

1 **IAASTD Global Report Chapter 2**  
2 **Historical Analysis of the Effectiveness of AKST Systems in Promoting Innovation**

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1 **Key Messages**

2

3 1. **Acknowledging and learning from competing and well evidenced historical**  
4 **narratives of knowledge, science and technology processes and understanding the flaws**  
5 **in past and existing institutional arrangements and maintaining the space for diverse**  
6 **voices and interpretations is crucial for designing policies that are effective in reaching**  
7 **the integrated goals of productivity, environmental sustainability, social equity and**  
8 **inclusion.** Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology (AKST) encompass diverse  
9 agricultural practices, interventions, institutional arrangements and knowledge processes.  
10 Different and often conflicting interpretations of the contributions of AKST to productivity,  
11 environmental and social sustainability and equity exist side-by-side but are not equally heard or  
12 recognized. Political power and economic influence have tended to privilege some types of AKST  
13 over others. Dominant institutional arrangements have established the privileged interpretations  
14 of the day and set the agenda for searching for and implementing solutions. The narrative used to  
15 explain past events and AKST choices has important implications for setting future priorities and  
16 projecting the future design of AKST.

17

18 2. **In the prevailing AKST arrangements of the past, key actors have been excluded or**  
19 **marginalized.** Preference has been given to short-term goals vs. longer-term agroecosystem  
20 sustainability and social equity and to powerful voices over the unorganized and voiceless.  
21 Development of appropriate forms of partnerships can help bring in the excluded and  
22 marginalized and open AKST to a larger set of policy goals. Many effective participatory  
23 approaches exist that facilitate the establishment and operation of such partnerships. Targeted  
24 public support can help address the biases in the dominant arrangements.

25

26 3. **The Transfer of Technology (ToT) model has been the most dominant model used**  
27 **in operational arrangements and in policy. However, the TOT model has not been the most**  
28 **effective in meeting a broader range of development goals that address the multiple**  
29 **functions and roles of farm enterprises and diverse agroecosystems.** In this model, science  
30 and technology are mobilized under the control of experts in the definition of problems and the  
31 design of solutions, problem setting and solving. Other types of knowledge have sometimes been  
32 tapped, although mainly for local adaptation purposes. Where the TOT model has been applied  
33 appropriately with the conditions necessary for achieving impact, it has been successful in driving  
34 yield and production gains. These conditions include properly functioning producer and service  
35 organizations, the social and biophysical suitability of technologies transferred in specific  
36 environments and proper management of those technologies at plot, farm and landscape levels.

1 4. **Successful education and extension programs have built on local and traditional**  
2 **knowledge and innovation systems, often through participatory and experiential learning**  
3 **processes and multi-organizational partnerships that integrate formal and informal AKST.**

4 Basic and occupational education empowers individuals to innovate in farming and  
5 agroenterprises, adapt to new job opportunities and be better prepared for migration. Attention to  
6 overcoming race, ethnic and gender biases that hamper the participation of marginalized  
7 community members, diverse ethnic groups and women, is essential. Education and training of  
8 government policymakers and public agency personnel, particularly in decentralized participatory  
9 planning and decision-making, and in understanding and working effectively with rural  
10 communities and other diverse stakeholders has also proven effective. Effective options include  
11 but are not limited to experiential learning groups, farmer field schools, farmer research circles,  
12 Participatory Plant Breeding, social forestry and related community-based forest landscape  
13 management, study clubs and community interaction with school-based curriculum development.  
14

15 5. **Investment in farmers and other rural actors' learning and capacity to critically**  
16 **assess, define and engage in locally-directed development processes has yielded positive**

17 **results.** Modern ICTs are beginning to open up new and potentially powerful new opportunities  
18 for extending the reach and scope of educational and interactive learning. Extension and advisory  
19 services complement but do not substitute for rural education. The development and  
20 implementation of successful learning and innovation programs requires skills in facilitating  
21 processes of interaction among partners, interdisciplinary science and working with all partners'  
22 experience and knowledge processes. Active development of additional options are needed to  
23 extend these arrangements and practices to include more marginalized peoples and areas and in  
24 ways that respect and uphold their roles, rights and practices.  
25

26 6. **Innovation is a multi-source process and always and necessarily involves a mix of**  
27 **stakeholders, organizations and types of knowledge systems.**

28 Innovative combinations of technology and knowledge generated by past and present arrangements and actors have led to  
29 more sustainable practices. These include for example, integrated pest management, precision  
30 farming, local innovations in crop management (e.g., push-pull in Africa). Further experimentation  
31 with facilitated innovation is needed to capitalize on new opportunities for innovation under  
32 market-oriented development.  
33

34 7. **Partnerships in agricultural and social science research and education offer**  
35 **potential to advance public interest science and increase its relevance to development**

36 **goals.** Industry, NGOs, social movements and farmer organizations have contributed useful  
37 innovations in ecological and socially sustainable approaches to food and agriculture. Increased

1 private sector funding of universities and research institutes has helped fill the gap created by  
2 declining public sector funds but has mixed implications for these institutions' independence and  
3 future research directions. Effective codes of conduct can strengthen multistakeholder  
4 partnerships and preserve public institutions' capacity to perform public good research.

5  
6 **8. Public policy and regulatory frameworks informed by scientific evidence and**  
7 **public participation and international agreements have enabled decisive and effective**  
8 **global transitions towards more sustainable practice.** New national, regional and international  
9 agreements will be needed to support further shifts towards ethical, equitable and sustainable  
10 food and agriculture systems in response to the urgent challenges posed by declining availability  
11 of clean water, climate change, and insupportable labor conditions.

12  
13 **9. Awareness of the importance of ensuring full and meaningful participation of**  
14 **multiple stakeholders in international and public sector AKST policy formation has**  
15 increased. For example, in some countries, pesticide policies today are developed by diverse  
16 group of actors including civil society and private sector actors, informed by science and empirical  
17 evidence and inclusive of public interest concerns. These policies have focused on the  
18 multifunctionality of agriculture.

19  
20 **10. The number and diversity of actors engaged in the management of agricultural**  
21 **resources such as germplasm has declined over time. This trend reduces options for**  
22 **responding to uncertainties of the future. It increases asymmetries in access to**  
23 **germplasm and increases the vulnerabilities of the poor.** Participatory plant breeding  
24 provides strong evidence that diverse actors can be engaged in an effective practice for achieving  
25 and sustaining broader goals of sustainability and development by bringing together the skills and  
26 techniques of advanced and conventional breeding and farmers' preferences and germplasm  
27 management capacities and skills, including seed production for sale. Further development and  
28 expansion would require adjustment of varietal release protocols and appropriate policy  
29 recognition under Union for the Protection of Plant Varieties (UPOV).

30  
31 **11. The debates surrounding the use of synthetic pesticides have led to new**  
32 **arrangements that have increased awareness, availability and effectiveness of the range of**  
33 **options for pest management.** Institutional responses have included the strengthening of  
34 regulatory controls over synthetic chemical pesticides at global and national levels, growing  
35 consumer and retail markets for pesticide-free and organic products, removal of highly toxic  
36 products from sale, development of less acutely toxic products and more precise means of  
37 delivery and education of users in safe and sustainable practices. What constitutes safe and

1 sustainable practice has been defined in widely varying ways by different actors reflecting  
2 different conditions of use as well as different assessments of acceptable tradeoffs. The  
3 availability of and capacity to assess, compare and choose from a wide range of options in pest  
4 management is critical to strengthening farmers' ability to incorporate effective strategies that are  
5 safe, sustainable and effective in actual conditions of use.

6  
7 **12. Integrated Pest Management exemplifies a flexible and wide-reaching arrangement**  
8 **of actors, institutions and practices that better address the needs of diverse farmers.**

9 Although definitions, interpretations and outcomes of IPM programs vary widely among actors,  
10 IPM typically incorporates KST from a broad range of sciences, including social sciences, and the  
11 experience and knowledge of a diverse set of actors. IPM has become more common in high  
12 value production systems and has been adopted by an increasing number of important  
13 commercial actors in food processing and retailing. Successful approaches to introducing IPM to  
14 small-scale producers in the tropics include farmer field schools, push-pull approaches, advisory  
15 services provided under contractual arrangements for supply to central processing facilities and  
16 creative use of communication tools such as farmer-to-farmer videos and focused-message  
17 information campaigns. A combination of such approaches, backed by strong policy reform to  
18 restrict the sale of out-dated and highly toxic synthetic controls, will be needed to meet future  
19 development goals. Further experimentation with and operational fine-tuning of the institutional  
20 arrangements for IPM in the field in different settings is also needed to ensure optimal efficacy.  
21 These can be evaluated by comparative assessment using a combination of social,  
22 environmental and economic measures that include positive and negative externalities.

23  
24 **13. Local food systems, known to sustain livelihoods at micro level, are currently**  
25 **challenged by globalized food systems.**

26 This trend brings opportunities but also threatens  
27 livelihoods and sovereignties of marginalized communities and indigenous peoples. In some  
28 countries, social, ethical and cultural values have been successfully integrated in commercial  
29 mechanisms. Fair trade and ethnic labeling are examples of institutional options that can be  
30 considered by those who wish to promote effective measures to protect the interests of the  
31 marginalized and revitalize rural livelihoods and food cultures. The addition of a geographic  
32 indication can promote local knowledge and open opportunities for other agroenterprises such as  
33 tourism and specialty product development, as well as collaboration with utilities such as water  
34 companies. Production systems dominated by export markets are weakened by erratic changes  
35 in international markets and have sparked growing concerns about the sustainability of long-  
36 distance food shipping and the ecological footprint and social impacts of international trade  
37 practices. Local consumption and domestic outlets for farmers' products can alleviate the risks  
inherent in international trade.

1 **2.1. Science, Knowledge, Technology and Innovation in Agriculture**

2 The Asian AgriHistory Foundation translates historical writings that remind us that formal  
3 processes for generating technology-led innovation were in place in some countries more than  
4 3000 years ago. This subchapter focuses on AKST processes and institutional arrangements,  
5 how these have been brought to bear on agricultural problems and combined to bring about  
6 innovation in agricultural systems when mobilized for different policy purposes. Subchapter 2.2  
7 assesses the roles that various knowledge actors have played in different contexts, noting  
8 changes over time from different perspectives so as to minimize the risk that past actions are  
9 judged by current values or by those of only one set of actors. The drivers are assessed at three  
10 levels – local, regional, global. The assessments are further elaborated (2.3) in order to provide  
11 depth and detail in terms of three thematic narratives – (1) genetic resources management; (2)  
12 pest management; (3) food system management.

13

14 **2.1.1 The specificity of agriculture as an activity**

15 At the beginning of the period under assessment, policy makers and other knowledge actors  
16 around the world had vividly in mind the fact that food is a basic necessity of life and that its  
17 supply and distribution is vulnerable to a range of disruptions that cannot always be well  
18 controlled. Only for those for whom food is reliably abundant can food be treated as an industrial  
19 good subject to the laws of elasticity of price. The special characteristics of farming as a human  
20 activity for supplying a basic necessity of life and as the cultural context of existence for a still  
21 large if declining proportion of the world's people are central to meaningful historical assessment  
22 of AKST.

23

24 **2.1.1.1. The characteristics of agriculture as a multidimensional activity**

25 Agriculture is based on local management decisions made in interaction with the biophysical,  
26 ecological and social context, this context to a large extent itself evolving independently of  
27 agriculture. It follows that AKST includes both a set of activities that happen to deal with the  
28 particular domain of agriculture and activities that necessarily co-evolve with numerous other  
29 changes in a society. AKST thus involves many types of knowledge and many suppliers of that  
30 knowledge acting in relation to vast numbers of (semi) autonomous enterprises and decision  
31 makers. This characteristic has provided special challenges but also opportunities in the design of  
32 institutional arrangements for AKST (Yunus and Islam, 1975; Yunus, 1977; Izuno, 1979; Symes  
33 and Jansen, 1994; Scoones et al., 1996; Buck et al., 1998; Stroosnijder and Rheenen, 2001;  
34 Edgerton, 2007).

35

36 *A place-based activity.* Agriculture as a place-based activity relies on unique combinations of  
37 bioclimatic conditions and local resources in their natural, socioeconomic and cultural

1 dimensions. Agricultural practices depend on and also influence these conditions and resources  
2 (Herdt and Mellor, 1964). Specific knowledge of the locality is an asset decisive for the outcomes  
3 actually achieved through application of any technology (Loomis and Beagle, 1953; Hill, 1982;  
4 Giller, 2002; Tittonell et al., 2005, 2007; Vanlauwe et al. 2006; Wopereis et al., 2006; Zingore et  
5 al., 2007) yet a dominant trend over the period is the evolution of agricultures driven by nonlocal  
6 changes and by the introduction of technologies designed by actors and in places far removed  
7 from their site of application (Merton, 1957; Biggs, 1978; Anderson et al., 1991; Seur, 1992;  
8 Matson et al., 1997; Harilal et al., 2006; Leach and Scoones, 2006). This trend has been tightly  
9 associated with the adoption of a science-based approach to the industrialization of farming. It  
10 has allowed greater control by farmers of production factors and the simplification and  
11 homogenization of production situations particularly for internationally-traded commodities and  
12 high-value crops (Allaire, 1996). This has enabled large surpluses of a narrow range of basic  
13 grains and protein foods to be generated, traded and also moved relatively quickly to meet  
14 emergency and humanitarian needs. It has eased hunger and reduced poverty as well as kept  
15 food prices stable and low relative to other prices and allowed investment in other economic  
16 sectors (FAO, 2004). However, the ecological and cultural context of farming is always and  
17 necessarily 'situated' and cannot – unlike functions such as water use or carbon trading – be  
18 physically exchanged (Berkes and Folke, 1998; Hubert et al., 2000; Steffen et al., 2004; Lal et al.,  
19 2005; Pretty, 2005). Advances especially in the ecological sciences and socioeconomic research  
20 as well as drivers originating in civil society movements (2.2, 2.3) have mobilized science,  
21 knowledge and technology in support of approaches appreciative of place-specific,  
22 multidimensional and multifunctional opportunities (Agarwal et al., 1979; Byerlee, 1992; Symes  
23 and Jansen, 1994; Gilbert, 1995; de Boef, 2000; INRA, 2000; Fresco, 2002). Examples include  
24 (Cohn et al., 2006), trading arrangements connecting those willing to pay for specific ecological  
25 values and those who manage the resources that are valued (Knight, 2007), urban councils using  
26 rate levies to pay farmers for the maintenance of surrounding recreational green space or for  
27 ecosystem services such as spreading flood water on their fields; hydroelectric companies such  
28 as Brazil-Iguacú paying farmers to practice conservation tillage to avoid silting behind the dams  
29 and improve communal water supplies; farmers' markets; and community-supported agriculture.

30  
31 *An embedded activity.* The resulting flows of products and services are embedded in a web of  
32 institutional arrangements and relationships at varying scales, such as farmers' organizations,  
33 industrial districts, commodity chains, *terroirs*, production areas, natural resource management  
34 areas, ethnic territories, administrative divisions, nations and global trading networks. Farmers  
35 are simultaneously members of a variety of institutions and relationships that frame their  
36 opportunities and constraints, offering incentives and penalties that are sometimes contradictory;  
37 farmers require strategic ability to select and interpret the relevant information constituted in these



1 institutions and relationships (Chiffoleau and Dreyfus, 2004). The various ways of organizing  
2 science, knowledge and technology over the last sixty years have taken different approaches to  
3 farmers' strategic roles (2.1.2).

4  
5 *A collective activity.* Farmers are not wholly independent entrepreneurs; their livelihoods critically  
6 depend on relationships that govern access to resources. With asymmetrical social relations,  
7 access is not equitably or evenly distributed. Individuals, groups and communities attempt to cope  
8 with inequalities by developing relational skills and capacity for collective action that help them to  
9 protect or enhance their access to and use of resources (Barbier and Lémery, 2000); the form  
10 that collective action takes changes over time and place and between genders. As commercial  
11 actors such as supermarkets have become dominant in food and farming systems, many farmers  
12 have transformed their production-oriented organizations into market-oriented organizations.

13  
14 *A disadvantaged activity.* Agriculture is disadvantaged as an economic sector in the sense that  
15 the majority of small-scale producers and farm workers even today, in developing countries  
16 particularly, suffer from restricted access to formal education and opportunities to learn more  
17 about science and technology. Women and indigenous communities in particular tend to be more  
18 disadvantaged than others in this respect (Moock, 1976; Muntemba and Chimedza, 1995;  
19 ISNAR, 2002; IFAD, 2003; FAO, 2004; UNRISD, 2006). Investment in educating farmers in their  
20 principal occupation has been low compared to need throughout the period in most contexts.  
21 Master Farmer classes, Farmer Field Schools, study clubs, land care groups and interactive rural  
22 school curricula are among the options that have been developed in part simply to fill the gaps;  
23 few assessments exist of their comparative cost-effectiveness as educational investments. The  
24 potential of AKST to stimulate economic growth is affected in multiple ways by educational  
25 opportunity although these effects have not been well quantified (Coulombe et al., 2004; FAO,  
26 2004). Overcoming educational disadvantages by contracting out extension to private suppliers  
27 as in Uganda poses new challenges (Ekwamu and Brown, 2005; Ellis and Freeman, 2006).

28  
29 Wherever the structural and systemic disadvantages have been coupled to a lack of effective  
30 economic demand among cash-poor households, farmers in most parts of the developing world  
31 have been excluded also from formal decision making in agriculture and food policy and from  
32 priority setting in agricultural research unless special arrangements have been made to include  
33 them, such as the PRODUCE foundations in Mexico (Paredes and Moncado, 2000; Ekboir et al.,  
34 2006). Even under these arrangements it is the better educated and socially advantaged who  
35 participate; the inclusion of poor farmers, women, and laborers in research agenda-setting  
36 typically requires additional effort, for example by use of Citizen Juries (Pimbert and Wakeford,  
37 2002). Given poor farmers' relative lack of education they also have been and remain vulnerable

1 to exploitation in commercial relations (Newell and Wheeler, 2006), a growing problem as  
2 competitive markets penetrate deeper into rural areas. Market-oriented small-scale agriculture in  
3 developing countries is disadvantaged also by the huge and growing gap in the average  
4 productivity of labor between small-scale producers relying mainly on hand tools and the labor  
5 efficiency of farmers in areas that contribute the largest share of international market deliveries  
6 (Mazoyer, 2005; Mazoyer and Roudard, 2005).

#### 7 8 2.1.1.2 The controversy on multifunctionality

9 How AKST should or could address multifunctionality is controversial; while some have sought to  
10 balance the multiple functions of agriculture others have made tradeoffs among them, creating  
11 large variation in outcomes at different times and in changing contexts. The concept of  
12 multifunctionality itself has been challenged (Barnett, 2004). In general (Fig. 2-1) it refers to  
13 agriculture as a multi-output activity producing not only commodities (food, fodder, fibers, biofuel  
14 and recently pharmaceuticals) but also non-commodity outputs such as environmental benefits,  
15 landscape amenities and cultural heritages that are not traded in organized markets (Blandford  
16 and Boisvert, 2002). The frequently cited working definition proposed by OECD in turn associates  
17 multifunctionality with particular characteristics of the agricultural production process and its  
18 outputs: (i) the existence of multiple commodity and non-commodity outputs that are jointly  
19 produced by agriculture; and that (ii) some of the non-commodity outputs may exhibit the  
20 characteristics of externalities or public goods, such that markets for these goods function poorly  
21 or are nonexistent (OECD, 2001).

22  
23 INSERT Fig. 2-1. Multiple outputs produced from farm inputs.

24  
25 A multi-country FAO study, Roles of Agriculture, identified the multifunctional roles of agriculture  
26 at different scales (Table 2-1). The project's country case studies underlined the many cross-  
27 sector links through which agricultural growth can support overall economic growth and  
28 highlighted the importance to sustainable farming of balancing the interests of rural and urban  
29 populations; social stability, integration, and identities; food safety and food cultures and the  
30 interests of nonhuman species and agroecological functioning.

31  
32 INSERT Table 2-1. Roles of agriculture.

33  
34 In the early years under review the multifunctionality of agriculture was under-valued in the  
35 tradeoffs made in technology choices and in formal AKS arrangements that were responding to  
36 urgent needs to increase edible grain output and high protein foods such as meat or fish. The  
37 success in meeting this essential but somewhat narrow goal tended to lock AKST into a particular

1 pathway that perpetuated the initial post World War II focus. The political environment evolved in  
2 a direction that gave further stimulus to the organization of AKST devoted to the production of  
3 internationally traded goods (as advocated, for example, by the Cairns group of nations) rather  
4 than to sustaining multidimensional, place-based functionality in both its biophysical and  
5 sociocultural dimensions. This suited the circumstances of countries with large agricultural trade  
6 surpluses and relatively few small-scale producers in the areas where the surpluses were grown  
7 (Brouwer, 2004). For the majority of nations agriculture throughout the period has remained a  
8 domestic issue, based in part on large numbers of small-scale producers who still need to ensure  
9 basic food security and here a different calculus of interests (Conway, 1994). Countries such as  
10 Japan, Switzerland, Norway and the European Union opted for re-directing AKST toward  
11 maintaining the multifunctional capacity of agriculture once food surplus was assured (De Vries,  
12 2000; Huylenbroeck and Durand, 2003; Sakamoto et al., 2007). In recent decades, changes in  
13 consumer demand and renewed emphasis by citizens on food quality, ethical issues, rural  
14 community livelihoods as well as changes in policy concerns (including resource conservation, ,  
15 tourism, biomass energy production and environmental sustainability) have led to expectations in  
16 many countries that agriculture will be able to play a balanced and sustainable role in meeting  
17 multifunctional goals (Cahill, 2001; Hediger and Lehmann, 2003; Rickert, 2004; Paxson, 2007).

18  
19 Debates about multifunctionality were taken up by the OECD and FAO leading to a clarification of  
20 the policy implications and a broader recognition among trading partners that agriculture does  
21 play multiple roles and that AKST arrangements can and do have a part. The additional broad  
22 benefits potentially associated with multifunctional agriculture, including conservation of  
23 biodiversity, animal welfare, cultural and historical heritage values and the liability and viability of  
24 rural communities (Northwest Area Foundation, 1994; de Haan and Long, 1997; Cahill, 2001;  
25 Hediger and Lehmann, 2003) were in many countries returned to core AKST agendas. A growing  
26 body of evidence concerning the social and environmental costs of past and current tradeoffs  
27 among functions also began to be systematically quantified (Pimentel et al., 1992, 1993; Pretty  
28 and Waibel, 2005; Pretty, 2005a; Stern, 2006) as well as the benefits of re-introducing  
29 multifunctionality to industrial agricultural environments (NRC, 1989; Northwest Area Foundation,  
30 1995; Winter, 1996; Buck et al., 1998). The role of local knowledge and technology processes  
31 also became more widely recognized and formed the basis of AKST arrangements that sought to  
32 offer rural youth a motivation and realistic opportunities to stay in farming and develop  
33 agroenterprises (Breusers, 1998; FAO, 2004; Richards, 2005).

34  
35 At some scales the multifunctional roles and functions that different agricultural systems actually  
36 play today are well described for many contexts and are non-controversial. However, many of the  
37 variables are difficult to assess and are recognized as requiring the development of new

1 knowledge routines if they are to be addressed adequately (Raedeke and Rikoon, 1997). In  
2 particular, some of the ecological and social goods, services and amenities that are not subject to  
3 commercial transactions have proven difficult to measure and hence in recent years greater  
4 reliance has been placed on developing alternatives. These include the use of relevant and  
5 efficient proxy indicators (Akca, Sayili, and Kurunc, 2005; Mukherjee and Kathuria, 2006), 'water  
6 footprint' estimations (Hoekstra and Chapagain, 2007; Chapagain and Hoekstra, 2003) that show  
7 the extent to which farming systems, production practices, consumption patterns and the  
8 composition of agricultural trade affect net water balances at national levels (Chapagain and  
9 Hoekstra, 2003) and environmentally adjusted macroeconomic indicators for national economies  
10 (O'Connor, 2006). The experience has been mixed of applying these to actual decision-making.  
11 Developing and using computer-simulated modeling of multifunctionality (McCown et al., 2002) at  
12 field-scale (e.g. McCown et al., 1996) or farm-to-landscape scale (e.g. Parker et al., 2002) has led  
13 to robust applications in support of interactive learning among diverse users (Walker, 2002; van  
14 Ittersum et al., 2004; Nidumolu et al., 2007) seeking to balance interests in processes of adaptive  
15 management (Buck et al., 2001).

### 16 17 **2.1.2. Knowledge processes**

18 *Knowledge processes* refer to the collective processes of creating, transforming, storing and  
19 communicating about knowledge (Beal et al., 1986). The organization of knowledge processes in  
20 agricultural development has been subsumed in powerful mental models of how science,  
21 knowledge and technology 'get agriculture moving' (Mosher, 1966; Borlaug and Dowsell, 1995).  
22 Each of the main models (Albrecht et al., 1989, 1990) has its own logic and fitness for purpose.  
23 They and their variants are discussed and compared; in each case for the sake of clarity they are  
24 first presented as commonly accepted abstractions followed by assessment of the dynamic ways  
25 in which the model has been applied within specific institutional arrangements in particular  
26 contexts. Institutional arrangements are important to the assessment because they provide  
27 different ways of distributing power and influence among sources of knowledge and hence are  
28 consequential for understanding the kinds of impact that can be expected and were in fact  
29 realized.

#### 30 31 2.1.2.1 Transfer of Technology as a model for organizing knowledge and diffusion processes

32 One model in particular has dominated as a guide to the organization of knowledge processes in  
33 the public sector in developing countries, the Transfer of Technology (ToT) model. It was formally  
34 elaborated as a practical model for guiding action and investment in specific AKST arrangements  
35 on the basis of empirical studies of knowledge management and diffusion processes in the mid-  
36 west of America (Lionberger, 1960; Havelock, 1969). Science is positioned in this model as a  
37 privileged problem-defining and knowledge generating activity carried out mainly by universities

1 and research stations whose knowledge, embedded in technologies, messages, and practices is  
2 transferred by extension agents to farmers. The model assumes a linear flow of technological  
3 products and information. Each of the entities described in the model is treated more or less as a  
4 'black box'. Although in practice much local level interaction takes place between extension  
5 agents, farmers and research specialists, the underlying assumption of the model is that farmers  
6 are relatively passive cognitive agents whose own knowledge is to be replaced and improved as  
7 a result of receiving messages and technologies designed by others and communicated to them  
8 by experts (Röling, 1988; Compton, 1989; Eastman and Grieshop, 1989; Lionberger and Gwin,  
9 1991; Blackburn, 1994; Röling and Wagemakers, 1998).

10  
11 The model mirrored the prevailing AKST organizational arrangements of states gaining their  
12 independence in the 1950s and 60s. Many explicitly favored centrally-planned economic  
13 development and most relied heavily on state organizations as the catalyst of agricultural  
14 development and commodity marketing (Hunter, 1969, 1970; Dayal et al., 1976). Extension field  
15 staff were positioned on the lowest rung in a hierarchy of relationships under the direction of  
16 departments of agriculture and publicly funded research stations and universities (Maunder,  
17 1972; Peterson et al., 1989). Social, educational and political biases reinforced the idea that lack  
18 of access to 'modern knowledge' was a constraint to production (Mook, 1974; Morss, et al.,  
19 1976). District development plans and projects to develop cooperatives, farmer service societies  
20 and the like received considerable attention (Halse, 1966; Lele, 1975; Hunter et al., 1976).

21  
22 The ToT model assumes that wide impact is achieved on the basis of autonomous diffusion  
23 processes; this indeed can be so (Rogers, 1962). The classic study of *diffusion of innovations*  
24 was published in 1943 based on the rapid autonomous spread of hybrid maize among farmers in  
25 Iowa (Ryan and Gross, 1943). The diffusion of innovations became a popular subject for  
26 empirical social science research, generating well over 2000 studies and much was learned that  
27 was helpful concerning the conditions in which rapid and widespread diffusion can occur, what  
28 helps and hinders such processes and the limitations of diffusion for achieving impact. Diffusion  
29 research has continued even after the late Everett Rogers (well-known for his classic decadal  
30 overviews of research on the diffusion of innovations) (Rogers, 1962, 1983, 1995, 2003) himself  
31 spoke of the 'passing of a dominant paradigm' (Rogers, 1976). The role of autonomous diffusion  
32 among farmers persists as one of the pillars of the common understanding of the pathways of  
33 science impact. The history of the rapid spread in Africa of exotic crops such as cassava, maize,  
34 beans and cocoa is added testimony to the power of diffusion processes to change the face of  
35 agriculture even without the kinds of scientific involvement of more recent years.

36

1 *The positive impact of the ToT model.* The ToT model gained credibility from the rapid and  
2 widespread adoption of the first products of the Green Revolution (GR) emerging from basic and  
3 strategic research (Jones and Rolls, 1982; Evenson, 1986; Jones, 1986; Evenson and Gollin,  
4 2003). For example, in the poor, populous, irrigated areas of Asia the GR allowed Bangladesh to  
5 move in 25 years from a net importer of rice to self sufficiency while its population grew from 53  
6 million to 115 million (Gill, 1995) and India, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Pakistan to avert major  
7 famine and keep pace with population growth (Repetto, 1994). In China, wheat imports dropped  
8 from 7.2 tonnes in 1994 to 1.9 tonnes in 1997 and by 1997 net rice exports had risen to 1.1  
9 tonnes. The Green Revolution not only increased the supply of locally available staples but also  
10 the demand for farm labor, increasing wage rates and thus the work-based income of the 'dollar-  
11 poor' (Lipton, 2005). National food security in food staples in the high population areas of  
12 developing countries throughout the world was achieved except in sub-Saharan Africa. The diet  
13 of many households changed as more milk, fish and meat became available (Fan et al., 1998).  
14 Investment in industrialized food processing and in agricultural engineering, often stimulated by  
15 heavy government subsidies, in turn began to transform subsistence farming into a business  
16 enterprise and created new employment opportunities in postharvest operations i.e., storage,  
17 milling, marketing and transportation (Sharma and Poleman, 1993). The ToT model clearly  
18 proved fit for the overall purposes of disseminating improved seed, training farmers in simple  
19 practices and input use and disseminating simple messages within the intensive, high external  
20 input production systems characterizing the relatively homogeneous irrigated wheat and rice  
21 environments of South and Southeast Asia. Positive impacts were recorded also in parts of sub-  
22 Saharan Africa (Moris, 1981, 1989; Carr, 1989).

23  
24 *The ToT model's drawbacks with respect to development and sustainability goals.* Criticism of the  
25 ToT model began to emerge strongly in the late 1970s as evidence of negative socioeconomic  
26 and environmental impacts of the GR accumulated (UNRISD, 1975; Freebairn, 1995) leading to  
27 sharp controversies that are still alive today (Collinson, 2000). Sometimes a technology itself was  
28 implicated; in other cases the institutional and economic conditions for using a new technology  
29 effectively and safely were not in place or the services needed for small-scale producers to gain  
30 access to or realize the benefits were inadequate, especially for the resource-poor, the indigent  
31 and the marginalized and women (Hunter, 1970; Roling et al., 1976; Ladejinsky, 1977; Swanson,  
32 1984; Jiggins, 1986). The loss of entitlements to subsistence brought about by changes in the  
33 agricultural sector itself and in societies as a whole; weather-related disasters; civil unrest; and  
34 war also left many millions still vulnerable to malnutrition, hunger, and starvation (Sen, 1981;  
35 Johnson, 1996). The evidence highlighted three areas of concern:

36

1 *Empirical:* The ToT model was shown to be unfit for organizing knowledge processes capable of  
2 impacting heterogeneous environments and farming populations (Hill, 1982) and did not serve the  
3 interests of resource-poor farmers in risky, diverse, drought prone environments (Chambers,  
4 1983). In the absence of measures to address women's technology needs and social condition,  
5 technologies transferred through male-dominated extension services largely by-passed women  
6 farmers and women in farm and laboring households (Hangar and Moris, 1973; Leonard, 1977;  
7 Harriss, 1978; Buvinic and Youssef, 1978; Fortmann, 1979; Bettles, 1980; Dauber and Cain,  
8 1981; Evans, 1981; Deere and de Leal, 1982; Safilios-Rothschild, 1982; Mungate, 1983; Carloni,  
9 1983; IRRI, 1985; Gallin and Spring, 1985; Muzale with Leonard, 1985; Nash and Safa, 1985;  
10 Staudt, 1985; Gallin et al., 1989; Gallin and Ferguson, 1991; Samanta, 1995). In addition, the  
11 improved seeds rapidly displaced much of the genetic diversity in farmers' fields that sustained  
12 local (food) cultures (Howard, 2005) and which had allowed farmers to manage place-dependent  
13 risks (Richards, 1985); the higher use of pest control chemicals in irrigated rice in the tropics had  
14 detrimental effects on beneficial insects, soils and water (Kenmore et al., 1984; Georghiou, 1986;  
15 Gallagher, 1988; Litsinger, 1989) as well as on human health (Whorton et al., 1977; Barsky,  
16 1984). The evidence of negative effects on equity was claimed by some to be a first generation  
17 effect. Analysis of data from the Northern Arcot region of Tamil Nadu, India, indicated that the  
18 differences in yield found between large and small-scale producers in the 1970s had disappeared  
19 by the 1980s (Hazell and Ramaswamy, 1991) but further empirical studies failed to resolve the  
20 extent to which the second generation effects were the result of 'catch up' by later adopters or the  
21 result of smaller farmers having lost their land or migrated out of farming (Niazi, 2004).

22  
23 *Theoretical:* A basic assumption of the ToT model that 'knowledge' can be transferred was shown  
24 to be wrong. It is information and communications about others' knowledge and the products of  
25 knowledge that can be shared (Beal et al., 1986). No one is merely a passive 'receiver' of  
26 information and technology since every one engages in the full range of knowledge processes as  
27 a condition of human survival (Seligman and Hagar, 1972; Maturana and Varela, 1992; Varela et  
28 al., 1993). Information about people's existing knowledge, attitudes and practices was found to be  
29 a poor predictor of their response to new ideas, messages, or technologies because knowledge  
30 processes and behaviors interact with the dynamic of people's immediate environment (Fishbein  
31 and Ajzen, 1975). The organization of processes for generating knowledge that is effective in  
32 action (Cook and Brown, 1999; Hatchuel, 2000; Snowden, 2005) was shown to take many forms.  
33 Where the rights of individuals and communities to be agents in their own development and  
34 considerations of equity, human health, and environmental sustainability were important policy  
35 goals, the comparative advantages of the ToT model also appeared less compelling (Jones and  
36 Rolls, 1982; de Janvry and Dethier, 1985; Swanson, 1984; Jones, 1986).

37

1 *Practical:* The mix of organizational support and services needed to gain maximum impact from  
2 the ToT model often were inadequate, imposed high transaction costs or were not accessible to  
3 the poor and to women (Howell, 1982; Korten and Alfonso, 1983; Ahmed and Ruttan, 1988;  
4 Jiggins, 1989). The positive role of local organizations as intermediaries in rural development was  
5 demonstrated but also the tendency for agricultural services organized along ToT lines to by-pass  
6 these (Esman and Uphoff, 1984). The credit markets introduced to support technology adoption  
7 for instance typically were selective and biased in favor of resource rich regions and individuals  
8 (Howell, 1980; Freebairn, 1995) although pioneering initiatives such as the Grameen Bank in  
9 Bangladesh demonstrated that alternative approaches to the provision of microcredit to poor  
10 producers, women and farm laborers were possible (Yunus, 1982). Institutional analyses  
11 demonstrated how and why ToT arrangements that worked well in one context might fail to  
12 perform as well when introduced into other contexts. A recent authoritative assessment  
13 concludes that after ‘twenty-five years in which agricultural extension received the highest level of  
14 attention it ever attracted on the rural development agenda’ political support for ToT in the form of  
15 ‘relatively uniform packages of investments and extension practices in large state and national  
16 programs’ had disappeared (Anderson et al., 2006).

#### 17 18 2.1.2.2 Other models of knowledge generation and diffusion processes

19 By the early 1970s, empirical studies and better theoretical understanding indicated that better  
20 mental models of knowledge processes were needed to guide practice if broader development  
21 goals were to be reached (Hunter, 1970). The first wave of institutional innovation in the  
22 organization of knowledge processes in non-Communist states sought to make more effective the  
23 process of moving science ‘down the pipeline’ and technologies ‘off the shelf’ by creating  
24 mechanisms and incentives for obtaining feedback from producers so that their local knowledge  
25 and priorities could be taken into account in targeting the specific needs of different categories of  
26 farmers. The *Training and Visit (T&V) approach* is a particularly well known example of this effort  
27 (Benor et al., 1984). Heavily supported by the World Bank and became standard practice in the  
28 majority of noncommunist developing countries. Among other aims it sought to strengthen the  
29 management of diffusion processes by selection of ‘contact’ or ‘leading farmers’ and in some  
30 cases also contact groups. Extension agents report back ‘up the line’ the problems and priorities  
31 of the farmer and farmer groups that they trained during their fortnightly field visits (Benor et al.,  
32 1984). The T&V approach was criticized almost from its inception as an inadequate response to  
33 the widespread evidence of the limitations of ToT approaches (Rivera and Schram, 1987; Howell,  
34 1988; Gentil, 1989; Roberts, 1989). Little remains today of national T&V investments and service  
35 structures (Anderson et al., 2006).

36



1 *Farming systems research and extension (FSRE)* is another well-known response. In this model  
2 feedback came directly through diagnostic surveys carried out by multidisciplinary teams, by farm  
3 level interactions between researchers and farmers in the course of technology design, testing  
4 and adaptation and by the organization of farmer visits to research stations (Rhoades and Booth,  
5 1982; Bawden, 1995; Collinson, 2000). Wide impact in this case was sought by the designation of  
6 farming systems within agroecological ‘recommendation domains’ for which a specific technology  
7 or practice was designed to be effective and profitable. FSRE practitioners explicitly took into  
8 account the contextual conditions that might compromise the effectiveness or profitability of a  
9 problem-solution as well as sociocultural factors such as women’s roles in farming. How well they  
10 managed to do so was disputed (Russell et al., 1989). FSRE produced interesting results but  
11 failed to have wide impact. Although largely abandoned as an institutional arrangement its  
12 influence lived on (Dent and McGregor, 1994) through methodological innovations addressing the  
13 highly differentiated livelihood needs of the rural poor (Dixon and Gibbon, 2001), the stimulus it  
14 gave to re-valuation of the multifunctionality of farming (Pearson and Ison, 1997) and the ways in  
15 which it forged connections across scientific disciplines that endure within the organizational  
16 arrangements of numerous research communities (Engel, 1990).

17  
18 Neither T&V nor FSR-E addressed the institutional challenge of creating ‘the mix’ of support  
19 services necessary for articulating innovation along the chain from producer to consumer  
20 (Lionberger, 1986). In the private commercial sector the production of tea, coffee, palm oil,  
21 rubber, pineapples and similar commodities in the small-scale sector typically used the *core-  
22 estate-without-growers model* to address the challenge (Chambers, 1974; Hunter et al., 1976;  
23 Compton, 1989), positioning producers under contract to supply outputs to a processing facility  
24 that provided inputs and services. The company assumed responsibility for assembling the  
25 scientific and market knowledge required as well as the technology and infrastructure for securing  
26 company profits, drawing largely on knowledge resources in the home country or from within the  
27 company’s international operations. The approach provided reliable income to producers,  
28 employees and companies and through commodity taxes or export levies to governments. It was  
29 criticized for locking small-scale producers into low income contracts. It also proved open to  
30 corruption when applied through government owned Commodity Boards, with profits siphoned off  
31 to intermediaries and elites (Chambers and Howe, 1979; Sinzogan et al., 2007).

32  
33 The challenge was addressed in Communist states by state seizure of the means of production  
34 and by state control of the provision of inputs and services and the distribution of the product. The  
35 scientific knowledge base to support such a high degree of planning was strong. However, the  
36 means chosen within the prevailing ideology to translate knowledge generated at the scientific  
37 level into knowledge that was effective for practice was based on *command and control*. Support

1 to the knowledge processes and experiential capacity of those actually working the land – albeit  
2 under direction of others – was not encouraged. In the exceptional historical experiences of  
3 states such as Cuba (Carney, 1993; Wright, 2005) or Vietnam state-directed knowledge  
4 processes contributed to basic food security but in general the command and control approach  
5 did not prove efficient in generating surplus nor a continuing stream of innovation in agriculture  
6 and became a source of vulnerability for state survival (Gao and Li, 2006). Since the fall of the  
7 Berlin Wall in 1989, the command and control model has been largely abandoned.

8  
9 A parallel wave of innovation in the organizational design of knowledge processes was centered  
10 in producers' own capacity to engage in 'knowledge work' and on the role of local organizations in  
11 meeting development and sustainability goals (Chambers and Howes, 1979; Chambers, 1981).  
12 Models for what became known as Farmer Participatory Research and Extension (FPRE) were  
13 elaborated in practice by drawing on local traditions of association, knowledge generation and  
14 communication. Experience generated under labels such as Participatory Learning and Action  
15 Research, Farmer Research Circles, Community Forestry, Participatory Technology  
16 Development and FAO's People's Participation Program (Haverkort et al., 1991; Scoones and  
17 Thompson, 1994; Ashby, 2003; Coutts et al., 2005; IIRR, 2005) showed that if time is taken to  
18 create effective and honest partnerships in FPRE the results are significant and can offer new  
19 opportunities to socially marginalized communities and those excluded under other knowledge  
20 arrangements. They share a number of generic features *viz.* learner-centered, place dependent,  
21 ecologically informed and use of interactive communication and of facilitation rather than  
22 extension skills (Chambers and Ghildyal, 1985; Ashby, 1986; Farrington and Martin, 1987;  
23 Gamser, 1988; Biggs, 1989; Haverkort et al., 1991; Ashby, 2003). Science and off-the-shelf  
24 technologies are positioned as stores of knowledge and as specialized problem-solving  
25 capacities that can be called upon as needed. An FPRE approach has been used for example in  
26 the development and promotion of on-farm multipurpose tree species in Kenya (Buck, 1990) that  
27 had wide-scale impact and complemented the mobilization of women in tree-planting under the  
28 Green Belt movement (Budd et al., 1990). The development and promotion through farmer-to-  
29 farmer communication and training of a range of soil fertility and erosion control techniques in  
30 Central America similarly was based on an FPRE approach (Bunch and Lopez, 1994; Hocdé et  
31 al., 2000; Hocdé et al., 2002) as were integrated rice-duck farming in Bangladesh (Khan et al.,  
32 2005) and the testing and adaptation of agricultural engineering prototypes by farmer members of  
33 the Kondomin Group network in Australia. Nongovernment organizations (NGOs), community-  
34 based organizations (CBOs), universities and the Consultative Group on International Agriculture  
35 Research (CGIAR) played key roles in elaborating effective practice and supporting local FPRE  
36 initiatives (Lumbreras, 1992; Dolberg and Petersen, 1997; IIRR, 1996, 2005).

37

1 *Participatory Plant Breeding* (PPB) is a particular adaptation of FPRE: its client-oriented  
2 interactive approach to demand-driven research has been shown to be particularly effective for  
3 grains, beans and roots (de Boef et al., 1993; Sperling et al., 1993; Farrington and Witcombe,  
4 1998; CIAT, 2001; Fukuda and Saad, 2001; Chiwona-Karlton, 2001; Mkumbira, 2002; Ceccarelli  
5 et al., 2002; Witcombe et al., 2003; Virk et al., 2005). It is a flexible strategy for generating  
6 populations, pure lines and mixes of pure lines in self-pollinated crops as well as hybrids,  
7 populations, and synthetics in cross-pollinated crops. Biodiversity is maintained or enhanced  
8 because different varieties are selected at different locations (Joshi et al., 2001; Ceccarelli et al.,  
9 2001ab). Recent assessments of over 250 participatory plant breeding projects in over 50  
10 countries in Latin America, Europe, south and southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa led by  
11 farmers, NGOs or by national or international researchers or some mix of these actors (Atlin,  
12 Cooper, and Bjornstad, 2001; Joshi et al., 2001; Cleveland and Soleri, 2002; Ashby and Lilja,  
13 2004; Almekinders and Hardon, 2006; Mangione, 2006; Ceccarelli and Grando, 2007; Joshi et al.,  
14 2007) demonstrate that PPB is a cost-effective practice that is best viewed along a continuum of  
15 plant breeding effort. French researchers, e.g., are working with marker-assisted selection to  
16 develop virus resistant rice varieties for Central America and the Cameroon in the context of PPB  
17 activities ([www.ird.fr/actualites/2006/fas247.pdf](http://www.ird.fr/actualites/2006/fas247.pdf)). GIS and satellite-based imaging are adding  
18 additional value to PPB activities.

19

20 While over 8000 improved varieties of food grains with wide adaptability have been released over  
21 a 40-yr period by the CGIAR institutes (Evenson and Gollin, 2003), PPB has shown capacity to  
22 generate multiples of this output for target environments, specific problems and the needs of  
23 farmers over-looked by conventional breeding efforts. The three major differences of PPB  
24 compared to conventional breeding are that testing and selection take place on the farm instead  
25 of on-station; the key decisions are taken jointly by farmers and breeders; the process can be  
26 independently implemented in a large number of locations. The activity incorporates also seed  
27 production with farmers multiplying promising breeding material in village-based seed production  
28 systems. The assessments highlights also the improved research efficiencies and program  
29 effectiveness gained by faster progress toward seed release and the focus on the multiplication of  
30 varieties known to be farmer-acceptable. Decentralized selection in target environments for  
31 specific adaptations allows women's seed preferences to be addressed (Sperling et al., 1993;  
32 Ashby and Lilja, 2004; Almekinders and Hardon, 2006). Sustained PPB activity has the additional  
33 advantage of bringing about the progressive empowerment of individual farmers and farmer  
34 communities (Almekinders and Hardon, 2006; Ceccarelli and Grando, 2007). However, the  
35 tightening of UPOV regulations and the increasing trend toward seed patenting and IPR over  
36 genetic material has given rise to concern (Walker, 2007) that despite PPB's demonstrated

1 advantages in a wide variety of contexts and for multiple purposes the space for PPB may be  
2 closing.

3  
4 As the case of PPB shows, wider scale impact in the case of FPRE relies on the replication of  
5 numerous initiatives in response to specific markets and non-market demands rather than on  
6 supply-push and diffusion of messages or technologies, although diffusion processes can and do  
7 amplify the outcomes of FPRE. The process of replication can be strengthened through  
8 investment in farmer-to-farmer networking (Van Mele and Salahuddin, 2005), support to farmer  
9 driven chain development (as in poultry or dairy chains serving local markets) and in the creation  
10 of 'learning alliances' among support organizations that aim to promote shared learning at  
11 societal scales (Pretty, 1994; Lightfoot et al., 2002). FPRE has proved to be cost-effective and fit  
12 for the purposes of meeting integrated development and sustainability goals (Bunch, 1982;  
13 Hyman, 1992) and for natural resource management (NRM) in agrarian landscapes (Campbell,  
14 1992, 1994; Hilhorst and Muchena, 2000; CGIAR, 2000; Stroosnijder and van Rheenen, 2001;  
15 Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 2004). However, it has been criticized for failing in specific cases to  
16 take advantage of the 'best' science and technology available, as self-indulgent by supporting  
17 farm systems that some consider insufficiently productive to provide surplus to feed the world's  
18 growing urban populations; as sometimes misreading the gender power dynamics of local  
19 communities (Guijt and Shah, 1998) and as incapable of involving a sufficient number of small-  
20 scale producers (Biggs, 1995; Richards, 1995; Cooke and Kothari, 2001). NGOs and community-  
21 based organizations have raised issues of equity. It also been criticized as too locally focused  
22 (see critiques of Australia's Landcare experience in Lockie and Vanclay, 1997; Woodhill, 1999)  
23 and thus unable to address higher level economic and governance constraints and tradeoffs. This  
24 criticism has prompted recent institutional experimentation with applying FPRE under catchment  
25 scale regional development authorities (Australia) and in sustainable water development (South  
26 Africa and Europe) (Blackmore et al., 2007) within normative policy frameworks that explicitly  
27 seek the sustainability of both human activity and agroecologies.

28  
29 Innovations in the organization of knowledge processes also occurred in relation to farmer-  
30 developed traditions of agroecological farming (e.g. Fukuoka, 1978; Dupré, 1991; Gonzales,  
31 1999; Furuno, 2001), gathering and domestication of wild foods and non-timber forest products  
32 (Scoones et al., 1992; Martin, 1995) and landscape management (Fairhead and Leach, 1996) .  
33 For example migrants from the Susu community first encountered the rice-growing ethnic  
34 Balantes in Guinea Bissau around 1920; later on, the Susu (and the related Baga peoples) hired  
35 migrant Balantes to carry out rice cultivation in the brackish waters of coastal Guinea Conakry  
36 where the skills are now recognized as traditional knowledge (Sow, 1992; Penot, 1994).

37

1 Indigenous technologies of long-standing include the use of Golden Weaver ants as a biocontrol  
2 in citrus and mango orchards (Bhutan, Vietnam and more recently, with WARDA's assistance,  
3 introduced to West Africa); stone lines and planting pits for water harvesting and conservation of  
4 soil moisture (West African savannah belt); *qanats* and similar underground water storage and  
5 irrigation techniques (Iran, Afghanistan and other arid areas); tank irrigation (India, Sri Lanka);  
6 and many aspects of agroforestry, e.g., rubber, cinnamon, and damar agroforests in Indonesia.  
7 Over the years they have supported wildlife and biodiversity and rich cultural developments.

8

9 It is this continuing *indigenous capacity for place-based innovation* that has been almost entirely  
10 responsible for the initial bringing together of the science, knowledge and technology  
11 arrangements for what have become over time certified systems of agroecological farming such  
12 as organic farming, confusingly known also as biological or ecoagriculture; (Badgely et al., 2007)  
13 and variants such as permaculture (Mollison, 1988; Holmgren, 2002). Systems such as these are  
14 knowledge-intensive, tend to use less or no externally supplied synthetic inputs and seek to  
15 generate healthy soils and crops through sustainable management of agroecological cycles  
16 within the farm or by exchange among neighboring farms. Although there is considerable  
17 variation in the extent to which the actors in diverse settings initially drew on formal science and  
18 knowledge, as the products have moved onto local, national, and international markets under  
19 various certification schemes the relationships between formal AKST actors and producer  
20 organizations have become stronger along the entire chain from seed production to marketing  
21 (Badgely et al., 2007). A distinctive feature in these arrangements is the role of specialist farmers  
22 in producing certified seed on behalf of or as members of producer organizations.

23

24 The relative lack of firm evidence of the sustainability and productivity of these kinds of certified  
25 systems in different settings and the variability of findings from different contexts allows  
26 proponents and critics to hold entrenched positions about their present and potential value  
27 (Bindraban and Rabbinge, 2005; Tripp, 2005; Tripp, 2006a). However, recent comprehensive  
28 assessments conclude that although these systems have limitations, better use of local  
29 resources in small scale agriculture can improve productivity and generate worthwhile innovations  
30 (Tripp, 2006b) and agroecological/organic farming can achieve high production efficiencies on a  
31 per area basis and high energy use efficiencies and that on both these criteria they may  
32 outperform conventional industrial farming (Pimentel et al., 2005; Sligh and Christman, 2006;  
33 Badgely et al., 2007). Despite having lower labor efficiencies than (highly mechanized) industrial  
34 farming and experiencing variable economic efficiency, latest calculations indicate a capability of  
35 producing enough food on a per capita basis to provide between 2,640 to 4,380 kilocalories/per  
36 person/per day (depending on the model used) to the current world population (Badgely et al,  
37 2007). Their higher labor demand compared to conventional farming can be considered an

1 advantage where few alternative employment opportunities exist. Organic agriculture as a  
2 certified system by 2006 was in commercial practice on 31 million ha in 120 countries and  
3 generating US \$40 billion per year.

4  
5 Innovations with comparable goals but originating in private commercial experience (Unilever,  
6 2005) or in the context of partnerships among a range of farmers' organizations, public and  
7 private commercial enterprises by the mid 1990s were reported with increasing frequency  
8 (Grimble and Wellard, 1996). The Northwest Area Foundation experience in the USA (Northwest  
9 Area Foundation, 1995), the New Zealand dairy industry (Paine et al., 2000) or farming and  
10 wildlife advisory groups in the UK are among the numerous compelling examples of an emerging  
11 practice. They indicate a convergence of experience toward a range of options for bringing  
12 multifunctional agriculture into widespread practice in diverse settings by working with farmer-  
13 participatory approaches in combination with advanced science solutions (Zoundi et al., 2001;  
14 Rickert, 2004).

15  
16 The *continuing role of traditional and local knowledge in AKST* for most of the world's small-scale  
17 producers in generating innovations that sustain individuals and communities also merits  
18 highlighting. Indigenous knowledge (IK) is a term without exact meaning but it is commonly taken  
19 to refer to locally bound knowledge that is indigenous to a specific area and embedded in the  
20 culture, cosmology and activities of particular peoples. Indigenous knowledge processes tend to  
21 be nonformal (even if systematic and rigorous), dynamic and adaptive. Information about such  
22 knowledge is usually orally transmitted but also codified in elaborate written and visual materials  
23 or artifacts and relates closely to the rhythms of life and institutional arrangements that govern  
24 local survival and wellbeing (Warren and Rajasekaran, 1993; Darré, 1999; Hounkonnou, 2001).  
25 Indigenous and local knowledge actors are not necessarily isolated in their experience but  
26 actively seek out and incorporate information about the knowledge and technology of others (van  
27 Veldhuizen et al., 1997). Sixty years' ago such knowledge processes were neglected except by a  
28 handful of scholars. From the 1970s onwards a range of international foundations, NGOs,  
29 national NGOs and CBOs began working locally to support IK processes and harness these in  
30 the cause of sustainable agricultural modernization, social justice and the livelihoods of the  
31 marginalized (IIRR, 1996; Boven and Mordhashi, 2002). Much more is known today about the  
32 institutional arrangements that govern the production of IK in farming (Colchester, 1994; Howard,  
33 2003; Balasubramanian and Nirmala Devi, 2006). Poverty and hunger persist at local levels and  
34 among indigenous peoples and this indeed may arise from inadequacies in the knowledge  
35 capacity of rural people or the technology available but field studies of knowledge processes of  
36 indigenous peoples, their empirical traditions of enquiry and technology generation capabilities  
37 (Gonzales, 1999) establish that that these also can be highly effective at both farm (Brouwers,

1 1993; Song, 1998; Hounkounou, 2001) and landscape scales (Tiffen et al., 1994; Darré, 1995). IK  
2 related to agriculture and natural resource management is assessed today as a valuable  
3 individual and social asset that contributes to the larger public interest (Reij et al., 1996; Reij and  
4 Waters-Bayer, 2001; World Bank, 2006) and likely to be even more needed under mitigation of  
5 and adaptation to climate change effects.

6  
7 However, empirical research shows how economic drivers originating in larger systems of interest  
8 tend to undermine the autarchic gains made at local levels or to block further development and  
9 upscaling (Stoop, 2002; Unver, 2005; van Huis et al., 2007). A major challenge to IK and more  
10 broadly to FPRE over the last few decades has been the emergence of IPR regimes (Hardon et  
11 al., 2005) (see 2.3.1) that so far do not adequately protect or recognize individual farmers' and  
12 communities' ongoing and historic contributions to knowledge creation and technology  
13 development or their rights to the products and germplasm created and sustained under their  
14 management. Even so, innovative ways forward can be found: formal breeders and commercial  
15 organizations in the globally important Dutch potato industry cooperate with Dutch potato hobby  
16 specialists in breeding and varietal selection; farmers negotiate formal contracts which give them  
17 recognition and reward for their intellectual contribution in all varieties brought to market.

18  
19 The inequities in access and benefit sharing under the various protocols and conventions  
20 negotiated at international levels have given rise to a strong civil society response (2.2.1; 2.2.3)  
21 reflected in the Declaration on Indigenous Peoples' rights to genetic resources and IK - a  
22 collective statement on an international regime on access and benefit sharing issued by the  
23 indigenous peoples and organizations meeting at the Sixth Session of the United Nations  
24 Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, in New York on 14-25 May, 2007 (ICPB-Net Indigenous  
25 Peoples' Council on Biocolonialism, <http://lists.ipcb.org/listinfo.cgi/ipcb-net-ipcb.org>). Recent  
26 experience with the development of enforceable rights for collective innovations (Salazar et al.,  
27 2007) offers ground for evolution of currently dominant IPRs. There are new concerns that clean  
28 development mechanisms (CDMs), international payments for environmental services or  
29 payments for avoided deforestation and/or degradation will over-ride the rights of indigenous  
30 people's and local communities.

31  
32 The final model considered here is by far the most dominant model of knowledge processes  
33 associated with commercial innovation in the private sector, *the chain-linked model* (Kline and  
34 Rosenberg, 1986). A distinctive feature is the effort made throughout every stage of product  
35 development to obtain feedback from markets and end users (Blokker et al., 1990); it is demand-  
36 driven rather than supply-push. It has given significant impulse to the development of market  
37 economies wherever the enabling conditions exist but has had little to offer where science

1 organizations have remained weak and consumer markets are unable to articulate monetary  
2 demand – as in fact has been the case for much of the period among the rural and urban poor  
3 and especially among women and other marginalized peoples.

4  
5 The recent emphasis among policy makers on developing market-oriented and market-led  
6 opportunities along entire value chains for small-scale producers and other rural people (DFID  
7 2002, 2005; NEPAD, 2002; IAC, 2004; FAO, 2005c; UN Millennium Project, 2005; World Bank,  
8 2005; OECD, 2006) has created wider interest in the model as a platform where diverse actors in  
9 public-private partnerships can find each other and organize their respective roles. Today it is  
10 being extended with varying energy mainly in the 'new consumer economies' i.e. countries with  
11 populations over 20 million (Argentina, Brazil, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia,  
12 Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea,  
13 Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Venezuela). However, evidence of the extent to which small-scale  
14 producers can participate effectively, if at all, in these arrangements in the absence of strong  
15 producers' organizations (Reardon et al., 2003) and of the impact on knowledge management  
16 (Spielman and Grebner, 2004; Glasbergen et al., 2007) has shown that the interests of private  
17 research and public-private partners may diverge from the combined public interest goals of  
18 equity, sustainability and productivity. Holding on to benefits may be difficult for employees and  
19 national research systems in globalizing markets as the recent rapid switch of a number of  
20 commercial cut flower operations from Kenya to Ethiopia illustrates, while global retailers' ability  
21 to determine price, quality, delivery and indirectly also labor conditions for suppliers and  
22 producers in the chain means that the burdens of competition may be transferred to those least  
23 able to sustain them (Harilal et al., 2006).

#### 24 25 2.1.3.1. New challenges and opportunities.

26 Transfer of technology has become important in recent years as a means of shifting technological  
27 opportunity and knowledge among private commercial actors located in different parts of the  
28 world and through science networks that stretch across geographic boundaries. It continues to  
29 guide practice as a means of promoting farm level change in what are still large public sector  
30 systems in countries such as China (Samanta and Arora, 1997). However, increasingly ToT has  
31 to find its place in an organizationally fragmented and complex context that emphasizes demand-  
32 driven rather than supply-push arrangements (Rivera, 1996; Leeuwis and van den Ban, 2004;  
33 Ekwamu and Brown, 2005). The shift toward contracting or other forms of privatization of  
34 research, extension and advisory services in an increasing number of countries (Rivera and  
35 Gustafson, 1991; Byerlee and Echeverria, 2002; Rivera and Zijp, 2002; van den Ban and  
36 Samantha, 2006) is an effort to re-organize the division of power among different players in  
37 AKST. In the process the central state is losing much of its ability to direct technological choice



1 and the organization of knowledge processes. The effects and the desirability in different contexts  
2 of altering the balance between public and private arrangements remain under debate as the  
3 expanding diversity of financing and organizational arrangements has not yet been fully assessed  
4 (Allegrì, 2002; Heemskerk and Wennink, 2005; Pardey et al., 2006a).

5  
6 Decentralization and devolution of development-related governance powers from central to more  
7 local levels in an increasing number of developing countries has opened the space for many  
8 more instances of FPR&E in an increasingly diverse array of partnerships that are not easy to  
9 classify and demand new frames of understanding (Dorward et al., 1998; AJEA, 2000). At the  
10 same time, the push for export-oriented agriculture and in an increasing number of countries, the  
11 strong growth in domestic consumer demand has opened the space for the chain-linked model to  
12 be expressed more widely and with deeper penetration into small-scale farming communities. In  
13 addition, the ‘core estate-with-out-growers’ model has taken on new life as international food  
14 processors and retailers contract organized producer associations to produce to specification.  
15 The partnership between IFAD and the Kenya Tea Development Authority to introduce  
16 sustainable production techniques to small-scale outgrowers by means of Field Schools is a  
17 strong example of how changing values in consuming countries can have positive knock-on  
18 effects for the poor. Some models are more fit than others for meeting development and  
19 sustainability goals (Table 2-2).

20  
21         INSERT Table 2-2. Characteristics of models of knowledge processes in relation to fitness  
22 for purpose.

23  
24 The growing recognition of the complexity of knowledge processes and relations among a  
25 multiplicity of diverse actors has led to renewed attention to the role of *information and*  
26 *communication processes* (Rogers and Kincaid, 1981). All parties in communication play roles of  
27 “senders” and “receivers,” “encoders” and “decoders,” of information but communication typically  
28 is neither neutral nor symmetric: empirical studies demonstrate the extent to which social, cultural  
29 and political factors determine whose voices are heard and listened to (Holland and Blackburn,  
30 1998). The history of the last sixty years may be read in part as a history of struggle to get the  
31 voices of the poor, of women and other marginalized people heard in the arenas where science  
32 and technology decisions are made (Leach et al., 2005; IDS, 2006).

33  
34 By the 1980s the technologies of the digital age began to revolutionize the ability to obtain and  
35 disseminate information. Computer communication technologies and mobile telephony are  
36 becoming available to populations in developing countries (ITU, 2006). Mobile telephony by end  
37 2006 had become a US\$ 25 billion industry across Africa and the Middle East and Indian

1 operators were signing up 6.6 million new subscribers a month. In the last five years low cost  
2 mobile telephony has begun to over-take computer-based technology as the platform for  
3 information-sharing and communication. For the first time, poor producers in remote places no  
4 longer have to remain isolated from market actors or to rely on bureaucrats or commercial  
5 middlemen for timely market information (Lio and Meng-Chun, 2006). Initiatives such as TradeNet  
6 (Ghana) connect buyers and sellers across more than ten countries in Africa and Trade at Hand  
7 provides daily price information to vegetable and fruit exporters in Burkina Faso and Senegal.

8  
9 The new ICTs are also opening up formal education opportunities, ranging from basic literacy and  
10 numeracy courses to advanced academic, vocational and professional training. Free on-line  
11 libraries (e.g., IDRIS) and new institutional arrangements offer potential for further innovation in  
12 knowledge processes. For instance, the Digital Doorway, a robust portable computer platform  
13 with free software for downloading information, is being initiated at schools and community  
14 forums throughout southern Africa by Syngenta and the University of Pretoria to support locally  
15 adapted curricula for Schools in the Field covering a range of crops, animals, poultry, small rural  
16 agroenterprises and soil and water management. Insufficient information is available as yet to  
17 make robust assessments of these trends but the early evidence is that their impact may be at  
18 least as important as technologies originating within AKST development. Nonetheless, the rate of  
19 expansion of access to modern ICTs continues to be much greater in developed than developing  
20 countries and among urban more than rural populations, raising concerns about how to avoid  
21 ICTs reinforcing existing patterns of inequality (Gao and Li, 2006). The history of broadcast radio  
22 suggests that over time the “digital divide” may become narrower. Issues of the quality and  
23 relevance of the information available are likely to become more important than those of access  
24 and ability to use the technology.

### 25 26 **2.1.3 Science processes**

27 Science processes are those involved in the creation and dissemination of scientific knowledge;  
28 including processes within the scientific community and interactions between scientific  
29 communities and other actors. Members of a scientific community are defined here as those who  
30 are principally involved as professional actors in such activities as pre-analytic theorizing,  
31 problem identification, hypothesis formulation and testing through various designs and  
32 procedures (such as mathematical modeling, experimentation or field study), data collection,  
33 analysis and data processing and critical validation through peer review and publication, i.e.  
34 activities commonly viewed as core practices of scientists.

35  
36 Intellectual investment in these activities by individual scientists is driven in part by human  
37 motivations such as curiosity and the pleasure of puzzle-solving but also by the structure of

1 professional incentives that encourages - even demands - that scientists pay closer attention to  
2 obtaining the recognition of their work by peers in the scientific community rather than by other  
3 segments of society. However, scientific institutions cannot ignore the preoccupations and  
4 knowledge wielded by other actors (Girard and Navarette, 2005) and in other societal forums.  
5 This is particularly obvious in the case of agriculture; no matter the science involved in the origin  
6 and initial development of an idea, to be effective it has to become an applied science with  
7 potential for wide impact whose results are visible to all in the form of changes in agricultural  
8 landscapes. Thus it is unsurprising that opinions and drivers outside the domain of science itself  
9 condition science for agriculture. This tension between the incentives faced by individual  
10 scientists and the societal demands placed on scientific institutions in agriculture has been  
11 growing in recent decades, posing a strong challenge for the governance of scientific institutions  
12 (Lubchenco, 1998).

#### 14 2.1.3.1 Cultures of science

15 Agricultural science processes in our period have been associated with the cultures of thought  
16 distinguished by two intellectual domains known respectively as 'positivist realism' and  
17 'constructivism'. The positivist realist understanding of modern science as a neutral, universal,  
18 and value-free explanatory system has dominated the processes of scientific inquiry in agriculture  
19 for the period under review. The basic assumptions are that reality exists independently of the  
20 human observer (realism), and can be described and explained in its basic constitution  
21 (positivism). This mind set is legitimate for the work that professional scientists do and enables  
22 transparent and rigorous tests of truth to guide their work. However, others (Kuhn, 1970;  
23 Prigogine and Stengers, 1979; Bookchin, 1990; Latour, 2004) have found this scheme  
24 problematic for explaining causality in their own disciplines for a number of reasons: it appears to  
25 exclude the qualitative (even if quantitative) ambiguous and highly contextualized interpretations  
26 that human subjects give to the meaning of reality and it does not allow sufficiently for the  
27 unpredictability of the social effects of any intervention nor for the reflexive nature of social  
28 interactions (the object of enquiry never stabilizes; learning that something has happened  
29 changes decisions about what actions to take, in an unending dance of co-causality). This  
30 difference in legitimate perspective provides a partial explanation of why 'the history' of the last  
31 sixty or so years cannot stabilize around a single authoritative causal interpretation of what has  
32 happened.

34 For scientists working within positive realist traditions the locus of scientific knowledge generation  
35 is largely confined to public and private universities, independent science institutions and  
36 laboratories and to an increasing extent corporate research and development (R&D) facilities.  
37 These offer the conditions for highly specialized expertise to be applied to study of immutable

1 laws governing phenomena that allow for prediction and control. Technology is conceived in this  
2 logic as applied science, i.e. as a design solution developed by experts removed from the site of  
3 application. The main task of the agricultural sciences in this perspective thus becomes that of  
4 developing the best technical solutions to carefully described problems (Gibbons et al. 1994;  
5 Röling, 2004). The problem description can and often does include scientists' understanding of  
6 environmental and social dimensions.

7  
8 The paradigm of positive realism has attracted large-scale support for public and private science  
9 institutions as a way of thinking about and organizing innovation in tropical agriculture. It was  
10 harnessed to the expectation of maximizing yields and compensating for shortfalls in the quantity  
11 or quality of the biotic and abiotic factors of production by the provision of supplementary inputs,  
12 such as fertilizers and services to improve the productivity of labor and land. As such this  
13 paradigm lies at the heart of what is often called 'productivism', a doctrine of agricultural  
14 modernization giving primary emphasis to increased productivity rather than the multifunctionality  
15 of agriculture or to the role of agriculture in rural development. It has constituted for much of the  
16 period under review a primary justification for science investments for development (Evenson et  
17 al., 1979).

18  
19 The dominance of this paradigm has had notable institutional consequences. University  
20 agricultural faculties progressively became divided into highly specialized departments. This split  
21 created 'knowledge silos' that reflected the increasing specialization of scientific disciplines that  
22 reduced agriculture as an integrated practice into smaller and smaller fractions that largely  
23 excluded the human manager. This reductionism made it harder to mobilize multidisciplinary  
24 teams to address more complex problems or (Bentley, 1994) and was consistent with the  
25 increasing specialization in modern farm sectors, developing countries and the social sciences.

26  
27 More inclusive and integrated science practices began to emerge from the 1970s onwards  
28 (Werge, 1978; Agarwal, 1979; Izuno, 1979; Biggs, 1980, 1982; Rhoades, 1982; Biggs, 1983). The  
29 drivers for this included the emergence of gender studies and women in agricultural development  
30 projects (Jiggins, 1984; Appleton, 1995; Doss and McDonald, 1999); the impact studies,  
31 analyses, and evaluations commissioned through the reporting cycles of the UN Human  
32 Development agency and the FAO's Food and Hunger reports that showed the persistence of  
33 widespread hunger, rural unemployment and food insecurity for vulnerable populations; and  
34 studies of the land degradation, water pollution, and loss of flora or fauna species associated with  
35 narrow technological interventions. (Repetto, 1985; Loevinsohn, 1987; Repto et al., 1989;  
36 Repetto, 1990). The growing experience of alternative ways of mobilizing science capacity (noted  
37 in 2.1.2 -2.1.4) complemented these efforts and stimulated a more critical reflection within

1 scientific communities (ODI, 1994) on the governance of agricultural science and the  
2 accountability of science as a source of innovation not only for 'success' but also for 'failure' in  
3 agricultural development. Institutional responses included the creation around 1995 of a system-  
4 wide program on gender analysis and participatory research within the CGIAR and the beginning  
5 of the sustained long term research that fed into the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA,  
6 2005). The ethical and political questions posed by scientific and technological choices stimulated  
7 the spread and more rigorous use of ethics committees to address a broader range of societal  
8 considerations and renewed efforts to bring together the natural, technical and social sciences.  
9 This often involved the creation of specialist cross-disciplinary organizational units charged with  
10 the task of integration around selected themes and of new knowledge networks.

11  
12 Scientists trained to specialize often struggled to understand their role in these arrangements. A  
13 different paradigm, constructivism, offered a sound epistemological base for the kinds of  
14 interactive and integrative work that challenged scientists as professionals to think about  
15 themselves and their work in new ways. The epistemological position of constructivism is that  
16 reality and knowledge are actively created through social relationships and through interactions  
17 between people and their environment. These relationships and interactions are seen as affecting  
18 the ways in which scientific knowledge is produced, organized and validated (Schütz, 1964;  
19 Berger and Luckmann, 1966). An authoritative overview of empirical research studies (Biggs and  
20 Farrington, 1991) robustly demonstrated the ways in which institutional and political factors  
21 affected both the conduct of agricultural science and the translation of research results into  
22 farming practices. An important distinction became more widely understood: i.e. between  
23 knowledge as a lived experience of inquiry and hence transient and continuously re-created and  
24 knowledge products that can be stabilized (e.g., in journal articles, technologies, artifacts and in  
25 the norms of organizational behavior) and shared and under the right conditions, will diffuse. It  
26 opened the door to science not only as a *source* of innovation but as potentially a *co-creator of*  
27 *knowledge* in processes of enquiry shared with other actors (Borrini-Feyerabend, et al., 2004).

28  
29 Collaboration among science disciplines tended to assume one of three forms: combining  
30 multiple disciplines in a single study; to a variable extent dissolving disciplinary boundaries in  
31 purposive learning from each others' disciplines and non-science actors; and transdisciplinary  
32 effort that actively sought to build new frames of meaning and understanding (Fig. 2-2). The  
33 founding precepts of General Systems Theory, introduced by the biologist von Bertalanffy in 1950  
34 informed these efforts, especially from the 1970s onwards (Spedding, 1975; Cox and Atkins,  
35 1979; Altieri, 1987). Strong interdisciplinary collaboration in developing systemic approaches to  
36 agroecology occurred throughout the world in the 1980s, often led by NGOs. The boundaries  
37 expanded to include on-farm fisheries, the role of wild and semi-domesticated foods and

1 medicines (Scoones et al., 1992), forests and non-timber forest products (Ball, Carl, and Del  
2 Lungo, 2005). The agricultural sciences were newly positioned at the interface of two complex  
3 and complementary systems: natural and social systems. Translation of this understanding into  
4 practice nonetheless faced strong barriers within the scientific community and from market  
5 specialization and the dominance of economic drivers over social and ecological sustainability  
6 concerns.

7  
8 **INSERT Fig. 2-2. Modes of science.**

9  
10 2.1.3.2 A changing contract between science and society

11 In the immediate post World War II period in what later became grouped as OECD countries  
12 there was a tacit understanding between science and society that what was good for science was  
13 good for humanity and that science would deliver solutions to societal problems. The output  
14 response in OECD agricultures and under the Green Revolution's early successes in Asia and  
15 then Latin America consolidated this view and led over time to significantly higher national  
16 investments in AKST and science in general. The less strong impacts experienced in sub-  
17 saharan Africa (Beintema and Stads, 2006) reflected both the weakness of the scientific  
18 infrastructures and personnel around the time of independence and the overall economic and  
19 social conditions of the time, leading to a prolonged period of donor investment to strengthen  
20 capacity (see Chapter 8). Although a few 'islands of success' were created the lack of sustained  
21 national investments meant that the capacity for science and technology development at the  
22 university, research institute or enterprise level in most of sub-Saharan Africa by the 1990s had  
23 fallen to an exceptionally low level (Eisemon, 1986; Eisemon and Davis, 1992; Gaillard and  
24 Waast, 1992). Recent renewed efforts by African leaders to build a stronger contract between  
25 their societies and science have not yet translated into adequate national investments in their  
26 own science base.

27  
28 Over time science as a human activity began to be viewed more critically as the increasing  
29 reliance on science and technology to drive national economic growth progressively revealed also  
30 the technical risks of scientific development. This view resulted in a growing public mistrust in  
31 some countries concerning the effectiveness of science as the unqualified promoter of the public  
32 good, (Nelkin, 1975; Calvora, 1988; Gieryn, 1995; BAAS, 1999) although in others, such as  
33 Sweden, public confidence in science has remained high. For example, public concerns,  
34 themselves informed by science, surfaced for instance concerning the impact of synthetic  
35 chemicals on other species, human health and the environment. As these issues began to figure  
36 more strongly in agricultural and food science research priorities (Byerlee and Alex, 1998)  
37 science began to occupy an ambiguous position as a supplier of the objective knowledge needed

1 to generate new kinds of formal knowledge and technology as well as that needed to identify and  
2 measure risks and the evidence of harm that applications of knowledge and technology might  
3 cause in particular conditions of use; science as a human activity thus became implicated in  
4 societal controversies (Nash, 1989; Brimblecombe and Pfister, 1993; Gottlieb, 1993; Sale, 1993;  
5 Shiva, 2000; Maathai, 2003). It experienced both optimistic support from the public about its  
6 potential social utility and loss of credibility when it was found in specific instances to have  
7 produced unintended or undesirable results. At the same time, the lines between public good  
8 science, not for profit science and science carried out for commercial gain began to blur as the  
9 public sector in many countries began to yield its role as a direct supplier and the private  
10 commercial sector emerged as a major source of funding for agricultural science and technology  
11 development.

12  
13 The imbalance between science investments, infrastructures and staffing in OECD countries  
14 compared to tropical countries (UNESCO, 1993; Annerstedt, 1994) for much of the period meant  
15 that ‘science’s contract with society’ for the goals of international agricultural development and  
16 sustainability had to be mobilized with the support of OECD country electorates. That is, the  
17 resources had to be mobilized by appeals to values and interests of people distanced from those  
18 experiencing the effects. This process stimulated the growth of civil society and NGOs working on  
19 international development and the introduction of the broader concerns of citizens into the  
20 science agenda. As science institutions by the 1990s in the poorest developing countries became  
21 heavily dependent on foreign funding and foreign training opportunities the concerns of donors  
22 tended to drive their agendas. Other countries such as Brazil, South Africa, China and India  
23 identified S&T as key drivers of their own economic development while giving relatively lower  
24 attention specifically to the agricultural sciences. Private commercial investment in science  
25 tended to concentrate on technologies such as food preservation and processing, pest control  
26 technologies, feed stuffs, veterinary products and more recently also on transgenic crops for  
27 which profits could be more easily captured (Clive, 1999); under competitive commercial  
28 pressures the concerns of better-off consumers and urban residents also began to influence the  
29 AKST agenda.

30  
31 As a consequence of these complex inter-weaving trends, public support for international  
32 agricultural development and sustainability was and remains peculiarly susceptible to crises (EC,  
33 2001; 2005). These include crises in intensive agricultures, in the public mind in Europe  
34 associated with ‘the silent spring’ (Carson, 1962) or diseases such as BSE (bovine spongiform  
35 encephalopathy - “mad cow disease”) and more recently the risks of the spread of avian flu to the  
36 intensive poultry industries of Europe and beyond. The actual or potential human health  
37 consequences provided an extra emotional dimension. Environmental crises, such as the drying

1 of Lake Aral through diversion of its waters to feed the Soviet Union's cotton farming or the  
2 unsustainable use of surface and groundwater in irrigated farming in the southwest of the United  
3 States or in the Punjab or crises of acute hunger and starvation, drought or flooding similarly  
4 brought the agricultural sciences into question. Fear of the unknown and suspicion of the  
5 concentration of ownership in commodity trading, food industries and input supply (Tallontire and  
6 Vorley, 2005) and increasing private control over new opportunities in agriculture arising from  
7 advances within science (WRI/UNEP/WBCSD, 2002) also fed into public concerns. The first  
8 generation technologies resulting from genomics e.g., raised concerns about the risks of  
9 increased spread of known allergens, toxins or other harmful compounds, and horizontal gene  
10 transfer particularly of antibiotic-resistant genes and unintended effects (Ruan and Sonnino,  
11 2006). An important consequence is that demand has grown for stronger accountability, stricter  
12 regulation and publicly funded evaluation systems to determine objectively the benefits of new  
13 sciences and technologies.

14  
15 Today in many industrialized countries an increasing percentage of the funding for university  
16 science comes from private commercial sources. It tends to be concentrated in areas of  
17 commercial interest or in advanced sciences such as satellite imaging, nanotechnologies and  
18 genomics rather than in applications deeply informed by knowledge of farming practice and  
19 ecological contexts. License agreements with universities may include a benefit sharing  
20 mechanism that releases funds for public interest research but product development, especially  
21 the trials needed to satisfy regulatory authorities, is expensive and companies (as well as  
22 universities) need to recover costs. Hence a condition of funding often is that the source of funds  
23 determines who is assigned first patent rights on faculty research results. In some cases the right  
24 to publication and the uninhibited exchange of information among scholars are also restricted.  
25 The assumption under these arrangements that scientific knowledge is a private good changes  
26 radically the relationships within the scientific community and between that community and its  
27 diverse partners

28

#### 29 ***2.1.4 Technology and innovation processes***

30 The relationship between technology and innovation has remained a matter of debate throughout  
31 the period under review. The analysis by scholars around the world of literally thousands of  
32 empirical studies of the processes that have led to changes in practice and technology (not only  
33 in agriculture but in related sectors such as health) over time has forced acceptance that  
34 innovation requires much more than a new technology, practice, or idea and that not all change is  
35 innovation. Innovation processes have been driven mainly by for-profit drivers but there has been  
36 also an as yet incomplete convergence toward AKST relationships, arrangements and processes



1 that foster innovations supportive of socially inclusive and ecologically sustainable and productive  
2 agricultures.

#### 3 4 2.1.4.1 Changes in perspective: from technologies to Innovations

5 The proposition that technical change could be a major engine of economic growth was  
6 demonstrated in the 1950s (Solow, 1957). Later analysis of empirical evidence showed that  
7 small-scale producers, although handicapped by severe constraints, made rational adaptations  
8 over time in their practices and technologies in response to those constraints. In as far as  
9 externally introduced technology released some of the constraints, technology could become a  
10 driver of significant change (Schultz, 1964). The Green Revolution subsequently appeared to  
11 vindicate the analysis and it quickly became dominant in the agricultural economics profession  
12 (Mosher, 1966). The model that this analysis pointed toward is the dominant way of organizing  
13 knowledge and diffusion processes, i.e. 'the transfer of technology model' (2.1.2) (e.g. Chambers  
14 and Jiggins, 1986). It is known also as a policy model, variously as 'the agricultural treadmill' (e.g.  
15 Cochrane, 1958) and 'the linear model' (e.g. Kline and Rosenberg, 1986); and its role in policy is  
16 assessed here. In its simplest form it recommends *technology supply-push*, i.e., developing  
17 productivity enhancing component technologies through research for delivery, transfer, or release  
18 to farmers, the 'ultimate users'.

19  
20 The model emerged in a specific historical context, the American mid-West in the decennia after  
21 WWII (Van den Ban, 1963); similar models were elaborated from empirical findings in other  
22 economic sectors. Although these mechanisms driving the model's impact are familiar to  
23 economists they are not necessarily as familiar to others so the persistence of technology supply  
24 push as the dominant policy model for stimulating technology change in agriculture warrants a full  
25 explanation of the mechanisms. In the case of agriculture the empirical data robustly confirm the  
26 following features:

- 27 1. *Diffusion of innovations*. Some technologies diffuse quite rapidly in the farming community  
28 after their initial release, typically following the S-curve pattern of a slow start, rapid  
29 expansion and tapering off when all farmers for whom the innovation is relevant or feasible  
30 have adopted. The classic case is hybrid maize in Iowa (Ryan and Gross, 1943). Diffusion  
31 multiplies the impact of agricultural research and extension effort 'for free'. But diffusion is  
32 mainly observed ex-post: it is difficult to predict (or ensure) that it will take place (Rogers,  
33 2003).
- 34 2. *Agricultural treadmill*. The treadmill refers to the same phenomenon but it focuses on the  
35 economics (Cochrane, 1958). Farmers who adopt early use of a technology that is more  
36 productive or less costly than the prevailing state-of-the-art technology, i.e. when prices have  
37 not as yet decreased as a result of increased efficiency, capture a windfall profit. When

- 1 others begin to use the new technology, total production increases and prices start to fall.  
2 Farmers who have not yet adopted the technology or practice experience a price squeeze:  
3 their incomes decrease even if they work as hard as before. Thus they must change; the  
4 treadmill refers to the fact that the market propels diffusion: it provides incentives for early  
5 adoption and disincentives for being late.
- 6 3. *Terms of trade.* A key underlying aspect of the treadmill is that farmers cannot retain the  
7 rewards of technical innovation. Because none of the thousands of small firms who produce a  
8 commodity can control the price, all try to produce as much as possible against the going  
9 price. Given the low elasticity of demand of agricultural products, prices are under constant  
10 downward pressure. During the last decennia, the price of food has continuously declined  
11 both in real and relative terms (World Bank, 2008). The farm subsidies in the US and Europe  
12 can be seen as a necessary cost for societal benefit without rural impoverishment.
- 13 4. *Scale enlargement.* In the tail of the diffusion process, farmers who are too poor, too small,  
14 too old, too stupid or too ill to adopt eventually drop out. Their resources are taken over by  
15 those who remain and who usually capture the windfall profits. This shakeout leads to  
16 economies of scale in the sector as a whole.
- 17 5. *Internal rate of return.* Investing in agricultural research and extension to feed the treadmill  
18 has a high internal rate of return (Evenson et al., 1979). The macro effects of relatively minor  
19 expenditures on technology development and delivery are major in terms of (a) reallocating  
20 labor from agriculture to other pursuits as agriculture becomes more efficient, (b) improving  
21 the competitive position of a country's agricultural exports on the world market, and (c)  
22 reducing the cost of food. An advantage is that farmers do not complain. Their  
23 representatives in the farmers' unions are among those who capture windfall profits and  
24 benefit from the process, even though in the end the process leads to loss of farmers' political  
25 power as their numbers dwindle to a few percent of the population. The treadmill encourages  
26 farmers to externalize social and environmental costs, which tend to be difficult to calculate  
27 and hence usually are not taken into account. One may note here that this process, first  
28 described at the national level in the case of the USA, also explains the growing gap in the  
29 productivity of agricultural labor between industrialized and developing countries and that it  
30 leads to overall efficiencies in production and reduced prices for consumers, outcomes that  
31 have favored its persistence as a dominant policy model.

32

33 However, other business analysts and social scientists throughout the period under review have  
34 stressed the concept of innovation rather than mere technical change as a measure of  
35 development. The evidence that technical change itself requires numerous often subtle but  
36 decisive steps before an adoption decision is made reinforced this view (Rogers, 1983). Others  
37 pointed to biophysical, sociocultural, institutional and organizational factors such that when the

1 same technology is brought into use in different contexts the effects vary (Dixon et al., 2001).  
2 Recently more emphasis has been given to development of 'best fit' technology options for a  
3 given situation, reflecting further discoveries of institutional and sociological factors that shape  
4 technical opportunities (Herdt, 2006; Ojiem et al., 2006). This understanding has deep roots in  
5 extension research (e.g. Loomis and Beagle, 1950; Ascroft et al., 1973; Röling et al., 1976),  
6 farming systems research (Collinson, 2000), 1980s gender research (e.g. Staudt and Col, 1991;  
7 Sachs, 1996), and 1990s policy research (e.g. Jiggins, 1989; Christopolos et al., 2000). However,  
8 the reasons that thinking about policy began to change likely had little to do with this research  
9 and more to do with the realization that technology supply-push could fuel massive social  
10 problems wherever there were no alternative opportunities for those who could not survive in  
11 farming. This lack of survival contributed to the growth of megacity slums (UN Habitat, 2007), the  
12 ease with which displaced youngsters eager turned toward civil disorder and even civil war  
13 (Richards, 2002; UNHCR, 2007) and the growing numbers of internal and transboundary  
14 migrants (UNHCR, 2007; UN Population Fund, 2007). Supply-push arrangements were shown to  
15 produce agricultures accounting for 85% of the world's water withdrawals and 21% (rising to  
16 35%) of gaseous emissions contributing to climate change; and to the declining material condition  
17 of natural resources and biophysical functioning (MA, 2005; UNEP, 2005). The cumulative  
18 evidence indicated a policy change was overdue.

19  
20 The concept of innovation systems offered itself as a policy model for sustaining agricultures to  
21 meet ecological and social needs. Effective innovation systems were shown to need systemic  
22 engagement among a diversity of actors (Havelock; 1986; Swanson and Peterson, 1989; Röling  
23 and Engel, 1991; Bawden and Packham, 1993; Engel and Salomon, 1997; Röling and  
24 Wagemakers, 1998; Chema et al., 2003; Hall et al., 2003, 2006). However, people and  
25 organizations interact in diverse ways for the purposes of creating innovation for sustainable  
26 development; the range of actors needed to develop a specific innovation opportunity is  
27 potentially large and thus becomes increasingly difficult to classify (Fig. 2-3) (see 2.3). The  
28 'innovation systems' concept, widely used in other industries, usefully captures the complexity  
29 (Hall et al., 2006) by drawing attention to the totality of actors needed for innovation and growth;  
30 consolidating the role of the private sector and the importance of interactions within a sector, and;  
31 emphasizing the outcomes of technology and knowledge generation and adoption rather than the  
32 strengthening of research systems and their outputs.

33  
34 Empirical studies emphasize that the dominant activity in the process is working with and re-  
35 working the stock of knowledge (Arnold and Bell, 2001) in a social process that is realized in  
36 collaborative effort to generate individual and collective learning in support of an explicit goal.  
37 Innovation processes focus on the creation of products and technologies through ad hoc

1 transformations in locally specific individual or collective knowledge processes. As such  
2 innovation is neither science nor technology but the emergent property of an action system  
3 (Crozier and Friedberg, 1980) in which knowledge actors are entangled. The design of the action  
4 system thus is a determinant of the extent to which an innovation meets sustainability and  
5 development goals.

6

#### 7 2.1.4.2. Market-led innovation

8 From about the 1990s onwards innovation processes in agriculture principally have been driven  
9 by a rise in market-led development. Typical responses to market pressures in North America  
10 and Europe in terms of the way in which technical requirements, market actors, and market  
11 institutions interact can provide an understanding of the 'innovation space' for socially and  
12 ecologically sustainable agriculture (NAE Chap 1; Fig. 2-3).

13

14 **INSERT FIG. 2-3.** Elements of an agricultural innovation system.

15

#### 16 2.1.4.3. Technological risks and costs in a globalizing world

17 The risk outlook fifty years ago could be described in general terms as high local output  
18 instability, relative autonomy of food systems and highly diverse local technology options: an  
19 agricultural technology that failed in one part of the world had few consequences for health,  
20 hunger or poverty in other regions. The increase in aggregate food output and the trend toward  
21 liberalizing markets and globalizing trade has smoothed out much of the instability; it has  
22 integrated food systems (mostly to the benefit of poor consumers) and it has spread generic  
23 technologies throughout the world for local adaptation. The mechanisms of food aid, local seed  
24 banks and other institutional innovations have been put in place to cope with catastrophic loss of  
25 entitlements to food or localized production shortfalls. Yet the world faces technological risks in  
26 food and agriculture that have potential for widespread harm and whose management requires  
27 the mobilization of worldwide effort (Beck et al., 1994; Stiglitz, 2006). A robust conclusion is that  
28 human beings are not very good at managing complex systemic interactions (Dörner, 1996).  
29 Immediate costs of risks that cause harm typically are carried by the poor, the excluded and the  
30 environment, for instance with regard to choices of irrigation technologies (Thomas, 1975; Biggs,  
31 1978; Repetto, 1986); crop management (Repetto, 1985; Kenmore, 1987; Loevinsohn, 1987);  
32 and natural resource and forestry management (Repetto et al., 1989; Repetto, 1990; Repetto,  
33 1992; Hobden, 1995). The weight of the evidence is that power relations and pre-analytic  
34 assumptions about how institutions and organizations actually work in a given context shape how  
35 scientific information and technologies are developed and used in practice, producing necessarily  
36 variable and sometimes damaging effects (Hobart, 1994; Alex and Byerlee, 2001). Recent  
37 assessments for instance of the 'long shadow' of livestock farming systems (Steinfeld et al.,

1 2006) and of agricultural use of water (Chapagain and Hoekstra, 2003) lead to a well-founded  
2 conclusion that estimations of agricultural technologies' benefits, risks and costs have been in the  
3 past too narrowly defined. The mounting scale of risk exposure in agriculture is delineated in the  
4 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005), Global Water Assessment (2007), and IPCC reports  
5 (2007). The accumulating weight of evidence that past technology choices in agriculture have  
6 given rise to unsustainable risks has led to efforts to develop more appropriate technological risk  
7 assessment methods (Graham and Wiener, 1995; Jakobson and Dragun, 1996; NRC, 1996) and  
8 to take on differing perspectives on what levels of harm are acceptable and for whom (Krimsky  
9 and Golding, 1992; Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993; Funtowicz et al., 1998; Scanlon, 1998; Stagl et  
10 al., 2004). Important experience has been gained in working with civil society on technological  
11 risk assessments and sustainability appraisals, sometimes involving large numbers of citizens  
12 (Pimbert and Wakeford, 2002; IIED, 2006; Pimbert et al., 2006).

## 14 **2.2 Key Actors, Institutional Arrangements and Drivers**

15 Actors and institutions have power to set policy agendas and influence how research and  
16 development investments are made. All knowledge actors develop processes for generating  
17 AKST and innovation that evolve within their own IAs and culture of understanding. These  
18 processes can generate stress when key actors are excluded or marginalized by new or old  
19 arrangements (Table 2-3).

21 INSERT Table 2-3. Analytic map of the main features of AKSTD paradigms.

23 The main actors considered here are in the vast majority *farmers and farm laborers*, many of  
24 whom are poor, with limited access to external resources and formal education, but rich in  
25 traditional and local knowledge and increasingly organized and adept at sharing knowledge and  
26 innovating. *Additional domestic actors* affecting the development and innovation of AKST include  
27 local, provincial and national governments, and the agencies, departments and ministries devoted  
28 to agriculture, environment, education, health, trade, finance, etc. Still *other actors* with direct  
29 impacts on AKST include regional consortia and international institutions, FAO, the Global  
30 Integrated Pest Management (IPM) Facility, the World Bank, CGIAR, private foundations, and  
31 others. Each organization develops and brings its own sets of priorities, perspectives and  
32 agendas to the business of AKST. Private sector actors who have played increasingly important  
33 roles are commercial and corporate players and civil society organizations (CSOs), including  
34 farmer and consumer organizations, foundations and those working for nonhuman species and  
35 the environment, as well as a range of development and relief NGOs.

37 The currently dominant AKST systems are the product of a long history of attempts by diverse

1 combinations of these actors, under numerous institutional arrangements (IAs), to meet the  
2 needs and challenges of agriculture in different contexts, as well as the actors' own individual or  
3 institutional needs. Their histories are made up of successes, but also failures and frustrations,  
4 often leading to new attempts at meeting both local and global challenges. In many instances,  
5 crises have led to the emergence of new actors and the reshuffling of roles and relationships.  
6 Institutional arrangements formally or informally coordinate the work of knowledge producers and  
7 engage them in distinctive knowledge processes, thus favoring the emergence of different kinds  
8 of innovation. Some become long-standing permanent arrangements; others are *ad hoc* initiatives  
9 or of more recent origin.

### 11 **2.2.1 Farmer and community-based arrangements**

12 The emergence of major producer organizations representing their members' interests and rights  
13 at district, national, regional and international levels may be seen as an increasingly strong driver  
14 of change over the last decades. Most of them are actively engaged in the provision of  
15 technology and information services and have entered into partnerships with R&D providers.  
16 Many now have websites that act as an information umbrella for and communication link to  
17 thousands of affiliated farmers' groups organized at local levels. Examples include the Network of  
18 Farmers' Organizations and Agricultural Producers from western Africa (<http://www.roppa-ao.org>);  
19 the International Land Coalition ([www.landcoalition.org/partners/partact.htm](http://www.landcoalition.org/partners/partact.htm));  
20 the International Federation of Agricultural Producers ([www.ifap.org](http://www.ifap.org)); and Peasants Worldwide  
21 ([www.agroinfo.nl/scripts/website.asp](http://www.agroinfo.nl/scripts/website.asp)).

23 The focus on local mobilization masks the wide scale of effort and impact (Boven and Mordhashi,  
24 2002). For example, in 2004 Catholic Relief Services was working directly with 120,000 poor  
25 producers in community-based seed system development ([www.crs.org](http://www.crs.org)) and South East Asian  
26 Regional Initiatives for Community Empowerment (SEARICE) (see 2.2.3). The local seeds  
27 movement pioneered by such organizations has given rise to information exchange networks that  
28 assert individual and community rights to 'first publication' so as to safeguard native IPR and  
29 germplasm. Over time, such organizations have strengthened their own R&D networks by  
30 commissioning research and through organizing national and international technical conferences,  
31 such as the International Farmers' Technical Conference held in conjunction with the 2005  
32 Convention on Biodiversity meeting.

34 *Farmer research partnerships* typically bring together farmers, professors, scientists and  
35 researchers to compose a technical pool of expertise dedicated to collaboration with farmers in  
36 research and development. These IA's emphasize the centrality of primary producers, food  
37 processors and laborers in agricultural and food systems. In general, they initially capitalize

1 volunteerism and fund-raising activities to implement farmer-led projects, but often move on to a  
2 holistic approach to development of livelihoods and welfare, community empowerment and  
3 measures to extend farmer control over agricultural biodiversity. For instance, MASIPAG  
4 (Farmer-Scientist Partnership for Development, Inc.) was established in the Philippines in 1987,  
5 after more than five years' collaboration between farmers concerned about the negative impacts  
6 of high-yield rice and associated technologies on their livelihoods, local genetic resources, and  
7 environment, and a few progressive scientists. It then rapidly developed into a large farmer-led  
8 network of people's organizations, NGOs and scientists, promoting the sustainable use and  
9 management of biodiversity through farmers' control of genetic and biological resources,  
10 agricultural production and associated knowledge based on a strategy of placing command of the  
11 skills and knowledge of the agronomic sciences in the hands of small-scale producers. By 2004,  
12 MASIPAG was working with four national/regional civil society networks and organizations, seven  
13 Philippine universities and research centers and seven local government authorities and line  
14 agencies. MASIPAG's network of trial and research farms included 72 in 16 provinces in the  
15 island of Luzon, 60 in 10 provinces in Visayas and 140 in 14 provinces in Mindanao. MASIPAG  
16 today is recognized world-wide as a leading example of highly effective farmer-led and largely  
17 farmer-funded and farmer-managed, R&D and extension that is building small-scale farm  
18 modernization, resource conservation and food sector development on ecological principles  
19 (Salazar, 1992; Araya, 2000). At the other end of the spectrum, systematic testing has been  
20 carried out of user involvement in the barley breeding cycle in Syria (Ceccarelli et al., 2000). The  
21 researchers initially designed four types of trials: by farmers in their fields, with farmers on-station,  
22 by breeders in farmers' fields and by breeders on-station. Their experience of the rigor, reliability,  
23 and comparative costs and benefits of the four led them to concentrate on testing and selection  
24 by farmers in their own fields, complemented by seed multiplication on station. Similar  
25 achievements have been recorded in southwest China for maize (Vernooy and Song, 2004).

26  
27 *Local research and innovation: the contribution of occupational education.* Local level innovation  
28 can be promoted if appropriate investments are made in educating farmers but this has been a  
29 relatively neglected area. One of the major breakthroughs has been the development and spread  
30 of *Farmer Field Schools* (FFS) (Braun et al., 2005). Based on adult education principles, the  
31 schools take groups of farmers through field-based facilitated learning curricula organized in  
32 cycles of observation, experimentation, measurement, analysis, peer review and informed  
33 decision-making. FFSs are making in aggregate a significant and influential contribution to  
34 sustainable and more equitable small farm modernization, particularly in the rain fed areas where  
35 two-thirds of the world's poor farm households live. Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda have included  
36 the approach in national research and extension strategies, as has India. Systematic review of  
37 available impact data (Braun et al., 2006; van den Berg and Jiggins, 2007) and area-based

1 impact studies (Braun et al., 2002; Pontius et al., 2002; Bunyatta et al., 2005; Mancini, 2006)  
2 demonstrate positive to strongly positive achievements. Contributing effectively to farmer  
3 empowerment also contributes to the strengthening of civil society and self-directed development  
4 (Mancini et al., 2007). Others have criticized their cost in relation to the scale of impact (Quizon et  
5 al., 2000; Feder et al., 2004ab), noted the weak diffusion of specific technologies, lack of  
6 diffusion of informed understanding (Rola et al., 2002) and failure in some instances to develop  
7 enduring farmer organizations (Bingen, 2003; Tripp et al., 2005). Further experimentation is  
8 warranted to test if combining farmer education such as FFSs with complementary extension  
9 efforts will overcome the perceived shortcomings (Van Mele and Salahuddin, 2005).

10  
11 World Learning for International Development, the Alaska Rural Systemic Initiative project and  
12 the Global Fund for Children similarly have documented gains (World Bank, 2005a) in the  
13 effectiveness and efficiency of local research, school-based science education and the  
14 development of agroecological literacy at the grass roots brought about by investing in farmers'  
15 occupational education (Coutts et al., 2005).

16  
17 *Farmer-funded R&D and extension.* Innumerable examples exist of effective technological  
18 advances pioneered by farmers themselves; e.g., grafting against pests, biological control agents  
19 such as the golden ant in citrus in Bhutan (Van Schoubroeck, 1999) and soil management and  
20 farming system development in the Adja Plateau, Benin (Brouwers, 1993). Yet the economic value  
21 of local and traditional innovations has not been much researched. One study in Nigeria in the  
22 early 1990s estimated the contribution of the informal agricultural sector where farmers are using  
23 mostly indigenous innovations at about US \$12 billion per year, providing income for an estimated  
24 81 million people (ECA, 1992). This estimate, however, does not include the cost of opportunities  
25 foregone or traditional practices that do not work. Recent literature begins to sketch out the  
26 strengths and weaknesses that might be taken into account if a more comprehensive cost-benefit  
27 analysis were to be attempted (Almekinders and Louwaars, 1999).

### 28 29 **2.2.2 Producers of AKST at national level**

30 Countries have developed a complex array of public institutions, IAs and actors responsible for  
31 planning, funding, implementing, assessing, and disseminating public interest agricultural  
32 research. They include national, regional/municipal agricultural research institutions, universities  
33 and other higher education institutes and extension services. Most of these arrangements  
34 historically have been publicly financed because agricultural research investments involve  
35 externalities, and are subject to long gestation periods (cfr. Chap 8, Table 8.1; Lele and  
36 Goldsmith, 1989; Beintema and Stads, 2006; Pardey et al., 2006ab).

37



1 In the 1960s and 70s National Agricultural Research Systems (NARS) in developing countries  
2 (subchapter 2.1), especially agricultural research institutes (ARIs), received strong financial  
3 support from governments and international donors to launch agricultural modernization through  
4 the dissemination of Green Revolution technologies (Chema et al., 2003). In the 1980s, as a  
5 result of budgetary crises and adjustment programs, public funds for agricultural research failed  
6 to keep up with expanding demand. Public expenditure declined as proportion of total research  
7 and development spending; expenditure per researcher declined much more because staffing  
8 continued to expand faster than budgets. From the 1980s onwards, the main drivers of  
9 institutional development of the NARS were structural reforms in national economies and  
10 adjustment policies, global political changes; ideological demands for reduced public sector  
11 involvement and intervention; a greater private sector role and significant biotechnological  
12 breakthroughs (Byerlee and Alex, 1998; Iowa State Univ., 2007). These events have given rise to  
13 a diverse institutional landscape responding to both domestic and global priorities and  
14 opportunities. Brazil's EMBRAPA, for instance, has become an exporter of capacity, in 2007  
15 opening liaison offices in West and East Africa whereas NARS in sub-Saharan Africa continue to  
16 face many constraints (Jones, 2004).

17  
18 *Sub-Saharan Africa's National Research Systems.* Overall budget constraints throughout the  
19 period have weakened public sector NARS in most African states. The general panorama today  
20 is of deep attrition of human resources, equipment facilities, capital funding and revenue, despite  
21 islands of promise such as the revitalization of capacity in Uganda under vigorous  
22 decentralization policies, in Ghana in relation to agroindustrial developments and in post-  
23 apartheid South Africa. Nongovernmental organizations, the CGIAR, private commercial actors  
24 and recently the establishment of sub-regional bodies (Central African Council for Agricultural  
25 Research and Development, CORAF), (Association for Strengthening of Agricultural Research in  
26 Eastern and Central Africa, ASARECA) and similar arrangements for southern Africa supported  
27 by the Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA), have filled the gaps only in part. An  
28 alliance largely funded by a US-based philanthropic trust recently has been established to  
29 transfer germplasm and advanced biotechnology skills to African NARS to catalyze Africa's  
30 'rainbow revolution.' Agricultural research trust funds set up to lever matching research contracts  
31 from commercial enterprises, donors and government organizations, have not succeeded;  
32 although farmer-managed funds are meeting with some modest success.

33  
34 *The Agricultural Research Council (ARC) model.* Some large countries with complex research  
35 systems have established agricultural research councils to coordinate the work carried out at  
36 research institutes. The ARC typically is a public body which has – *inter alia* - the functions of  
37 managing, coordinating or funding research programs. Management of the councils has proved

1 effective because they are both autonomous and accountable to users and donors for planning  
2 and executing research. In India, the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) has  
3 coordinated the higher agricultural education system since the 1950s and in 1996 established an  
4 agricultural education accreditation board (<http://www.icar.org.in/aeac/ednac.htm>). In Africa, the  
5 role of ARCs has varied widely as some have moved beyond a policy and coordinating role to  
6 undertake research themselves (Bingen and Brinkerhoff, 2000). However, the councils that have  
7 proliferated have failed to live up to expectations, become bureaucratized (Chema et al., 2003)  
8 and been unable to influence national research budgets or coordinate agricultural research  
9 among institutions to reach out to small-scale farmers (Byerlee, 1998; Rukuni et al., 1998;  
10 Bingen and Brinkerhoff, 2000).

11  
12 *The National Agricultural Research Institute (NARI) model.* This model is common in Latin  
13 American countries, where agricultural research has been conducted primarily at the national  
14 level. They control, direct and manage all publicly funded agricultural research; they may be  
15 autonomous or semiautonomous in budgetary support, scientist recruitment, financial norms and  
16 disciplines with experiment stations as the basis for research organization. Their creation in the  
17 1950s and early 1960s was driven mainly by the recognition of the leading role of technological  
18 change in the modernization of agriculture. In the late 1990s, rural development and poverty  
19 alleviation efforts became differentiated from research and technology development,  
20 accompanied by the increasing participation by private sector entities in financing and  
21 implementing R&D activities. These shifts were driven by changes in the wider socioeconomic  
22 and political context within which the NARIs operated (i.e., state reform, deregulation, economic  
23 liberalization), and changes in the scientific processes underlying agricultural research (i.e.,  
24 privatization of knowledge, plant breeders' rights, patent protection for R&D results. In Latin  
25 America, two important constraints have limited the role of the NARIs: the decline in government  
26 funding and the weak incentives for coordination and cooperation among research system  
27 components within each country. In two cases the NARIs also had responsibility for extension:  
28 the National Institute of Agriculture (INTA), Argentina, and the National Institute of Agriculture  
29 (INIA), Chile. In 2005 INTA created a Center for Research and Technological Development for  
30 small-scale family agriculture (CIPAF), with three regional institutes. This signaled a decisive  
31 transition from the supply-push Transfer of Technology approach that hitherto characterized the  
32 NARI model throughout Latin America, to a client-oriented demand-pull approach based on  
33 participatory action-research (<http://www.inta.gov.ar/cipaf/cipaf.htm>). Since 2003 Brazil has  
34 promoted biotechnology as a national policy priority for the Brazilian Agriculture and Livestock  
35 Research Company (EMBRAPA) in order to boost productivity in both family farms and large  
36 scale agroenterprises. EMBRAPA is collaborating in the federal government's Fome Zero (Zero  
37 Hunger) program (<http://www.fomezero.gov.br>), taking a lead role in the global Cassava

1 Biotechnology Net (CBN) through the Biotechnology Research Unit of Mandioca e Fruticultura  
2 (<http://www.cnpmf.embrapa.br>) and in Participatory Plant Breeding, principally through  
3 EMBRAPA-CNPMPF, Cruz das Almas, Bahia, together with the Bahian Company of Agricultural  
4 Development (<http://www.ebda.ba.gov.br>), Caetité, southeast Bahia and farmer communities also  
5 located at Caetité.

6  
7 *The Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) model.* This model was dominant in communist countries and  
8 in the immediate postcolonial era and still prevails in countries where this less agricultural  
9 research capacity. It is characterized by centralized governance and bureaucratic practice.  
10 However, in recent years new organizational patterns have begun to emerge that provide greater  
11 flexibility. Collectivization and nationalization resulted in significant and often irrational  
12 concentration of agricultural production in state or quasi cooperatives managed as industrial  
13 enterprises, affecting the whole social and economic life of villages and rural areas in countries  
14 such as Tanzania and in the former soviet bloc countries (Swinnen and Vranken, 2006).  
15 Adjustment to new economic and political conditions has demanded significant AKST role  
16 changes (Petrick and Weingarten, 2004) including redefinition of the role of government in  
17 agricultural research; separation of research funding, priority setting and implementation;  
18 decentralization of agricultural research both geographically and in terms of decision making;  
19 strengthening of system linkages among multiple innovation partners including CSOs, traders,  
20 input and processing industries (Swinnen and Vranken, 2006; Petrick and Weingarten, 2004).

21  
22 *Universities and other higher education models.* Universities are institutions placed amidst three  
23 coordinating forces: the academic oligarchy, the state and the market (Clark, 1983). These three  
24 forces are seldom in balance; they act in a continuous and dynamic tension, which often brings  
25 about intellectual, practical and organizational conflicts and ruptures (Bourdieu, 1988) often  
26 leading to diffuse and contradictory missions (Weick, 1976; Busch et al., 2004). In agricultural  
27 universities (schools/colleges or faculties) there are many such divides between purpose and  
28 mission; social and scientific power, among managers, teachers, researchers and extensionists;  
29 between the established canonical agricultural disciplines and disciplines, such as sociology,  
30 ethics and public administration (Readings, 1996; Delanty, 2001). Urgent societal demands, such  
31 as those posed by hunger, poverty, inequality, exclusion and solitude, and more recently also  
32 natural resource degradation and climate change have had to find their place against the  
33 background noises of collaboration and dissent. Universities, nonetheless, are widely identified as  
34 key actors in national research systems (Castells, 1993; Clark 1995; Edquist, 1997; Mowery and  
35 Sampat, 2004), but their contribution to agricultural research, real or potential, often has been  
36 neglected in cost-benefit analyses. Yet they have been and remain the major educators of  
37 agricultural scientists, professionals and technicians, a voice of reason (and sometimes

1 partiality) in controversial debates about bioethics, transgenic seeds, IPR, food quality and safety  
2 issues, etc., and a source of factual information (Atchoarena and Gasperini, 2002). Robust  
3 indicators do not exist for the comparative assessment of the efficiency and effectiveness of  
4 universities in generating knowledge, science and technologies for sustainability and  
5 development. For example, in a survey of Argentine agricultural scientists (1996 to 1998), the  
6 number of journal publications was a proxy measure (Oesterheld et al., 2002), despite known  
7 limitations (Biggs, 1990; Gómez and Bordons, 1996; Garfield, 1998; Amin and Mabe, 2000;  
8 Bordons and Gómez, 2002). Output was found to be highly variable and on average, low but  
9 higher than in other institutions such as the National Institute of Agricultural Technology (INTA),  
10 and the National Council for Science and Technology (CONICET) (Oesterheld et al., 2002).

11  
12 Higher-level agricultural education institutions can be sub-divided into (i) agricultural colleges  
13 embedded in a comprehensive university, (ii) land grant universities, patterned after the US land  
14 grant universities, and (iii) tertiary level agrotechnological institutes that are not part of a university  
15 and depend on a ministry of education or of agriculture. They all have similar constraints to  
16 achieving the diversity of their roles and purposes (Table 2-4).

17  
18 INSERT Table 2-4. Constraints of university arrangements.

19  
20 (i) *Agricultural schools or college/faculties model embedded in a comprehensive university.* This  
21 model is shaped after the German Humboldt tradition and has teaching, research and extension  
22 as central functions. It has diffused to other European countries as well as to other parts of the  
23 world, mainly the Americas.

24  
25 Until recently in many countries research universities were autonomous, with public funds  
26 provided as block grants by the Treasury to the Ministry of Education, which transferred them to  
27 the central university governing body; the agricultural colleges then had to compete against other  
28 interests. In Latin American countries, research budgets are often less than 0.5% of the total  
29 university budget (Gentili, 2001) and little of this has reached the agricultural departments,  
30 colleges and schools. However, in the last decades research has been financed by the use of  
31 competitive funds open to all public research institutions and in some cases to private  
32 universities. International donors, philanthropic foundations and increasingly also commercial  
33 enterprises also contribute to financing (Echeverría et al., 1996; Kampen, 1997; Gill and Carney,  
34 1999). Their main asset is research and their internal system of reward and promotion is  
35 designed to protect standards in this core activity. The pressure to 'publish or perish' favors  
36 acceptance of actors and types of AKST that is produced in conditions that support such  
37 performance and thus tends to increase the gap between developed and developing countries'

1 national academic and research systems. It also further marginalizes scientists and academics in  
2 the latter countries where funds for research, in particular for basic research, are scarce. The  
3 incentive system legitimated the dominant position of universities in colonial and later in OECD  
4 countries as the centers of basic and strategic research in a hierarchy of AKST providers.  
5 Students as well as trained agricultural scientists and professionals continue to leave employment  
6 in tropical countries wherever national governments have failed to invest in 'catch up' institutional  
7 development at tertiary levels.

8  
9 In the United States policies were important in assisting the commercialization of research  
10 products and services. The US Bayh-Dole Act passed in 1980 gave universities and corporations  
11 the right to patent federally funded research and was buttressed by the Federal Technology  
12 Transfer Act of 1986 (Kennedy, 2001; Bok, 2003). These acts succeeded in their primary purpose  
13 but widened existing gaps with most developing countries. Incentive systems designed for the  
14 commercialization by universities of private good research appear to perform less well in  
15 promoting public goods research and its application in agriculture and food industries (Byerlee  
16 and Alex, 1998; Berdahl, 2000; Bok, 2003; Washburn, 2005).

17  
18 The most immediate challenges tertiary institutions face is how to respond to the often divergent  
19 interests of private and public actors, consumers and citizens as AKST systems become more  
20 demand-driven and hence also develop or strengthen their capacity to become engaged in  
21 problem solving in specific settings, and continue to provide generic potential for sustainable  
22 development.

23  
24 (ii) *Land-grant colleges and state universities*. These have been patterned after the land-grant  
25 model originating in the 19th century in the United States. Key components are the agricultural  
26 experiment station program (Hatch Act 1887) (Kerr, 1987; Mayberry, 1991; Christy and  
27 Williamson, 1992; BOA, 1995), and the link via extension programs to farmer advisory, leadership  
28 development and training activities in the community. The grant of land to finance research and  
29 education ensured in the original conception a high degree of accountability to the application of  
30 science to local, practical problem solving and entrepreneurship. These distinctive features  
31 tended to attenuate over time or progressively decline as the model spread to and then merged  
32 into different contexts. After World War II, the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations and the United  
33 States Agency for International Development (USAID) played leading roles in the establishment  
34 of state agricultural universities in India modeled on the US land-grant universities. State  
35 agricultural universities of Pakistan and the Philippines also adopted the model as their guide. In  
36 sub-Saharan Africa, the research and extension missions of the land-grant model generally  
37 introduced under Ministries of Higher Education came into conflict with research and extension

1 departments in ministries of agriculture. By the 1980s most of the land-grant universities in SSA  
2 had become comprehensive universities emphasizing training. Nevertheless, the model proved  
3 powerful; land-grant universities in the USA throughout the 20th century have been central to  
4 North America's farm modernization, dominance in commodity trade and pre-eminence in global  
5 food industries (Ferleger and Lazonick, 1994; Slaybaugh, 1996; Fitzgerald, 2003). The land-grant  
6 construct explicitly rests on concern for both agriculture and rural communities; enterprise  
7 development, revenue and welfare; education and research as a privileged knowledge and  
8 information activity for faculty and students and as a service to meet citizens' needs. The task of  
9 forming, educating and empowering farmers and young farm leaders has been a key strategic  
10 objective, resting on tripartite funding contributions from education, agriculture and state agencies  
11 at various levels. Farmers have opportunities as well as a right to participate in forming and  
12 assessing university research priorities and outputs. Outreach and service count in professional  
13 advancement; and the universities' own institutional advancement - even survival – rests on  
14 accountability to the broad constituency it serves.

15  
16 On the other hand, in industrialized countries, particularly in the US, universities have emerged as  
17 the nation's main source for the three key ingredients to continued growth and prosperity: highly  
18 trained specialists, expert knowledge and scientific advances. There is some evidence that more  
19 recent shifts in the balance of public and private funding is affecting the type of research and  
20 teaching and hence narrowing the range of available AKST systems. One paradigmatic and  
21 controversial case was the agreement between the Novartis Agricultural Discovery Institute and  
22 the Department of Plant and Microbial Biology at the University of Berkeley. Under this  
23 agreement Novartis provided \$5 million per year in support of basic research at the department  
24 and in return was given the right to license patents held by the University for up to one-third of the  
25 patentable intellectual property developed by the department, with the University retaining the  
26 patent rights and earning royalties from the patents. Participating faculty, in turn, received access  
27 to proprietary databases held by Novartis (Berdahl, 2000; Busch et al., 2004). The Novartis  
28 agreement disquieted those who believed it indicated a transition toward the privatization of  
29 public universities; critics argued that by allowing Novartis to participate even as a minority vote  
30 on the funding committee, the University was allowing a private company to chart the course of  
31 research at the University (Berdahl, 2000). Others pointed out that faculty members applying for  
32 research support from the federal government possibly also tailored their applications to increase  
33 their chances of support. This situation illustrates the need for codes of conduct in universities to  
34 guide their interactions with industry (Washburn, 2005) in order to preserve independence and  
35 capacity to deliver disinterested public goods and maintain public trust (Vilella et al., 2002). More  
36 public-private partnerships without ensuring such codes may reduce the space for public interest  
37 science (Washburn, 2005), although under certain conditions, university partnerships with private

1 actors may contribute to equitable and sustainable development. For instance, the Seed Nursery  
2 at the Faculty of Agronomy, Buenos Aires University ([www.agro.uba.ar](http://www.agro.uba.ar)) and the Argentine  
3 Agrarian Federation ([www.faa.com.ar](http://www.faa.com.ar)) developed high-yielding non-Bt corn hybrids (FAUBA 207,  
4 209 and 3760), which are locally adapted and affordable by small-scale farmers and were  
5 released to market at less than half the price of the main competitors (Vilella et al., 2003;  
6 Federacion Agraria Argentina, 2005; <http://www.todoagro.com.ar/todoagro2/nota.asp?id=6542>)

7  
8 *(iii) Agrotechnical institutes.* Postsecondary institutes that are not part of the university system  
9 usually depend on public funding from Ministries of Education or Agriculture. They mostly train  
10 technicians in agricultural competences related to local labor demand in order to bridge the gap  
11 between untrained farmers, semi-skilled technicians and university graduates. However, many  
12 developing countries have given little attention to the training demanded by agricultural service  
13 agencies and agroindustries. Other countries, such as India or Brazil, invested heavily in such  
14 training. In Brazil, the Federal Centers of Technological Education (CEFETs) originated in  
15 agrotechnical or technical schools that were upgraded to tertiary-level institutes in the mid-1990s.  
16 They have developed good links with the private sector and sometimes share resource training  
17 activities through “sandwich courses.” They have become drivers for the application of  
18 technology, but an extension worker with certificate-level training and field experience can seldom  
19 bridge to a degree program (Atchoarena and Gasperini, 2002; Plencovich and Costantini, 2003).  
20 The Sasakawa Africa Fund for Extension Education (SAFE) specifically addresses this need in  
21 SSA. Other countries have chosen an alternative agricultural school system shaped after the  
22 Maisons Familiale Rurale (rural family house) (Granereau, 1969; Forni et al., 1998; García-  
23 Marirrodiga and Puig Calvó, 2007). Today there are more than 1,300 such schools in forty  
24 countries, alternating residential training and experience on the family farm. In Argentina, a large  
25 group of secondary public schools managed privately by NGOs, foundations, and other private  
26 actors and federated under the umbrella of an apex organization (FEDIAP;  
27 <http://www.fediap.com.ar/>) manages 3,000 teachers and about 15,000 students, taking  
28 occupational education deep into marginal and vulnerable areas (Plencovich and Costantini,  
29 2006).

### 30 31 **2.2.3 Producers of AKST at regional and international levels**

32 The institutional arrangements for development-oriented AKST at international levels have  
33 evolved from rather simple relationships organized largely by and in support of colonial interests,  
34 through focused support organized through the CGIAR system largely under the guidance of  
35 multilateral and bilateral development organizations, to arrangements that are rapidly diversifying  
36 under market pressures. The increasing attention to environmental issues, especially from the  
37 early 1980s onwards, also gave rise to arrangements that made effective use of collective

1 capacity to address shared practical and policy problems related to such issues as watershed  
2 management, vector-borne diseases and biodiversity conservation efforts. Examples include  
3 CSOs, such as the South East Asian Regional Initiatives for Community Empowerment  
4 (SEARICE) in the Philippines (cf. <http://www.searice.org.ph/>), which serves as the secretariat for  
5 region-wide advocacy, lobbying and action among networks of CSOs to promote and protect  
6 farmers' seed exchanges and sales and to ensure legal recognition of farmer-bred varieties and  
7 of community registries of local plants, animals, birds, trees, and microorganisms. SEARICE has  
8 become a major actor in the establishment of community-based native seeds research centers,  
9 such as CONSERVE in the Philippines and Farmer Field Schools for plant genetic resource  
10 conservation development and use in Laos, Bhutan, Vietnam and community biodiversity  
11 conservation efforts in Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines. SEARICE today is recognized as  
12 an effective and legitimate partner in sustainable and equitable development. The Mekong River  
13 Commission (MRC) offers a different kind of arrangement; founded in 1995 by the Agreement on  
14 the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin  
15 (<http://www.mrcmekong.org/>). It is funded by contributions from the downstream member  
16 countries (Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam) and donors and is considered an important  
17 institutional innovation that is successfully bringing together cross-sectoral knowledge and  
18 helping actors to learn from policy experiments. However economic drivers within the member  
19 states resulting in upstream development of irrigation and hydroelectric power in China are  
20 undermining local efforts to forge more sustainable development pathways (Jensen, 2000; MRC,  
21 2007). In SSA regional AKST arrangements have emerged and today their NARIs also act as  
22 regional service centers. ASARECA and CORAF were established in the late 1990s in eastern  
23 and western Africa respectively to fill gaps and build on strengths but no assessment can yet be  
24 made of their effectiveness. In southern Africa the formalization of inter-state collaboration in  
25 AKST has not yet occurred. The South African Agricultural Research Council and universities  
26 continue to provide a regional back up service and various R&D networks seek to fill some of the  
27 severe gaps in public and private capacity.

28

29 The tropical AKST institutions established by the colonial powers, such as the Royal Tropical  
30 Institute (Netherlands) or the Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (formerly ORSTOM)  
31 (France) and their supporting university networks similarly have surrendered their dominance and  
32 undergone major transformations over the period (Jiggins and Poulter, 2007), yet they remain  
33 collectively the largest source of knowledge on the diversity of ecological and ethnic situations in  
34 the tropics. These institutional arrangements were generally effective for their initial purpose, but  
35 they badly neglected the food crops consumed by indigenous populations, with the exception of a  
36 few such as the federal research station for French West Africa created in 1935 to increase food



1 production (Benoît-Cattin, 1991). The International Agricultural Research Centers (IARCs),  
2 subsequently grouped under the CGIAR umbrella, was in part a response to this gap.

3  
4 *CGIAR*. Assessing the role of the CGIAR is fraught with difficulties, mainly because of the  
5 controversies raised by this important actor, since its inception. Several external reviews of the  
6 CGIAR took place in the 1990s (World Bank, 2003), most of them organized by the CGIAR itself,  
7 indicating a willingness to change and adapt but also some uneasiness about the way the CGIAR  
8 worked, chose its priorities and was governed. However, the reviews did not fully address some  
9 of the more fundamental questions raised by the critics. There is insufficient space here to do  
10 justice to all these debates.

11  
12 *Creation of the CGIAR*. The role of the two US-based foundations, Rockefeller and Ford, in the  
13 creation of the first international centers has been well-documented (Baum, 1986). The first  
14 international research center, the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center – in  
15 Spanish, CIMMYT- was devoted to wheat and maize, the second one – the International Rice  
16 Research Institute (IRRI) established in the Philippines in 1960- to rice. This early emphasis on  
17 cereals, i.e. on staple food crops, was a direct reaction, befitting the philanthropic nature of the  
18 two foundations, to the emphasis on plantation crops during the colonial era.

19  
20 The emergence of this new type of institutional configuration had a profound impact on the IAs for  
21 agricultural research in developing countries. In this respect, the rapid evolution of the role of IRRI  
22 is exemplary. The first high-yielding (HY) rice cultivar released by IRRI (IR8) grew out of a dwarf  
23 gene which originated in Japan. Soon, however, its limitations became obvious. The new variety  
24 was sensitive to multiple pests and did not have the taste desired by many in Asia. The second  
25 generation of HY cultivars released by IRRI grew out of elaborate collaborations among many  
26 national research institutions in Asia, permitting a quantum jump in the exchange of genetic  
27 material and the coordinated testing of new genetic material in multiple locations. These new  
28 kinds of IA's, based on networking among public research institutions, with the hub located at an  
29 international center, set a pattern for the future. The role of the international centers in the  
30 development of new and more productive staple crop varieties has been well documented  
31 (Dalrymple, 1986) and is not by itself a controversial issue.

32  
33 *Early criticisms*. But early on, extensive criticisms were expressed; in particular, it was pointed out  
34 that a technological change, however rapid and even if called a revolution as in the expression  
35 'green revolution,' could fall short of the radical changes in agrarian structures which many felt  
36 were necessary to tackle the most glaring inequalities associated with unequal access to  
37 productive resources, land in particular (Griffin, 1979; Griffin and Khan, 1998). One must recall in

1 this respect that the Green Revolution (GR) came after many attempts at promoting land reforms  
2 or agrarian reforms. Many of the reform attempts were made in a climate of bitter social struggles,  
3 often violent. In this context, the promotion of an international consensus in support of a  
4 technology-led green revolution could be seen as an alignment with conservative forces,  
5 nationally and internationally (Frankel, 1971). A similar criticism saw the GR, the CGIAR and their  
6 promoters such as the World Bank, which indeed had played a crucial role in the formal creation  
7 of the CGIAR, patterned on other consultative groups sponsored by the Bank, as an attempt at  
8 'liquidating peasantries' in developing countries (Feder, 1976). These criticisms prompted a large  
9 body of empirical research and interpretative analyses to evaluate the impact of the GR on  
10 poverty and the survival of small-scale producers. The assessment of the merits and limitations of  
11 the transfer of technology (ToT) model draws on that literature (2.1) (Harris, 1977; Lipton and  
12 Longhurst, 1989; Biggs and Farrington, 1991; Hazell and Ramaswamy, 1991; Lipton, 2005). One  
13 important lesson was that the social impacts of the technological changes associated with the GR  
14 varied greatly in space and in time. This should not come as a surprise since we know that  
15 technological change is only one component in the complex evolution of social realities yet the  
16 implications for how AKST were conducted within the CGIAR and with the CG's partners did not  
17 immediately sink in. The controversies themselves also reflect the fact that many views  
18 expressed in the controversies were oversimplifications drawn from limited empirical data, giving  
19 privileged attention to some aspects of the complex phenomena involved.

20  
21 Similarly, the debates on the role of the CGIAR in the impact of the GR on the environment have  
22 been heated (2.1). Those who defend the GR and the CGIAR emphasize the millions of hectares  
23 of primary forests and other lands saved from destruction through the intensification of existing  
24 cropland that the GR permitted (see Borlaug's numerous public speeches on the topic). There is  
25 no doubt, however, that negative environmental effects, ranging from pollution to degradation of  
26 land and water resources also have been significant (Byerlee, 1992). Another environmental  
27 consequence, the increase in the uniformity of crop germplasm, with all the risks that the  
28 corresponding loss of biodiversity entails, roused similar controversies (Hogg, 2000; Falcon and  
29 Fowler, 2002).

30  
31 *Subsequent evolution of the CGIAR.* These debates and the recognition that many issues were  
32 not well addressed led to changes within the CGIAR. For instance, it was recognized that the  
33 focus on individual crops had serious limitations. Mixed farming – the basis of many small-scale  
34 farming systems-, agroecosystem sustainability and the management of natural resources had  
35 not been addressed systematically. The two livestock-focused centers had not achieved impacts  
36 comparable to the crop-focused centers. These concerns led to the creation in the 1970s and  
37 1980s of a further wave of international agricultural research centers that were initially outside the

1 ambit of the CGIAR (e.g. IWMI: water and irrigation, IBSRAM: soils, ICRAF: agroforestry,  
2 ICLARM: aquatic resources, and INIBAP: plantains and bananas). Generally speaking, the newer  
3 institutions developed more extensive networks of partnerships with a wider range of civil society  
4 and public agencies than the original crop research centers. In the early 1990s, some of the new  
5 centers were brought into the CGIAR ambit, after much discussion and resistance by those who  
6 feared that the expansion of the CGIAR would entail a reduction in funding for the original  
7 centers. Two major concerns drove this expansion: the perceived need to widen the research  
8 agenda to include a systematic focus on natural resource management, and a broad recognition  
9 of the need for CGIAR centers to diversify their partnerships and networking capacity. The  
10 international centers were thus driven by a growing pressure to address new issues, mainly  
11 related to natural resource management, and to address more directly than before the needs of  
12 the poorest producers and of under-valued clients, such as women (Jiggins, 1986; Gurung and  
13 Menter, 2004).

14  
15 In response to donor calls for more efficient, collaborative and cost-effective approaches, the CG  
16 centers opened up to new modes of collaboration, including ‘system-wide programs’ that draw  
17 together expertise from across the range of centers and other AKST actors in order to focus on  
18 specific themes and the development of ‘partnerships for innovation’. The increasing focus on  
19 innovation in turn required the centers to pay more attention to institutional issues and the  
20 contexts in which a technology is inserted and to seek a wider range of partners in recognition of  
21 the emerging global architecture for AKST (Petit et al., 1996). However, the rate of change within  
22 the CG was considered by its funders to be too slow and indecisive. One of the solutions was the  
23 introduction of well-resourced, multistakeholder, regionally focused “Challenge Programs”  
24 (CGIAR, 2001), often including a competitive research grant component. Their emphasis on  
25 multiple partnerships is a potentially significant institutional development for the CGIAR system.  
26 As yet however, there is insufficient evidence to assess their contribution to sustainable  
27 development or to driving change within the CG. The Global Forum on Agricultural Research  
28 (GFAR) was established in 1996 as a complementary initiative to promote global leadership in  
29 AKST for shared public interest goals; currently there is insufficient data for an assessment of  
30 GFAR’s effectiveness.

31  
32 *Current debates.* In spite of the changes briefly sketched above, the debates and controversies  
33 about the CGIAR have not disappeared. For some, “the CGIAR and the GR that it created have  
34 arguably been the most successful investments in development ever made” (Falcon and Naylor,  
35 2005). Yet criticisms abound. The old fundamental questions regarding the insufficient inclusion  
36 of the poor and marginalized and the consequences on the environment, particularly the loss of  
37 biodiversity, have not been resolved in the eyes of many. Another criticism, often heard but

1 seldom formalized, is that the CGIAR is very much part of the ‘establishment’ and not sufficiently  
2 receptive enough to new ideas. An illustration of this resistance to change is the assessment by  
3 social scientists (other than economists) that their expertise has not been used as effectively as  
4 possible (a few have now been integrated into some CG centers) (Rhoades, 2006; Cernea and  
5 Kassam, 2006). Another frequent criticism, often heard in donor circles but not often openly  
6 expressed, is that many centers are not open enough to broad partnerships with multiple and  
7 diverse actors. Others continue to fear a dilution of the main mission and unique role of the  
8 CGIAR, lest it drift more and more towards becoming a broad based development agency. Thus,  
9 some convincingly argue for a stronger CGIAR focus on international public goods through its  
10 attention higher productivity, particularly for orphan crops (Falcon and Naylor, 2005). One lesson  
11 to draw from this debate may be the relevance of, but also the difficulties associated with, the use  
12 of the concept of global public goods (Dalrymple, 2006; Unnevehr, 2004).

13  
14 *Food and Agriculture Organization of United Nations (FAO)* was founded in October 1945 under  
15 the United Nations as a key pillar of the post WWII reconstruction, with a mandate to raise levels  
16 of nutrition and standards of living, to improve agricultural productivity and the condition of rural  
17 populations. From 1994 onwards, it has undergone significant restructuring in an effort to  
18 increase the voice of tropical countries in its governance and priority setting and in response to  
19 advances within AKST and the changing architecture of public and private provision. Although  
20 remaining heavily male-dominated in its staffing and leadership, it has been a significant global  
21 actor in creating awareness of gender issues, stimulating growth with equity and in linking  
22 nutrition, food security and health issues.

23  
24 It has played a leading role in organizing disinterested technical advice in the international  
25 response to the health and environmental concerns associated with synthetic chemical pesticides  
26 (see 2.3.2), leading among other important outcomes to the International Code of Conduct on the  
27 Distribution and Use of Pesticides and efforts to remove stockpiles of obsolete pesticides. This  
28 code has encouraged many countries to adopt pesticide legislation and regulations although  
29 governments may experience difficulty in implementing and managing pesticide regulations in the  
30 face of competing interests (Dinham, 1995). The FAO similarly has played a critical role also in  
31 international efforts to protect crop genetic diversity through the International Treaty on Plant  
32 Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. One of the important spin-offs so far is the Global  
33 Crop Diversity Trust hosted jointly by FAO and IPGRI (<http://www.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/itpgr.htm>).

34  
35 *The World Bank.* The World Bank Group was established as another of the key pillars of post  
36 World War II reconstruction. It consists of the International Bank of Rural Development (IBRD),  
37 the International Development Agency (IDA), International Finance Corporation (IFC) and

1 Multilateral Investment Agency (MIGA). The Group has been and remains a leading global player  
2 in development policy, funding and advisory efforts. It has invested heavily in economic and  
3 service infrastructures in rural areas; it was an early backer and consistent supporter of the  
4 emerging CG system and particularly through the 1980s dominated investments in agricultural  
5 extension and advisory systems in developing countries. The World Bank directly shapes the  
6 development path of many borrower countries through its research and through structural  
7 adjustment programs that restructure national economies or specific sectors (including  
8 agriculture). Yet Bank agricultural lending has decreased steadily over the past 60 years;  
9 currently it constitutes less than 10% of IBRD and IDA lending. The very mixed effects of these  
10 trends and shifts in financing on AKST and on innovation in the agricultural sector have been  
11 assessed in the 2008 World Development Report on Agriculture (World Bank, 2008). Internal as  
12 well as external analysts over the last 15 years have recommended that the trend be reversed.

13

14 Like other development actors, the World Bank has evolved over the decades in response to  
15 different drivers, external pressures and internal experiences (Stone and Wright, 2007).  
16 According to one narrative, the Bank initially perceived its central role as the transfer of capital  
17 from rich countries to poor ones. The bulk of its portfolio lay in infrastructure projects developed  
18 by engineers. In the 1970s, Bank management concluded that infrastructure development alone  
19 was not sufficient to eliminate poverty and so Bank agricultural economists focused on “poverty  
20 alleviation.” In the 1980s, macroeconomists, who played a leading role in designing investment  
21 projects at the Bank, viewed the debt crisis as evidence that sectoral development efforts could  
22 not succeed in the presence of major macroeconomic imbalances. Powerful interests in  
23 industrialized countries (where commercial banks feared that the loans they had made to  
24 developing country governments were at risk), pressured their government representatives in the  
25 Bank, and in the IMF to intervene. Accordingly, Bank management promoted structural  
26 adjustment programs as a condition of its lending. In the 1990s, the Asian economic crisis  
27 demonstrated that a narrow macroeconomic perspective was not appropriate for the pursuit of a  
28 sustainable development agenda, and the role of social sciences was gradually recognized.  
29 Changes in the hierarchy of professional disciplines within the Bank did not come about smoothly.  
30 Struggles eventually led to greater inclusion of the social sciences (Kardan, 1993); Ismail  
31 Serageldin, a Bank vice-president, spelled out why non-economic social scientists were not  
32 listened to earlier and delineated key intellectual challenges that remained to be faced (Cernea,  
33 1994).

34

35 Political economic, anthropological and ethnographic analyses have also assessed the role of the  
36 Bank (Wade, 1996, 1997, 2001, 2004; Ferguson, 1990; Harris, 2001; Mosse, 2004a; Broad,  
37 2006; Bebbington et al., 2007). Simple causal linkages between external event, internal analysis,

1 policy formation and subsequent implementation have been questioned (Mosse, 2004b).  
2 Evidence suggests that the Bank through its principal research unit has constructed, defended,  
3 maintained and promoted a neoliberal paradigm, despite changing contexts and emerging  
4 empirical evidence that challenge this paradigm (Broad, 2006). Organizational dynamics and  
5 international political economy have consistently shaped policy statements produced by the Bank  
6 over the period, while organizational culture—the everyday imperative to disburse loans and  
7 move projects through the pipeline, the internal incentive structure, hiring, staffing and  
8 subcontracting decisions and, importantly, power relationships within the Bank and between it  
9 and other actors—have been more decisive determinants of the outcomes of Bank interventions  
10 than its policy statements (Liebenthal, 2002; Mosse, 2004a; Bebbington et al., 2007). The  
11 empirical evidence indicates a need for more political economy and social science-based  
12 analyses of the World Bank’s institutional behavior, culture, internal and external power relations  
13 and dynamics, and outcomes in terms of equitable and sustainable development.

14  
15 The positive role of the Bank in the provision of financial resources to AKST includes loans to  
16 many governments in support of public agricultural research and extension institutions. Such  
17 support usually accompanied commitment to institutional reforms of these institutions. For  
18 instance, in Mali a Bank loan permitted the creation of research user committees at the level of  
19 regional research centers. These committees were designed to give a voice to farmers in the  
20 selection of research topics and in the evaluation of the usefulness to them of research results.  
21 The initiative gave some space for educated farmers with more resources to participate in  
22 research agenda-setting. In India, a large loan made in the late 1990s promoted significant  
23 reforms in the large Indian public sector agricultural research establishment, which had become  
24 quite bureaucratized. In Brazil, the volume of the loan made in the late 1990s was relatively  
25 modest; it was used by the then new leaders of EMBRAPA, the national research institute, to  
26 facilitate institutional reforms. The impact of Bank supported projects have been assessed and  
27 documented by the Bank’s own Operation Evaluation Department (OED), a quasi-independent  
28 body which, while providing a degree of critical analysis, admittedly often reflects the dominant  
29 ideology in the Bank. Accordingly, the final and critical evaluation by OED of the T&V agricultural  
30 extension system, long promoted by the Bank particularly in Africa, was published only in 2003  
31 (Anderson, Feder, and Ganguly, 2006) i.e. long after the shortcomings of T&V had been  
32 emphasized by its critics; thus internal institutional learning and reform has been slow.

33  
34 In 1992, the Bank joined 178 governments in committing itself to Agenda 21, a global effort to  
35 articulate the link between environment and development issues. An internal World Bank review  
36 of progress towards environmentally sustainable development found that it had failed to integrate  
37 environmental sustainability into its core objectives or to forge effective cross-sectoral linkages

1 between environmental and other development goals (Liebenthal, 2002). External assessments  
2 similarly found that the Bank had not lived up to the expectations of its Agenda 21 commitment  
3 (FOE/Halifax Initiative, 2002). A four-year Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative, in  
4 which the World Bank participated, reported that the effects of the Bank's structural adjustment  
5 programs on the rural poor over the past 20 years had been largely negative (SAPRIN, 2002).  
6 External analyses likewise found that these programs tended to drive the evolution of AKST  
7 towards high external input models of production, while the pressure of debt repayment  
8 schedules in turn prevented governments from investing in poverty-oriented multi-sector  
9 sustainable development programs at home (Hammond and McGowan, 1992; Danaher, 1994;  
10 Korten, 1995; Oxfam America, 1995; Clapp, 1997; McGowan, 1997; Hellinger, 1999; SAPRIN,  
11 2002).

12  
13 An important lesson is that both because of its size and its role as a financial institution, the World  
14 Bank has not been deft in its interventions in countries' institutional arrangements, particularly at  
15 the local level. This is a damaging limitation because as other subchapters demonstrate,  
16 appropriate institutional arrangements, particularly at the local level, are critical to the  
17 effectiveness of AKST in terms of the Assessment's criteria of equitable and sustainable  
18 development. The Bank also has faced numerous demands in the area of AKST from other  
19 development funding agencies that are willing to fund initiatives through "trust fund  
20 arrangements." The danger that the Bank could be drifting too far from its primary role as a  
21 financial institution has been keenly felt by some senior managers; as a result, the Bank has at  
22 times taken up and then dropped AKST initiatives that may have been worthwhile in advancing  
23 broader development goals. The consequences of its brief attention to these issues have not  
24 been well assessed. The other regional development banks have not held the central and  
25 symbolic role of the World Bank. But they also have played an important role in their region and  
26 have sent powerful signals regarding their AKST priorities to client governments. More in-depth  
27 social scientific analyses of the nature of the banks' interactions with other AKST actors and their  
28 contributions to equitable and sustainable development, is warranted.

#### 30 **2.2.4 Public-private and private sectoral arrangements**

31 *Public-private arrangements.* A number of countries have relied on multi-organizational  
32 partnerships to carry AKST to small-scale producers. For instance, the Foundation for the  
33 Participatory and Sustainable Development of the Small-scale producers of Colombia (Spanish  
34 acronym, PBA) brings together members of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development,  
35 the Ministry of the Environment and the DNP (National Planning Department); international  
36 research centers, such as CIAT (International Center for Tropical Agriculture); research agencies  
37 such as CORPOICA (Colombian Corporation of Agricultural Research) and CONIF (National

1 Agency for Forestry Research); national and regional universities and local farmers'  
2 organizations. It is responsible for bringing together at local levels the expertise and support  
3 required for small-scale producers and rural entrepreneurs in research, technology generation,  
4 and extension and agroenterprise development. The Andean consortium, established in the early  
5 1990s on the initiative of the PBA, brings together five Andean countries (Venezuela, Colombia,  
6 Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia) under a regional project in order to strengthen participative exchange  
7 of research and technology with small-scale producers, as well as mobilize international  
8 cooperation in AKST and funding. The project has significantly advanced understanding of the  
9 small farm economy, established a strong nucleus of expertise in participatory research,  
10 developed the scientific, adaptive and applied research infrastructure and established key  
11 agroenterprises for the production of clean seed and bio-inputs, and initiated links with private  
12 commercial actors in the development of value-adding chains in export-oriented markets, e.g., cut  
13 flowers, tropical fruits and counter-season vegetable supply.

14  
15 Organizations such as *Solidaridad* have extended the concept and practices of public-private  
16 partnerships by linking fair trade to high return markets, such as the fashion industry and more  
17 recently, by moving an increasing amount of fair trade product into mass marketing. This effort is  
18 being guided by the multistakeholder negotiation of Codes of Conduct. For instance, the Common  
19 Code for the Coffee Industry was introduced in September 2004. It is currently operating in  
20 Vietnam and Uganda, with major expansion from 2006 onwards under the sponsorship of the  
21 German Ministry for Development Cooperation, the German Coffee Association, producer  
22 associations and major coffee processors, such as Nestlé, Tchibo, Kraft and Sara Lee, and  
23 international organizations such as Consumers International.

24  
25 *Private sector arrangements for profit.* The last sixty years have witnessed a rapid increase in the  
26 concentration of commercial control by a handful of companies over the sale of planting seed for  
27 the world's major traded crops – by 1999, seven companies controlled a high percentage of  
28 global seed sales and the concentration has since increased through take-overs and company  
29 mergers. The budgets of the leading six agrochemical companies in 2001-2002 combined  
30 equaled US\$ 3.2 billion – compared to a total CGIAR budget in 2003 of US\$ 330 million, an order  
31 of magnitude less (Dinham, 2005). At the same time, national small and medium-sized seed  
32 companies have emerged, playing an important role for small-scale producers and niche markets.  
33 They may result in improved market access by small-scale farmers to locally adapted and  
34 affordable seed but this remains to be proven. Interesting innovations include the following three  
35 examples. The Seeds of Development Program (SODP) is a capacity development and network  
36 initiative that seeks to alleviate rural poverty through improved access to appropriate seed  
37 varieties. It offers an innovative program for small and medium sized indigenous seed companies



1 in Africa. The network currently includes 25 seed companies in eight African countries. The  
2 SODP has been developed by Market Matters, Inc., a US-based organization working in  
3 collaboration with Cornell University. Private seed companies operating in India for many years  
4 relied on ICRISAT-bred hybrid parents and while gradually developing their own research and  
5 development capabilities; over time they became a major channel for large-scale farm level  
6 adoption of hybrids derived from ICRISAT-bred hybrid parents or their derivatives. ICRISAT  
7 realized that such partners have better integrated perceptions of farmers' preferences and this  
8 triggered the initiation in 2000 of the ICRISAT-Private Sector Hybrid Parent Research Consortia  
9 for sorghum and pearl millet. The consortia expanded to include pigeon pea in 2004. Small and  
10 medium sized manufactures of agricultural machinery and equipment, specialized for  
11 conservation agricultural equipment (e.g. no-till seeders and planters), especially in Brazil,  
12 provide agronomic assistance to farmers and advice on conservation agriculture, which  
13 simultaneously increases their own market.

#### 14 **2.2.5 NGOs and other civil society networks**

15 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are the so-called 'third sector' of development, which is  
16 different from but interacts with both the state (public) and the for-profit private sector in AKST  
17 relationships ranging from complementarily to challenge (Farrington and Lewis, 1993; Farrington  
18 et al., 1993). The NGO sector developed in response to the actual and perceived failures or  
19 shortcomings of the state, a desire to examine developmental questions from motives other than  
20 those of profit and to question and analyze interests, priorities and the conditionalities imposed by  
21 donor agencies and other organizational actors. A fundamental basis of NGO activity is  
22 voluntarism (Uphoff, 1993) and this conditions NGO perspectives and scope of action and  
23 imposes a degree of similarity on what is an otherwise diverse domain. The diversity in the  
24 domain may be usefully classified by the origin of the NGO (Southern, Northern, Northern with  
25 activities in the South etc.); the nature of the work - grassroots organizations (such as  
26 communities, cooperatives, neighborhood communities, etc.), organizations that give support to  
27 the grassroots, and those that (whether in addition to other activities or solely focused on this) are  
28 engaged in networking and lobbying activities; their funding; relationships with the state and  
29 private sector; their membership base; their size, staffing and relationships with their  
30 constituencies (which could be as diverse as rural farmers, urban slum dwellers, indigenous  
31 tribes), and the mechanisms and procedures in place for accountability (Farrington and Lewis,  
32 1993; Farrington et al., 1993). In the case of the agricultural sector, the main types of NGOs  
33 encountered are those working directly with farmers with close involvement in dissemination of  
34 farming techniques and processes, provision of agricultural inputs, technologies, access to  
35 markets and implements (i.e. developmental NGOs); NGOs that are engaged in conducting  
36 research on agricultural crops, processes and products (research NGOs); NGOs that lobby for  
37

1 specific issues related to agriculture ranging from farm-worker health, to gender empowerment  
2 among farming communities, to advocating for specific regional, national and international  
3 agriculture and trade policies (advocacy NGOs); NGOs focusing on activities such as microcredit  
4 for farmers and agricultural communities (support NGOs).

5  
6 The nature of activities that NGOs undertake, their relationship with the state and the private  
7 sector, their core constituency and nature of their involvement with it, their own organizational  
8 character and staff profile determine the attitude of an NGO towards the kinds of knowledge it  
9 considers valid and consequently the nature of knowledge processes it engages with and utilizes  
10 in its interactions with its constituency (Pretty, 1994). The processes of engagement range from  
11 the commissioning of research providers to inform NGO action, top-down dissemination of  
12 knowledge through NGO community trainers to engagement with farming communities in  
13 research and enquiry through user groups and participatory committees and direct involvement of  
14 farming communities in research agenda setting and knowledge selection. NGOs have become  
15 significant players in AKST. One of the largest member-based NGOs, BirdLife International has  
16 become a significant player in organizing civil society-based collection of data that informs local,  
17 national and global environmental policy and conservation effort. Local groups affiliated to this  
18 NGO and to WWF (World Wildlife Fund) were instrumental in ensuring that attention was paid to  
19 the impacts on native biodiversity in UK trials of GM oil seed rape and other selected field crops.  
20 Collaboration among three Indian NGOs (Deccan Development Society, Andhra Pradesh  
21 Coalition in Defence of Diversity and Permaculture Association of India) supported the first  
22 thorough assessment of Bt Cotton from farmers' perspectives (Qayum and Sakkhari, 2005).

### 23 24 **2.3 AKST Evolutions over Time: Thematic Narratives**

25 The implementation and evolution of different IAs (sub-chapter 2.2), have been causes as well as  
26 consequences of the main changes in AKST. Although it now appears that AKST presents itself  
27 as a whole, or at least as a tightly intertwined ensemble of domains, it has not always been the  
28 case. Progressively, over centuries, a hierarchy has developed between scientific knowledge,  
29 technological knowledge and agricultural production, the latter being progressively limited to the  
30 execution of external recipes. Paralleling this hierarchy, science itself established a hierarchy  
31 between emerging and evolving disciplines: chemistry, biology, genetics, botany, entomology,  
32 economy, sociology, and anthropology are permanently struggling for recognition, status and  
33 resources, and scientists engage in alliances with other actors in this purpose. Science allied with  
34 technology branched out in different domains of application that resulted in new professions  
35 related to various aspects of agricultural production, its products and impacts. Hence, in modern  
36 times is that the role of scientific research in maximizing agricultural productivity has increased  
37 exponentially (Cernea and Kassam, 2006). However, through the last decades, a reverse

1 movement has occurred and the division between the different branches of AKST have been  
2 blurred, the great divide of labor between science and technology is currently challenged, the  
3 hierarchy among disciplines reveals its shortcomings and the role of public and private actors has  
4 changed.

5  
6 The following narratives are illustrative of how AKST contributed and shaped (as well as resulted  
7 from) the management of three major elements: seeds, pests, and food. These narratives identify  
8 trends, turns, and bifurcations in each domain and look at the major actors who managed them,  
9 in response to drivers relevant for them.

### 11 **2.3.1. Historical trends in germplasm management and their implications for the future**

#### 12 2.3.1.1. Summary of major trends in the history of global germplasm management

13 Genetic resource management over the past 150 years has been marked by an institutional  
14 narrowing with the number and diversity of actors engaged in germplasm management declining.  
15 Breeding has largely become an isolated activity, increasingly separated from agricultural and  
16 cultural systems from which it evolved (Box 2-1).

17  
18 This narrowing is illustrated in history by four major trends: (i) a movement from public to private  
19 ownership of germplasm; (ii) unprecedented concentration of agrochemical, seed corporations,  
20 and commodity traders; (iii) tensions between civil society, seed corporations, breeders and  
21 farmers in the drafting of IPR; (iv) stagnation in funding for common goods germplasm. These  
22 trends have reduced options for using germplasm to respond to the uncertainties of the future.  
23 They have also increased asymmetries in access to germplasm and benefit sharing and  
24 increases vulnerabilities of the poor.

25  
26 INSERT Box 2-1. Timeline of genetic resource management.

27  
28 For example, farmers have received no direct compensation for formerly held public accessions  
29 that have been sold on to the private sector but have generally benefited from public breeding  
30 arrangements. It remains a question if farmers now have to pay for accessing seed stock and  
31 germplasm that contain lines and traits that originally were bred by them and originated in their  
32 own farming systems. Meanwhile, decreases in funding for public breeding has stagnated  
33 research innovations for the public good (e.g. lack of research on orphan crops). New ownership  
34 and IPR regimes have restricted movement and made development of noncommercial (public)  
35 good constructs more expensive. These changes have limited those actors that do not have  
36 legal, commercial and financial power.

37

1 2.3.1.2. Genetic resources as a common heritage

2 *Farmers as managers of genetic resources.* Historically, farmers have been the principal  
3 generators and stewards of crop genetic resources (e.g. Simmonds, 1979). This means that  
4 genetic resources have been viewed as a common heritage to be shared and exchanged. The  
5 concept places farmers at the center of control of their own food security. The planting of  
6 genetically diverse, geographically localized landraces by farmers can be conceptualized as a  
7 decentralized management regime with significant biological (Brush, 1991; Tripp, 1997;  
8 Almekinders and Louwaars, 1999) and political (e.g. Ellen et al., 2000; Stone, 2007) implications.  
9 Studies of traditional farming systems suggest that farmers in Africa (Mulatu and Zelleke, 2002;  
10 van Leur and Gebre, 2003) the Americas (Quiros et al., 1992; Bellon et al., 1997, 2003; Perales  
11 et al., 2003) and Asia (Trinh et al., 2003; Jaradat et al., 2004;) managed and continue to manage  
12 existing varieties and innovate new ones through a variety of techniques including hybridization  
13 with wild species, regulation of cross-pollination, and directional selection (Bellon et al., 1997). In  
14 many parts of the world, it is women's knowledge systems that select and shape crop genetic  
15 resources (Tsegaye, 1997; Howard, 2003; Mkumbira et al., 2003). The fear is that erosion of crop  
16 diversity is commonly paralleled by erosion of the farmer's skills and farmer empowerment  
17 (Bellon et al., 1997; Brown, 2000; Mkumbira et al., 2003; Gepts, 2004). This loss of farmer's skills  
18 (i.e., agricultural deskilling; see Stone, 2007) means a loss of community sovereignty as less of  
19 the population is able to cultivate and control their own food (see 2.3.3).

20

21 *Development of public and private sector.* The public sector emerged to catalyze formal crop  
22 improvement, focusing on yield with high input requirements and wide adaptability (Tripp 1997;  
23 Almekinders and Louwaars, 1999). Major benefits arose from breeding with large, diverse  
24 germplasm populations. These advancements had both negative and positive impacts on farming  
25 communities as more uniform crops replaced locally adapted crops. Meanwhile, expeditions to  
26 collect global germplasm were underway by several nations and gene banks were established for  
27 the conservation of germplasm for use in research and breeding.

28

29 Public sector institutions were the dominant distributors of improved varieties in first half of the  
30 20th century, aiming to reach as large a constituency possible. Where different forms of mass  
31 selection formed the main breeding method in the 19th century, the rediscovery of Mendel's laws  
32 of heredity (1900) and the discovery of heterosis (1908) spurred the growth of the commercial  
33 industry, most notably with the founding of Pioneer Hi-Bred in 1919 (Crow, 1998; Reeves and  
34 Cassaday, 2002). Throughout the 20th century, universities and research institutes gradually  
35 specialized in basic research while the private sector increased its capacity in practical breeding.  
36 The public sector assumed primary responsibility for pre-breeding, managing genetic resources  
37 and creating scientific networks that acted as conduits of information and technology flow (Pingali

1 and Traxler, 2002), and creating regulatory bodies for variety testing, official release, and seed  
2 certification.

3  
4 *The first institutional arrangements exported to developing countries.* The education, research  
5 and extension system triangle commonly found in industrial countries was exported to developing  
6 countries to help foster agricultural development and food security, mainly through the  
7 development of broadly adapted germplasm. With the aid of the Rockefeller Foundation (and later  
8 the Ford Foundation), a collaborative research program on maize, wheat and beans in Mexico  
9 was founded in 1943. This laid the foundation for the first international research centers of the  
10 CGIAR, with the initial focus to improve globally important staple crops (see 2.2.4).

11  
12 The formation of the CGIAR centers laid the groundwork for the emergence of the technologies of  
13 the Green Revolution. Borrowing from breeding work in developed countries, high yielding  
14 varieties (HYV) of rice, wheat, and maize were developed in 1960s and 70s. By the year 2000,  
15 8000 modern varieties had been released by more than 400 public breeding programs in over  
16 100 countries. The FAO launched a significant program to establish formal seed production  
17 capacities and so-called 'lateral spread' systems in developing countries to make the new  
18 varieties available to as many farmers as possible. These public seed projects, financed by  
19 UNDP, World Bank and bilateral donors were subsequently commercialized, often as parastatal  
20 companies, before national or multinational seed companies were established in these  
21 developing countries (World Bank, 1995; Morris 1998; Morris and Ekesingh, 2001).

22  
23 The FAO has estimated the economic and social consequences of crop genetic improvement  
24 gains emanating from the international agricultural research centers using the IFPRI based model  
25 'IMPACT' (Evenson and Gollin, 2003b). Without CGIAR input, it is estimated that world food and  
26 feed grain prices would have been 18-20% higher: world food production 4-5% lower, and imports  
27 of food in developing countries about 5% higher. Debates continue as to whether increases in  
28 food production, such as those of the Green Revolution, necessarily lead to increases in food  
29 security (IFPRI, 2002; Box 2-2; see 2.3.3).

30  
31 INSERT Box 2-2. Historical limitations of CGIAR arrangements.

32  
33 *Sharing of genetic resources as historical norm.* Until the 1970's, there were very few national  
34 and international laws creating proprietary rights or other forms of explicit restriction to access to  
35 plant genetic resources. The common heritage concept of genetic resources as belonging to the  
36 public domain had been the foundation of farming communities for millennia where seed was  
37 exchanged and invention was collective (Brush, 2003). Farmers and professional breeding have

1 relied on genetic resources, in the public domain or in the market, to be freely available for use in  
2 research and breeding. The public-sector research ‘culture’ is based on this tradition of open-  
3 sharing of resources and research findings (Gepts, 2004) although this is changing (see below),  
4 with serious social and political implications. Indeed, the global collaboration required for the  
5 development of the HYVs of the Green Revolution demonstrated the effectiveness of an  
6 international approach to sharing of germplasm. The International Undertaking on Plant Genetic  
7 Resources, 1983, encapsulated this spirit citing the “universally accepted principle that plant  
8 genetic resources are a heritage of mankind and consequently should be available without  
9 restriction.” Since that time, in many ways, the common heritage principle has been turned on its  
10 head, with the gradual encroachment of claims for control over access to and use of genetic  
11 resources grounded in IP laws, assertions of national sovereignty (Safrin, 2004) and or the  
12 intentional use of technologies that cannot be re-used by farmers.

13  
14 The common heritage or public goods approach to the use of Plant Genetic Resources for Food  
15 and Agriculture (PGRFA) has not been entirely eclipsed. It is worth noting in this regard that the  
16 Union for the Protection of Plant Varieties (UPOV) Conventions through their several revisions to  
17 further strengthen breeders’ rights have consistently maintained a “breeders’ exemption” which  
18 allows researchers/breeders to use protected materials in the development of new varieties  
19 without the permission of the owners (as long as the new varieties are not ‘essentially derived’  
20 from the protected varieties). Furthermore, in what might be considered a surprise development  
21 in the context of the overall shift in the genetic rights paradigm, the International Treaty on  
22 PGRFA creates an international research and breeding commons within which individuals and  
23 organizations in member states, and international organizations that sign special agreements,  
24 enjoy facilitated access (and benefit sharing) on preset, minimal transaction costs. Farmers and  
25 other target groups of this assessment have been inadvertently, and largely negatively, affected  
26 by the battles over genetic rights.

#### 27 28 2.3.1.3. Major change in germplasm management

29 *The development of IPR in breeding.* The business environment and size of the market are  
30 important factors for investment. Intellectual property rights (IPR) provides a level of protection.  
31 With the introduction of IPR, the private seed industry has benefited from the ability to appropriate  
32 profits to recoup investments and foster further research, organizational capability and growth  
33 (Heisey et al., 2001). The stakes are high; IPR regimes have transformed the US \$21 billion  
34 dollar global seed market and contribute to the restructuring of the seed industry (ETC, 2005).

35  
36 The increasingly international character of IPR regimes is a reflection of widespread and  
37 integrated trade in germplasm resources as well as global trends toward liberalization of markets

1 and trade, privatization, and structural adjustment that reduce the role of the public sector (Tripp  
2 and Byerlee, 2000).

3  
4 *An evolution towards stronger IPR protection.* Germplasm protections have been both biological;  
5 (e.g. hybrid maize) and legal. Initially plants were excluded from patentability for moral, technical  
6 and political reasons. For example, special, so-called *sui generis* protection was developed for  
7 asexually reproduced plants (US Plant Act 1930). In Europe protection for all varieties in the  
8 1940s was harmonized through the Union for the Protection of Plant Varieties (UPOV) (1961).  
9 This Plant Variety Protection (PVP) system recognized farmers and breeders exemptions. While  
10 PVP offers protection to private seed producers by prohibiting others from producing and selling  
11 the protected variety commercially, it does not restrict anyone from using a protected variety as  
12 parental material in future breeding. This is known as ‘farmer’s privilege’ and responds to the  
13 traditional seed handling mechanisms which allows farmers to save and exchange seed (1978  
14 Act), a provision which was interpreted very widely in the USA, leading to large scale ‘brown  
15 bagging.’

16  
17 Utility Patents (UP) on a bacterium in 1980 signaled the advent of an era of strong IPR (Falcon  
18 and Fowler, 2002), marking the end of ‘farmer’s privilege,’ which was restricted in the latest  
19 revision in UPOV (1991 Act). This loss of privilege generated heated debate among ratifying  
20 countries, especially developing nations, because it limits the rights of farmers to freely save,  
21 exchange, reuse and sell agricultural seeds (Tansey and Rajotte, 2008).

22  
23 Patents entered plant breeding initially through court decisions in the USA in the 1980s via  
24 association with biotechnology. They were subsequently granted in other OECD countries, and  
25 offered greater protection to a wider array of products and processes, such as genes, traits,  
26 molecular constructs, and enabling technologies (Lesser and Mutschler, 2002). However,  
27 varieties are excluded from patentability in most countries. The EU introduced a breeder’s  
28 exemption into its patent law, and some EU countries have introduced a farmer’s privilege to  
29 avoid the pitfalls of excessively strong protection (World Bank, 2006).

30  
31 *IPR limitations.* Even though IPR may be important for private seed sector development, some  
32 sectors have been successful in developing countries without IP protection. For example, the  
33 private seed sector in India has grown and diversified without the benefit of IPRs but in the  
34 context of liberal seed laws and in many cases through the use of hybrids as a means of  
35 appropriation (Louwaars et al., 2005).

36  
37 Some indicators suggest that the IPR in developing countries may have occurred primarily as

1 costs, as many patents are thought to slow down research. This problem is described as “the  
2 problem of the anti-commons” (Heller and Eisenberg, 1999) or “patent thickets” (Shapiro, 2001;  
3 Pray et al., 2005). Consider the example of Veery wheat, which is the product of 3170 different  
4 crosses involving 51 parents from 26 countries that were globally, publicly released. The  
5 development cycle of Veery would have been very difficult if, for each parent and each cross, it  
6 was necessary to negotiate a separate agreement (SGRP, 2006). Even though IPR tends to be  
7 territorial, i.e. granted at the national level, trade agreements have led to greater ‘harmonization’  
8 of IPR regimes (Falcon and Fowler, 2002) with countries adopting laws and rules that may not  
9 benefit seed-saving farmers (Box 2-3).

10  
11 INSERT Box 2-3. Emergence of TRIPs-Plus.

12  
13 In many developing countries, institutional infrastructure required for implementation and  
14 enforcement of IPR regimes is still lacking. Opposition against TRIPS and the IP-clauses of free  
15 trade agreements concentrates on the lack of incentives for development of the seed industry in  
16 developing countries due to the harmonization approach. However, in agricultural biotechnology  
17 development, which is highly concentrated, the IPR issues precipitate more in the form of  
18 licensing practices and policies, shaping the impact of patent systems to a large extent.  
19 Consequently, there has been a misconception that existing problems can be best solved through  
20 reshaping patent regulations and laws alone. There is a related need to examine how licensing  
21 agreements contribute to many problems at the intersection of IP and agricultural biotechnology  
22 (CIPP, 2004).

23  
24 *Sharing of genetic resources; challenge and necessity. A reaction to IPR: national sovereignty*  
25 *and equity issues.* The lack of explicit rules governing germplasm rights was the historical  
26 standard in agriculture until the 1990’s. As pressure to protect IPR in improved varieties and  
27 ‘inventions’ increased, the atmosphere concerning access to and use of genetic resources  
28 became increasingly politicized. This was augmented with concern, particularly among  
29 developing countries, that inequitable global patterns were established in the distribution of  
30 benefits associated with the use of genetic resources. Concurrently, there was growing concern  
31 that genetic diversity and local knowledge related to the use of those resources continued to be  
32 eroded under the pressures of modernization (Gepts, 2004).

33  
34 In response, the international community attempted to address these tensions and create a new  
35 regime for access to genetic resources and the sharing of benefits associated with their use. One  
36 of the most significant outcomes was the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD, 1994) (Box 2-  
37 4 and Chapter 7), which came into force in 1993. The CBD emphasized states’ sovereign rights



1 over their natural resources and their “authority to determine access to genetic resources, subject  
2 to national legislation.” The Convention also addresses rights of local and indigenous  
3 communities in this respect. Over 160 countries have ratified the CBD, the US is not among  
4 them. Most countries have interpreted the access and benefit sharing provisions of the CBD as  
5 the basis for establishing much tighter procedural and substantive restrictions to gaining access  
6 to genetic resources within their borders. To this end, they have developed, or are developing,  
7 bilaterally oriented access laws that require case-by-case negotiations to establish legal  
8 conditions for obtaining and using materials from a country although they are not binding, and few  
9 countries have reported implementing them. Nonetheless, they are a good indicator that most  
10 countries think of the CBD’s access and benefit sharing provisions as requiring, or justifying, a  
11 bilateral and restrictive approach to regulating access. Very different approaches were taken by  
12 individual countries to implement their sovereignty rights. Noticeably, the African Union and some  
13 countries in Asia (notably India and Thailand) have developed an approach that combines  
14 aspects of access and benefit sharing and breeder’s rights in one regulatory framework, thereby  
15 clearly indicating the connection between the two issues.

16  
17 INSERT Box 2-4. Convention on Biological Diversity.

18  
19 While a restrictive bilateral approach to implementing the CBD may be appropriate for wild  
20 endemic species of flora or fauna, it is not well suited to plant genetic resources for food and  
21 agriculture (Box 2-4). All domesticated crops are the end result of contributions of farmers from  
22 numerous countries or continents over extremely long periods of time. The CBD explicitly closed  
23 the concept of ‘heritage of mankind’ that had been expressed in the 1980’s. The nonbinding  
24 International Undertaking (Box 2-5) has re-established a commons for the crops and forages  
25 included in its Annex 1. CIP and IRRI have reported that since the CBD came into force,  
26 movement of plant varieties from and to their gene bank collections have been noticeably  
27 reduced and regulation of biological materials has resulted in increased bureaucracy and  
28 expense. Very few cases of effective (even non-monetary) benefit sharing as a result of CBD-  
29 based regulation during the first decade of the Convention (Visser et al., 2005). The key message  
30 is that promoting fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the use of genetic  
31 resources remains a major goal. Defining a monetary value to estimate the historic or current  
32 contribution of farmers’ varieties remains elusive (Mendelsohn, 2000). Identifying the actual  
33 genetic resource property attributable to specific farming communities or even nations is  
34 “problematic” (Peeters and Williams, 1984; Visser et al., 2000). Some proponents have argued  
35 that benefit sharing would be more successful in the form of transfer of international capital, e.g.  
36 through development assistance to improve rural incomes in genetically diverse farming systems  
37 (Brush, 2005). Another approach could be to reduce structural adjustment policies that link

1 agricultural credit to the planting of modern homogeneous varieties, and other crop and  
2 technology choices (Morales, 1991; Foko, 1999; Amalu, 2002).

3  
4 *The question of facilitated access.* To match the principle of national sovereignty with the needs  
5 of sustainable agriculture and food security, an International Treaty for Plant Genetic Resources  
6 for Food and Agriculture concluded in 2001 and entered force in June 2004 (Box 2-5 and Chapter  
7 7). With roughly the same objectives as the CBD, it translates its conservation and sustainable  
8 use goals to agriculture, including both *in situ*, on farm and *ex situ* conservation strategies, and  
9 various aspects of crop improvement by both farmers and specialized plant breeders in  
10 implementing ‘sustainable use’.

11  
12 INSERT Box 2-5. International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture.

13  
14 The main novelties in the International Treaty are (i) the creation of a Multilateral System for  
15 Access and Benefit Sharing for most important food crops and pasture species and (ii) the  
16 definition of the concept of Farmers’ Rights. Farmers’ Rights include the right of benefit sharing,  
17 of protection of traditional knowledge and of farmers’ involvement in relevant policy making. The  
18 objective is to have no restrictions on the ability of farmers to save, use, exchange and sell seed.  
19 However, signatory countries have freedom in specifying the Farmers’ Rights as “subject to  
20 national law and as appropriate.” The formulation was chosen to avoid conflict with existing and  
21 future IPR laws. Some claim that this formulation has thus far prevented an international  
22 acceptance of an inclusive Farmers’ Rights concept (Brush, 2005).

23  
24 2.3.1.4. Increasing consolidation of the private sector.

25 *The changing face of the seed industry.* In the context of newly emerging IPR regimes and the  
26 development of biotechnology (e.g. identification, cloning and transferring of individual genes), a  
27 major theme of consolidation in the agricultural plant biotechnology and seed industries has  
28 emerged (Pingali and Traxler, 2002; Pray et al., 2005). This consolidation significantly altered the  
29 course of germplasm management and marked a major shift in the relationship between the  
30 public and private sector.

31  
32 Consolidation of the industry began with mergers of family-owned seed companies by  
33 multinational chemical firms to capitalize on synergies between seeds and chemical inputs  
34 (Thayer, 2001; Falcon and Fowler, 2002). Consolidation in the seed industry had been ongoing  
35 since the 1970s, but the unprecedented concentration in the 1990s resulted in an extreme vertical  
36 integration of the seed and biotechnology industries (Hayenga, 1998). This was followed by a  
37 horizontal integration of agriculture and pharmaceuticals into life sciences companies.

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The first trend was driven by (i) the stagnation of the agrochemical sector; (ii) the changing knowledge base and innovations in chemistry and biotechnology; and (iii) the policy environment, such as the increased burden of regulations (Hayenga, 1998; Falcon and Fowler, 2002). Between 1995 and 1998, in the US alone, approximately 68 seed companies either were acquired by or entered into joint ventures with the top six multinational corporations (King, 2001). An analysis for thirty UPOV member-countries identified a high degree of concentration in the ownership of plant variety rights for six major crops at the national level in the developed world (Srinivasan, 2004). The area with the greatest concentration intensity in the past decades has been genetic transformation (Pray et al., 2005; Box 2-6). Liberalized foreign investment policies and multinational structure have allowed agribusiness companies to provide upstream research, with the local seed companies providing the crop varieties developed for specific geographical markets (Fulton and Giannakas, 2001). For developing countries, this concentration has implications for (i) the structure and autonomy of their domestic seed industries; (ii) their access to protected varieties; and (iii) the use of important breeding technologies (Srinivasan, 2004).

Recent research demonstrates that the effects of the increasing concentration of control over agricultural biotechnology has had mixed yield, economic, social and environmental effects in the United States, Argentina, South Africa, India and China (Fukuda-Parr, 2007), with the differences caused in part by differences in technology adopted, the structure of farming, the organization of seed markets and in the regulatory and institutional contexts. For instance, Emergent, the third largest cotton seed company in India was recently acquired by the US based Monsanto (ETC, 2005), yet India maintains substantial domestic seed company interests in GM technologies (Ramaswami and Pray, 2007). Agricultural liberalization in East Africa has led to an increase in the number of seed companies and varieties on the market but this has not led to an increase of maize yields or production per capita since the mid-1980s (De Groote et al., 2005).

Today, the top 10 agribusiness companies (all based in Europe, the US or Japan) represent half of the world's commercial seed sales (ETC, 2005). These ten firms increased their control of biotechnology patents to over 50% in 2000 (Pray et al., 2005); indicating that instead of negotiating for the rights to a competitor's technology, it might be simpler, cheaper, or more advantageous to acquire the competitor outright. Currently, patents on the foundational transformation technologies for grains are held by only three firms: DuPont, Monsanto, and Syngenta (Brennan et al., 2005).

INSERT Box 2.6 Emergence of genetic engineering.

1 *Implications of concentration.* A relatively stable market share may encourage corporations to  
2 invest in R&D, both in terms of current profitability and a reasonable expectation of future  
3 profitability. However, recent analysis suggests that we are seeing the beginning of negative  
4 impacts on innovation and competition through increased concentration within the private sector  
5 (Brennan et al., 2005). The major concerns are (i) industrial concentration reduces the amount  
6 and the productivity of research because R&D expenditures are consolidated and narrowly  
7 focused; (ii) concentrated markets create barriers to new firms and quell creative startups; (iii)  
8 concentration allows large firms to gain substantial monopolistic power over the food industry,  
9 making food supply chains vulnerable to market maneuvers (see 2.3.3; Pray et al., 2005). For  
10 instance, a recent USDA study suggests that consolidation in the private seed industry over the  
11 past decade dampened the intensity of research undertaken on maize, cotton, and soybeans  
12 crop biotechnology (Fernandez-Cornejo and Schimmelpfennig, 2004). This raises concerns that  
13 decreasing levels of research activity would stunt agricultural innovations, and brings into  
14 question whether large biotech firms can be relied on to conduct research with an eye on the  
15 public good as well as their own profit margins (Pray et al., 2005). There is additional concern that  
16 the anti-competitive impacts of concentration have led to higher seed prices. USDA data suggest  
17 that cotton seed prices in the US have increased 3-4 times since the introduction of GM cotton  
18 and that GM fees have substantially raised the price of cotton seed in developing nations, such  
19 as India (Iowa State Univ., 2007).

20  
21 *The dilemma of the public sector.* The establishment and strengthening of IPR in agriculture has  
22 contributed to a shift in emphasis from public to private breeding (Moschini and Lapan, 1997;  
23 Gray et al., 1999). The public research sector is increasingly restricted because fragmented  
24 ownership of IPR creates a situation wherein no comprehensive set of IPR rights can be  
25 amassed for particular crops. In 2003, the Public-Sector Intellectual Property Resource for  
26 Agriculture (PIPRA) regime was introduced by several US universities in collaboration with  
27 Rockefeller and McKnight Foundations with the goal of creating a collective public IP asset  
28 database. This collective management regime would allow public sector institutions to retain  
29 rights to use the newest and best technologies of agricultural biotechnology for the public good  
30 when they issue commercial licenses (Atkinson et al., 2003).

31  
32 These creative IPR management regimes are needed for the public sector because many public  
33 breeding programs have been unsure of whether to complement or compete with the private  
34 sector; confusion has arisen as to how to take advantage of IPR to control the use of public  
35 material (Reeves and Cassady, 2002) or to capture royalties for bigger budgets (Fischer and  
36 Byerlee, 2002). These trends have triggered concerns that the lure of potential royalty revenue  
37 has distorted research priorities in public institutions away from poverty alleviation and

1 sustainability, as has been suggested by research managers in Uganda (Louwaars et al., 2005)  
2 and the emergence of the so called ‘University-Industrial Complex’ in which universities are  
3 redirecting their research to meet the needs of sponsoring corporations (Press and Washburn,  
4 2000). Historically, public sector institutions have been the dominant distributor and pre-breeder  
5 of germplasm (Morris and Ekasingh, 2001). In contrast, the growing private sector has focused on  
6 widely commercialized, competitive crops that are well protected by legal or technical IPR  
7 (Fernandez-Cornejo and Schimmelpfennig, 2004). This has meant that tropical crops, crops for  
8 marginal areas (and other public goods attributes, such as safety, health, and environmental  
9 protection), and “orphan crops” have remained outside the orbit of private investment (Naylor et  
10 al., 2004; Fernandez-Cornejo and Schimmelpfennig, 2004). This will remain a problem until an  
11 incentive is created for private firms to work on marginal crops or funding for these important  
12 crops is increased in public institutions.

#### 13 14 2.3.1.5. Farmers, public and private sector: roles and relations

15 *Changes in funding and investments and the strengthening of the private sector vis à vis the*  
16 *public sector.* While global agricultural research investment has grown dramatically since the  
17 1960's (more than doubling between 1976 and 1995), recent trends indicate a shift from public to  
18 private sector dominated research. The top ten multinational bioscience companies spend \$3  
19 billion annually on agricultural research while the global CGIAR system will spend just over \$500  
20 million in 2007 (see Chapter 8). The system has seen its funding decline over the last 15 years  
21 compared to the widening of its mandate to include NRM issues (Pardey and Beintema, 2001).  
22 Lack of funding for the CGIAR is expected to have negative consequences for NARS plant  
23 breeding, particularly in Africa as more than one-third of the approximately 8,000 NARS released  
24 crop varieties were based on IARC germplasm. Additionally, structural adjustment programs have  
25 severely affected the ability of developing countries to support their own public R&D budget  
26 (Kumar and Sidharthan, 1997; CIPR, 2002; Chaturvedi, 2008). A continued decline in public  
27 sector breeding (see Chapter 8), coupled with increased private sector growth will only increase  
28 the growing gap in research intensity between rich and poor countries.

29  
30 *Emergence of new institutional arrangements. Public-private partnerships (PPPs) to reach*  
31 *development and sustainability goals.* The changing character of the seed industry has  
32 highlighted public/private partnerships as potential generators of valuable synergies (Table 2-5).  
33 Examples of PPPs that have positively affected small-scale farmers include hybrid rice  
34 development in India, insect resistant maize in Kenya, industry led associations to improve seed  
35 policy in Kenya and collaborative efforts to promote biosafety regulation in India (IFPRI, 2005).

36  
37 INSERT Table 2.5. Public-private partnerships in the CGIAR.

1

2 Some PPPs have a strong charitable character; others include a clear, but often long term,  
3 commercial benefit to the private partner. However, to date few success stories of PPPs that are  
4 pro-poor have emerged, and even fewer examples have surfaced where partnerships have  
5 contributed to food security, poverty reduction and economic growth. Major constraints on PPPs  
6 have been identified, including (i) fundamentally different incentive structures between  
7 collaborating organizations; (ii) insufficient minimization of costs and risks of collaboration; (iii)  
8 limited use of creative organizational mechanisms that reduce competition over key assets and  
9 resources; and (iv) insufficient access to information on successful partnership models (see  
10 Spielman and von Grebmer, 2004). Creative IPR strategies may help in the establishment of  
11 public-private partnerships. Licensing of IP rights by private to public sector actors for  
12 humanitarian uses has facilitated technology transfer, e.g. rice rich in pro-vitamin A and Ringspot  
13 Virus Resistance for papaya Asia (Al-Babili and Beyer, 2005; Brewster et al., 2005). Partnerships  
14 can be successful as in the case of the Daimler Chrysler collaboration with Poverty and the  
15 Environment in Amazonia (POEMA) to use coconut fibers and natural latex rubber (Zahn, 2001;  
16 Laird, 2002). Additionally, a recent initiative, the Science and Knowledge Exchange Program, to  
17 exchange staff between the public and private sectors may effectively develop productive pro-  
18 poor partnerships in food and agriculture. In Africa, schemes have been put forward to promote  
19 the acquisition of private sector innovations by the public sector at a price based on their  
20 estimated value to society (Kremer, 2003; Master, 2003). Private companies would contribute to  
21 crop improvement through partnerships that use local varieties and provide source material and  
22 information for improved regulatory passage (Keese et al., 2002; Cohen, 2005). However for  
23 complicated genetic transformations, dozens of patents are involved in a single transformation  
24 (Guerinot, 2000). In this case, all public and private IPR holders must grant licenses to all IP  
25 involved in the final product (Al-Babili and Beyer, 2005). Experience suggests that the public  
26 sector must take the lead in such initiatives on crops that are essential for food security, but have  
27 marginal profitability.

28

29 *Renewed involvement of farmers in genetic resource management: Participatory Plant Breeding*  
30 *as a new arrangement.* Today, farmers remain indispensable actors in any regime that seeks to  
31 conserve, improve, and disseminate genetic diversity. It is estimated that 1.4 billion farmers save  
32 seed from year to year (Pimentel et al., 1992; Cleveland et al., 1994; Bellon, 1996). There are  
33 many advantages of *in situ* conservation, in particular the relationship between diversity and yield  
34 stability (Amanor, de Boef, and Bebbington, 1993; Trinh et al., 2003; Abidin et al., 2005).  
35 Participatory plant breeding and *in situ* management relies on the collaboration between farmer-  
36 breeders and corporate plant breeders (Lipton and Longhurst, 1989; Sthapit et al., 1996; Kerr and  
37 Kolavalli, 1999; Almekinders and Elings, 2001; Witcombe et al., 2005). Traditionally, these

1 projects are judged on their ability to produce adapted crop material at lower costs than  
2 conventional programs and on their ability to produce higher genetic gains per year (e.g.,  
3 Ceccarelli et al., 2001a, 2003; Smith et al., 2001; Witcombe et al., 2001; Virk et al., 2003, 2005).  
4 However, participatory research projects (comprised of both formal and informal actors) have also  
5 led to the spread of socially responsible, technical innovations and important policy changes  
6 (Joshi et al., 2007). These innovations have been shown to improve the welfare of the poor and  
7 socially excluded. One of the best examples is a 1997 client-oriented participatory crop  
8 improvement (PCI) project in Nepal in which there was formal recognition that informal R&D  
9 processes were taking place, and a move to encourage those processes (Biggs, 2006). This led  
10 to changes in National Varietal Release Procedures and to more effective collaboration between  
11 different actors. Informal developments were essentially legitimized and supported. Nevertheless,  
12 the benefits of farmer participation may not be universal, and adoption of participatory methods  
13 has not been as high as expected, notably because of methodological limitations to upscaling  
14 (Witcombe et al., 2005).

15  
16 *The quality issue.* In developed countries, changes in the consumers' preferences have pushed  
17 the labeling of the geographical origin of products, along with the notion of "terroir", with the result  
18 that farmers and specialized breeders are reviving old crop varieties (Bérard and Marchenay,  
19 1995; Bonneuil and Demeulenaere, 2007). The development of organic and sustainable food  
20 production systems has created additional challenges, e.g., organic production must use seeds  
21 that have been produced in organic conditions. Instead of working on larger domains of breeding  
22 for conventional agriculture, breeders select for specific adaptability to specific environments and  
23 practices. All these trends challenge the classical ways of evaluating varieties. Since the  
24 multifactor and multi-site experimentation, backed by statistical analysis is more difficult to  
25 perform, new ways of assessing varieties and seeds are needed, e.g., simulation modeling  
26 (Barbottin et al., 2006). The key conclusion is that knowledge must be shared among different  
27 actors, including farmers, users and consumers. The overall globalization of markets is  
28 increasingly pushing this issue in developing countries that seek to cater to the needs of specific  
29 market niches in industrialized countries.

#### 30 31 2.3.1.6. The need for a renewed design with distribution of diverse roles

32 Germplasm management over the last 150 years has been characterized by standardization and  
33 scale of economies. This has been paramount to the rapid spread and success of widely adapted  
34 germplasm. It resulted in seed management becoming largely separate from agricultural and  
35 cultural systems, with a decline in the number and diversity of actors actively engaged in seed  
36 systems. Moreover, the tightening of IPR, access and benefit sharing laws and other forms of  
37 controls over genetic resources weakened exchange of genetic resources among breeders.

1 Industrial strategies have been based on strengthened IP arrangements; attempts to balance  
2 IPRs with farmers, industry and the public sector has added to hyper-ownership issues.  
3 Consolidation of the seed industry has facilitated the spread of rapid technological advances, but  
4 not always to the benefit of the poor. The history of germplasm management has revealed  
5 shortcomings, specifically in social and ecological arenas.

6  
7 Asymmetries in access to germplasm and benefit sharing have increased vulnerabilities of the  
8 poor. The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources is the first major international policy  
9 that attempts to proactively address the situation by creating a form of international germplasm  
10 exchange and research commons. Other initiatives such as Public-Sector Intellectual Property  
11 Resource for Agriculture (PIPRA) aim to create a collective public IPR asset database to allow  
12 the public sector to continue to develop public good germplasm. PPPs could lead to pro-poor  
13 advances if current challenges, such as minimization of risks of collaboration, are tackled. This  
14 assessment questions the current separation between researchers and farmers and calls for an  
15 increased role of user's knowledge in the design of innovation, as exemplified in participatory  
16 plant breeding. Local and diverse arrangements have been successful at meeting development  
17 and sustainability goals for germplasm management. These arrangements will be important for  
18 using germplasm to respond to the uncertainties of the future.

### 19 20 **2.3.2 Pest management**

21 Multiple approaches to pest management have emerged in different places during different  
22 periods in history. Each has been upheld by distinctive organizational arrangements reflecting  
23 cultural values, societal norms and political and economic priorities of their time and place. Widely  
24 differing interpretations exist that make competing claims regarding the advantages and  
25 disadvantages of the range of options; other narratives may describe differently the identification  
26 and implementation of sustainable solutions in pest management. The following narrative  
27 emerged from analysis of publications of UN agencies, the World Bank, the CGIAR, universities,  
28 national IPM programs in numerous countries, and the work of physical and social scientists,  
29 researchers, private sector actors including agrochemical companies, and NGOs actively  
30 involved on the ground in pest and pesticide management programs.

#### 31 32 2.3.2.1 Chemical control

33 *Emergence of chemical control.* Chemical control had its roots in US and German chemical  
34 research before and after both World Wars and was driven by formal interagency collaboration  
35 between military and public sector chemists and entomologists (Russell, 2001). The emphasis on  
36 crop protection and risk minimization supported pest control, rather than management and pest  
37 eradication using synthetic chemicals (Perkins, 1982; Russell, 2001). The approach underpinned



1 the priorities of industrial countries: maximizing food and fiber production, increasing efficiency  
2 and releasing labor to other economic sectors. Research and extension efforts directed at  
3 biological, cultural and mechanical management of risk dropped sharply at this time (Perkins,  
4 1982; Lighthall, 1995; Shennan et al., 2005). The pesticide industry grew rapidly, initially financed  
5 through government contracts and then loans, a practice that necessitated constant product  
6 innovation and marketing to repay debts (Perkins, 1982). Significant concentration has occurred  
7 (DFID, 2004; UNCTAD, 2006); by 2005, the top six multinational pesticide corporations  
8 accounted for 75% of the US\$ 29,566 million global pesticide market (Agrow World Crop  
9 Protection News, 2005; ETC, 2005).

10  
11 National and global concerns over food security drove the further intensification of agricultural  
12 production and adoption of synthetic chemical pesticides across much of Asia and Latin America  
13 (Rosset, 2000). The CGIAR played a pivotal role in the Green Revolution that carried synthetic  
14 chemicals into widespread use in irrigated systems (see 2.1). Multilateral and bilateral donor and  
15 development agencies such as the World Bank, USAID and JICA provided direct or subsidized  
16 supplies of synthetic pesticides, sometimes tying agricultural credit to adoption of input packages  
17 inclusive of these chemicals (Holl et al., 1990; Hammond and McGowan, 1992; Jain, 1992;  
18 Korten, 1995; Clapp, 1997; Ishii-Eiteman and Ardhianie, 2002; USAID, 2004). Direct state  
19 intervention in some cases enforced pest control through calendar spraying regimes or  
20 established pesticide distribution systems to ensure product use (Meir and Williamson, 2005).  
21 Farmers received pest control advice from pesticide sellers and extension agents operating under  
22 T&V and similar state-directed systems. In some cases, government extension personnel served  
23 also as pesticide distributors (Pemsl et al., 2005; Williamson, 2005) to supplement low  
24 government wages. Smaller pesticide production and distribution companies grew rapidly in  
25 developing countries such as Argentina, India, China and South Africa, often producing cheaper  
26 but more hazardous pesticides than their multinational counterparts (Pawar, 2002; Bruinsma,  
27 2003).

28  
29 *Impacts of the chemical pest control approach.* The significant yield gains and achievements in  
30 food security obtained in many countries in the 1950s and 60s have been closely linked to the  
31 use of hybrid seeds, synthetic fertilizers and other inputs including pesticides and to high levels of  
32 political and institutional investment in public sector research and extension (Bhowmik, 1999;  
33 Evenson and Gollin, 2003a; Lipton, 2005). Yield losses owing to disease and weed infestations  
34 have been reduced through chemical pest control (Bridges, 1992; CropLife, 2005ab); animal  
35 health has improved where insect-vectored diseases have been successfully controlled (Singh,  
36 1983; Windsor, 1992; Kamuanga, 2001) and soil resources have been conserved through no-till  
37 practices, which sometimes rely on herbicide use (Lal, 1989; Holland, 2004). Some have

1 speculated that widespread famines and devastation of crops from outbreaks of disease and  
2 pests have been prevented (Kassa and Beyene, 2001); from an historical evidence-based  
3 approach it is difficult to assess the validity of these claims. As early as 1950, evidence of pest  
4 resistance to pesticides, resurgence where natural enemy populations had been destroyed and  
5 secondary pest outbreaks began to accumulate (Stern et al., 1959; Smith and van den Bosch,  
6 1967; van Emden, 1974). Pesticide resistance (including cross-resistance to new products)  
7 became extensive and has been thoroughly documented in the scientific literature (MSU, 2000;  
8 Bills et al., 2003).

9  
10 By the 1960s the adverse environmental and human health effects of pesticide exposure had  
11 become known. The impacts, widely documented in the scientific and medical literature and  
12 popularized (e.g., Carson, 1962), affected not only pesticide applicators but entire rural  
13 communities and diverse biota in aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems and watersheds (reviewed in  
14 Wesseling et al., 1997, 2005; Hayes, 2004; Kishi, 2005; Pretty and Hine, 2005; Relyea, 2005;  
15 USGS, 2006; Desneux et al., 2007). Acute poisonings by pesticide residues have had immediate  
16 adverse effects, including death (Chaudhry et al., 1998; Rosenthal, 2003; Neri, 2005). Social and  
17 environmental justice cases have been documented regarding the inequitable distribution of the  
18 benefits of chemical control (largely accruing to better resourced farmers and manufacturers) and  
19 the harms in actual conditions of use that are experienced disproportionately by the poor and  
20 disadvantaged and the “ecological commons” (Wesseling et al., 2001; Reeves et al., 2002;  
21 Jacobs and Dinham, 2003; Reeves and Schafer, 2003; Harrison, 2004; Qayum and Sakhari,  
22 2005). A significant portion of the chemicals applied has proved to be excessive, uneconomic or  
23 unnecessary in both industrialized (Pavely et al., 1994; Yudelman et al., 1998; Reitz et al., 1999;  
24 Prokopy, 2003; Pimentel, 2005) and developing countries (Ekesi, 1999; Adipala et al., 2000;  
25 Jungbluth, 2000; Sibanda et al., 2000; Asante and Tamo, 2001; Dinham, 2003; Nathaniels et al.,  
26 2003). Pesticide reliance has also been linked to agricultural deskilling (Vandeman, 1995; Stone,  
27 2007), evidenced by subsequent erosion of farmers’ knowledge of crop-insect ecology and  
28 reduced ability to interpret and innovate in response to environmental cues at field level (Thrupp,  
29 1990; Pemsil et al., 2005).

30  
31 Chemical control remains the cornerstone of pest management in many parts of the world,  
32 sustained by its immediate results, the technology treadmill (see 2.1) and path-dependency  
33 (wherein a farmer’s accumulation of equipment, knowledge and skills over time conditions her  
34 potential to change direction). It is also upheld by the professional cultures and training of most  
35 advisory and extension programs (Mboob, 1994; Sissoko, 1994; Agunga, 1995; FAWG, 2001;  
36 Sherwood et al, 2005; Touni et al., 2007); the dominance of institutions promoting technology-  
37 driven intensification of agriculture; product innovations and marketing by the agrochemical

1 industries (FAO/WHO, 2001; Macha et al., 2001; Kroma and Flora, 2003; Touni et al., 2007); and  
2 direct and indirect policy supports such as tax or duty exemptions for pesticides (Mudimu et al.,  
3 1995; Jungbluth, 1996; Gerken et al., 2000; Williamson, 2005). In recent years, leading  
4 agrochemical companies have integrated seed ventures and biotechnology firms, enabling them  
5 to establish synergies among key segments of the agricultural market. This trend is expected to  
6 continue and lead to increasing convergence between the segments, with possible inhibition of  
7 public sector research and of start-up firms (UNCTAD, 2006). The history of chemical control  
8 illustrates a phenomenon in agricultural science and technology development, in which early  
9 success of a technical innovation (often measured by a single agronomic metric such as  
10 productivity gains), when accompanied by significant private sector investment in advertising and  
11 public relations (Perkins, 1982) and by direct and indirect policy supports from dominant  
12 institutional arrangements (Murray, 1994), translates into narrowing of organizational research  
13 and extension objectives, widespread if uncritical grower adoption and delayed recognition of the  
14 constraints and adverse effects of the technology (e.g. resistance, health hazards, etc.).

#### 16 2.3.2.2 Integrated Pest Management (IPM)

17 Integrated Pest Management (Box 2-7) in its modern form was developed in the 1950s in direct  
18 response to the problems caused by use of synthetic insecticides in actual conditions of use  
19 (Perkins, 1982). IPM took many forms but in general emphasized cultural and biological controls  
20 (Box 2-8) and selective application of chemicals that do not harm populations of pest predators or  
21 parasitoids (Stern et al., 1959), based on scientific understanding of agroecosystems described  
22 as complex webs of interacting species that can be influenced to achieve crop protection. IPM  
23 adoption in industrialized countries was stimulated by growing concern for human health and the  
24 environment, consumer desire for low or no pesticide residues in food (Williamson and Buffin,  
25 2005) and public sector recognition that regulatory interventions were needed to remove the most  
26 harmful chemicals from sale. The spread of IPM in the South was driven by the high incidence of  
27 involuntary pesticide poisonings among farmers and farm workers through occupational exposure  
28 (Holl et al., 1990; Wesseling et al., 1993, 1997, 2002; Antle et al., 1998; Cole et al., 2002). Other  
29 drivers were state authorities' recognition of the high cost of pesticide purchase for poorer  
30 farmers and resulting problems of indebtedness (Van Huis and Meerman, 1997); the potential of  
31 new markets spurred by consumer demand for pesticide-free produce both in the North (IFOAM,  
32 2003; Ton, 2003; Martinez-Torres, 2006) and in countries with growing middle class populations  
33 (e.g. Thailand, China, India); export requirements of Maximum Residue Limits; and international  
34 attention to issues such as pollution of drinking water, human rights to a safe home and  
35 workplace and biodiversity loss.

37 INSERT Box 2-7. Integrated Pest Management and Box 2-8. Biological control.

1

2 *Impacts of IPM paradigm.* IPM can deliver effective crop protection and pesticide reduction  
3 without yield loss (Heong and Escalada, 1998; Mangan and Mangan, 1998; Barzman and  
4 Desilles, 2002; Eveleens, 2004). The yield advantages of IPM have been particularly strong in the  
5 South and thus have significant policy implications for food security in developing countries  
6 (Pretty, 1999; Pretty, 2002, Pretty et al., 2003). The community-wide economic, social, health and  
7 environmental benefits of farmer-participatory ecologically-based IPM have been widely  
8 documented (Dilts, 1999; Pontius et al., 2002; Pontius, 2003; Braun, 2006; Braun et al., 2006;  
9 Mancini, 2006; Mancini et al., 2007; van den Berg and Jiggins, 2007), including measurable  
10 improvements in neurobehavioural status as a result of reduced pesticide exposure (Cole et al.,  
11 2007). Large-scale impacts on social equity have not yet been assessed but higher household  
12 income, reduced poverty levels and significant reduction in use of WHO Class 1 highly toxic  
13 compounds have been shown in some cases (FAO, 2005a).

14

15 Difficulties in measuring the cost-effectiveness of large scale farmer-participatory IPM has  
16 impeded wider adoption (Kelly, 2005) and raised questions about its fiscal sustainability as a  
17 national extension approach (Quizon et al., 2000; Feder, 2004ab). As acknowledged by the  
18 authors, these studies did not calculate the economic savings from reduced poisoning and  
19 pollution nor attempt to quantify non-economic benefits. An evaluation of IPM research in the  
20 CGIAR system points to the need for more comprehensive economic impact analyses that  
21 include these variables (CGIAR TAC, 2000). A recent meta-review of 35 published data sets on  
22 costs and benefits of IPM Farmer Field Schools has meanwhile substantiated their effectiveness  
23 as an educational investment in reducing pesticide use and enabling farmers to make informed  
24 judgments about agroecosystem management (van den Berg and Jiggins, 2007).

25

26 More widespread adoption of IPM as defined in the FAO Code of Conduct has been constrained  
27 by political, structural and institutional factors, principally

- 28 ➤ limited capacity of extension services in both industrialized and developing countries in  
29 providing adaptive, place-based, knowledge-intensive ecological education and technical  
30 support in IPM (Blobaum, 1983; Anderson, 1990; Holl et al., 1990; Agunga, 1995;  
31 Paulson, 1995; Altieri, 1999; Norton et al., 2005; Rodriguez and Niemeyer, 2005; Touni et  
32 al., 2007);
- 33 ➤ inadequate public sector and donor investment in IPM research and extension and poor  
34 coordination between relevant agencies (Mboob, 1994; ter Weel and van der Wulp, 1999;  
35 Touni et al., 2007);

- 1 ➤ insufficient private sector interest in natural controls (Ehler, 2006) and widespread  
2 promotion of synthetic chemical controls by pesticide suppliers and distributors (Kroma  
3 and Flora, 2003; Touni et al., 2007);
- 4 ➤ shifts in funding and research interests in agricultural colleges away from basic biology,  
5 entomology and taxonomy and limited resources for ecological investigations (Jennings,  
6 1997; Pennisi, 2003; Herren et al., 2005); an incentives system that discourages  
7 multidisciplinary collaboration in pest management (Ehler, 2006); and a growing  
8 tendency, e.g. in the United States, to encourage research likely to return financial  
9 benefits to the university rather than broader benefits to the public or ecological commons  
10 (Kennedy, 2001; Berdahl, 2000; Bok, 2003; Washburn, 2005) while offering private sector  
11 partners such as the agrochemical/biotechnology industry a wider role in shaping  
12 university research and teaching priorities (Krimsky, 1999; Busch et al., 2004);
- 13 ➤ vertical integration of ownership (FAO, 2003b) and concentration in private sector control  
14 (Vorley, 2003; DFID, 2004; Dinham, 2005) over chemical, food and agricultural systems,  
15 processes that tend to favor larger scale, input-intensive monoculture production over the  
16 biodiverse agroecosystems necessary to sustain effective performance by natural  
17 enemies; and
- 18 ➤ inequitable distribution of risks and costs: in the absence of public sector support, farmers  
19 typically bear the upfront transaction costs and risks of conversion to pest management  
20 practices that serve the public good (Brewer et al., 2004; Ehler, 2006).

### 21 22 2.3.2.3 Institutional innovations and responses in pest management.

23 *Institutional innovations.* FAO's paradigm-shifting work in Asia provided (a) the scientific evidence  
24 that pesticide-induced pest outbreaks could contribute to crop failures while reduction of pesticide  
25 use could improve system stability and yields (Kenmore et al., 1984); (b) empirical evidence of  
26 the positive social impacts of field-based experiential learning processes (Matteson, et al., 1994;  
27 Mangan and Mangan, 1998; Ooi, 1998) and (c) the policy insight that a number of directives (e.g.,  
28 ban of selected pesticides, removal of pesticide subsidies and national support for IPM) could  
29 transform the situation on the ground, as in Indonesia (Kenmore et al., 1984; Settle et al., 1996;  
30 Gallagher, 1999; Röling and van der Fliert, 2000). Building on FAO's Farmer Field School  
31 methodology (<http://www.farmerfieldschool.info/>), participatory field-based educational processes  
32 in IPM gained strength in the 1980s (Röling and Wagemakers, 1998). These innovations in  
33 knowledge, science, technology and policy subsequently led to an institutional innovation, the  
34 establishment of the Global IPM Facility (see 2.2) and the implementation of farmer-participatory  
35 IPM across Asia, Latin America, Africa and Central and Eastern Europe (UPWARD, 2002; Jiggins  
36 et al., 2005; Luther et al., 2005; Braun et al., 2006). Plant Health Clinics (piloted in Nicaragua,  
37 currently in use in 16 other countries), the combination of mass media campaigns, and farmer-to

1 farmer extension and education (Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Vietnam, Bangladesh) similarly have  
2 proven effective in promoting IPM. In Africa and Latin America, communities are exploring  
3 economic innovations in self-financing mechanisms for IPM field schools (Okoth et al., 2003).

4  
5 Innovative agroenvironmental partnerships between growers, extensionists and IPM scientists  
6 have implemented integrated farming and alternative pest management strategies to reduce  
7 organophosphate insecticide use in major commodity crops across California (Warner, 2006ab)  
8 and implement resource-conserving IPM in Michigan (Brewer et al., 2004; Hoard and Brewer,  
9 2006). Their success derives from collaborative partnership structures that emphasize co-learning  
10 models, social networks of innovation (through informal grower networks and supported by  
11 statewide commodity boards) and building capacity in flexible place-based decision-making rather  
12 than conventional transfer of technology (Mitchell et al., 2001; Getz and Warner, 2006; Warner,  
13 2006ab).

14  
15 *Policy responses.* Governments have responded to the scientific evidence of adverse  
16 environmental and health effects of pesticides with legislation, regulatory frameworks and policy  
17 initiatives. A growing number of Southern governments have national IPM extension and  
18 education programs (Box 2-9), and several countries (Costa Rica, Ecuador, Paraguay, China,  
19 Thailand and Vietnam) have taken the lead in banning WHO Class 1a and 1b pesticides (FAO,  
20 2006a). Various European countries have implemented Pesticide Use Reduction programs with  
21 explicit benchmarks for pesticide reduction (Box 2-9) and Organic Transition Payment programs  
22 (Blobaum, 1997). Domestic US programs emphasized IPM in the 1970s and 1990s but shifts in  
23 political priorities have led to uneven national support and a more narrow interpretation  
24 emphasizing pollution mitigation strategies over preventative approaches to ensuring crop health  
25 (Cate and Hinkle, 1994; GAO, 2001; USDA/NRCS, 2001; Brewer et al., 2004; Hammerschlag,  
26 2007; see Hoard and Brewer, 2006 and Getz and Warner, 2006 for state-level innovations in  
27 IPM). The CGIAR has established an inter-institutional partnership to promote participatory IPM  
28 (<http://www.spipm.cgiar.org>). Bilateral donor agencies have also prioritized biocontrol or IPM in  
29 their development aid, e.g. Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, IPM Europe and the United  
30 States (ter Weel and van der Wulp, 1999; SIDA, 1999; Dreyer et al., 2005; USAID, 2007).  
31 Maximum Residue Levels (MRL) regulations for pesticides in food have been established at  
32 national and international levels (see 2.3.3.). These and other international and national  
33 standards continue to undergo revisions in light of emerging scientific findings on possible and  
34 actual effects of low dose and chronic exposure to pesticide residues (NRC, 1993; Aranjó and  
35 Telles, 1999; Baker et al., 2002; Thapinta and Hudak, 2000; Kumari and Kumar, 2003;  
36 Pennycook et al., 2004).

37

1 INSERT Box 2-9. Policy instruments affecting pest management.

2

3 The UN FAO Code on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides (Box 2-9) focuses not only on  
4 minimizing hazards associated with pesticide use but also on promoting IPM. It indicates that  
5 “prohibition of the importation, sale and purchase of highly toxic products [such as] WHO Class I  
6 a and I b pesticides may be desirable” and recommends that pesticides requiring use of personal  
7 protective equipment (e.g. WHO Class II pesticides) should be avoided where such equipment is  
8 uncomfortable, expensive or not readily available (e.g. in most developing countries). In 2007, the  
9 131<sup>st</sup> Session of the FAO Council mandated FAO to pursue a “progressive ban on highly toxic  
10 pesticides” (FAO, 2007). FAO has urged chemical companies to withdraw these products from  
11 developing country markets and is calling on all governments to follow the example of countries  
12 that have already banned WHO Class Ia and Ib pesticides (FAO, 2006a). Also in 2007, FAO  
13 hosted an international conference that highlighted organic farming’s capacity to meet food  
14 security goals without reliance on chemical pesticides (Scialabba, 2007; Sligh and Christman,  
15 2007). The FAO conference confirmed similar findings from numerous recent studies on organic  
16 agriculture (Parrott and Marsden, 2002; Pimentel et al., 2005; Badgley, et al. 2007; Halberg, et  
17 al., 2007; Kilcher, 2007).

18

19 The World Bank revised its pest management policy in 1998, in response to internal impact  
20 assessments (Schillhorn van Veen et al., 1997), public pressure (Aslam, 1996; Ishii-Eiteman and  
21 Ardhianie, 2002) and donor government concerns (e.g., Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands,  
22 Norway, Switzerland, United States). The policy now emphasizes “reducing reliance on chemical  
23 pesticides” and promoting “farmer-driven ecologically-based pest control” (World Bank, 1998a).  
24 Subsequent external and internal reviews of World Bank lending and project monitoring noted  
25 weak implementation of the Bank’s IPM policy (Tozun, 2001; Ishii-Eiteman and Ardhianie, 2002;  
26 Hamburger and Ishii-Eiteman, 2003; Sorby et al., 2003; Karel, 2004) hampered by lack of trained  
27 staff and an organizational culture and incentive system favoring loan approval over project  
28 quality (Liebenthal, 2002). Recent analyses of written policy and project design documents  
29 suggest compliance may be improving (Karel, 2004; World Bank, 2005) and a detailed guidebook  
30 to support implementation of the Bank’s IPM policy has been produced.

31

32 Significant international treaties (Box 2-9) are now in force that seek to minimize and eliminate  
33 hazards associated with pesticide use. Multistakeholder initiatives such as the Africa Stockpile  
34 Program have harnessed the energies of diverse stakeholders in reducing the hazards and risks  
35 of pesticides. Together these policy responses and international agreements, informed by  
36 scientific evidence and public participation, have enabled decisive and effective transitions  
37 towards more sustainable practice.

1

2 *Civil society responses.* Civil society has emerged as a powerful force in the movement towards  
3 ecological pest management, in Northern as well as Southern countries (e.g. India, Thailand,  
4 Ecuador, Philippines and Brazil). CSOs and independent researchers (as well as FAO, ILO, WHO  
5 and some governments) have called for a rights-based approach to agricultural development, that  
6 explicitly recognizes agricultural workers' and rural communities' rights to good health and clean  
7 environments (UN High Commission for Human Rights, 2001; Reeves and Schafer, 2003). NGOs  
8 working with social justice, environmental and health causes have contributed to national and  
9 international treaties and agreements on chemicals management, sustainable agriculture and  
10 food safety. Development NGOs (Thrupp, 1996), social movements such as the Brazilian  
11 Landless Workers' Movement (Boyce, et al. 2005) and farmer-NGO-scientist partnerships such  
12 as MASIPAG in the Philippines, CLADES in Latin America (Chaplowe, 1997a) and the Latin  
13 American Scientific Society of Agroecology (Sociedad Científica Latino Americana de  
14 Agroecología or SOCLA) are implementing ecological pest management as a means towards  
15 achieving sustainable development goals. Like other development actors, NGOs have limitations  
16 in terms of impact, resources, capacity and performance; and accountability mechanisms have  
17 been weak (Chaplowe, 1997b). Nevertheless, important contributions to ecological pest  
18 management have resulted from NGO efforts (Altieri and Masera, 1993; UNDP, 1995; Chaplowe,  
19 1997b; Altieri, 1999), although scaling up to achieve widespread impact, in the absence of  
20 broader policy reforms, remains difficult (Bebbington and Thiele, 1993; Farrington and Lewis,  
21 1993; Farrington et al., 1993).

22

23 *Market responses.* There has been a notable rise in certification and labeling regimes to meet  
24 consumers' demand for information about the origins of foods and methods of production. Food  
25 retailers are responding by insisting on observance of legal MRL requirements and using  
26 pesticide residue data as marketing material. Food industry actors have focused on minimizing or  
27 eliminating pesticide use to meet consumer preferences and regulatory requirements and reduce  
28 business costs. Some agrifood companies and the US \$30 billion food service company Sysco  
29 (Hammerschlag, 2007), food processors (e.g. tomato paste, coffee, cacao/chocolate) and some  
30 food retailers (Williamson and Buffin, 2005; EurepGap, 2007) have taken steps to source produce  
31 from suppliers—including thousands of small-scale producers—using IPM and organic methods.  
32 Labels identifying organic or low-pesticide production methods and other successful market-  
33 oriented collaborations (IATP, 1998) have encouraged growers to adopt these practices. Local  
34 food systems also offer a small but growing alternative to conventional crop production and  
35 distribution (Williamson and Buffin, 2005) (see 2.3.3).

36



1 *Response from pesticide manufacturers.* The multinational agrichemical industry has responded  
2 to global concerns about pesticides by developing less hazardous, lower dose and more selective  
3 pesticides, improved formulations, new application technologies and resistance management  
4 strategies (CropLife, 2003; Latorse and Kuck, 2006; Syngenta, 2006). These efforts can  
5 significantly reduce pesticide pressure on the environment, particularly in larger farm operations  
6 that can afford specialized equipment. Some pesticide manufacturers have formed Resistance  
7 Action Committees to assist advisors and growers in implementing pesticide resistance  
8 management practices (Jutsum et al., 1998). The Danish chemical company, Cheminova,  
9 submitted plans to FAO in 2006 to voluntarily phase out highly hazardous WHO Class I pesticides  
10 from developing countries by 2010 (FAO, 2006a). At the same time, public health specialists and  
11 development NGOs have criticized multinational pesticide companies for lobbying against  
12 stronger public health regulations, for failing to comply with national laws and the FAO Code of  
13 Conduct on the use and distribution of hazardous pesticides (Congress, 2002; Dinham, 2007),  
14 and in some cases for refusing to voluntarily withdraw recognized highly hazardous active  
15 ingredients—including WHO Class 1 pesticides and acutely toxic organophosphate pesticides—in  
16 developing countries (Rosenthal, 2003, 2005; Sherwood et al., 2005; Wesseling et al., 2005).  
17 Competitive pressure from local generic pesticide manufacturers that continue to produce off-  
18 patent pesticides can be a factor (EJF, 2002; Pawar, 2002).

19

20 Industry actors have developed their own IPM programs (Dollacker, 2000; CropLife, 2006). Many  
21 of these are built around continued or relatively small reductions in use of a company's pesticide  
22 products (Sagenmuller, 1999; Dollacker, 2000; Ellis, 2000; CropLife, 2003, 2005ab).

23

24 One explanation for this is that a company's need to maintain economic returns on its  
25 investments renders them less likely to encourage substantial shifts towards pest management  
26 strategies that would significantly reduce reliance on their products (CGIAR TAC, 2000; FAO,  
27 2001a; Murray and Taylor, 2001; Sherwood et al., 2005). Some newer products developed by  
28 private firms show potential to strengthen IPM efforts (for instance, synthetic pheromone products  
29 to be tried in the context of 'push-pull' strategies in Europe). Other programs describe the  
30 integration of crop productivity and biodiversity conservation efforts (Dollacker and Rhodes,  
31 2007). Independent assessments of their effects in actual use, particularly in small scale farming  
32 conditions in the tropics, have not been made.

33

34 The multinational agrichemical industry has also launched 'safe use' programs to train farmers in  
35 the use and handling of pesticides and to ensure that products are used in a manner consistent  
36 with national regulatory frameworks (Syngenta, 2003; CropLife, 2005b). The efficacy of these  
37 pesticide use training programs is disputed, with some sources reporting considerable success

1 (Tobin, 1996; Grimaldi, 1998; Syngenta, 2006) and others finding no reduction in poisoning  
2 incidence among participating farmers (McConnell and Hruska, 1993; Murray, 1994; Kishi et al.,  
3 1995; Murray and Taylor, 2000). “Safe use” measures are often not affordable or feasible in  
4 tropical climates and under actual conditions of use in poor countries (Dinham, 1993, 2007; Cole  
5 et al., 2000; FAO, 2007). Even when pesticides are used according to label specifications,  
6 adverse health effects have been documented (Nurminen et al., 1995; Garry et al., 1996;  
7 Wargo, 1996; Schettler et al., 1996; Reeves et al., 2002). The industry’s overall contribution to  
8 broader equitable and sustainable development goals, particularly in developing countries, has  
9 not as yet been clearly demonstrated.

#### 11 2.3.2.4 Overall assessment of trends and challenges in pest management

12 Despite the tightening national and international regulatory environment around synthetic  
13 pesticides and notwithstanding the documented success of ecological pest management in most  
14 crops and a fast-growing market for organic products, sales and use of synthetic pesticides is still  
15 growing, especially in developing countries. These trends continue to result in pesticide-induced  
16 pest outbreaks (Yudelman et al., 1998) and an unacceptably high level of unintentional pesticide  
17 poisonings under conditions of actual use, mostly but not solely in the developing world  
18 (Wesseling et al., 1993; Kishi, 2005, London et al., 2005). Public sector commitment to pesticide  
19 reduction efforts and investments in IPM and other ecological approaches has not been  
20 consistent over time (Cate and Hinkle, 1994). The prevalence of the use of synthetic pesticides  
21 today reflects their immediate results, path dependency at farm and institutional support levels,  
22 and the significant political and economic influence of agribusiness interests, trade associations  
23 and lobbying groups in the regulatory and policy arena (Ferrara, 1998; Rothstein et al., 1999;  
24 FAWG, 2001; Irwin and Rothstein, 2003; CAP/OMB Watch, 2004; Mattera, 2004; UCS, 2004;  
25 Dinham, 2005; Wesseling et al., 2005; Shulman, 2006; Hardell et al., 2007). This influence has  
26 sometimes downplayed research findings on harmful effects and weakened regulatory  
27 assessment of risks (Castleman and Lemen, 1998; Watterson, 2001; Hayes, 2004).

29 Scientific and technological progress has not been linear; successful pathways (e.g. in biocontrol)  
30 have gained and lost popularity according to the economic and political priorities of dominant  
31 institutional arrangements. Advances in ecological sciences (e.g. population, community,  
32 landscape ecology) have contributed to development of pest management options, but have been  
33 underutilized by most conventional extension systems. Genetically-engineered crops were  
34 expected by many to reduce the need for and therefore use of synthetic insecticides. However,  
35 their impact on both insecticide and herbicide use has been mixed, in some cases leading to  
36 increased recourse to synthetic controls. Their cultivation is perceived by some scientists and  
37 critics as potentially introducing new environmental hazards (Wolfenbarger and Phifer, 2000;

1 CEC, 2004; Donald, 2004; Snow et al., 2005), reducing efficacy of biocontrol measures (Obryki et  
2 al., 2002) or leading to adverse social impacts (de Grassi, 2003; Pengue, 2005; FOE, 2006) and  
3 health risks (Ewen and Pusztai, 1999; Prescott et al., 2005), constraining their adoption in  
4 sustainable development initiatives.

5  
6 The central technical issue facing pest management today is no longer yield maximization, but  
7 long-term stabilization and resilience in the face of unknown and changing stresses (Reganold et  
8 al., 2001). New directions in science and technology can strengthen IPM efforts if the latter have  
9 a strong foundation in basic biology (entomology, botany, plant pathology, taxonomy, ecology),  
10 economics and the social sciences (CGIAR TAC, 2000). Agroenvironmental partnerships among  
11 farmers, extension agents and researchers that balance social and environmental learning  
12 (Warner, 2006b; Stone, 2007) and strengthen ecologically-informed decision-making capacities  
13 (Röling and Wagemakers, 1998; Getz and Warner, 2006; Warner, 2006a; Mancini et al., 2007;  
14 van den Berg and Jiggins, 2007) offer robust possibilities for meeting technical, social and  
15 institutional challenges in sustainable pest management.

16  
17 Policy decisions in pest management knowledge, science and technology often have been  
18 implicitly or explicitly based upon perceptions of tradeoffs. The uneven distribution of gains and  
19 losses from these decisions reflect power asymmetries between competing actors (Krimsky,  
20 1999; Kleinman and Vallas, 2001). They have fuelled social and political tensions; in some cases,  
21 these have contributed to the development of new institutional arrangements such as  
22 international treaties and conventions to manage pesticide problems. Dominant approaches to  
23 pest control have in many cases failed to ensure the now-recognized human right to a safe home  
24 and working environment (Fabra, 2002; Robinson, 2002; Reeves and Schafer, 2003). The  
25 evidence shows that if crop production is assessed solely by a simple economic metric, then  
26 other societal goals will not be properly valued. Informed decision-making in pest management  
27 requires integration of ecological and social equity metrics as well.

28  
29 The policy and investment choices regarding pest management have significant implications for  
30 how successfully societies will respond to major global challenges ahead (associated with, e.g.  
31 clean water, climate change, biodiversity, etc). Responses are varied, reflecting the complex and  
32 sometimes competing interests of diverse actors. UN agencies such as the FAO, national  
33 governments, public health professionals, labor groups, NGOs, development experts and some  
34 private firms are working to eliminate WHO Class I and phase-out WHO Class II pesticides.  
35 Some pesticide manufacturers are developing new less toxic products and improved delivery  
36 systems, although many continue to sell and promote highly hazardous pesticides at the same  
37 time. Market leaders and innovators in the food industry are moving towards sourcing organic,

1 fairly traded products. Governments, international commissions and initiatives such as UNCED  
2 (UNCED, 1993, and the UN IFCS (Box 2-9) use the precautionary and polluter pays principles in  
3 designing policy approaches to chemical use and distribution (EEA, 2001; City and County of San  
4 Francisco, 2007; Fisher, 2007). Scientists and researchers in the fields of public health, medicine,  
5 ecology and participatory development and extension call for greater public sector investment in  
6 agroecological research and education, and establishment of better institutional linkages among  
7 farmers, extension agents and physical and social scientists (UNDP, 1995; Wesseling et al.,  
8 1997; Röling and Wagemakers, 1998; SIDA, 1999; Sorby et al., 2003; Norton et al., 2005;  
9 Warner, 2006a; Cole et al., 2007).

10  
11 The weight of the evidence points towards the need for more determined institutional and policy  
12 support for participatory ecologically-based decision making by farmers; agroenvironmental  
13 partnerships to foster social and environmental collaborative learning; stronger and enforceable  
14 policy and regulatory frameworks; and investments by public sector, donor and commercial  
15 agencies in sustainable and agroecological research, extension, education, product innovation  
16 and marketing. More experimentation is needed to develop and test institutional innovations that  
17 are likely to enable further societal shifts towards sustainable pest management.

### 18 19 **2.3.3 Food systems management**

20 Satisfaction of social needs and desires, and hunger, more than nutritional needs, govern the  
21 selection and consumption of foods). Different food systems differently affect food security, safety  
22 and sovereignty. Food systems (Fig. 2-4, 2-5) include the complex interactive and interrelated  
23 processes involved in keeping a community fed and nourished (Ericksen, 2006ab). At the core  
24 are food system activities that include production, processing, distribution, consumption and their  
25 outcomes: social welfare; food security and environmental welfare. A sustainable food system  
26 would incorporate social justice into a more localized system; alleviate constraints on people's  
27 access to adequate, nutritious food; develop economic capacity to purchase local food; train  
28 people to grow, process, and distribute food; maintain adequate land to produce a high proportion  
29 of locally required food; educate people removed from food production, to participate in, and  
30 respect, its generation; and integrate environmental stewardship into process (Koc et al., 1999).  
31 Food systems are assessed at the local and global level here for the sake of simplicity, although  
32 more complex variations (e.g. regional systems) exist and much interaction actually occurs  
33 among all the levels.

34  
35 Insert Fig 2-4. The food systems.

36 Insert Fig. 2-5. Food system activities and outcomes.

#### 37 38 **2.3.3.1 Local food system activities**

1 At the eve of World War II, local food systems (LFS) prevailed throughout the world. These  
2 predominantly fallow/rotational systems used manual labor (Mazoyer and Roudard, 2005), were  
3 family-owned, small and highly diversified crop-animal systems with varying productivity (Fogel,  
4 2004; Mazoyer and Roudard, 2005). Food processing in many parts of the world relied on local  
5 knowledge of preservation and packaging techniques, such as salting, curing, curding, sun  
6 drying, smoking and fermentation (Bender and Smith, 1997; Johnson, 2000). Surplus produce  
7 was sold at the farm gate or in local market places directly to consumers or to intermediary  
8 traders (Amilien, 2005). LFS directly contributed to the incomes of small-scale farmers, providing  
9 fresh and culturally acceptable food to consumers, and allowing direct interaction between  
10 consumers and food producers. However, farmers and local processors often experienced high  
11 transaction costs, seasonal price highs and lows and flooded markets, while consumers often  
12 lacked choice and quality foodstuffs or encountered contaminated or unsafe products (Crosson  
13 and Anderson, 2002). Rural households primarily acquired food from their own production (from  
14 local markets, relatives and friends; or from gathering, hunting or fishing). LFS sustain livelihoods  
15 of a significant number throughout the world, particularly in the southern hemisphere.

#### 16 17 2.3.3.2 Global food systems activities

18 Over the past 50 years there has been a dramatic change in food systems particularly in  
19 developed countries (Knudsen et al., 2005; LaBelle, 2005) from local to global, traditional to an  
20 industrial, and from state regulated to a market- or transnational corporations-dominated system  
21 monopolized by relatively few companies from production to retail (Hendrickson and Heffernan,  
22 2005). LFS production has changed for many into mechanized high-input specialized commodity  
23 farming, employing fewer people (Lyson, 2005; Dimitri et al., 2005; Knudsen et al., 2005). This  
24 transformation resulted in farm output growing dramatically, except in Africa (Knudsen et al.,  
25 2005) and a dramatic rise in GDP (Crosson and Anderson, 2002); spurring rapid growth in  
26 average farm size accompanied by an similar rapid decline in the number of farms and rural  
27 populations (Lyson, 2005; Knudsen et al., 2005).

28  
29 Prior to the 20<sup>th</sup> century, increases in food production were obtained largely by bringing new land  
30 into production, With the exception of a few limited areas of East Asia, in the Middle East, and in  
31 Western Europe (Welch and Graham, 1999; Stringer, 2000; Knudsen et al., 2005). Science-  
32 based technology advancements by the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Ruttan, 1990; Johnson, 2000;  
33 Khush, 2001) allowed consumers to spend a smaller portion of their income on food (Knudsen et  
34 al., 2005). Institutional factors like efficient marketing systems, dynamic production technology  
35 and higher education played equally important roles in generating long-term growth in agricultural  
36 output per hectare and person employed (Mellor, 1966; Hayami and Ruttan, 1985; Eicher and  
37 Staatz, 1998). Food processing and preservation involving new technologies such as cold

1 storage; irradiation; high temperature treatments; chemical additives; canning; milling, labeling  
2 and sophisticated computer based controlled systems emerged, both creating and taking  
3 advantage of new mass markets. The advantages of pre-prepared time-saving food to rapidly  
4 urbanizing populations drove further innovations in food preservation. In OECD countries, a few  
5 international food processing giants controlled a wide range of well-known food brands, co-  
6 existing with a wide array of small local or national food processing companies. Globalized food  
7 trade was originally confined to commodities and non-perishables such as wine, salt, spices and  
8 dried fish but expanded to include a wide range of perishable foods transported, sold and  
9 consumed at long distances away from their production and processing locality (Young, 2004;  
10 Knudsen et al., 2005). Even consumers in rural areas became less dependent on food supplies  
11 from local farms and markets (Roth, 1999). Meanwhile, small food retail groceries merged or  
12 were swallowed by other emerging and increasingly powerful stores, chains and supermarkets  
13 (Smith and Sparks, 1993; Roth, 1999). In the USA for example, from 1990-2000, the market  
14 share of the meat industry held by the nation's top four retailers rose from 17 to 34%. Institutional  
15 linkages within local food systems (Lyson, 2005) were thus broken and economies of scale  
16 increased by means of new institutional arrangements (Ericksen, 2006ab). Vertical integration in  
17 ownership of food supply chains (FAO, 2005c) and increasing concentration in private sector  
18 control over food systems (DFID, 2005) has been documented.

#### 20 2.3.3.3 Food systems outcome trends

21 The globalized food system (GFS) is considered by some to be economically efficient and  
22 productive (Welch and Graham, 1999; LaBelle, 2005) and draws on a range of science,  
23 knowledge and technology that extends beyond the agricultural sector. The GFS however hides  
24 disparities among agricultural and food systems both in developed and developing countries  
25 (Knudsen et al., 2005; LaBelle, 2005). Concerns revolve around social welfare; food and  
26 nutritional security; food sovereignty, food safety and environmental welfare (Knudsen et al.,  
27 2005; Lyson, 2005) (Fig. 2-6).

29 Insert Fig 2-6. Potentially problematic social and environmental aspects of global food systems  
30 sustainability

32 *Social welfare:* The GFS widened the gap between the most productive and least productive  
33 systems: it increased 20-fold over the last 50 years, particularly between industrialized and  
34 developing countries<sup>1</sup> (Kinudsen et al., 2005; Mazoyer, 2005). Characterized by capital intensive  
35 AKST and seed/animal breeds that required high inputs and favorable agronomic conditions, the

---

<sup>1</sup> With the exception of some portions of Latin America, North Africa; South Africa and Asia where it has been adopted by large national or foreign farms that have the necessary capital (Knudsen et al., 2005). Africa has the lowest production per unit area of land in the world (Wiggins, 2000; Paarlberg, 2002).

1 GFS favored farming populations with more resources (Knudsen et al., 2005; Lyson, 2005).  
2 There is some evidence that the Green Revolution, e.g., in Bangladesh, benefited the poor and  
3 the landless as well as those with resources and that small-scale farmers adopted faster than  
4 large scale farmers (Crosson and Anderson, 2002), but in many countries evidence demonstrates  
5 that better resourced individuals and firms benefited, sometimes at the expense of the poor and  
6 landless (see 2.2).

7

8 *Food trade:* The Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations saw agriculture and food issues placed  
9 firmly within the WTO although some countries and organizations argued against their inclusion,  
10 maintaining that countries should have the right to determine their own policies on such an  
11 important issue as food security, i.e., they adopted a “food sovereignty” position (FOEI, 2001).  
12 Nonetheless, the 1994 WTO Agricultural Agreement adopted minimum import requirements and  
13 tariffs and producer subsidies that were accessible to transnational corporations both in USA and  
14 Europe (McMichael, 2001; Lyson, 2005), allowing them to operate economies of scale that  
15 lowered agricultural product prices all over the world (Welch and Graham, 1999; Wilson, 2005).  
16 Consumers and national economies benefited substantially from this agreement. These trends  
17 also opened up agricultural and food markets for the northern hemisphere commodities, with USA  
18 becoming the major exporter of cereals (with surplus being disposed of as food aid; Johnson,  
19 2000) and Australia and New Zealand of dairy products. This development negatively affected  
20 local producers in developing countries; many countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa,  
21 became increasingly food importers (FAO, 2004). In developed countries, control of the food  
22 system became vertically integrated from seeds; production inputs; processing; transportation  
23 and marketing, forming food chain clusters (LaBelle, 2005; Lyson, 2005) and consequently, many  
24 small-scale producers lost their livelihoods (Watkins, 1996; Welch and Graham, 1999; Robinson  
25 and Sutherland, 2002; Wilson, 2005), migrating to towns where they faced new livelihood  
26 challenges and opportunities.

27

28 Insert Fig 2-7. A framework for understanding food security.

29

30 *Food security* (Box 2-10 and Fig. 2-8) greatly improved over the last few decades as a result of  
31 the increase in global food production (Johnson, 2000; Crosson and Anderson, 2002) and the  
32 global grain trade (Johnson, 2000). Although increases in global food production (Paarlberg,  
33 2002; Knudsen et al., 2005) surpassed population growth (Crosson and Anderson, 2002;  
34 Bruinsma, 2003; Knudsen et al., 2005), and was accompanied by an increase in the poorer  
35 country’s average food consumption, (Garrett, 1997; Izquierdo and de la Silva, 2000; Stringer,  
36 2000; Johnson, 2000), food and nutritional insecurity persisted throughout the world even in

1 countries which achieved *national* food security (Mellor, 1990; Stringer, 2000; LaBelle, 2005),  
2 particularly in sub-Saharan Africa (Wafula and Ndiritu, 1996; Knudsen et al., 2005).

3  
4 Insert Box 2-10. Evolution of the term food security.

5 Insert Fig 2-8. Determinants of nutrition security: basic causes and links.

6  
7 Protein energy malnutrition in developing countries declined from as high as 46.5% in the early  
8 1960s to as low as 17% in the late 1990s (Khush, 2001; Young, 2004), with Africa contributing  
9 about a quarter (24%) of the total undernourished population globally (Young, 2004). This  
10 phenomenon corresponds with the proportion of those with prolonged deficits in required energy  
11 intake as chronic food shortages fell in Asia and Latin America except sub-Saharan Africa (FAO,  
12 2001b; Lipton, 2001). In addition to other drivers (Johnson, 2000; Chopra, 2004), the failure of a  
13 Green Revolution in Africa (Crosson and Anderson, 2002) may partially be explained by the lack  
14 of improvement or worsening of the situation in Africa. Based on the Global Hunger Index (GHI)<sup>2</sup>  
15 (Weismann, 2006), 97 developing and 27 transitional countries exhibit poor GHI trends; the  
16 malnutrition hot spots are in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, where wars and HIV/AIDS  
17 exacerbate the situation.

18  
19 The commoditized monocropping characteristic of the globalized food system (GFS) has resulted  
20 in a narrower genetic base for plant<sup>3</sup> and animal production (Knudsen et al., 2005; Lyson, 2005;  
21 Wilson, 2005) and in declining nutritional value (Welch and Graham, 1999; Kataki et al., 2001)  
22 and has negatively affected micronutrient reserves in the soil (Bell, 2004). A Mexican study,  
23 however, suggested that adoption of some improved varieties of maize had enhanced maize  
24 genetic diversity (Brush et al., 1988). Increasing and widespread micronutrient malnutrition has  
25 developed, affecting millions of people in industrialized and developing countries alike (Welch and  
26 Graham, 1999; Khush, 2001), with quantifiable costs through compromised health resulting from  
27 reduced productivity and impaired cognition (Welch and Graham, 1999). However, recent  
28 improvements are noted in some parts of the developing world (Mason et al., 2005). Meanwhile,  
29 elements of the GFS, for example, subsidies of commodity crops such as corn in the US (Fields,  
30 2004), have contributed to often radical and rapid changes in dietary patterns characterized by an  
31 excess of highly refined carbohydrates, sucrose, glucose and syrups (ingredients in fast foods)  
32 and animal fats, with a parallel decline in intake of complex carbohydrates (Tee, 1999; Fields,  
33 2004; Young, 2004). These changes, combined with a decline in energy expenditure associated  
34 with sedentary lifestyles, motorized transport and household domestic and work place labor-

---

<sup>2</sup> GHI captures three equally weighted indicators of hunger: insufficient availability of food (the proportion of people who are food energy deficient); prevalence of underweight in children <5 years old; and child mortality (<5 years old mortality rate).

<sup>3</sup> Wheat, rice and maize account for the majority of calories in human diets.



1 serving devices (Young, 2004) have resulted in the emergence of obesity and other dietary-  
2 related chronic diseases afflicting both the affluent as well as the low income population in  
3 industrialized and developing countries (Tee, 1999; Fields, 2004; Young, 2004). This  
4 paradoxically co-exists with undernutrition (Young, 2004), signifying growing imbalances and  
5 inequities in food systems.

6  
7 In the 1980s, food production shifted toward products that were convenient and served ethnic and  
8 health-based preferences. This shift has changed the structure of agricultural markets, further  
9 increasing specialization and prompting the emergence of contractual farming and vertical  
10 integration for supply and quality control, and development of special-use, high-value  
11 commodities (Barrett et al., 1999) particularly of farmed fish, livestock and specialty crop  
12 operations (Knudsen et al., 2005). Concerns have been raised regarding the impact of these  
13 structural changes on the rural poor (Lindstrom and Kingamkono, 1991; Welch and Graham,  
14 1999; Grivetti and Olge, 2000) and marginalized urban populations.

15  
16 *Food safety:* The right of everyone to have access to safe and nutritious food is reaffirmed by the  
17 Rome Declaration on World Food Security. Yet food-borne poisonings and illnesses represent a  
18 major daily health threat and results in significant economic costs in both developed and  
19 developing countries in spite of significant progress in the regulation of food standards, medicine,  
20 food science and technology (Box 2-11; FAO, 1999b).

21  
22 The globalized food system, although it is subject to high controls and standards, can still  
23 threaten food safety, particularly for marginalized populations in industrialized and developing  
24 countries (Welch and Graham, 1999; Mol and Bulkeley, 2002). High-profile risks such as those  
25 associated with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE); Belgian dioxin chickens; vegetables  
26 contaminated with Chernobyl nuclear fallout or with dioxins from waste-burning plants; and GMOs  
27 have been profiled in recent decades. Other environmental and health threats, less reported in  
28 the media, are also contributing to widespread concern about the GFS. As food passes over  
29 extended periods of time through the food production, processing, storage and distribution chain,  
30 control has become difficult, increasing the risks of exposing food to intentional, undetected or  
31 involuntary contamination or adulteration. The use of pesticides and fertilizers, the use of  
32 hormones in meat production, large-scale livestock farming, and the use of various additives by  
33 food processing industries are among the food safety concerns that are associated with the GFS.  
34 In developing countries, GFS safety concerns are compounded by rampant poverty negatively  
35 influencing policy compliance and poor infrastructure for enforcement of food control systems.  
36 Other threats to food safety in developing countries are offered by inadequate social services and  
37 service structures (potable water; health, education, transportation); population growth; high  
38 incidences of communicable diseases including Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS);

1 competitive markets and trade pressures that may encourage short cuts that compromise food  
2 safety (CSPI, 2005).

3

4 Access to good quality food has been humankind's main endeavor from the earliest days of  
5 human existence (FAO, 1999b) with governing authorities codifying rules to protect consumers  
6 from dishonest practices in the sale of food. The first general food laws in modern times were  
7 adopted during the second half of the nineteenth century; subsequently basic food control  
8 systems were established to monitor compliance.

9

10 Efforts to deal with hazardous agents (pesticides and food additives) began in the 1940s and 50s  
11 when toxicologists derived limits on exposure for protection of human health (Rodricks, 2001). A  
12 major step in advancing a science-based food safety system was the development and  
13 implementation of Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) procedures in the food  
14 industry in the 1960s. In parallel, the development of "farm to fork" strategies by the industry  
15 extended the notion of quality management along the entire supply chain (Hanak et al., 2002).

16

17 Insert Box 2-11. Food-borne illnesses: Trends and costs.

18

19 Food contamination creates a social and economic burden on communities and their health  
20 systems. The market costs of contaminated commodities cause significant export losses (Box 2-  
21 11), while sampling and testing costs and costs to food processors and consumers can be high.

22

23 The incidence of food-borne diseases may be 300 to 350 times higher than the number of  
24 reported cases worldwide. Sources of food contamination may be either microbiological or  
25 chemical and may occur throughout the food chain, from the farm to the table. Risk, particularly in  
26 developing countries, is in part due to difficulties in ensuring that appropriate procedures are  
27 followed.

28

29 Microbiological contaminants, the most reported cause of food-borne illnesses, include bacteria,  
30 fungi, viruses or parasites (Box 2-12) and usually result in acute symptoms. Over the past few  
31 decades, the incidence of reported illnesses caused by pathogenic microorganisms in food has  
32 increased significantly.

33

34 Insert Box 2-12. Common microbiological contaminants in food.

35

36 Food-borne illnesses caused by chemicals are sometimes difficult to link to a particular food, as  
37 the onset of effects may be slow and hence may go unnoticed until permanent or chronic damage

1 occurs. Contamination by pesticides, heavy metals or other residues intentionally or  
2 unintentionally introduced into the food supply, or introduced through poor post-harvest  
3 techniques leading to mycotoxins, are included in this category (Box 2-13). On the other hand,  
4 food poisonings can also be acute with immediate adverse effects including death, such as those  
5 caused by organophosphate pesticides (Box 2-13) (Kishi, 2005).

6  
7 Insert Box 2-13. Chemical contamination of food: a few examples.

8  
9 Food irradiation is another controversial food safety issue. Although useful in reducing the risk of  
10 microbial food-borne illness, the technology also destroys vitamins (OCA, 2006); affects taste and  
11 smell; poses dangers to workers and the environment; may create toxic byproducts; and has the  
12 potential for cellular or genetic damage. The European Commission heavily regulates irradiated  
13 foods and food ingredients (EC, 1999).

14  
15 Recent trends in global food production, processing, distribution, and preparation are creating a  
16 growing demand by consumers for effective, coordinated, and proactive national food safety  
17 systems. Although governments play critical roles in protecting the food supply, many countries  
18 are poorly equipped to respond to the growing dominance of the food industry and to existing and  
19 emerging food safety problems. Fraudulent practices such as adulteration and mislabeling persist  
20 and can be particularly devastating in developing countries where 70% of individual income may  
21 be spent on food (Malik, 1981). The effectiveness of HACCP is limited to large scale firms  
22 (Unnevehr and Jensen, 1999; Farina and Reardon, 2000). Export safety standards are often  
23 higher than those applied to domestic products markets particularly in developing countries. In  
24 some cases, governments have shifted the burden of monitoring product safety to the private  
25 sector, and in so doing, have become at most an auditor of the industry's programs.

26  
27 *Major institutional arrangements:* Codex Alimentarius Commission was created in 1963 by FAO  
28 and WHO to guide and coordinate world food standards for protection of consumer health and to  
29 ensure fair food trade (Heggun, 2001). Bodies that operate at regional levels include the  
30 European Food Safety Authority (EFSA); and US Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Codex  
31 food standards are considered vital in food control systems even in smaller and less developed  
32 countries. However, 96% of low-income countries and 87% of middle-income countries do not  
33 participate in the Codex actively and hence their priorities are not always reflected in the  
34 standards developed by Codex ([http://www.codexalimentarius.net/web/evaluation\\_en.jsp](http://www.codexalimentarius.net/web/evaluation_en.jsp)).  
35 Recent findings on possible effects from low dose, chronic exposure to contaminants and  
36 development of the risk assessment procedures has led to on-going revisions of international and  
37 national safety maximum residue levels of agrichemicals in the US, EU and Codex.

1

2 *Food sovereignty*: Whereas food security focuses on access to food, the concept of food  
3 sovereignty encompasses the right of peoples and sovereign states to democratically determine  
4 their own agricultural and food policies. Many definitions have emerged since the 1990s (People's  
5 Food Sovereignty Network, 2002; FOEI, 2003; Chopra, 2004; Forum for Food Sovereignty,  
6 2007). There is currently no universally agreed public policy and regulatory framework definition  
7 for the term food sovereignty (Windfuhr and Jonsén, 2005). However, most definitions share a  
8 common reference point, starting from the perspective of those actually facing hunger and rural  
9 poverty and developing a rights-based framework that links the right to food with democratic  
10 control over local and national food production practices and policies. The concept often focuses  
11 on the key role played by small-scale farmers, particularly women, in defining their own  
12 agricultural, labor, fishing, food and land policies and practices, in ways that are environmentally  
13 sustainable, and ecologically, socially, economically and culturally appropriate to their unique  
14 circumstances (<http://www.foodsovereignty.org/new/>). Proponents also contend that  
15 decentralized, diverse, and locally adapted food and farming systems, based upon democratic  
16 and participatory decision-making, can ultimately be more environmentally sustainable and  
17 equitable than a globalized food system lacking such features (Cohn et al., 2006).

18

19 Via Campesina, a global farmers' movement developed the concept in the early 1990s, with the  
20 objective of encouraging NGOs and CSOs to discuss and promote alternatives to neo-liberal  
21 policies for achieving food security (Windfuhr and Jonsén, 2005). The concept was publicized as  
22 a result of the International Conference of Via Campesina in Tlaxcala, Mexico, in April 1996. At  
23 the World Food Summit in 1996, Via Campesina launched a set of principles (Box 2-14) that  
24 offered an alternative to the world trade policies to realize the human right to food (Menezes,  
25 2001; Windfuhr and Jonsén, 2005). In August the same year, reacting to the Mexican  
26 government's decision to increase maize imports from North American in accordance with the  
27 Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a large number of Mexican entities organized the *Foro Nacional*  
28 *por la Soberanía Alimentaria*, underscoring the need to preserve the nation's autonomy in terms  
29 of defining its food policy (Menezes, 2001). Since then, a number of NGOs, CSOs and social  
30 movements have further developed the concept and its institutional implications (Menezes 2001;  
31 Windfuhr and Jonsén, 2005).

32

33 Insert Box 2-14. Via Campesina's food sovereignty principles. Source: Windfuhr and Jonsén,  
34 2005.

35

36 The concept of food sovereignty introduced into debates on food security and international trade  
37 regulation the right of each nation to maintain and develop its own capacity (particularly of small-

1 scale farmers) to produce food to fulfill its own needs while respecting agroecosystem and  
2 cultural diversity (Menezes, 2001) and ensuring sustainable access and availability of food in  
3 order to enable people to lead quality lives and exercise democratic freedoms (Rosset et al.,  
4 2006; Riches, 1997). Market-oriented globalization of economic activity is an important driver of  
5 change in the evolution of agricultural trade and food systems. The development of the right to  
6 food based on normative qualities is another driver but with markedly different characteristics.  
7 The efforts made over the last fifty years to express in international and national laws a series of  
8 universal rights, including the right to food, has been an explicitly moral enterprise that stands in  
9 contrast to the economic processes of market-driven globalization. The right to food was included  
10 in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations in 1948, following  
11 Franklin D. Roosevelt's speech in 1941 that captured the world by proclaiming freedom from want  
12 and fear; freedom of speech and faith (Oshaug et al., 1994). The UN Declaration on the Right to  
13 Development Act 2 (UN, 1986; General Assembly Resolution 41/128, New York) states that "...  
14 the human being, being central subject to development, should be the active participant and  
15 beneficiary of the right to development." The various human rights instruments brought into force  
16 have created expectations and obligations for the behavior of individuals, social groups, and  
17 States (Oshaug and Edie, 2003). People are expected to be responsible for satisfying their  
18 needs, using their own resources individually or in association with others. States are expected to  
19 respect and protect the freedom of the people to make these efforts and the sovereignty over the  
20 natural resources around them, and are obliged to meet every individual's right to food and  
21 nutritional security.

22

23 Successive efforts have been made to build such rights, expectations, and obligations into  
24 national laws and the governance of food systems. Norway has formulated food security and the  
25 right to food as the basis of its agricultural policy, strongly driven by consumer concerns. Brazil  
26 has extended the concept of cultural heritage under Article 215 of its Constitution to include food  
27 cultures. Both these efforts have had an explicit normative quality.

28

29 The concepts of economic, social and environmental sustainability as applied to food systems  
30 have been developed in processes of negotiation and intensive discussions that reflect  
31 contrasting political priorities and ideologies (Oshaug, 2005). The food sovereignty movement is  
32 increasingly challenged to actively develop more autonomous and participatory ways of knowing  
33 to produce knowledge that is ecologically literate, socially just and relevant to context. This  
34 implies a radical shift from the existing hierarchical and increasingly corporate-controlled research  
35 system to an approach that devolves more responsibility and decision-making power to farmers,  
36 Indigenous peoples, food workers, consumers and citizens for the production of social and  
37 ecological knowledge (Pimbert, 2007).

1

2 *Organic agriculture*: The term organic agriculture (OA) has evolved from various initiatives,  
3 including biodynamics, regenerative agriculture, nature farming, and permaculture movements,  
4 which developed in different countries worldwide from as early as 1924.<sup>4</sup> Since the early 1990s,  
5 OA has been defined in various ways. The most widely accepted definitions are those developed  
6 by IFOAM and the FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius (Box 2-15). In response to the incipient  
7 marginalization of foods of local origin by supermarket chain developments; those dissatisfied  
8 with a globalizing food trade, desiring health foods or foods associated with cultural landscapes  
9 opened the way during the late 1950s and early 1960s for expansion of initiatives such as pick-  
10 your-own operations and farm stands that supported a slow growth in alternative marketing  
11 channels for farm goods on which organically certified food capitalized (Roth, 1999). Consumer  
12 demand for 'healthy' foods has begun to encourage large distributors and retailers also to  
13 integrate local and regional products into their offerings (Tracy, 1993; LaBelle, 2005).

14

15           Insert Box 2-15.

16

17 Emerging evidence (Bavec and Bavec, 2006) indicates that organic farmers are able to sustain  
18 their livelihoods and increase employment in local processing and marketing, thereby increasing  
19 community economic activity and incomes (FAO, 1999b; Parrot and Marsden, 2001; Halberg et  
20 al., 2007; Kilcher, 2007; Scialabba, 2007). OA systems rely on biological processes to improve  
21 soil fertility and manage pests and are often high in crop biodiversity (Roth, 1999). The resulting  
22 increased food variety and overall per-area productivity has led to diversified and increased  
23 nutrient intake and improved food safety and food security, particularly for Indigenous and  
24 resource-poor people (Roth, 1999; Scialabba, 2007; Sligh and Christman, 2007). Some studies,  
25 however, suggest that crop yields in organic farming are too low to sustain farmers' livelihoods  
26 and to produce quantities sufficient to meet growing and rapidly diversifying market needs  
27 (LaBelle, 2005) leading to concerns that more land would be needed if OA were to become  
28 widespread (Crosson and Anderson, 2002). These claims have been challenged by recent  
29 findings (Halweil, 2006; Badgley et al., 2007).

30

31 Technical challenges facing certified OA revolve around sourcing organically produced seed and  
32 fodder; consistent product quantity and quality; traceability; liability insurance of growers and  
33 processors; appropriate product attributes and pack size (LaBelle, 2005). More research is  
34 needed concerning the labor requirements of different OA systems. Labor demands in organic

---

<sup>4</sup> Pioneered by a German philosopher Rudolf Steiner who theorized that a human being as part of a cosmic equilibrium has to live in harmony with nature and the environment (Stoll, 2002). Certification of biodynamic farms and processing facilities began in Europe during the 1930s under the auspices of the DEMETER Bund, a trademark chosen in 1927 to protect biodynamic agriculture.

1 farming could deter younger generations from farming, but unemployment could be alleviated,  
2 since the labor is more evenly spread over a growing season (Pimentel, 1993; Sorby, 2002;  
3 Granatstein, 2003; Pimentel et al., 2005). Commercial challenges include narrowing profit  
4 margins; regulatory overload; increased competition; and the need for constant innovations to  
5 stay ahead of consumer trends (Roth, 1999), as well as uncertain implications of large-scale  
6 corporate entry into the market. These questions have prompted FAO to propose a framework for  
7 socioeconomic analysis focusing on ecological, economic and social performance as an  
8 instrument for farmers and decision makers to understand the problems, tradeoffs and outcomes  
9 in alternative scenarios for a range of OA systems (Scialabba, 2000).

10  
11 *Agriculture and human health:* The interrelations between agriculture and human health are  
12 complex (Fig. 2-9). The two are mutually and directly dependent on each others' status and  
13 performance. Agriculture contributes to good health through provision of food, fuel, fiber, fodder,  
14 materials for shelter and medicines. On the other hand, agricultural activities contribute to poor  
15 health through produce with nutritional deficiency; Food-borne diseases; food poisoning; chemical  
16 pesticide residues; and a range of occupational hazards (including, for instance, induced hazards  
17 such as schistosomiasis and malaria that may be induced by irrigation developments). Similarly,  
18 human health also affects agriculture either positively or negatively. It requires a healthy  
19 individual and society to generate a productive agricultural performance. Hence individuals or  
20 societies with poor health are unable to provide the necessary quality human input in agricultural  
21 activities, leading to poor agricultural productivity (quantitatively and qualitatively) and low  
22 incomes that in turn perpetuates poor health – a vicious circle.

23  
24 Insert Fig 2-9. Linkages between agriculture and health.

25  
26 The interrelationship between agriculture and human health is mediated by the natural  
27 environment, human culture and technological inputs. How to achieve equitable food production  
28 delivering optimum nutrition for health requires a better understanding of the interplay between  
29 agriculture and environment, culture, and technical capacity, and how this interplay changes over  
30 time (Lang, 2006; Snowden, 2006) (Table 2-6).

31  
32 Insert Table 2-6. Health implications of agricultural and food revolutions.

#### 33 34 **2.4 Lessons from the Past: Implications for the Future**

35 AKST encompasses different kinds of knowledge produced by numerous agencies and actors,  
36 notably but not only farmers. The complexity of the diverse and often unpredictable ways in which  
37 knowledge is generated justifies a systemic view of the processes involved in AKST. Well-

1 evidenced but divergent and often conflicting interpretations exist of the contributions of AKST to  
2 such societal goals as increased productivity, environmental and social sustainability and equity  
3 as well as to societal knowledge about the damaging effects of agricultural technologies in  
4 different conditions of use. The resulting multiple narratives of past AKST processes and  
5 arrangements are not equally heard or recognized. Political power and economic influence has  
6 privileged some types of AKST processes, actors and institutional arrangements over others.  
7 Dominant institutional arrangements established the privileged interpretations of the day and set  
8 the agenda for searching for and implementing solutions.

9  
10 The choice of historical narrative used to explain past events and the AKST options brought into  
11 farm practice has important implications for setting future priorities and projecting the future  
12 design of AKST. Special effort has been made here to render an account from differing  
13 perspectives of past and often yet unresolved controversies regarding AKST in order to present  
14 as comprehensive as possible an assessment of the effectiveness of different AKST systems in  
15 promoting innovations associated with a range of policy goals. Three main lessons regarding the  
16 effectiveness of AKST in relation to the combined goals of sustainability and development are  
17 drawn: the critical importance of partnerships, the crucial role of educating farmers in their  
18 vocation and the role of public policies and regulations.

#### 20 ***2.4.1 Multiple AKST actors and partnerships***

21 In the prevailing AKST arrangements of the past key actors often have been excluded or  
22 marginalized. Preference has been given to short-term considerations over longer-term  
23 agroecosystem sustainability and social equity and to powerful voices over the unorganized and  
24 voiceless. Strong evidence shows that development of appropriate forms of partnerships can help  
25 bring in the excluded and marginalized and open AKST to a larger set of policy goals. A large  
26 number of effective participatory approaches exist that facilitate the establishment and operation  
27 of such partnerships. Targeted public support can help promote the use of these approaches and  
28 thereby address the biases in the hitherto dominant arrangements.

29  
30 The Transfer of Technology (ToT) model, a supply-push approach, has dominated operational  
31 arrangements and policy thinking. Where the ToT model has been applied appropriately under  
32 the conditions of use necessary for achieving wide impact, it has been successful in driving yield  
33 and production gains. These conditions include properly functioning producer and service  
34 organizations, the social and biophysical suitability of technologies transferred in specific  
35 environments and proper management of those technologies at plot, farm and landscape levels.  
36 The implementation of the ToT model increased production at a faster pace than population



1 growth in most developing countries, an achievement which did not appear likely thirty or forty  
2 years ago when the specter of famine and food crises loomed very large.

3

4 But AKST arrangements shaped by the ToT model have not been effective in meeting a broader  
5 range of goals associated with the multiple functions and roles of farm enterprises and diverse  
6 agroecosystems. Recognition of these limitations led to a growing awareness or rediscovery -  
7 documented by robust evidence - that innovation is a multisource process of demand-pull that  
8 always and necessarily involves a mix of stakeholders, organizations and types of knowledge  
9 systems. Effective innovation for combined sustainability and development goals has been led  
10 by farmers in association with a range of local institutional actors has occurred in both OECD and  
11 tropical settings. Multi-organizational partnerships for AKST that embraces both advanced  
12 scientific understanding and local knowledge and experimental capacities have led to the  
13 development and wider adoption of sustainable practices such as participatory plant breeding,  
14 integrated pest management, precision farming and multiyear nutrient management.

15

16 Agricultural and social science research and education offer examples of diverse partnerships  
17 with potential to advance public interest science and increase its relevance to equitable and  
18 sustainable development goals. A range of knowledge, science and technology partnerships  
19 among corporate actors in the agricultural and food industries, consumer organizations, NGOs,  
20 social movements and farmer organizations have pioneered ecologically and socially sustainable  
21 approaches to food and agriculture. Experience suggests that effective and enforceable codes of  
22 conduct can strengthen multi-organizational partnerships, preserve public institutions' capacity to  
23 perform public-good research and mobilize private commercial capacity to serve sustainability  
24 and development goals.

25

#### 26 **2.4.2 AKST and education**

27 The ability of farmers and other actors to collaborate effectively in demand-pull partnership  
28 arrangements for the generation and implementation of AKST critically depends on the quality of  
29 the formal and informal education available to them. Basic and occupational education also  
30 empowers individuals and communities to drive the evolution of farming and build  
31 agroenterprises, adapt to new job opportunities and be better prepared for migration if necessary.  
32 Over the past decades various education and extension programs have enhanced farmers'  
33 education through the integration of formal and informal AKST. Generally the most effective have  
34 built on local and indigenous knowledge and innovation systems, typically through participatory  
35 and experiential learning processes and multi-organizational partnerships. Proven options include  
36 but are not limited to experiential learning groups, 4-H clubs, farmer field schools, farmer  
37 research circles, participatory plant breeding, social forestry and related community-based forest

1 landscape management, study clubs and community interaction with school-based curriculum  
2 development. Their gains at local levels often are undermined by higher level interests and by  
3 economic drivers.

4  
5 Measures that remove or mitigate race, ethnic and gender biases that hamper the participation in  
6 educational opportunity of marginalized community members, diverse ethnic groups and women  
7 have been essential for local progress toward social equity but have not been widely adopted.  
8 Investment in the education and training of government policymakers and public agency  
9 personnel, particularly in decentralized participatory planning and decision-making and in  
10 understanding how to work effectively with rural communities and other stakeholders has also  
11 proven effective in promoting progress toward combined sustainability and development goals;  
12 broader issues of governance remain a concern.

13  
14 More generally, experience shows that investment in science-informed, farmer-centered learning  
15 and in other rural actors' educational needs develops grassroots capacity to critically assess,  
16 define and engage in positive locally-directed development and the sustainable management of  
17 their environment. Modern ICTs are beginning to open up new and potentially powerful  
18 opportunities for extending the reach and scope of educational and interactive learning  
19 opportunities. Extension and advisory services complement but do not substitute for rural and  
20 occupational education.

21

#### 22 ***2.4.3 Public policy and regulatory frameworks***

23 International agreements informed by scientific evidence and public participation have enabled  
24 decisive and effective global transitions toward more sustainable practices (for example, the  
25 Montreal Protocols, the Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions, the FAO Code of Conduct, the  
26 EU Thematic on Sustainable Agriculture). However, new national, regional and international  
27 agreements will be needed to support further shifts towards ethical, equitable and sustainable  
28 food and agriculture systems in response to the urgent challenges such as those posed by the  
29 declining availability of clean water and competing claims of water, loss of biodiversity,  
30 deforestation, climate change, exploitative labor conditions.

31

32 Awareness of the importance of ensuring full and meaningful participation of multiple  
33 stakeholders in international and public sector AKST policy formation has increased over the  
34 period. For example, in some countries, pesticide policies today are developed by diverse group  
35 of actors including civil society and private sector actors, informed by science and empirical  
36 evidence and inclusive of public interest concerns. These policies—exemplified by the 2007  
37 European thematic on IPM — focus on the multifunctionality of agriculture.

1

2 Three thematic narratives on the management of germplasm, pests and food systems illustrate  
3 the role of public policy and regulatory frameworks as key drivers of AKST.

4 ➤ The number and diversity of actors engaged in the **management of germplasm** has  
5 declined over time, driven in large part by advancements in science, privatization of seed  
6 supply and more widespread recourse to various intellectual property regimes. This trend  
7 reduces the options available for responding to uncertainties in the future. It increases  
8 asymmetries in access to germplasm and increases the vulnerabilities of the poor.

9 Participatory plant breeding provides strong evidence that diverse actors can engage in  
10 an effective practice for achieving and sustaining the broader goals of sustainability and  
11 development by bringing together the skills and techniques of advanced and conventional  
12 breeding and farmers' preferences and germplasm management capacities and skills,  
13 including seed production for sale. Further development and expansion would require  
14 adjustment of varietal release protocols and appropriate policy recognition under UPOV  
15 1991.

16 ➤ The debates surrounding the use of synthetic pesticides have led to new arrangements  
17 that have increased awareness, availability and effectiveness of the range of options for  
18 **pest management**. Institutional responses to evidence of harm caused by certain  
19 synthetic chemicals in actual conditions of use include the strengthening of regulatory  
20 controls over synthetic chemical pesticides at global and national levels, growing  
21 consumer and retail markets for pesticide-free and organic products, removal of highly  
22 toxic products from sale, development of less acutely toxic products and more precise  
23 means of delivery and education of users in safe and sustainable practices. What  
24 constitutes safe and sustainable practice has been defined in widely varying ways by  
25 different actors reflecting different conditions of use as well as different assessments of  
26 acceptable tradeoffs, between crop security, productivity and economic gain on the one  
27 hand and health and environmental protections on the other.

28

29 IPM exemplifies a flexible and wide-reaching arrangement of actors, institutions and AKST  
30 practices that better address the needs of diverse farmers and a more broadly acceptable  
31 balance of interests. Although definitions, interpretations and outcomes of IPM programs vary  
32 widely among actors, IPM typically incorporates KST from a broad range of sciences, including  
33 social sciences, and the experience and knowledge of a diverse set of actors. IPM has become  
34 standard practice in a number of high value production systems and has been adopted also by an  
35 increasing number of important commercial actors in food processing and retailing. Successful  
36 approaches to introducing IPM to small-scale producers in the tropics include farmer field  
37 schools, push-pull approaches, advisory services provided under contractual arrangements for

1 supply to central processing facilities and creative use of communication tools such as short  
2 farmer-to-farmer videos and focused-message information campaigns. A combination of such  
3 approaches, backed by strong policy reform to restrict the sale of old-fashioned and highly toxic  
4 synthetic controls, will be needed to meet future development and sustainability goals. Further  
5 experimentation and operational fine-tuning of the institutional arrangements for IPM in the field in  
6 different settings is also needed. These can be evaluated by comparative assessment using a  
7 combination of social, environmental and economic measures that include both positive and  
8 negative externalities.

9 ➤ **Food systems** have changed fundamentally over the last decades. Local food systems,  
10 known to sustain livelihoods at micro level, are currently challenged by globalized food  
11 systems that are evolving to meet urban demands. This trend brings opportunities but  
12 also threatens livelihoods and sovereignties of marginalized communities and indigenous  
13 peoples. Evidence based research has shown that social, ethical and cultural values in  
14 some countries can be integrated in the commercial mechanisms driving the evolution of  
15 food systems. Fair trade, territorial identities and ethnic labeling are among the options  
16 that can be considered by decision makers who wish to promote effective measures to  
17 protect the interests of the marginalized and revitalize rural livelihoods and food cultures.  
18 The promotion of geographic indicators can open development opportunities based on  
19 local resources and knowledge. They also offer opportunities for new agroenterprises  
20 such as tourism and specialty product development, as well as for collaboration with  
21 utilities such as water companies. Substantial evidence shows that production systems  
22 dominated by export markets can be weakened by erratic changes and price instability  
23 on international markets. Export-oriented food systems have sparked growing concern  
24 about the sustainability of long-distance food shipping and about the ecological footprint  
25 and social impacts of international trade in food products and agricultural commodities.  
26 Local consumption and domestic outlets for farmers' products, often enhanced by the  
27 desire to sustain cultural identities associated with the consumption of products identified  
28 with their territorial origin, can alleviate the risks for food security and food sovereignty  
29 inherent in international trade.