initiated by international consortiums
29 of research institutions forming the “Generation Challenge Program” (Barry and Louwaars, 2005),
30 and those collaborating in PIPRA (Public Intellectual Property Resource for Agriculture).

31 Application of open-source approaches to genetic technologies (www.bios.net) is a policy option
32 for providing more sustainable solutions to the emerging patent thicket, but its impact is yet
33 limited.

34

35 *Private, community and national rights.* It is not only the private rights (primarily IPRs) that affect
36 the organization of agricultural research for development. Community rights, such as those based
37 on traditional knowledge, and sovereign national rights (on genetic resources based on the CBD)

1 affect research institutions in a similar way. Transaction costs are increased through the need to
2 negotiate access and terms, the opportunities to use the best available inputs in research are
3 reduced, and the use of the research results may be restricted (Safrin, 2004; Louwaars, 2006).
4 Research institutions need to trace all the knowledge, technologies and genetic materials in the
5 various research programs and may have to check at the start of every program or experiment
6 whether third party rights may interfere with their program or experimental design. These
7 institutions may have to consult with legal advisor regarding these rights at every step of making
8 their new technologies available to farmers. One policy option is to expand and strengthen the
9 International Treaty on Plant Genetic resources for Food and Agriculture, the implementation of
10 which is likely to reduce the transaction costs at least for the use of genetic resources of the
11 major field crops and pasture species covered by the Standard Material Transfer Agreement.

12

13 *Challenges for public research and policy options.* Whether or not public research organizations
14 intend to obtain revenue through protecting their own intellectual property, they need to develop
15 institutional policies how to deal with such rights. Such policies need to be supported at the
16 national level of policy and regulation.

17

18 Option to strengthen awareness of the issues and professional capacity in IP-strategy and
19 marketing (Erbisch and Fischer, 1998) can focus on three different levels: scientists, research
20 managers and policy makers (Cohen et al., 1999), which often requires the establishment of
21 specialized technology transfer offices (Maredia and Erbisch, 1999).

22

23 Above all, national policy makers responsible for agricultural development and the national
24 agricultural research systems need to be aware of the challenges that new rights regimes on
25 intellectual property, traditional knowledge and genetic resources pose in the public research
26 institutes and their relation with an emerging private sector. Policies that reduce public
27 expenditure, that promote the use of IPRs by public research institutions or that restrict access to
28 genetic resources and traditional agricultural knowledge could be based on a thorough
29 understanding of the role of public research in the arena of access, development and use of
30 AKST in development.

31

32 Policy options at the national level to make sure that thickets of rights do not develop in
33 technologies and materials that are important for development and sustainability goals particularly
34 include mechanisms to exempt the use of knowledge and materials for use for these goals when
35 these are protected by private, community and national rights

36

37 **7.4.4 *Rights systems on natural resources: from simple ownership to bundle of rights***

1 Scientific knowledge takes into account the frames through which the real world is perceived by
2 stakeholders, such as scientists (fundamental and applied), local innovators, policy makers,
3 businessmen, negotiators in international arenas. The knowledge on local management systems
4 of natural resources and the theories to which this knowledge refers are the basis upon which
5 decisions and agreements are made. Appropriate AKST can contribute to the improvement of the
6 understanding of what is relevant at the field level and with local situations.

7

8 There are a wide variety of rights and management systems for natural resources. For example,
9 one may own the land but not the subsoil resources, or the trees in a forest. A participant in a
10 common property regime may have guaranteed exclusive use of a parcel she has cleared, or that
11 parcel may be subject to re-assignment by a tribal elder. An untitled farmer at the agricultural
12 frontier may have what is commonly considered 'ownership' of the 'improvement' to the land, which
13 may not be *de jure*, but sufficiently enshrined in a *de facto* sense that those improvements can be
14 bought and sold in the market. Some common property regimes have proven to be far more
15 sustainable than individual property regimes. Commons are open access resources the property
16 of which is not allocated to individuals but supposedly owned in common. Commons are not
17 excludable and are *in se* not rivalrous. (Kaul et al., 1999; Wouters and de Meester, 2003).
18 Strengthening the focus on new rules and international agreements that take into account more
19 complex situations in regard of property rights and regimes is an option.⁷

20

21 This issue is raised without further details in Article 10c of the CBD (Sustainable Use of
22 Components of Biological Diversity): "protect and encourage customary use of resources in
23 accordance with traditional cultural practices that are compatible with conservation or sustainable
24 use requirements." This Article is now in legal tribunals by native populations experiencing
25 difficulties with norms they feel are being imposed on them (Goldman, 2004). Such rules may
26 lead to confusion about ownership or accountability of 'resources' that have meaning and values
27 at the local as well as at the global levels or aggravate the situation of those who are
28 marginalized by the negotiated rules (Allier, 1997, 2002).

29

30 Studies on local management systems can contribute to designing new systems that better fit to
31 evolving and dynamic conditions. Conceptual analyses has greatly benefited from scientific
32 research since the late 1980s (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992; Sandberg, 1994; Le Roy, 1996;
33 Chauveau, 1998; Lavigne Delville, 1998; Karsenty, 2003). Taking into account the different forms

⁷ There are many examples of successful management 'in common', based on a variety of rights which are used to regulate access to, usage, exploitation, ownership, alienation, exclusion, etc. of such resources. Even though land is a rival and excludable good, many traditional societies maintain non exclusive grazing and hunting grounds. And some communities effectively manage as commons such natural resources as land, forests, water and plant and animal species (Demsetz, 1967; Bromley, 1990; Barzel, 1997), thus reconfirming that excludable resources do not necessarily have to be made private or exclusive. Doing so is a policy choice.

1 of knowledge involved, e.g., ‘explicit’ and ‘incorporated,’ can lead to a more complex view of what
2 is at stake in a range of situations (Box 7.1).

3
4 **[Insert Box 7.1]**

5
6 The principle of legal plurality facilitates operational understanding of two coexisting legal worlds
7 These normative productions were defined as “*droits de la pratique*”, i.e. rights based on practice,
8 as a “plural set based on different ages and particular stakes, actors and formalisms”, specifying
9 what is commonly designated as the ‘law of the land’.

10
11 A piece of land may be viewed as a “good” while the resources may be seen as “things” free of
12 access or as an “having” (as defined above) open to harvesting by people other than the owner
13 with his/her authorization. All these management practices may be subject to seasonal variation
14 depending on the types of resources to be taken (grass, crops, berries, mushrooms, game, fish,
15 etc.). The “right to hand over” (Chauveau, 1998) between the right of exclusion and of alienation,
16 as hybrid forms of access to land, such as buying land for migrants, which gives them the right to
17 pass it on to their heirs, but not the right to sell it. This traditional order may evolve with time. This
18 system commonly falls within the more general social norms, and follows an intrinsic evolution as
19 a result of overall change in the customary order, and of interactions with the positive law
20 implemented by the modern state. The trend towards commoditization of land and resources will
21 challenge the authority of these different modes and is likely to lead to individual property and
22 ownership as understood by capitalist economy and modern law.

23
24 However when the excess capacity of common goods is limited, congestion may turn the
25 consumption of the good as rival, i.e. when an additional unit of the good consumed by one
26 member negatively affects other members’ satisfaction of the public good. An example of this
27 situation is the fish-stock in oceans. Over-fishing depletes the world’s fish-stock and threatens
28 endangered species with extinction (Wouters and de Meester, 2003). Thus a complex set of laws
29 and agreements have completed the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), which
30 introduced two fundamental principles: (1) the territorial sea, providing a coastal state with the
31 right to control a narrow band of sea as an extension of its sovereignty offshore; and (2) freedom
32 of the high seas, meaning the freedoms of navigation and fishing in the high sea beyond that
33 offshore coastal area (Joyner, 2000).

34
35 The first principle relies on the co-management between states and coastal communities in
36 planning, regulating, and conducting resource management (Borgese, 1999). One of the main
37 issues is the obligation for states to maintain or restore populations of harvested fish at levels that

1 produce a 'maximum sustainable yield'. 'Non-exploitive users', i.e. the rest of society's citizens,
2 also have a right of access to the Exclusive Economic Zone for other functions, which include
3 permission to locate aquaculture installations, mineral mining, shipping access, etc. decisions on
4 which remain with government (Caddy, 1999).

5
6 On the second principle, a UN Agreement for the Conservation and Management of Straddling
7 Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks has been adopted in 1995, mandating states to
8 establish sub-regional and regional conventions and organizations to facilitate conservation and
9 management of living resources, and an International Seabed Authority for the deep ocean floor
10 and non living marine resources. Except for sedentary species of the sea floor, international
11 fisheries agreements do not speak in terms of ownership of resources but of access rights. This
12 distinction raises the fine point as to the timing of the access and even whether this right could be
13 extended to include the progeny of the resource share in future rights. A corpus of international
14 law has evolved around the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention for protecting and managing the
15 world's oceans (Joyner, 2000), which will likely be extended in the future (Caddy, 1999).

16 Assessments such as the MA, point out that these arrangements are insufficient to avoid a
17 decline of populations of harvested fisheries and 25% of the oceans are over-fished, creating
18 problems for both the fish species and the fishermen depending on them. The setting of fishing
19 quotas doesn't take in account the effects of the withdrawal of one species on the functioning of
20 the whole marine ecosystem: it alters not only the targeted fish population but also the other
21 trophic levels concerned by this species as prey or predator. In most situations there is
22 insufficient knowledge on the functioning of marine complex ecosystems to design better
23 management rules.

24
25 *Challenges for public research and policy options.* Scientific knowledge has to help to understand
26 the complexity of such situations, in the oceans as well as on the continents to formalize these
27 different sets of right regimes and also to design new ways for collective action for the fair
28 implementation of such rights reach optimally sustainable management of renewable natural
29 resources. Such knowledge has to guide the design of laws, incentives, contracts, taxes, quotas,
30 permits and licenses that take in account the diversity of situations and that avoid blueprint
31 solutions.

32
33 *Natural Resources Management Policies:* Since state appropriation of NRM based on positive
34 law may co-exist with the modalities of local rights systems, which distinguish access to, usage,
35 exploitation, ownership, alienation, exclusion, of "common" goods at a collective level, one option
36 is to recognize that the 'law of the land' may further involve land tenure systems that cannot be
37 reduced to individual ownership. Collective ownership and management of natural resources is

1 protected in Article 10c of the CBD (Sustainable Use of Components of Biological Diversity).
2 Indigenous groups have referenced this Article to help defend their collective rights and NRM
3 practices against governments that would ignore these rights in fulfilling commitments to protect
4 'global' resources. New instruments for collective action have to make explicit and feasible the fair
5 implementation of collective rights and NRM practices in order to obtain the best and sustainable
6 management of renewable natural resources. Formal institutions have to take in account this
7 diversity of NRM knowledge and avoid conforming only to a concept of individual ownership and
8 rights.

10 **7.5 Pro-Poor Agricultural Innovation**

11 ***7.5.1 Technology supply push and the global agricultural treadmill***

12 The dominant policy model for promoting innovation is called the linear model (Kline and
13 Rosenberg, 1986), or the transfer of technology model (Chambers and Jiggins, 1987; Ch 2). Also
14 known as "technology supply push," this approach relies on the agricultural treadmill (Cochrane,
15 1958) i.e. market-propelled waves of technological change that squeeze farm-gate prices,
16 stimulate farmers to capture economies of scale, deliver high internal rates of return to
17 investments in agricultural research (Evenson et al., 1979), but also encourage externalization of
18 significant social and environmental costs (Lal et al., 2005; Mukherjee and Kathuria, 2006).

19 While the technology push model provided the basis for the positive impacts of the Green
20 Revolution in favorable areas (Castillo, 1998) and under defined conditions that typically included
21 high subsidies on fertilizers and pesticides (Pontius et al., 2002), it has not served nearly as well
22 as resource-poor areas that are highly diverse, rain fed, and risk prone, and that currently hold
23 most of the world's poor (Anderson et al., 1991; Biggs and Farrington, 1991; Vanlauwe et al.,
24 2006).

25
26 The market-propelled diffusion of innovations called 'the agricultural treadmill' (Cochrane, 1958)
27 has been ongoing in developed market economies for 50 years or more. The literature observing
28 the process for hybrid maize in the American mid-West goes back to 1943 (Ryan and Gross,
29 1943). During these 50 years, farmers in those economies have been able to capture significant
30 economies of scale. The treadmill process in those economies has been heavily supported in
31 terms of public funding of agricultural research, education and extension, credit subsidies, land
32 and irrigation development, supportive legislation, access to inputs, services and markets, and
33 the evolution of farmers' organizations and their lobbies that represent farmers' interests at state
34 and federal or EU levels. One can now speak of a 'global treadmill' that allows farmers in
35 developed economies to export their (sometimes subsidized) products to developing countries
36 and compete with local small-scale farmers.

1

2 Value added per agricultural worker in 2003 (constant 2000 US\$) in developed market economies
3 was 23,081 with a growth over 1992-2003 of 4.4% (FAO, 2005b). For sub-Saharan Africa the
4 figures are 327 and 1.4%, respectively. As long as the global treadmill is operating, even with all
5 OECD subsidies removed, efforts to uplift rural poverty will remain severely handicapped and it
6 will continue to be difficult to enlist the vast arable lands in developing countries that are now
7 underperforming and degrading for purposes of global food security. In these circumstances, to
8 continue with a technology-supply push conception of innovation seems inappropriate. The rural
9 poor are not on the global treadmill; instead the global treadmill prevents them from development.
10 Required are institutional framework conditions that provide realistic opportunities to subsistence
11 farmers to become small-scale commercial farmers.

12

13 In imperfect markets the benefits are uneven and do not always reach the poor. Policy responses
14 of proven historical efficacy to addressing unevenness in competitiveness and opportunity
15 include institutional framework conditions within which AKST can play a more positive role, i.e. by
16 stimulating targeted investment in creating small farmers' access to market opportunities, inputs,
17 alternative employment and to creating value-adding enterprises and by temporary market
18 protection to infant agro-industries. The contemporary and future challenge is to achieve positive
19 policy outcomes in ways that internalize the environmental and social costs as well.

20

21 **7.5.2 Brokered long-term contractual arrangements**

22 Brokered long-term contractual arrangements (BLCA; a term used here to designate a suite of
23 modern contractual arrangements) have proven effective in improving the livelihoods of poor
24 farmers and fostering rural innovation (Little and Watts, 1994; Key and Runsten, 1999). However,
25 the set of conditions required for this policy option to be attractive are rather restrictive. BLCAs
26 were initiated to use the good aspects of state trading enterprises (STEs) because STEs proved
27 sensitive to corruption, rent seeking, gender discrimination and externalization of costs to farmers
28 (Hobart, 1994; Dorward et al., 1998). A major challenge facing expanded use of BLCA's as a
29 policy option is to avoid repetition of the historical record that provides ample evidence of the
30 misuse and abuse of nationalized BLCA-like (STE) schemes.

31

32 BLCAs, under favorable social conditions with transparency and strong farmer organization,
33 provide a policy option for public sectors to invest in the creation of opportunities for poor farmers.
34 Synergies between long term contractual arrangements and the organic and fair trade markets
35 increase when such types of contractual arrangements are coupled with group certification of
36 small-scale organic producers. Policy options include retooling abolished STEs and creating
37 legal, financial and technical support for emerging new BLCAs that are pro-poor.

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7.5.3 Endogenous development and traditional knowledge

Endogenous development draws mainly on locally available resources, local knowledge, culture and leadership, with an openness that allows for integration of outside knowledge and practices’ (Haverkort et al., 2002; Millar, 2005).

Traditional knowledge can be effective and reliable (Brammer, 1980; Warren et al. 1991; Reij et al., 1996; Brammer, 2000; Balasubramanian and Devi, 2005) with respect to: (1) knowledge about the agroecosystem and seasonality in which the farmers operate; (2) information about what local people need, want and have capacity for in terms of resources, access to markets; (3) locally adapted technical knowledge and practices and (4) a system view based on having to live by the results.

Farmers may innovate at the system level. For example, farmers on the very densely inhabited Adja Plateau in Benin have developed an ‘oil palm fallow’ rotation that allows them to suppress *Imperata cylindrica*, restore soil fertility for annual crops, and make money from distilling palm wine once the palms are cut down (Brouwers, 1993). But traditional knowledge may have weaknesses such as attributing plant disease to rain and thus foregoing useful management measures (Almekinder and Louwaars, 1999) or an inability to respond to rapidly changing circumstances, e.g., climate change. Experience with multi-agent approaches suggests that mobilizing the intelligence of a great many actors to address a new and complex problem can be an effective and efficient way to solve such systemic complexity (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993; Gilbert and Troitzsch, 1999).

Policy options for promoting endogenous development include decentralization; use of rapid rural appraisals and participatory approaches; empowerment initiatives; multistakeholder processes; and strengthening farmer organizations. Decentralization as in India or Uganda, however, may strengthen and widen the base for democratic participation in agricultural research decision making, open new opportunities for collaboration in agroenterprise innovations and service delivery, address specific local development problems, and improve responsiveness to the needs of the poor (e.g., SNV and CEDELO, 2004).

Rapid rural appraisal (RRA) and participatory approaches may supply more accurate or insightful information than questionnaire surveys or more relevant or better adapted technologies than the experiments of scientists conducted in conditions and places remote from the fields (e.g., Collinson, 2000). Participation has long been dominant in pro-poor development approaches and may range from simple consultation to support for autonomous decision-making (e.g., Pretty,

1 1994; Biggs, 1995). RRA and participatory approaches may be poorly performed and insufficient,
2 however, for addressing the multiple scales of policy intervention required (Biggs, 1978; Biggs,
3 1995; Cleaver, 2001; Cooke and Kothari, 2001). The challenge in meeting development and
4 sustainability goals is to create complementarity that draws on best practice across the range of
5 pro-poor approaches and policies (Biggs, 1982; Biggs, 1989; Bunders, 2001; Ceccarelli et al.,
6 2002; Chema et al., 2003).

7
8 Participatory Technology Development (PTD) (Jiggins and De Zeeuw, 1992) is a concrete
9 approach to the design of complementary action that is relevant for achieving development and
10 sustainability goals but has some negatives associated with it. With very small windows of
11 opportunity, it is not easy to reduce poverty by enhancing productivity at the farm level, even
12 through PTD. The challenge is to *stretch* those windows through access to markets, better prices,
13 the development of services, and the removal of extractive practices and patrimonial networks.
14 Given opportunities, West African farmers have time and again considerably increased their
15 production without major technical change. Technology becomes important once framework
16 conditions begin to improve (Box 7.2).

17
18 **[Insert Box 7.2]**

19
20 *Empowerment.* The corollary of recognizing resource-poor farmers as partners in complementary
21 and collaborative approaches to development is to accept their empowerment. It can be more
22 efficient to increase farmers' countervailing power than to increase an agency's intervention
23 power through investing in more vehicles, agent training or budget support. Farmer Field Schools
24 (FFS) (Box 7.3) is an option that warrants further empirical research to determine the conditions
25 under which this may be so and the kinds of policy environment that best enable empowerment
26 strategies to be effective in meeting development and sustainability goals. (Van den Berg and
27 Jiggins, 2007, for a review and assessment of IPM FFS literature).

28
29 **[Insert Box 7.3]**

30
31 *Multistakeholder processes.* A special participatory approach is the facilitation of multi-
32 stakeholder processes (Leeuwis and Pyburn, 2002; Wals, 2007). Especially in resource
33 dilemmas, where different categories of interdependent stakeholders make competing claims on
34 common pool resources, sustainable solutions cannot come from regulation, technology or
35 market interventions only. The way forward is a facilitated process of negotiation, shared (social)
36 learning, and agreement on concerted action, based on trust, fairness and reciprocity. There is
37 increasing evidence that humans are capable of agreeing on sustainable solutions and of
38 creating institutional conditions that support the implementation of such solutions if drawn into

1 appropriate knowledge processes (e.g., Ostrom et al., 1992; Blackmore et al., 2007).
2 Multistakeholder processes increasingly are important with respect to climate change adaptation,
3 when agreements have to be reached to avoid crisis or when loss of ecosystem services
4 becomes a key cause of poverty.

5

6 *The Chain-Linked Model.* Commercial innovation studies give a central place to the entrepreneur
7 who sees a possibility to capture an opportunity by mobilizing resources, including knowledge
8 (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986). The driver of innovation in these situations typically is the
9 entrepreneur spotting or creating market-related or social organizational opportunity. Policy
10 support to innovation in these cases is provided by helping entrepreneurs to access specialized
11 sources of knowledge, services and skills (Coehoorn, 1994; Crul, 2003). International experience
12 of supporting innovation in small and medium enterprises in non-farming sectors can be useful in
13 guiding pro-poor agricultural enterprise development.

14

15 *Strengthening farmer organizations.* Investing in people's organizations is a policy option
16 (Toulmin, 2005) with a long history. The experience of the USA and Europe shows that strong
17 farmers' organizations can be a necessary condition for commercially efficient agricultural
18 development (Bigg and Satterthwaite, 2006). An African example is provided by ROPPA in West
19 Africa (Koning and Jongeneel, 2006; ROPPA, 2006). Organizations such as AGRITERRA in The
20 Netherlands attempt to strengthen farmers' organizations in developing countries through
21 training, delegating research funds to farmers' organizations, and building farmers' capacities as
22 effective partners in the negotiation of contracts as well as in research-priority setting. Since
23 farmers' organizations need allies in other sectors or at other levels if they are to become strong
24 and act effectively in collaborative AKST partnerships (Wennink and Heemskerk, 2006) it is a
25 useful a policy option to invest in 'platforms' (or organized social arenas) where farmers and
26 researchers can meet on a level playing field. The inclusion of small farmers' representatives on
27 such platforms (as in the PRODUCE foundations in Mexico) may require special effort but may
28 still end up favoring those with sufficient assets to seize commercial opportunity.

29

30 One of the persistent experiences in agricultural development is that while it can be relatively
31 easy to promote pro-poor endogenous development, collaborative AKST partnerships and the
32 mobilization of indigenous knowledge in pilot projects, the prevailing governance conditions make
33 it difficult to scale up and embed successful pilot experiences in routine institutional behaviors
34 The difficulty in part lies in social realities that position power and opportunity as highly contested
35 zero-sum contests. In 1986, when Java's rice fields were devastated by resurgent waves of
36 Brown Plant Hoppers (BPH) resistant to pesticides destroyed the natural enemies or predators of
37 the BHP, it took considerable time for the government to respond. The problem was a principle

1 called 'asal bapak senang' that may be translated as 'as long as father is happy' (with the sense
2 of 'to avoid upsetting your boss with negative information'). At each level in the hierarchy, the bad
3 news about the devastation in the rice fields was watered down. It was only when the people from
4 his own village came to the President directly to ask for help that he learned that something was
5 seriously amiss. In our assessment, policy initiatives that aim at empowerment and endogenous
6 development would be most accepted where democratic forms of government and a strong civil
7 society exist; most poor people live in countries where these conditions are not present.

9 **7.5.4 Innovation systems (IS)**

10 Innovation is the emergent property of the interaction among organizations and people who make
11 the complementary contributions required for innovation to take place (Röling and Engel, 1991;
12 Bawden and Packam, 1993). The configuration of actors is not fixed (Engel and Salomon, 1997).
13 The empirical research of successful and innovative economies that stimulated the recent interest
14 in innovation Systems has found that 'the essential determinant of innovation appeared to be that
15 the suppliers of new knowledge were intimately engaged with the users of that knowledge'
16 (Barnett, 2006).

17
18 Older traditions of systems thinking and practice (e.g. Checkland, 1981; Checkland with Scholes,
19 1990) drew attention to linkages, relationships, interfaces, conflicts, convergence, and reciprocity
20 in innovation processes. The application of such thinking and practice to pro-poor development in
21 agriculture has been stimulated also by the evidence that it appears to be suited to dealing with
22 the kind of institutional development that The New Institutional Economics (North, 2005) sees as
23 a precursor to growth.

24
25 The 'innovation systems' approach in recent years has become an ex-ante policy model (World
26 Bank, 2007a) that draws on the aforementioned traditions as well as on empirical research on
27 the emergence of Asian economies. Such models are an increasingly important tool for
28 stimulating innovation at the interface of agriculture, sustainable natural resource management
29 and economic growth, for instance in the context of the EU's Water Framework Directive (e.g.,
30 Blackmore et al., 2007) and Land Care and more recently Catchment Management Authorities in
31 Australia (Campbell, 1994). These experiences also show up the weakness of the IS approach:
32 absent appropriate enabling policy frameworks and economic drivers at higher system scales,
33 successful lower scale innovations can peter out or become frustrated. The lessons may be
34 linked to the widespread confidence that rational choice theory offers an appropriate foundation
35 for policy designed to support innovation; the empirical evidence suggests to the contrary that,
36 given the public good character of development and sustainability goals, policies based on an

1 understanding of the role of collective management in innovation processes may be more
2 appropriate (Ostrom et al., 1993; Gunderson et al., 1995).

3

4 *Conditions under which the policy options may be conducive to meeting development and*
5 *sustainability goals:* The following concrete steps have been proposed to make an innovation
6 systems approach work in resource-poor environments (see Tripp, 2006; McCann et al., 2006;
7 Van Huis and Houkonnou, 2007):

- 8 • Public, private and civil society agencies identify a number of priority themes based on
9 national plans, or poverty reduction strategies;
- 10 • For each theme, rapid appraisal of agricultural knowledge systems (RAAKS) (Engel and
11 Salomon, 1997) or other methods are used to identify configurations of stakeholders (including
12 researchers, farmer organizations, etc.) that constitute promising innovation systems. Such
13 configurations include actors at the both the national and the decentralized local government
14 level;
- 15 • Key representatives of these stakeholders are facilitated to form a 'Community of Practice'
16 (COPs) (Wenger, 1998) at decentralized (e.g., district) and national levels, where the national
17 level has the power and ability to create conducive institutional framework conditions for the
18 concrete activities at the decentralized level. An IS approach thus requires trained facilitators who
19 operate within a national mandate that recognizes the importance of IS;
- 20 • For each COP, diagnostic studies identify concrete opportunities that can be realized through
21 concerted action by the stakeholders;
- 22 • Each COP submits proposals to a national fund set up for this purpose;
- 23 • Each COP is monitored to allow national learning about the IS approach as a basis for staff
24 training and increasing management effectiveness.

25

26 The IS approach assumes considerable political will and an understanding of processes that
27 cannot be captured by hierarchy and market since creating windows of opportunity for small-scale
28 producers will require new kinds of institutional innovation (Egelyng, 2000).